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Research Problems

Chapter 1
The Personal and the Political

he rise of the modern welfare state has transformed the
relationship between citizens and the state. A century ago, many
ordinary people had only infrequent personal contacts with
government institutions and employees. Abstractions such as “the
state” or “the public sector” were given more meaning by the picture
of the king on the wall, than by direct experiences with concrete
government policies and services.
Much of that changed throughout the twentieth century. Public
social insurance systems were established and a broad range of human
services were increasingly financed and produced by the public sector
rather than by the family, by the market, or by civil society. Today,
most citizens in developed nations have frequent personal encounters
with one public service institution or another. Most of us are in regular
contact with things like public health care, education, transportation
systems, and public libraries. And at one life stage or another we
receive parts of our incomes in the form of pensions, student aid,
unemployment insurance, and so on.
From the outset, observers have suspected that in the emerging
welfare state, personal contacts with public institutions would
increasingly begin to affect people’s lives, thoughts, and opinions. For
instance, already in 1931 British political scientist Herman Finer
exclaimed: “This is the problem of the twentieth century: the
relationship between officials and the public.”1 In a nutshell, this is
also the basic idea of the book you are about to read. It is an
investigation of how personal welfare state experiences affect political
orientations among the mass public.
                                                          
1 As quoted in Goodsell (1981:3).
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The welfare state as an arena for public opinion formation
The character and causes of welfare state expansion have been a major
topic in the social sciences.2 For instance, considerable attention has
been devoted to identifying causal forces behind the post-War welfare
state growth (see Flora & Heidenheimer 1981; Baldwin 1990; Olsson
1993). Other studies have examined why the size of public spending
on welfare arrangements is larger in some countries than in others (see
Korpi 1983; Castles 1989; Hofferbert & Cingranelli 1996), and why
the organisation of such arrangements looks different across countries
(see Titmuss 1974; Esping-Andersen 1990).
There has also been much research on attitudes towards the welfare
state. Researchers have assessed the extent to which welfare state
arrangements enjoy popular support in different countries, and
whether such support has strengthened or weakened over time. Also,
they have explored the socio-economic and demographic group bases
of welfare state support (see Coughlin 1980; Taylor-Gooby 1985;
Hadenius 1986; Borre & Scarbrough 1995; Svallfors 1989, 1996;
Nilsson 1996b; Johansson, Nilsson & Strömberg 2001).
This study looks at the welfare state and public opinion from a
slightly different angle in that it deals explicitly with citizens’ direct
personal welfare state experiences. The aim is to shed light on whether
and how such experiences affect political attitudes. In short, I
investigate what happens when a person is discontent with some
aspect of, say, the particular health services or the public kindergartens
that she has experienced. Will she lose faith in the welfare state? Does
she take her negative experiences as a sign that the political system and
its politicians are not functioning very well? Will her inclination to
support the governing party drop? And how strong is the impact of
experiences compared to other explanatory variables?
Researchers have long sensed that some form of political impact of
personal welfare state experiences is taking place. For instance, in their
summary of the five-volume Beliefs in Government project, Kaase and
Newton (1995:65) argued, “It is not just the scope of government that
has expanded, but also the depth of its influence on the everyday lives
of citizens. This combination of scope and pervasiveness gives the state
its paramount significance in Western Europe.” Or as Skocpol
(1994:21) contends somewhat more explicitly: “public opinion does
                                                          
2 For two accessible introductions to the twentieth century welfare state ex-
pansion, see Tarschys (1978) and Goldsmith (1995).
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not come out of nowhere. Nor is it only rooted in current social and
economic conditions – although it partly is. Public opinion is also
influenced by the citizenry’s experiences with pre-existing
governmental institutions and programs.” And Soss (1999:364) makes
a case for “studying welfare programmes as sites of adult political
learning [...] I argue that as clients participate in welfare programs they
learn lessons about how citizens and governments relate, and these
lessons have political consequences beyond the domain of welfare
agencies [...] Because clients associate the agency with government as a
whole, these program-specific beliefs, in turn, become the basis for
broader orientations toward government and political action.” Finally,
Rothstein (1991:43-4) has ventured that “Weber’s view, that the
output side is especially important for the legitimacy of the state, is
probably even more valid in the modern welfare state than it was in
his own time. The simple reason is that citizen’s lives, to a greater
degree than before, are directly dependent on public sector programs
and schemes. We are born, we play, we are educated, we are nursed
[...] and we finally die under the aegis of public administration.”3
A deceptively simple research question
The message is that a new arena for public opinion formation has
arisen with the welfare state. In that arena, citizens can directly
observe how the political system and its policies perform in practice.
Personal welfare state experiences thus provide politically relevant
information that might – or might not – influence political
orientations.
More empirical studies of the link between personal welfare state
experiences and public opinion are needed, however. More often than
not, dramatic statements like those above lack references to empirical
results that demonstrate the alleged effects. With important exceptions
to be discussed, we still have surprisingly little empirical knowledge
about what Herman Finer thought was the problem of the twentieth
century.
The basic research question thus seems straightforward. In fact,
some readers might now feel ready to delve into a theoretical
discussion about what kinds of welfare state experiences may have
what kinds of political effects. But it turns out that the research
                                                          
3 My translation from original Swedish. Parts of this popular quote can also
be found in Assarson (1995:166-7), and in Dahlberg & Vedung (2001:11-12).
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question is deceptively simple. As the remainder of this chapter will
make clear, one cannot presuppose that personal experiences have
attitude effects. In fact, much empirical public opinion research
implicitly suggests the opposite: that citizen’s personal experiences in
adult life are typically not very consequential for political preferences.
This suggestion has two components. First, many influential studies
on public opinion and political behaviour apriori assume that people
actually do not have many politically relevant experiences in adult life
from which they can draw political conclusions. Political issues and
struggles are (sometimes implicitly) regarded as located well beyond
citizens’ life spheres.
The second component consists of empirical research indicating that
when people do have personal experiences from which they could
draw political conclusions, they nevertheless typically fail to do so.
While personal events like unemployment, short-term ups and downs
in the private economy, or personal experiences of violent crime are of
great personal importance, they often have proven to be of relatively
minor importance to citizens’ political reasoning (Verba & Schlozman
1979; Sears & Funk 1991; Mutz 1998). Instead, the literature suggests
that perceptions of aggregated collective experiences of societal events
and trends have much greater effects on political attitudes than direct
personal experiences of the same events and trends. Such perceptions
of collective experience – often called “sociotropic” perceptions – are
seen as the results of information provided by political elites, experts
and the mass media. Judging by these findings, people are rarely
willing and/or able to translate personal observations of social reality
into political judgements. And the fact that the personal and the
political seem to lead separate lives makes people dependent on the
mass media and elite actors for politically relevant information.
This literature forces us to postpone the discussion about what kind
of welfare state experiences may have what kind of effects. Instead, the
remainder of this chapter addresses the more basic premise that
welfare state experiences have effects at all. While previous research
nicely points out that such a premise is not unproblematic, we will also
discover that many studies have had certain biases in their research
designs, biases that may have led to an underestimation of personal
experience effects on political attitudes. More to the point, most
previous research has actually dealt with personal economic
experiences rather than with personal welfare state experiences; we
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devote the latter parts of Chapter 1 to a discussion of why personal
welfare state experiences may be more politically consequential than
personal economic experiences.
Only after having addressed these basic issues will the time be ripe
for developing a theoretical framework for thinking about political
effects of personal welfare state experiences. Along which dimensions
can personal welfare state experiences be conceptualised? And what
kind of political orientations could be affected by such experiences?
Do different kinds of welfare state institutions systematically generate
different experiences and in turn different effects on political orienta-
tions? A framework addressing these and other questions is laid out in
Chapters 2-4.
A number of testable hypotheses will be presented as we go along
through Chapters 1-4. These hypotheses are tested in Chapters 6-10,
using mostly primary Swedish survey data described in Chapter 5.
Conclusions are drawn and implications spelled out in Chapter 11.
The political world: Out of reach, out of sight, out of mind?
An implicit assumption that the personal is separate from the political
can be traced back through the history of political behaviour research.
According to this assumption, politics and its results are things that
people do not observe directly. Rather, citizens are to a large degree
dependent on political elites and the mass media to notice and
comprehend the political world. As explained by Heunks (1989:135),
“Many observers have the impression that ordinary people are usually
not interested in politics because it takes place at a level that is too
abstract or too removed and inaccessible to them. People have their
daily worries and pursuits which seem remote or irrelevant to the
political issues of the day.”
Especially American studies of opinion formation and political
behaviour convey the notion of a watertight partition between the
personal and the political. Moreover, while there is – as we shall soon
see – certainly evidence to support this notion, its source runs deeper
than empirical results. In fact, American opinion researchers often start
out with an a priori assumption that politics is something remote,
something distant, an extraterrestrial phenomena having little to do
with people’s personal life spheres. Scholars tend to describe their basic
research puzzles in questions like “how do people manage to arrive at
political judgements in complex issues that they have no personal
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experience with?” These researchers sustain Lippman’s feeling that
“The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of
sight, out of mind” (Lippman 1922:29).4
For example, Iyengar and Kinder’s (1987:2) oft-cited study on mass
media and opinion formation kicks off like this: “Our argument begins
with the observation that Americans develop opinions towards an
astonishing variety of issues that lie far outside their own experience
[...] They reach such judgements without benefit of direct experience
...” Similarly, Sears (1993:144) say that “For the most part, the
political choices faced by citizens do not have a major impact on their
lives.” And in Kinder’s (1998:20) formulation, “the press alone
describes and interprets the events of public life that few citizens
experience directly.”5 And in Neuman, Just and Crigler’s (1992:4)
vivid account, “The majority of citizens operate in a world outside the
rarefied realm of public discourse. It is a personal world, with an
equally pressing set of career and family demands, economic and
health problems, personal dreams and aspirations. For brief moments
in a citizen’s hurried day, there is an intersection of these worlds.
Stepping out of the shower in the morning one might hear an interview
with a former hostage on the “Today show,” glance at the front page
of the morning newspaper over coffee, hear the headlines on the car
radio, or catch some evening news after dinner. The interconnection of
public and private worlds is often unscheduled, incidental, and
haphazard.”
Note how utterly different these quotes are compared to those of
Kaase and Newton (1995), Skocpol (1994), Soss (1999) and Rothstein
(1991). It seems that we are left with a puzzling discrepancy: one
group of distinguished scholars is convinced that personal welfare state
experiences matter to political opinions. Another equally distinguished
group doubts whether “the personal world” can generate much
information relevant to opinion formation. On the contrary, politics is
depicted as out of reach, out of sight, out of mind.
The personal and the political in large welfare states
Much of the influential work on public opinion and political
behaviour has been done in the US. A basic suspicion in this study is
                                                          
4 The quote can also be found in Strömbäck (2000:148).
5 Very similar arguments have been made by Lane (1962),  Sniderman, Brody
& Tetlock (1991), and Zaller (1992).
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that – from a European welfare state perspective – the idea that the
personal and the political are separate is less convincing, and should
not be taken as an apriori assumption. Because European welfare state
arrangements are typically more pervasive than the American ones,
reaching far into the personal realm of life, citizens typically possess a
greater wealth of self-communicated information that is at least
potentially relevant to many political choices. Most citizens are
regularly in personal contact with the results of politics: health care,
elderly care, childcare, education, public transportation systems, public
libraries, and so on. Saying that the interconnection of public and
private worlds is unscheduled, incidental, and haphazard therefore
seems exaggerated. After all, citizens both enter and leave the world
under the aegis of public administration. Therefore, saying that they in
fact have life-long opportunities for direct observation of the biggest
bone of political contention – the welfare state – appears a better
abstract simplification.
A close relation between the personal and the political is a common
ingredient in theoretical accounts of welfare state politics. One case in
point is Swedish political scientist Jörgen Westerståhl’s notion of
service democracy.6 In the pure version of this type of democracy, a
great majority of voters want politicians to handle a number of
societal problems by providing high-quality public services.7 When
inside the voting booth, people are driven by their perceptions of party
competence in delivering public services, and retrospective evaluations
of public service performance. Consequently, political parties compete
on the basis of competence in providing such services. In short, a good
politician in a service democracy is one who delivers public service to
the people. In Holmberg’s (1996:109) interpretation of the notion of
service democracy, “citizens are consumers, politicians are producers;
                                                          
6 Westerståhl introduced the concept in a 1956 newspaper article (see Nilsson
1996). It has also inspired publications such as Westerståhl & Johansson
(1981), and Johansson, Nilsson & Strömberg 2001. For an in-depth analysis
of Westerståhl’s democratic thought in general, and of service democracy in
particular, see Boström (1988:chapter 8; see also Strandberg 1998:chapter 6).
7 Here, the notion of service democracy has something in common with the
“end-of-ideology” argument. Both build on the idea that ideological conflict
in developed democracies became less severe as post-War affluence was
gradually generated. Instead, as authors like Bell (1960) and Tingsten (1966)
argued, political debate shifted its main focus from ideological goals to practi-
cal methods for reaching certain goals that were largely uncontested. The
delivery of satisfactory public services could very well be seen as such a goal.
For a discussion, see Håkansson (1999:17-19).
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elections are marketplaces where service products are sold and
accountability is achieved.” In service democracies, then, political
discourse is greatly concerned with the quality of public services and
welfare state arrangements (Nilsson 1996:184; see also Johansson,
Nilsson & Strömberg 2001). Welfare state experiences are important,
not only in the sense that they are common in society, but also in the
sense that they are a major political concern.
Moreover, because of the political attention given to welfare state
experiences, one might suspect that they influence individuals
politically. This point will be developed in greater detail below. For
now, suffice it to say that an implicit premise in much opinion research
– that citizens have few politically meaningful personal experiences in
adult life – is not convincing in large welfare states. For sure, more
theoretical and empirical work is needed to find out if, how, and when
welfare state experiences affect attitudes. But such experiences cannot
be a priori defined as non-existent or politically irrelevant. In large
welfare states, the political world is not necessarily out of reach, out of
sight, out of mind.
The personal and the political in past empirical research
These theoretical arguments about the relation between the personal
and the political in large welfare states are just that: theoretical
arguments. In fact, based on a large accumulation of empirical studies,
the view that the personal is separate from the political has a lot to
recommend it. Here, research on “economic voting” is especially
important. This research program has been driven by the macro
observation that incumbents do worse if the nation’s economic
situation has become worse recently. The task has been to uncover
micro processes underlying such aggregate correlations (see Norpoth
1996; Lewis-Beck & Paldam 2000).8
                                                          
8 The economic voting literature is gigantic. Lewis-Beck and Paldam
(2000:113) identify more than 200 books and articles that are relevant to the
field. Some examples are: Campbell et al. 1960:391; Kinder & Kiewiet 1981;
Weatherford 1983; Miller & Listhaug 1984; Holmberg 1984; Lewis-Beck
1988; Conover & Feldman 1986; Aardal & Valen 1989; Mutz 1992, 1994;
Gilljam & Holmberg 1993, 1995; Hibbs 1993; Mondak, Mutz & Huckfeldt
1996; Borre & Goul Andersen 1997; Jenssen 1998; Bengtsson 2002. For
studies examining the (typically weak) impact of personal unemployment on
various political attitudes, see Verba & Schlozman 1979; Garcia de Polavieja
1999; Adman 1999.
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The literature has dealt with a number of sub-topics. One of them is
whether economic voting is driven by personal pocketbook experiences
(or egotropic concerns), or by collective sociotropic perceptions of how
the nation as a whole is doing economically. Sociotropic perceptions
are perceptions of macroeconomic phenomena such as unemployment
statistics, budget deficits and inflation rates (“the economy has
improved,” “unemployment is rising”). With some exceptions, results
show that sociotropic factors are more important than egotropic ones.
Citizens’ perceptions of the economy have political effects and these
operate mainly, though not exclusively, at the collective, sociotropic
level. In contrast to the impact of sociotropic economic perceptions,
changes in people’s private financial situations are relatively
unimportant to political judgements.9 As stated by Kinder and Sears
(1985:690), “The political preferences of ‘sociotropic voters’ are
shaped by the country’s economic predicament, not their own. [...]
voting seems to reflect more the assessment of national economic
conditions than the economic circumstances of private life.”
It has also been shown that economic judgements influence political
trust variables like satisfaction with democracy, confidence in
democratic institutions, and trust in politicians (Weatherford 1984;
Finkel, Muller & Seligson 1989; Monroe & Erickson 1986; Clarke,
Dutt & Kornberg 1993; Kornberg & Clarke 1992; Listhaug 1995;
Hetherington 1998; Huseby 2000; Chanley, Rudolph & Rahn 2000).10
                                                          
9 The notion that the personal is weakly related to the political applies only
to short-term changes in the personal economic situation, rather than to peo-
ple’s locations in relatively stable long-term socio-economic structures. This is
an important remark: while short-term ups and downs in the private economy
have usually turned out to have rather weak effects on political attitudes and
behaviour, we know that variables such as occupational class, education, and
income level have quite a strong impact in this regard (see Franklin, Mackie &
Valen 1992; Oskarson 1994; and the cited literature in chapter 4). A similar
but more general point will be made in chapter 2, where the definition of a
personal experience will include strictly personal observations of politically
relevant phenomena, but not inter-personal communication concerning those
phenomena. Of course, we know that much of the effects of stable social
structure on attitudes and behaviour are brought about by a good deal of
inter-personal communication and socialisation in primary groups. Therefore,
such effects should not be thought of as personal experience effects in the
sense that the term is used in this study.
10 As it stands, the literature seems to indicate that economic perceptions are
less influential for political trust variables than for party choice, or at least
that the effects are quite unstable and inconsistent (see McAllister 1999:201).
Recently however, a number of scholars have tried, with some success, to
account for the instability in economic effects on political trust by including
contextual interaction variables measuring the clarity of responsibility for
economic failure. The hypothesis is that the fuzzier the political responsibility,
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Again, personal experiences have less impact than perceptions of how
the economy in the country as a whole is doing.11 For instance, Huseby
(2000:142) examined survey data from eight countries during the
period of 1982-1994 and concluded, “the influence of personal
economy is weaker than the influence of national economy.” Nye
(1999:vi) summarises the prevailing contention: “…  loss of confidence
is a social rather than a personal phenomenon. Few people report that
their views of government derive from personal experience with it;
rather, such attitudes are informed by the media and politicians.”
The sources of sociotropic perceptions
The results of the economic voting literature pertain to direct effects
on political preferences. However, although personal experiences do
not seem to have direct effects on attitudes under control for
sociotropic perceptions, personal experiences may still exercise an
indirect effect. That effect would arise if sociotropic perceptions were
in turn significantly shaped by personal experiences. For instance,
people who become unemployed or go through economic hardship
could infer that many in the collective as a whole share these
experiences. To the extent that sociotropic perceptions of collective
experiences are affected by personal experiences, and given that
sociotropic perceptions in turn matter for political attitudes, personal
experiences will affect attitudes indirectly. The process would be one
where people gather information themselves, perceive collective
experience in ways that harmonise with what has been personally
experienced, and finally adjust political attitudes accordingly.
But the link between experiences and sociotropic perceptions has
proven to be weak. Personal experiences of violent crime,
unemployment, personal financial problems and the like, are at best
weakly correlated with the extent to which one thinks these problems
are shared by the population and society at large.12 Summarising her
                                                                                                                          
the more likely it is that economic discontent reduces support for the whole
political system, rather than just support for the incumbent party or candidate
(see further Powell & Whitten 1993; Huseby 1999; Taylor 2000; Bengtsson
2002).
11 This does not mean that personal economic experiences are always unim-
portant for political trust. For instance, Aardal and Valen (1995:210-220) and
Aardal (1999) found relatively strong effects in Norway.
12 Experiences of such events still have strong effects on perceptions of the
extent to which one thinks they are important as personal problems (Mutz
1998:73).
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own and others’ research, Mutz (1998:66) notes that “Despite the
accessibility and obvious salience of personal experiences, they very
seldom have a large or significant effect on judgements about
collective-level reality.”
Instead, sociotropic perceptions seem to be informed by elites in
society. While there has been less research on this issue compared to
economic voting, various reports indicate that the origins of
sociotropic perceptions of the economy are to be found in mass media
(Mutz 1998; Nadeau, Niemi & Amato 1999; Nadeau et al. 2000), or
among politicians and elite experts (MacKuen, Erickson & Stimson
1992; Zaller 1992). Sociotropic perceptions of the economy are best
described as responses to elite interpretations of collective economic
reality. They do not seem to be the result of direct personal experiences
with that reality.
In sum, the empirical literature suggests that citizens’ personal
experiences of politically relevant social phenomena do not move their
political preferences. Personal experience is regarded as “depoliticised”
(Mutz 1992), “morselized” (Lane 1962), or “cognitively compart-
mentalized” (Sears 1993).
Modelling personal experience effects on mass preferences
Figure 1.1 summarises how most researchers have modelled the
problem (see Tyler 1980; Mutz 1992, 1998; Gilljam & Holmberg
1995).13 The model also defines the playing field of this study. With
this basic causal structure in mind we will later develop a theoretical
framework about what kind of personal welfare state experiences
might have what kinds of effects.14
Previous research, conducted mainly in the economic field, has
shown that effects represented by the “a” path are typically
substantial, whereas “b” and “c” are relatively insignificant. It is
sociotropic perceptions, not personal experiences that influence
political attitudes. And sociotropic perceptions are more likely to be
informed by the media than by personal experience.
                                                          
13 For a Swedish discussion on the topic, see Strömbäck (2001).
14 I ask those suspecting that this non-recursive model is too simple for pa-
tience. In particular, some might be inclined to draw additional arrows repre-
senting a reciprocal impact of political preferences on sociotropic perceptions
or on experience perceptions. Chapter 5 will discuss at some length these and
other more complicated reciprocal possibilities (see the section on “selecting,
projecting, resisting, and constructing experiences”).
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Figure 1.1 Personal experience, sociotropic perceptions, and 
political attitudes
The causal arrow connecting personal experience with perceptions
of personal experiences has not been discussed so far. This path
represents the fact that any experience has a number of objective
qualities that must first be perceived by the individual. And if objective
experiences are to affect attitudes such perceptions must be used as
political information in the opinion formation process. For example,
objectively speaking, one may become unemployed, get richer, or be
forced to wait a year for surgery. In order to affect attitudes, events
must be perceived by the individual and then treated as political
information forming a basis for political judgement. While this may
seem an obvious point when made in the abstract, it will prove to be
helpful in the concrete theoretical discussion.15
Previous studies on personal experiences have concentrated heavily
on only one policy area – the economy. For instance, the conclusion
that personal experiences have weak effects on vote choice compared
to those of sociotropic perceptions is derived mainly from experiences
like changes in the private economy or personal unemployment (Mutz
1998:103). Similarly, most relevant studies on general political trust
have concentrated on economics. To a curiously large extent, other
potentially important aspects of government performance have been
neglected. As McAllister (1999:188) notes, “almost no attention has
been devoted to the impact of the broader policy outputs of
                                                          
15 I urge the reader not to look at the model in figure 1.1 as a single coherent
theoretical proposition that could and should be tested simultaneously. As will
become clear in later chapters, “personal experiences” can stand for very
different things. In addition, only rarely will I simultaneously have hypotheses
and measures that cover the whole model. Rather, the model is a means to
specify the area within which this study will operate.
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government” (for similar arguments, see Miller & Listhaug 1999;
Huseby 2000).
This study moves the model in figure 1.1 out of the economic realm
and into welfare state territory. We now turn to the following
question: Why should we not automatically generalise findings from
the economy to the welfare state? Why might personal experience
effects grow when we move from the economy to the welfare state? I
see two possible reasons. The first one has to do with the differing
nature of political responsibility in the two policy realms. The second
one has to do with the nature of political information. Let us consider
these differences in turn.
The welfare state and the nature of political responsibility
Past research suggests that the political impact of both sociotropic
perceptions and personal experiences depend on how people attribute
political responsibility. People will rarely draw political conclusions on
the basis of perceptions unless they see some sort of link between the
perceived state of affairs and decisions taken by responsible politicians.
In the absence of such a link, the perceptions are unlikely to stimulate
political thinking and attitude formation (see Lewis-Beck 1988:156).
What is more, several studies indicate that citizens regard their
personal economy as an area where most of the responsibility resides
with the individual (see Sniderman & Brody 1977; Brody &
Sniderman 1977). To a certain extent, this makes sense; while
government policies are obviously not unrelated to citizens’ private
finances, politicians still have a rather indirect responsibility in this
area. By and large, taking care of the personal pocketbook is chiefly,
though not entirely, a personal responsibility. Rather, political
responsibility for the economy, according to most observers, has to do
mainly with aggregate phenomena such as unemployment level,
inflation, budget deficits and opportunities for investment and growth.
Indeed, several authors have found that the the personal economy is
as an area where few people think that politicians have the main
responsibility.16 Brody and Sniderman (1977:339) discovered that few
                                                          
16 The finding that personal economic experiences have weak effects on politi-
cal attitudes is a relatively stable result that has proven to pertain to most
developed Western states including Sweden (see Holmberg 1984; Gilljam &
Holmberg 1993; Adman 1999), not just to the US (Lewis-Beck 1988). Excep-
tions have been reported, especially in Denmark and Britain (Lewis-Beck
1988; Jordahl 2002).
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people regard personal finances as an area of government
responsibility, as well as that “personal problems are likely to affect
political choices to the extent that citizens hold government
responsible for helping them cope with the problems they face.”17
Interestingly, among the minority who actually did attribute political
responsibility for ups and downs in the personal pocketbook or for
personal unemployment experiences, the correlation between
experiences and political attitudes was clearly stronger than among the
sample at large. Findings such as these have led researchers to conclude
that an “ethic of self-reliance” in the economic field often prevents
people from attributing political responsibility for personal economic
experiences. Therefore, economic experiences will rarely affect political
attitudes.
Personal welfare state experiences could function differently. The
starting point here is that there is (or should be) a clearer political
responsibility for what individual citizens experience in contacts with
public agencies and programs. According to this argument, experiences
of welfare state institutions are more immediate results of decisions
taken by responsible politicians. After all, we are dealing with
experiences with institutions that are supposed to implement public
policy. This firmer link between personal welfare state experiences and
responsible political actors might have a greater capacity to stimulate
political attitude formation than the weaker link between personal
economy and political actors.
These remarks received support in a study by Soss (1999). Based on
both qualitative interviews and election study data, Soss (1999:369)
found that his American respondents treated personal experiences with
government services as political information. They were aware that
services had been decided upon, and were ultimately controlled by,
responsible politicians. Citizens “draw political lessons from their
program experiences because welfare agencies are usually the most
accessible and consequential government institution in their life.
Welfare agencies are easily recognized as a part of government and
have clear links to its other branches [...] they serve as the most direct
source of information about how government works.” Similar
                                                          
17 These findings corroborate studies indicating that the correlation between
economic perceptions and government popularity increases when the measures
of economic perceptions tap views on whether the government has actually
been able to influence the economic situation (Gilljam & Holmberg 1993;
Aardal & Valen 1989).
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conclusions were reached by Möller (1996) on the basis of qualitative
interviews with some 120 Swedish respondents with personal
experiences from elderly care or child care.
These findings suggest that personal welfare state experiences are
political in a way that personal economic experiences are not. As we
move figure 1.1 out of the economy and into the welfare state,
personal experience effects are not necessarily constrained by the “the
ethic of self-reliance.” The theoretical interpretation here is not just
that there is a political responsibility for the public sector in the
aggregate, just like there is a political responsibility for the aggregate
economy. Rather, the argument is that the citizen has individual-level
rights to expect certain things when encountering welfare state
arrangements. Of course, the precise nature of these rights is a sensitive
issue and depends on political conviction as well as on what kind of
public service is up for discussion. This is, however, beside the point;
while it is an ambiguous matter whether governments are responsible
for our personal economies, there is a much more direct political
responsibility for the products of welfare state institutions. The latter
are public policies emanating directly from within the political system.
Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate whether personal
welfare state experiences are better at triggering political reasoning
and political attitude formation compared to personal economic
experiences.
The welfare state and the nature of political information
Tyler (1980) shows that the political effects of sociotropic perceptions
depend on the informativeness and memorability of information. The
more various facts are perceived to reveal about social trends and
events, and the easier it is to remember them, the more likely they are
to affect sociotropic perceptions and, in turn, political attitudes.18 This
finding leads us to the second reason that personal welfare state
experiences may have a greater attitudinal impact than economic
experiences. The sociotropic information available to citizens in the
two policy domains differs with respect to both informativeness and
memorability.19 In the economic realm, citizens’ economic perceptions
                                                          
18 For similar arguments, see Weatherford (1983) and Mondak, Mutz &
Huckfeldt (1996).
19 Tyler (1980) also found that the affectivity of information matters. If in-
formation has the power to evoke stronger emotional reactions among people
it is more likely to affect sociotropic perceptions and, in turn, political prefer-
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have proven to be very responsive to a very small subset of macro
economic indicators. Essentially, these factors are unemployment level,
budget deficit and inflation (Paldam & Nannestad 2000; Feld &
Kirchgässner 2000). It could be argued that these indicators are
relatively informative and memorable. They are informative as few, if
any, would argue that such macro indicators are not highly relevant
and important over-all measures of the economic situation in a
country. Also, such information is memorable as it can be
parsimoniously summarised using just a few powerful quantifiable
measures.
The high memorability and informativeness of macro economic
information has consequences for both citizens and elites. For citizens
it becomes a manageable task to form meaningful sociotropic
perceptions to be used when forming attitudes. One does not have to
be a political expert to form a reasonable impression of how the
economy is doing. We all know roughly whether the economic
situation is “good,” “bad,” “worse,” or “better.” In addition, the
process discussed above by which sociotropic economic information
trickles down to citizens from the media and economic experts
becomes smoother. Journalists have access to relevant and not overly
disputed macro economic information. This information can be
parsimoniously presented in ways that make it easy for citizens to
remember (for instance using graphics). Sociotropic economic
perceptions that are independent of our personal economies can be
relatively easily formed.
 It may be harder for citizens to form sociotropic perceptions of the
welfare state. The key difference is that sociotropic welfare state
information is more heterogeneous than economic information. First,
the concept of the welfare state is by definition an aggregation of a
large number of institutions. In order to form sociotropic perceptions
of how the welfare state is doing one must simultaneously consider
such diverse things as health care, public schools, social insurance
systems, and so on. The institutional heterogeneity makes sociotropic
welfare state information more complex and difficult to keep track of
than aggregated, parsimonious macro economic statistics. It is
therefore likely that welfare state perceptions are driven by the
                                                                                                                          
ences. However, I leave this factor outside the discussion as I see no reason
why the level of affectivity should differ across welfare state information and
economic information.
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development within a subset of institutions. Hence, when survey
respondents are asked to make overall evaluations of “public services,”
citizen A may have health care in mind whereas citizen B is talking
about public libraries, and citizen C about primary-level education.
Furthermore, even forming a sociotropic perception of a single
welfare state institution appears potentially more problematic than
forming a macroeconomic sociotropic perception. This is because even
for a single institution the measures of welfare state quality are
numerous and disputed. While most people feel that unemployment,
budget deficits, and inflation rates are valid indicators of macro
economic health, there is no comparable parsimonious set of agreed-
upon indicators for the welfare state. On the contrary, research on
evaluation of public programs emphasises the need to define the policy
goals and the meaning of quality before sensible evaluation can begin
(see Vedung 1998; Dahlberg & Vedung 2000). Does a welfare state
institution seek to maximise some normative principle such as equal
treatment or legal security? Or should various indicators of product
quality be the focus, such as proportion of pupils who pass
standardised tests, waiting time for surgery, or proportion of drug
users returning to addiction? What weights ought to be attached to
economic goals such as welfare state productivity? Also, regardless of
which of these goals we personally prefer, we must still decide whether
we are referring to the goals of politicians, voters, users, or public
employees.
As the potential yardsticks become numerous and disputed, any
single yardstick will become less informative, telling less and less of the
full story. Also, memorability decreases as the number of reasonable
quality indicators grows. Moreover, the probability that different
indicators point in different directions increases. For example, the
productivity in public health care might be impressive at the same time
as employees are under great physical and mental pressure, treating
citizens with less respect and care, and so on. As such ambiguity
repeats itself across a number of welfare state institutions, sociotropic
welfare state perceptions become harder to form.
Writing in the American context, Mutz (1998:116) nicely captures
the importance of differences in political information and opinion
formation across issue areas: “In the realm of economic issues, reliable
statistics are readily available on a periodic basis, regularly distributed
to the media, and then often thematically presented in news coverage
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[...] But for most issues, reporters do not have such a systematic means
of monitoring change over time; thus their impressions of whether a
given issue is becoming more or less problematic and whether it is
improving or worsening will be based on educated guesses at best [...]
The prospects for a sociotropic model [...] are considerably less when
one considers issue areas in which national statistics are not regularly
released and reported on. For example in areas such as education,
health care, illegal drug use, racial inequality, and so forth, the idea
that the aggregate public listens to, and moves in accord with, an
informed elite analysis becomes far less tenable.”
Finally, I do not suggest that the evaluation of macroeconomics is
intrinsically less complex or sophisticated than the evaluation of the
welfare state. Rather, the point is that elite discourse provides citizens
with a memorable and informative set of macro economic indicators,
which lends itself naturally to the formation of fairly accurate
sociotropic perceptions. As a result, most of us know whether the
country’s economy is going up or down, and such views are easily
separated from personal economic experiences. There is no compar-
able information about the welfare state. Therefore, saying whether
welfare state institutions are improving or deteriorating is typically a
more difficult question for citizens than saying something about the
general state of the economy. Such information tends to be more
ambiguous and more disputed so that no reasonably small set of
indicators tells the full story of the well-being of the welfare state.
Maybe personal experience comes into play again?
So what do citizens do if they find welfare state issues important but
cannot access sociotropic information as easily as they do in the
economic realm? One possibility is that they nevertheless rely more or
less entirely on the information provided by elite actors and the mass
media. Even lacking a parsimonious set of quantitative indicators, the
media will often abound with reports about how the public sector is
doing (“how long is the waiting time for by-pass surgery?” “what are
the costs of public child care?” “what is the situation for health care
employees?”). And although this information is often less concisely
informative and memorable than macroeconomic information, people
may still try to synthesise many heterogeneous and perhaps conflicting
reports into overall sociotropic perceptions of how various welfare
state institutions are doing. However, because success and failure are
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such multifaceted concepts in these policy domains, the information
becomes more heterogeneous and open to interpretation by politicians,
by journalists as well as by citizens themselves. Therefore, the bases
and justifications for welfare state perceptions will probably vary more
across time and people than what has proven to be the case for
economic perceptions. Still, at a given point in time, a given individual
could still hold sociotropic welfare state perceptions that may matter
to attitude formation. What is more, this impact could still operate
independently of personal experiences, and sociotropic perceptions
could still be uncorrelated with personal experiences, thus keeping the
personal separate from the political also in welfare state territory.
However, another possibility is that people to a greater extent resort
to personally experienced welfare state information. In the economic
realm, it makes little sense to anchor political orientations in personal
economics, because the available macro economic information is
highly informative and memorable. By contrast, because sociotropic
welfare state information is heterogeneous and difficult to handle,
citizens may make more extensive political use of their personal wel-
fare state experiences. It is this possibility that is investigated in this
study.
Actually, empirical studies of economic perceptions suggest that
personal experience can even come into play in assessments of the
economy, provided that good macro information is lacking. A number
of studies have shown that the typically weak link between personal
economic experiences and sociotropic perceptions of collective eco-
nomic experience is considerably stronger among people who do not
possess accurate information or sociotropic knowledge about for in-
stance unemployment or inflation (Weatherford 1983; Conover, Feld-
man & Knight 1986; Mutz 1998). This phenomena goes by the name
of the “default source” hypothesis. That is, in the absence of reliable
macro information about the collective state of affairs, people tend to
default back to personal experiences as the most basic source of infor-
mation for the formation of sociotropic perceptions, and in turn for
political attitudes.
There are reasons, then, to believe that the nature of the opinion
formation process changes when we move out of the economic realm
and into welfare state territory. Such increased reliance on personal
experience in assessments of the welfare state would be understandable
both from the perspective of political information, as well as from the
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perspective of political responsibility. Because welfare state arrange-
ments offer heterogeneous and potentially conflicting sociotropic
information, and because of the firmer link between welfare state
products and responsible political actors, personal welfare state
experiences might have a greater capacity to stimulate political
reasoning and opinion formation than economic experiences. For these
reasons, personal welfare state experiences could be a more important
political information source than personal economic experiences.
Let us use the model in figure 1.1 to specify our expectations
further. What could happen in terms of the various causal paths as we
move the model out of the economic realm and into welfare state
territory? There are two possibilities. The more obvious one is that the
effect represented by the b path is strengthened. People find it so
difficult to form sociotropic welfare state perceptions, and personal
welfare state experiences appear so easy and relevant, that sociotropic
perceptions become disconnected from politics altogether. We might
still get people to answer survey questions about overall welfare state
quality, but the answers will not be consequential in the sense of being
related to political attitudes. Rather, controlling for sociotropic
perceptions, differences in personal welfare state experiences would
have a greater direct effect on attitudes, compared to the effect of
personal economic experiences. If our empirical analyses would
support this possibility, then the widespread image of voters as
“sociotropic animals” would not seem to apply at all when it comes to
welfare state politics.
The second and subtler possibility is that the indirect effects of
personal experience increase. In statistical language the “c times a”-
path increases in magnitude. In this case it is still sociotropic
perceptions of collective experience that are of immediate attitudinal
importance, and the notion of stronger experience effects in the
welfare state is thus not necessarily incompatible with the notion of
sociotropic animals. However, in this second case, sociotropic
perceptions are in turn partly products of personal experience. Because
of the more difficult sociotropic information and the greater political
relevance of personal experience, sociotropic welfare state perceptions
will be more tightly linked to personal experiences than what has
proven to be the case in the economic realm. Personally collected
welfare state facts then carry greater weight in the formation of overall
welfare state judgements. As a result, the weak correlation between
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personal experience and sociotropic judgement found in economic
voting research should become stronger. While citizens are still
sociotropic animals, their sociotropic judgements are, to a greater
extent than has proven to be the case in the economic realm, informed
by personal experiences.
In conclusion, our model suggests two causal paths by which
personal experiences might be generalised into political attitudes. This
means there are also two ways in which personal welfare state
experiences could be more politically influential than personal
economic experiences. It is difficult to have strong a priori
expectations as to the relative importance of these two generalisation
paths. Whether and how the role of personal experience in opinion
formation changes when we move from the economy to the welfare
state will be investigated in Chapter 6.
Nested research problems
This chapter has outlined the most basic research problem to which
this study contributes. The question is to what extent people are driven
politically by their own personal observations and experiences of
politically relevant phenomena. Expressed differently, what is the
impact of the personal on the political in different policy domains?
This overarching inquiry will lead us to several additional political
science research problems. These are nested research problems in the
sense that they will turn up in the theoretical chapters as consequences
of the more basic research question whether personal experiences are
at all important. In time, the concluding Chapter 11 will return to all
these nested research problems and discuss them generally in the light
of the empirical findings.
In particular, soon after one has decided to study whether personal
welfare state experiences matter to political orientations, one runs into
the question of how they might matter. Chapters 2-4 approach this
question from different angles. And as the reader will notice, one
cannot deal with that question without addressing several nested
political science problems. Here, a first nested problem concerns the
relative impact of self-interest versus social justice concerns as factors
behind public opinion formation. Based on previous research in this
area, chapter 2 identifies three ways of conceptualising personal
welfare state experiences: self-interest, distributive justice, and
procedural justice. We thus connect to a broad social science debate on
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the impact of economic self-interest versus social justice concerns in
political reasoning and behaviour (see Tyler et al. 1997). Also, the fact
that we consider self-interest means that we contribute to the
discussion on whether the welfare state produces a political cleavage
between citizens relying heavily on welfare state services and citizens
who do not (Dunleavy 1979, 1980c; Zetterberg 1985).
Chapter 3 takes a step back in the model and conceptualises the
actual objective properties of personal experiences. It thus runs across
a second nested research problem: the impact of institutional welfare
state design on public preferences. Using the concept of institutiona-
lised citizen empowerment, hypotheses are developed as to how
differently designed institutions in the same welfare state might
generate different experiences and in turn different political
orientations. In doing so, chapter 3 connects to a growing literature
concerned with how different ways of designing welfare states affect
the public (Bean & Papadakis 1998; Lapinski et al. 1998 Svallfors
1997; Soss 1999; Edlund 1999a). Here, a key concept is that of “path
dependence.” The idea is that institutional and policy choices made at
one point in time affect popular preferences at the next point in time.
In turn, these popular preferences will have a recursive impact on the
institutional and policy choices made at a third point in time, and so
on (see Pierson 1994, 2001; Rothstein & Steinmo 2002). As we shall
see in the final chapter, some of the results throughout this study shed
sharper light on how processes of path dependence might actually
work in the realm of the welfare state: What types of welfare state
designs have what type of effects on political orientations?
Chapter 4 is devoted to discussing the dependent variables identified
in the title of the book. These are political trust (general attitudes
towards politicians and the political system), and political ideology
(left-right related orientations towards the size of the public sector and
the level of state intervention in society). There are at least three main
arguments for focusing especially on these dependent variables. First,
as we will see in the next chapter, personal welfare state experiences
can often generate information that has the potential to affect these
orientations. In particular we will see that political trust and ideology
are common in the research literatures on self-interest, distributive
justice, and procedural justice. Second, as we will see in chapter 4, past
research shows that political trust and ideology – by virtue of being
very general tools for making sense of and evaluating political
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information – affect a wide range of political attitudes and behaviour.
It is thus valuable to contribute to the ongoing research program on
what causes differences in political trust and ideology. This constitutes
the final nested research problem. As will be discussed in more detail
in the final chapter, we make a small contribution to straightening one
of the bigger question marks in research on public opinion. That
question mark relates to the fact that we know surprisingly little about
how and why citizens’ general political orientations change in adult
life. A final argument for analysing political trust and ideology is
inspired by research in political psychology on how citizens translate
political information into political preferences. As discussed in chapter
4, this research has implications for our understanding of how
experience effects may arise, and which types of political attitudes may
reasonably be affected by experiences.
Finally, it should be pointed out that while political trust and
ideology constitute the main dependent variables in this study, they are
not the only ones: Chapter 6 examines personal experience effects on
support for the incumbent party and on “government approval.” As
discussed above, previous research on economic perceptions has
concentrated on party preferences, and because chapter 6 explicitly
wants to compare results in the economic realm with those obtained in
the welfare state territory, it is meaningful to consider also such party-
related variables for this particular purpose.

Theoretical Framework
and Hypotheses

Chapter 2
 Self-Interest and Social Justice

t was a miracle nobody was injured,” said the director of the social
welfare office to the journalist. It had been just an ordinary day in
Härryda. Nobody in the peaceful little community had realised what was
about to happen as a middle-aged man came driving up towards the social
welfare office. Nobody would have thought that a few seconds later his
car would blast through the entrance doors of the office at full speed.
Why? The newspaper article reporting the incident did not contain any
definitive clues, but the man had called earlier during the day and wanted
to speak to a social worker. “In the past there have been few problems
with disappointed clients,” the director continued. “But I know that some
employees feel bad at the moment. After this we might have to discuss
how to improve safety and protection.”
This story is about a unique event in the life of a unique human being.
And while the story is certainly about “a personal welfare state
experience,” it seems to have little in common with most other people’s
experiences. The episode could easily have been complemented with less
extreme stories that nevertheless have equally unique and personal
qualities: a student applying for another semester on student aid, a woman
delivering a baby in a public hospital, a visit to the demented father in an
elder home. Because all such experiences have unique personal qualities,
some may consider it a daunting task to use commonly defined concepts to
formulate general hypotheses about welfare state experiences and their
effects (“experiences of type X generally tend to produce effect Y”). The
suspicion would be that such simplifications capture precious little of a
complex and individualised welfare state reality.
“I
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On the other hand, one may just as well argue that the complex
heterogeneity of personal welfare state experiences is exactly what creates
a need for a simplifying theoretical framework. Such experiences, and their
political effects, are difficult to discuss and investigate without a
reasonably parsimonious set of general concepts and hypotheses. This is
the line of reasoning that will be pursued here. Specifically, this chapter
formulates a general and commonly defined theoretical framework
addressing the question of what aspects of welfare state experiences affect
political orientations.
Such a framework should meet at least two requirements. First, it
should clearly allow for some complexity. Given the diversity in
individuals’ welfare state experiences, it may be unsatisfactory to
characterise experiences along one single dimension. Second, as argued
above, the framework should nevertheless be reasonably parsimonious.
Exactly because welfare state experiences constitute a heterogeneous and
bewildering reality, it would be helpful if we could arrive at a simplifying
model. Such a model should have heuristic qualities while still capturing
much of the essence of experiences and their political effects.
Unfortunately, the bulk of past research has not developed a conceptual
framework that can be easily adopted and applied to the empirical
material used in this study. Therefore, what is presented in this chapter is,
to a great extent, a synthesis of relevant thought on how personal welfare
state experiences could affect political orientations.
Immediately inspired by Tyler, Rasinski and McGraw (1985), the
outcome is a conceptual framework based on three explanatory
perspectives: the self-interest perspective, the distributive justice per-
spective, and the procedural justice perspective.1 Note from the outset that
there is a kinship between the latter two: Both the distributive justice
perspective and the procedural justice perspective assume that people are
attentive to whether experiences conform with normative expectations
concerning what constitutes social justice. In contrast, the self-interest
perspective is an application of rationalist public choice theory, which
assumes that people are attentive to how much experiences contribute to
                                                
1 Miller and Listhaug (1999) also use essentially the same three conceptual
distinctions.
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their personal self-interest. This point will be developed in much greater
detail below.
Admittedly, the theoretical trinity hardly exhausts all conceivable ideas
that have been brought to bear on the subject. However, I believe that it
captures most of the basic theoretical propositions that have been applied
in previous empirical studies. Furthermore, most previous studies have,
with some exceptions, tested only one or sometimes two of these
perspectives in a single study or publication.
The convenient term “perspective” stands for a distinct set of
theoretical assumptions about what aspects of personal welfare state
experiences matter to citizens when drawing political conclusions.
Expressed differently, the perspectives are three distinct families of
independent variables that rest on different assumptions of what people
pay attention to when they connect personal welfare state experiences to
politics.
I have tried to strike a reasonable balance between complexity and
parsimony. Beyond its moderate size, the framework is parsimonious also
because it expects communality across individuals, institutions, and
situations. By characterising experiences along commonly defined
dimensions, it assumes that the experience aspects that trigger political
conclusions have something in common across different individuals,
institutions, and situations. On the other hand, the framework allows for
quite some complexity and heterogeneity: by identifying three perspectives,
we take seriously the possibility that no single “master variable” will
suffice to capture all the politically relevant information generated by
welfare state experiences.
The chapter begins by pondering at a more abstract level the notion of
“a personal welfare state experience.” It then goes on to discuss the three
perspectives one by one, and finally closes by considering the relationships
between the three theoretical perspectives.
What is a personal welfare state experience?
To explain what personal welfare state experiences are we must clarify
both the meaning of “personal experience” as well as the meaning of
“welfare state.” As for the former, personal experiences refer to direct,
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personal and unmediated contacts with an attitude object. Such
experiences may be contrasted with other channels through which citizens
acquire information about attitude objects (Asp 1986:64). One such
channel is the mass media. Getting information about welfare state
institutions through newspapers and television programs is an important
information source, but it is different from personal experiences. Similarly,
inter-personal communication with family members, neighbours, collea-
gues, and so on has proven to be politically influential (Katz & Lazarsfeld
1955; Huckfeldt & Sprague 1995). Still, listening to other peoples’
accounts of welfare state institutions is a different process compared to
personally and directly acquiring compatible information. Personal
experiences thus refer to a more individualised mode of information
gathering compared to the processes captured by a concept such as
“socialisation.” Of course, the latter connotes – among other things –
information exchange between people belonging to the same groups. In
contrast, the personal welfare state experiences we are interested in occur
when a citizen uses her five senses to see, hear, smell, feel, or taste welfare
state institutions and their products.
Further, we concentrate on experiences with the “outputs” of the public
sector, such as receiving services and benefits. Of course, many people
have personal relations with the public sector beyond being consumers of
services and benefits.2 Most importantly, people can be said to have a
personal relation with the public sector as taxpayers. That is, citizens do
not just enjoy the outputs of the public sector. They also contribute to the
financing of that output. And as pointed out by for instance Downs
(1960), welfare state support should reasonably be the joint outcome of
both experiences of welfare state outputs and experiences of taxpaying
(“are the outputs worth the costs?”). The results of this study will fit well
with such a contention in that the extent to which one contributes
personally to the public budget (by necessity operationalised as family
                                                
2 Nilsson (1995, 1996b) identifies four “citizen roles” in which citizens can have
personal contacts with welfare state institutions. First, citizens may be “users” or
“consumers” of welfare state services and transfers, a role that is essentially the
same thing as the welfare state experiences that are at focus here. Second, citizens
may also encounter the public sector as public employees, as taxpayers, and as
voters.
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income) has an independent effect among people with comparable
experiences of public sector outputs.3
In addition, many experience welfare state institutions as public
employees (for a discussion, see Nilsson 1995, 1996; Johansson, Nilsson
& Strömberg 2001). As discussed in greater depth later on in this chapter,
Scandinavian public employees tend to display greater ideological support
for the welfare state and they tend to stand further to the left than others
(Knutsen 1998b). Our empirical estimates will lend further support also to
this hypothesis.
Still, our empirical investigation deals largely with experiences on the
output side. This is not because experiences related to public employment
and taxpaying are deemed uninteresting. Rather, the reason is a more
mundane need to limit the empirical task, coupled with the fact that the
available data contain information mainly about output experiences. For
these reasons, public employment and taxpaying appear only as control
variables in our statistical models. What we are interested in theoretically
is the effects of differences in output experiences, controlling for
employment and taxpaying experiences.
What are “welfare state institutions”? While there is no exact agreed-
upon meaning attached to the concept of the welfare state, its broad
contours are clear enough for our purposes. We have in mind a broad
                                                
3 As suggested by Downs (1960), there are important differences between citizens’
relations to public sector inputs and outputs respectively (see also Peters 1991:55-
6). He noted that whereas there is usually a direct link between costs and benefits
in the market, the two are often divorced in the public sphere. This may reduce
support for public spending among the ordinary citizen: “since his payments to the
government are not related to the benefits he receives from it, he finds himself
contributing to things that do not benefit him” (Downs 1960:548). Further, he
argued that whereas the costs of the public sector become very well-known to
most people through an annual and painful taxpaying experience, many of the
products of the public sector are both remote and uncertain to all those who are
not extremely well informed about government matters. According to Downs,
these characteristics of public sector transactions mean that the support for a large
public sector will be lower the less information about government outputs the
electorate possesses. In contrast, according to a very different hypothesis,
uninformed citizens tend to underestimate the costs of public service provision,
and their support for public spending on various services tends to go down if they
are informed about the real costs for taxpayers (for a more detailed discussion,
further references, and some empirical support for this latter hypothesis, see
Winter & Mouritzen 2001).
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spectrum of public transfers and services ranging from things like social
assistance to unemployment insurance to public health care to public
libraries.4
What welfare state concept ties this broad institutional spectrum
together? Drawing on Flora and Heidenheimer (1981), we view the
welfare state as a response to two major categories of demands, demands
that are different both in terms of character and historical origin. The first
set of demands relates to socio-economic security. Here the starting point
is that in modern societies, citizens are vulnerable to a great number of
risks. Many of these risks are caused by capitalist market forces: people
run the risk of becoming unemployed, injuring themselves at work, and so
on. Other risks are related to particular parts of the life cycle and old age.
Both market- and life-cycle-related risks nurture demands for publicly
guaranteed socio-economic security. As Flora and Heidenheimer (1981:23)
explain, “the welfare state is seen as an attempt to deal with specific
problems of capitalist development, class conflict and recurring economic
crises.” The second set of demands relates to socio-economic equality. The
roots of such demands are typically traced back to the development of
mass democracy and political equality (see Marshall 1950). As clarified by
Roller (1995:167), “the demand for socio-economic equality is a
consequence of the democratization process with its stress on political
equality; effective political equality can be realized only under the
condition of socio-economic equality.” Needless to say, there is great
disagreement as to exactly what kind of equality various welfare state
institutions should try to establish. For instance, in one major discussion a
Marxist “equality of results” is pitted against a liberal “equality of
opportunity.
In conclusion, according to the above definition, “the welfare state is an
integrative mechanism to neutralize the disruptive features of
modernization, and its essence lies in a government responsibility for
security and equality” Alber (1988:456).
But what public institutions contribute to security and/or equality?
Here, many authors have regarded transfer systems as the essential core of
                                                
4 For in-depth descriptions of the Swedish public sector and welfare state, see
Ringqvist (1996), Edebalk, Ståhlberg & Wadensjö (1998), and Olsson (1993).
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the welfare state (Wilensky 1975). In Sweden and elsewhere, one type of
transfers ensures minimum-level security. Means-tested benefits such as
social assistance and housing allowance are distributed to citizens who
cannot support themselves or are otherwise deemed needy. Another type
of transfers involves universal flat-rate benefits tied to citizenship;
examples include basic old-age pensions and child allowances. A third
transfer type includes earnings-related public social insurances related to
unemployment, sick leave, old age, and so on. All these three transfer types
are welfare state institutions as they try to satisfy demands for socio-
economic security and/or equality.
We also consider a range of public human services. These services are
typically distributed by local and regional government and include
activities like public education, health care, elder care, kindergartens, and
so on. These policies belong to the welfare state because they redistribute
wealth by being partly financed by progressive taxes, thus contributing to
greater equality of results. Also, such services presumably equip citizens
with basic capabilities and functions they will almost invariably need in
order to get by in modern society, thus contributing to an equality of
opportunity.
Furthermore, we take into account a variety of universally available
services located on “the fringe” of the welfare state. Examples include
publicly organised and subsidised services like cultural institutions and
public libraries. While we rarely think of such services as “social policy”
they are welfare state institutions as they are designed to foster equality of
opportunity. Services like cultural institutions and public libraries provide
information or “culture” that are useful for citizens in the pursuit of
personal life projects. In this vein, Rothstein (1998:218) points out that,
“If citizens are to be able to act as autonomous individuals in the face of
political, economic, and social structures, they must have the right to
certain basic capabilities enabling them to make well-considered choices.”
So services like cultural institutions and public libraries belong to the
welfare state as they contribute to “basic capabilities” that in turn foster
equality of opportunity.
In summary, then, we consider a broad spectrum of public welfare state
arrangements. This is a difference compared to much previous research on
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the welfare state: As authors like Cox (1998) and Smith (2002) point out,
the comparative welfare state literature has in its attempts to classify and
explain welfare state development in different countries often concentrated
on central state transfer and insurance systems, whereas it has tended to
neglect the “softer” human services that are often implemented at the local
level (see also Clayton & Pontusson 1998).
Given our purposes, such a focus on centrally governed transfer systems
would not be appropriate as local service experiences very often involve
direct contacts, not only with welfare state outcomes, but also with public
employees and the concrete physical environment of institutions. In fact,
these features of public services should make them more salient and
emotionally charged in citizens’ memories (Eagly & Chaiken 1993). In
contrast, experiences with insurances and transfer systems tend to involve
less direct personal contact with public employees and actual physical
institutions. Experiences are often reduced to the reception of an
anticipated sum of money. Or as formulated by Nilsson (1997:131) “the
Swedish welfare state is to a large degree synonymous with the local
welfare state. It is mainly at the local level that citizens experience the
welfare state.”5
Now that we have pondered at a more abstract level the meaning of
personal welfare state experiences, we may begin to consider different
perspectives on what it is in such experiences that might affect citizens
politically.
The self-interest perspective
What we will label the self-interest perspective is probably the most
common account of how contacts with welfare state institutions affect
people politically. Its essence lies in the claim that people form political
attitudes towards political issues, institutions and parties on the basis of
their personal interests. The more issues, institutions and parties satisfy
interests, the more positive attitudes towards such objects become. As Lind
and Tyler (1988:151-52) explain: “The [...] assumption is that the citizen
will attempt to maximise his or her gain from the political system, just as a
                                                
5 My translation from original Swedish.
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person would do in a financial marketplace transaction such as buying a
car. This is the major assumption of public choice theory and provides the
distinctiveness that sets that theory apart from other models of political
behavior.” Dunleavy (1991:3) formulates the same assumption like this:
“people are basically egoistic, self-regarding and instrumental in their
behaviour, choosing [...] on the basis of the consequences for their
personal welfare.”
Defining self-interest, however, is a touchy business. Here, we shall rely
on the self-interest definition that has been employed in most previous
empirical research (Sears et al. 1980; Green 1988; Sears & Funk 1990,
1991). This literature has defined self-interest in terms of how political
choices affect one’s personal, material, short-term situation. A “self-
interest effect” denotes the rational process by which a person becomes
more likely to support a political alternative – an attitude, a party, an
ideological point of view – because that alternative has the most positive
implications for personal, material, short-term well-being. In the context
of personal welfare state experiences, the prediction is that people make
political choices on the basis of how much their personal, short-term,
material interests are satisfied by various welfare state arrangements. The
self-interest perspective thus conceptualises experiences in terms of the
varying “amount,” “quantity,” or “frequency” of personal reception of
welfare state products. Such individual differences in “how much” one
gets from the welfare state may explain individual differences in political
attitudes and behaviour. In chapter 7, we deal with two specific questions
raised by the self-interest perspective: whether individuals who currently
consume more welfare state services and benefits than others also tend to
stand further to the left, and display more positive attitudes towards
politicians and the political system.
Conceptual pros and cons
What are the pros and cons of this self-interest conceptualisation? The
major drawback is quite obvious: it does not capture all reasonable and
potentially influential variants of interests. For instance, it excludes group-
interests, at least to the extent that group-interest does not overlap with
individual self-interest. In other words, the concept does not capture
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interests related to the well-being of some collective to which an individual
belongs, without necessarily affecting the specific individual (see Sears &
Funk 1991:16). Hence, the process by which rational working-class
citizens choose to support extensive welfare state arrangements because
they think such arrangements benefit workers as a collective is not a self-
interest effect according to our definition. For purposes of clarity, we
would rather refer to it as a group-interest effect. Moreover, the definition
excludes long-term interests, such as a young woman being in favour of
raised child allowance because she will probably some day have children
of her own. Rather, the concept is concerned with more short-term
reasoning such as “I want the child allowance to be raised because I’m
currently getting it.” Finally, the concept is concerned with material
interests that can be more or less directly translated into economic terms.
That is, it does not classify individuals in terms of how immaterial
personal interests such as “life quality,” “happiness,” “justice,” “social
rewards,” and the like, may be affected by different political alternatives.
While these are real limitations, the limited self-interest concept also
offers two types of real payback. One payback is methodological in that a
limited concept facilitates both falsifiable hypotheses and valid
measurement. Consider for example the distinction between short-term
and long-term interests. The problem with long-term interests is that
almost anything can happen in our lives with at least a reasonable
probability: most people can become unemployed, have children, become
ill tomorrow, and so on, which means that most people can become
beneficiaries of just about any welfare state service in the future. Such
uncertainty has unfortunate consequences for empirical researchers. For
instance, hypotheses about long-term interest become hard to falsify as
almost any political preference or attitude could be rationally defended in
terms of some long-term interest. More than this, the insecurity built into
the notion of long-term self-interest makes it difficult for researchers to
measure. In plain empirical language, it is notoriously difficult to decide
individuals’ values on the independent variable.6
                                                
6 Therefore, it is not surprising that there are few empirical studies on long-term
self-interest and political attitudes and behaviour (Sears & Funk 1991:65).  In one
of the rare exceptions, it was shown that whereas expectations about personal
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Actually, this point can easily be directed also at the distinction between
material and immaterial interests, and at the distinction between personal
and group-based interests. Here, too, the problem is that the self-interest
concept becomes terribly inclusive when we start to incorporate
immaterial interests or group-based interests. Because there are so many
conceivable groups that individuals belong to, and because there are so
many potential immaterial values, hypotheses based on such an expanded
concept would be difficult to operationalise. In addition, they would be
hard to falsify as almost any attitude could be rationally defended in terms
of some group-interest or some immaterial value.7
The second payback from the narrow self-interest concept is
substantive. As we shall see, the notion of personal, short-term material
self-interest has formed our understanding of welfare state politics.
Moreover, as we shall also see, this definition of self-interest has been used
in a large accumulation of empirical studies on political attitudes and
behaviour. I firmly believe that it becomes easier to contribute to these
research programmes if we use similar concepts.
But what, then, is the substantive reason for why previous research has
focused on such a narrow notion of self-interest? The answer begins with
the democratic postulate that citizens’ political preferences should signifi-
cantly affect public policies. Further, this crucial postulate carries an
equally important amendment: “preferences” does not just mean any gut
feeling or basic instinct that one may hold at a given point in time. Rather,
it stands for the “enlightened choices” that (a majority of) citizens make
when they have access to, and take their time to make sense of, greater
quantities of information (Lupia 1994; Bartels 1996).
Naturally, different models of democracy have different answers to how
enlightened political choices could be achieved. For instance, according to
                                                                                                            
finances in the next year influenced presidential voting in the 1984 US election,
expectations concerning the next five years did not have a significant impact
(Lewis-Beck 1988:121).
7 Having said this, it should be pointed out that “other” versions of self-interest
are in no way rejected theoretically or empirically. On the contrary, to the extent
that the self-interest perspective as conceptualised here is not supported
empirically, one possible explanation may very well be that citizens are still
interest-driven, but more inclined to consider group- and long-term interests.
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models of representative democracy, they can result from popular selection
of a small political elite with sufficient skills and incentives to figure out
what their voters would choose if they had access to as much information
as the representatives (Manin 1997). And if representatives can make a
case for why the current manifest public opinion does not correspond to
such fully informed choices, they are allowed to enact policies at odds with
the basic instinct of current public opinion (Pitkin 1967; Przeworski,
Stokes & Manin 1999).
Proponents of “participatory democracy” offer different solutions to the
same problem. They suggest that citizens should be given more, rather
than fewer, chances to participate directly in the decision-making process
at different levels in the political system. This gives citizens both
competence and a sense of responsibility, which makes them better
equipped to make enlightened choices themselves (Barber 1984). Finally,
proponents of “deliberative democracy” advocate yet a somewhat
different strategy. Here enlightened opinions are presumably the results of
open-minded debate, where different types of information, interests and
actors are allowed equal access (Fishkin 1995; Bohman & Rehg 1997).
In spite of their differences, these lines of democratic thought are united
by the fear that people’s manifest opinions do not correspond to what they
would have chosen with more information, competence and knowledge.
Interestingly, while there are many potential sources of such a lack-of-fit
between current opinions and “true interests,” the perhaps most usual
suspect is exactly personal, short-term, material self-interest. Such self-
interest is seen as a default basis for political attitudes that will often drive
political choices in the absence of information concerning long-term,
immaterial, and collective interests (Green 1988; Mansbridge 1990; Lewin
1988). Moreover, because preferences fuelled by narrow personal, short-
term, material interests are feared to deviate from what people would have
chosen with more information, such preferences are believed to have a
great potential for transformation through representation, deliberation,
and participation. From this vantage point, the very narrowness of our
self-interest definition becomes its greatest asset. Because narrow personal,
short-term, material interests are feared to be the perhaps greatest threats
to enlightened popular preferences, it becomes especially interesting to
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know more empirically about this particular type of interest (although
other types of interest may be equally important determinants of
attitudes). More precisely, two important empirical questions emerge from
this discussion. First, is it true that citizens’ preferences often change, for
example by becoming increasingly anchored in long-term, immaterial, and
collective interests, as citizens get more political information and
competence? Second, how true is it in the first place that short-term
material interests explain citizens’ political attitudes in the absence of
extremely detailed information and debate? This study contributes to the
ongoing debate and research on the latter question, a literature to which
we now turn.
The self-interest perspective has shaped our understanding of welfare state
politics
The self-interest perspective is no obscure product of researchers primarily
interested in the oddities of the human mind. On the contrary, it lies at the
very heart of our accumulated understanding of social development in
general, and welfare state development in particular. In fact, many
respected theories about welfare state expansion and retrenchment assume
that citizens take their personal welfare state self-interest into account
when making political choices.
In particular, scholars tend to argue that leftist opinions and parties
gain support where welfare state arrangements benefit, not just the worse-
off working class, but also the well-educated and well-to-do middle
classes. Short-term material self-interest is believed to be one important
causal mechanism in this process. To put it harshly, the more voters that
enjoy welfare state benefits and services, the more interest-based support
will there be for such arrangements and the parties that protect them.
This view underlies Esping-Andersen’s (1990:27-8) influential work on
welfare state development. He argues that one secret behind popular
support for welfare arrangements in Scandinavia is their ability to make
middle class citizens perceive that they gain from such arrangements:
“Rather than tolerate a dualism between state and market, between
working class and middle class, the Social Democrats pursued a welfare
state that would promote an equality of the highest standards, not an
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equality of minimal needs as was pursued elsewhere. This implied [...] that
services and benefits be upgraded to levels commensurate with even the
most discriminating tastes of the new middle classes.” Designing welfare
state services in accordance with middle class interests, Esping-Andersen
argues, “constructs an essentially universal solidarity in favor of the
welfare state. All benefit; all are dependent; and all will presumably feel
obliged to pay.” Rothstein (1998:153) has made the similar argument that
“a universal welfare state can only exist if it enjoys support far up the
social ladder. The ‘poor,’ the ‘underprivileged,’ the ‘working class,’ or any
other such social group is simply too small to constitute a sufficient
electoral base for a comprehensive universal welfare policy. And
conversely, one can only reckon with support for this policy from white-
collar groups and the middle class if it is so formulated as to serve their
interests ... ”
These ideas were taken yet a step further in American historian Peter
Baldwin’s The Politics of Social Solidarity (1990).8 Analysts of early
welfare state development, Baldwin argued, have not sufficiently
appreciated the weakness and inconsistency of the relationship between
social class – as conceptualised in terms of relations to the means of
production – and actual personal gain from welfare state arrangements.
Baldwin therefore distinguishes between social classes and “risk
categories,” the latter tapping, in a nutshell, differences in individual
welfare state interest. He concludes that European welfare state
development was often shaped by somewhat surprising alliances between
representatives of risk categories that rarely overlapped perfectly with the
poorer working class groups typically seen as the motor of social reform:
“Solidaristic reform was the outcome of narrowly based battles between
antagonistic interests, a change occasionally able to clothe itself in the
vestments of high principle and lofty ideals [...] It succeeded only when
sufficiently powerful elements within the bourgeoisie also stood to profit
[...] Solidarity in the real world, after the veil of ignorance has been lifted,
shifts burdens between identifiable groups of the disfavored and the
fortunate” (Baldwin 1990:293-4).
                                                
8 See Svallfors (1996:30-3) for critical comments on especially Baldwin’s
treatment of the social class concept.
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Similar ideas have been applied to modern welfare state trends. A
prominent example is Pierson’s (1994) analysis of Reagan’s and Thatcher’s
welfare state legacies. Interestingly, considering their neo-conservative
rhetoric, they managed surprisingly little welfare state retrenchment in
practice.9 According to Pierson, the previous welfare state expansion had
restructured the playing field of social policy so that many citizens now
had a personal interest invested in one welfare state service or the other.
And similar to Baldwin’s argument, welfare state self-interest is not
confined to traditional working class groups or to the poorer segments of
society. Therefore, “ ... efforts to dismantle the welfare state have exacted
a high political price. The costs associated with cutbacks are concentrated
and immediate, whereas benefits are likely to be diffuse and to appear only
over time [...] The maturation of social programs has produced a new
network of organized interests – the consumers and providers of social
services – that are well placed to defend the welfare state” (Pierson
1994:180-1; see also Pierson 2001:411-13).
In sum, the self-interest perspective on personal welfare state
experiences is embraced by respected macro accounts of welfare state
development. Granted, self-interested political reasoning at the individual-
level is but one of several corner stones of these theories, and nobody is
suggesting that the sum of individuals’ interests is driving welfare state
development in any automatic fashion. On the contrary, authors like
Esping-Andersen, Baldwin, Rothstein, and Pierson emphasize the varying
ability of welfare state-oriented parties and interest organisations to form
alliances at the elite level, as well as their varying abilities to make citizens
“discover” their welfare state-related interests. Moreover, all interests are
not considered to be personal in nature and scholars typically highlight
group-interest mobilization, as well as perceived moral attractiveness (see
especially Rothstein 1998) as explanations of why welfare state
institutions receive support. Still, while keeping such theoretical
amendments in mind, it is nevertheless evident that many successful macro
                                                
9 See Clayton & Pontusson (1998) for an attempt to modify Pierson’s view that
welfare retrenchment largely failed in these countries, and Lindbom (2001) for an
analysis of the extent of welfare state retrenchment in Sweden in the 1990s. For a
similar overall Scandinavian analysis, see Kuhnle (2000).
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theories of the welfare state to a significant degree build on the notion of
self-interested political attitudes among the mass public. These theories
have in turn shaped the way we think about politics in developed
democracies.
The self-interest perspective: previous individual-level research
What does individual-level empirical research tell us about the viability of
the self-interest perspective? It turns out that it has quite a lot to say about
political ideology, but very little about political trust. As for the former,
one accumulation of findings is offered by the literature on “sectoral
cleavages” (see Dunleavy 1979, 1980a,b,c; Dunleavy & Husbands 1985;
Taylor-Gooby 1986). This research, which was especially lively in Britain
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, takes as its point of departure the
declining impact of social class on political behaviour noted all over the
western world (Dalton, Flanagan & Beck 1984; Franklin, Mackie & Valen
et al. 1992; Oskarson 1994). Dunleavy’s (1979) explanation of the decline
was the emergence of “sectoral cleavages.” The growth of public
expenditure meant that significant portions of the population came to
consume welfare state services. By the same token, a significant part of the
work force came to be employed in the public sector.
Dunleavy stressed that public consumption and employment were no
longer confined to the industrial working classes or the poorer social
segments. He identified a trend where more middle class citizens became
dependent on public services and argued that this produced a social
cleavage between people who consume a lot of public services and those
who consume less, and between those who are employed in the public
sector and those who are not. The prediction was that heavy public service
consumers and public employees are more likely to embrace leftist political
attitudes and vote for leftist parties (as such parties presumably protect the
public sector).  The new sectoral cleavage was thought to “cut across” the
older one between labour and capital in the sense that sectoral positions
are not predicted well by positions in the old class cleavage.10
                                                
10 Sectoral cleavage theory assumes that the main causal mechanism at the
individual-level is self-interested and rational comparison of political alternatives.
The sectoral perspective thus builds on a different micro-theoretical foundation
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Similarly, Swedish sociologist Hans Zetterberg (1985) reported that the
most important voter group for the Swedish Social Democrats is no longer
the industrial working class.11 Rather, the crucial target group is people
employed in or otherwise dependent on public services and benefits. In
Zetterberg’s parlance, the Swedish electorate has become “an electorate in
the grips of the welfare state.” The metaphor implies that self-interested
voters are almost forced to support the welfare state in the sense that there
is no way they can resist its generous offers. In his analysis of the 1985
election Zetterberg argued that “An absolute majority of the 6.4 million
enfranchised voters in this year’s Swedish elections [...] consists of those
who are employed in the public sector or belong to groups such as
pensioners, the unemployed, the chronically disabled whose primary
source of income are the funds in the public coffers. [...] The campaign and
the outcome of the elections [...] will largely echo this structure”
(Zetterberg 1985:1).
The employment hypothesis has fared quite well in empirical research.
The public-private employment dichotomy is now routinely included in
voting behaviour analyses, especially in Scandinavia (Petersson 1977;
Holmberg & Gilljam 1987; Knutsen 1998b; Borre & Andersen 1997;
Oskarson 1990, 1994; Gilljam & Holmberg 1993, 1995; Aardal & Valen
1995).
But signals are mixed when it comes to the prediction that public service
consumers are more inclined than others to vote left. Most relevant studies
were conducted in Britain in the 1980s (Dunleavy 1979; Dunleavy &
Husbands 1985). The data were usually from the late 1970s or early
1980s and indicated some impact, though perhaps of varying magnitude.
But sectoral cleavage theory was soon under attack. In Britain,
Dunleavy’s findings were criticised by for instance Franklin and Page
(1984) who interpreted the uncovered effects as weak and unimpressive. In
                                                                                                            
than traditional cleavage theory, which emphasises various group-oriented
socialisation mechanisms. Such mechanisms bring people from the same social
environment to adopting similar political preferences (see Franklin & Page 1984,
for a similar point). Instrumental cost-benefit calculation, on the other hand, has a
less prominent position in traditional cleavage theory.
11 Svensson (1994) shows that the Social Democratic party elite developed
important welfare state institutions with this model of Swedish voters in mind.
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Sweden, Zetterberg’s verdict was questioned by Hadenius (1986),
Holmberg and Gilljam (1987), Oskarson (1990), and Svallfors (1996;
1999). Again, the political effects of public sector dependency were found
to be marginal compared to those of variables such as traditional
occupational class.
American researchers, too, have assessed the impact of welfare state
self-interest. These studies – often referred to as the symbolic politics
literature – has contrasted the impact of self-interest with that of so-called
symbolic orientations (see Sears 1993; Kinder & Sears 1985; Listhaug &
Miller 1985).12 This literature offers a compelling explanation for the
disconfirming findings in many European studies looking for sectoral
cleavages. The explanation is that people do not calculate the personal
benefits and costs implied by every new concrete political choice. Instead
they use overarching predispositions – symbolic orientations – to arrive at
an opinion. Such overarching orientations can be described as emotionally
charged attitudes towards a group, a political party, or ideological abstract
symbols like “welfare,” “family,” “market,” “left” “right,” and so on.
Examples of symbolic orientations include party identification, left-right
self-placement, and class identification. The idea is that people form their
opinions in more concrete matters based on easily accessible cues or
symbols telling them how the choice relates to their symbolic orientations.
Few are cool enough to hold their horses and instrumentally ponder the
impact of policies on their personal life situation. (“Can I use this welfare
program? Will black children be bussed to my children’s school?”). In
turn, symbolic orientations are presumably the result of pre-adult political
socialisation: They are regarded as very stable over time and charged with
strong emotion and identity.
Sears et al. (1980:671) explain this alternative to the self-interest
hypothesis: “The alternative point of view we wish to contrast with self-
interest may be termed ‘symbolic politics’ [...] By this line of thinking,
people acquire stable affective preferences through conditioning in their
pre-adult years, with little calculation of the future costs and benefits of
                                                
12 The symbolic politics literature dealt with the impact of self-interest in a wider
context than does this study. Many areas that lie outside the scope of the welfare
state were covered, for instance attitudes towards the Vietnam War.
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these attitudes. [...] When confronted with new policy issues later in life,
people respond to these new attitude objects on the basis of cognitive
consistency. The crucial variable would be the similarity of symbols posed
by the policy issue to those of long-standing predispositions.”
The empirical evidence includes strong effects of symbolic orientations
on policy opinions, and weak and inconsistent effects of various self-
interest measures (Sears, Hensler & Speer 1979; Sears et al. 1980; Sears &
Funk 1990, 1991; Green 1988). A typical finding is that opinions about a
particular public social scheme are much better predicted by people’s
general symbolic orientations towards government intervention than by
measures of short-term individual gain from that particular scheme, as
typically measured by the extent to which one receives service from the
scheme.13
For example, in his study of welfare state attitudes in Sweden, Hadenius
(1986:121) concluded that “preferences with regard to public welfare
arrangements, are thus largely a reflection of political symbolic beliefs [...]
People appear to a very minor extent to assess the public sector from the
viewpoint of personal utility.” Sears and Funk (1991:76) reviewed a large
number of such empirical studies and summarised the major findings like
this: “The conclusion is quite clear: self-interest ordinarily does not have
much effect upon the ordinary citizen’s sociopolitical attitudes.”
Most of the time, researchers have assumed that symbolic orientations
are “symbolic”: that is, stable, affectively driven, and mainly the result of
pre-adult political socialisation. However, some scholars have discussed
the possibility that symbolic orientations themselves are in turn affected by
self-interest (see Campbell et al. 1960:203-204). If this is true, symbolic
predispositions are not entirely stable,14 not entirely affective in nature,
                                                
13 Interestingly, in one of the few Swedish analyses that have been set up in this
particular way, Holmberg (1981:264-5) found a slightly different pattern.
Drawing on the 1979 Swedish Election Study, Holmberg found that opinions on
“reducing tax deductions for house-owners” were affected both by left-right
ideology and by self-interest (as measured by a home-ownership dummy variable).
Here it may be noted that issues related to home-ownership were especially salient
in the 1979 election (see Esaiasson 1990).
14 For further references to research on the stability of general “symbolic”
political orientations, see Krosnick (1991), Sapiro (1994), and Sears & Funk
1999.
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and not only the result of pre-adult socialisation. Sears et al. (1980:676)
opened up for this possibility by suggesting “Such predispositions may be
constantly reformulated to capture and synopsize a variety of the voter’s
interests...” This is the empirical track followed in this study: we
investigate the impact of self-interest on general “symbolic” orientations
such as political ideology and political trust. Maybe such orientations
reflect not just socialisation, group identity, and gut-level affection but
also short-term welfare state-related self-interest? If so, symbolic
orientations would not appear as “symbolic” as the symbolic politics
literature has assumed and supported with empirical evidence.
So far, this idea has not received support either. For instance, in their
extensive study of the Californian “tax revolt” in the 1970s, Sears and
Citrin (1982) found weak or insignificant effects of various indices of self-
interest on symbolic orientations such as party identification or liberal-
conservative ideology. Sears et al. (1980) reached similar conclusions using
the American National Election Studies. And based on Swedish survey
data, Svallfors (1996:109) and Hadenius (1986:101) have reported data
indicating that general welfare state attitudes among frequent public
service consumers do not differ much from those of other groups.15 Goul
Andersen (1993:43) concluded that “interests are almost irrelevant as
determinants of welfare state support in Denmark” (see also Borre & Goul
Andersen 1997). Finally, in recent years these country-specific findings
have been sustained by comparative studies reporting weak correlations
between the extent of welfare usage and the extent of general welfare state
support (see Papadakis & Bean 1993; Bean & Papadakis 1998).
As for general political trust orientations, there is not much research to
draw on. We know very little about whether people partly evaluate the
political system and its politicians at large in the light of what the system
does for one’s short-term material well-being. One exception is Tyler,
Rasinski and McGraw (1985). Analysing a sample of Chicago residents,
they found that receiving services from public institutions correlated
                                                
15 In contrast, Gilljam and Nilsson (1985) found somewhat stronger effects of
various variables representing the self-interest perspective (especially among non-
socialist voters). Their dependent variable was opinions on “reducing the public
sector” among the Swedish electorate.
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positively with displaying trust in government. In other words, those who
personally consumed the products of the political system were also more
likely than others to endorse it. Miller and Listhaug  (1999:214) reached
similar conclusions.
In summary, how should we judge the viability of the self-interest
perspective? While macro theorists assume that self-interest matters, micro
research has been tough on such assumptions: attitudes seem to be rather
well explained by general symbolic orientations, but only rarely by short-
term interests. And symbolic orientations do not seem to reflect self-
interest either.
So why should we continue testing the self-interest perspective? Has it
not been falsified already? Not quite yet! On a closer inspection, it turns
out that most studies investigating the impact of self-interest on general
orientations have used rather sparse information about welfare state
interests. Chapter 7 develops this observation in greater detail and
reassesses empirically the impact of welfare state self-interest using richer
data on individual welfare state interests than many previous studies.
An electorate in the grips of the welfare state?
The self-interest perspective has a weird and non-obvious implication.
Given that welfare state experiences make at least some minimal
contribution to one’s short-term material situation, these experiences are
bound to have positive effects on support for the welfare state and for the
political system. Because political thinking is assumed to be driven by self-
interest, and because most encounters with institutions to some extent
increase people’s material well-being, experiences will have positive effects.
This deterministic view was clearly reflected in Zetterberg’s (1985) paper
An Electorate in the Grips of the Welfare State. The title implies that the
welfare state had closed its trap around self-interested Swedish voters. The
generosity of welfare state institutions coupled with the short-sighted
egoism of individual citizens meant seriously anti-welfare parties and
ideological viewpoints can no longer receive extensive support.
This sounds rigid. Surely, it is possible that personal encounters with
public institutions communicate more than just facts about the extent to
which one’s self-interest is satisfied? Surely, our framework should allow
 Self-Interest and Social Justice60
the possibility that some welfare state experiences in fact undermine
support for the welfare state and for the political system?
The point of departure for the next two sections is that people look for
social justice just as much as they are trying to maximise their personal
gain. People compare their experiences with some normative expectation
about what they have “a right to experience.” And if personal experiences
fall short of social justice expectations, an experience may very well have
negative effects on support for the welfare state and for the political
system, even though it indeed made a substantial contribution to personal,
short-term, self-interest.
In the coming sections, we develop two distinct versions of the general
social justice argument. First, we discuss the possibility that judgements of
distributive justice in the encounter between citizens and the state are
influential. Later, I develop the social justice argument with respect to
procedural justice.
In the final section of this chapter, we consider different possible
relations between self-interest and social justice judgements. We note that
according to theories of social justice, judgements of experienced social
justice are not supposed to be rationalisations of personal self-interest (or
“self-interest in disguise”), but rather independent of the extent to which
one’s personal, material, short-term situation is improved by experiences.
The distributive justice perspective
Trust in political actors and institutions continued to decrease in Sweden
in the 1990s (Holmberg 1999). Svallfors traces part of the development
back to deteriorating welfare state transfers and services (Svallfors
1996:17, 216). At first glance, this claim appears to belong in the
discussion of self-interest. Discontent and declining support would then be
explained by a declining ability of welfare state institutions to improve
citizens’ short term material well-being.
However, Svallfors links outcome quality to morally based expectations
of what citizens have a right to. Using the concept of “a moral economy”
as a metaphor, he argues that as Swedes’ enjoyed the outcomes of one of
the most generous welfare states, its institutions slowly generated morally
charged conceptions of rights. For example, benefits such as receiving a
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certain percentage of your prior income in the case of unemployment were
literally incorporated into the definition of citizenship. When outcome
levels and service quality deteriorate many people will feel that the
political elites have broken a tacit agreement with the people. Cynical
attitudes towards the political system and its actors will develop.
Svallfors’ account of the Swedish development builds on the same basic
assumptions as the distributive justice perspective. First, citizens are
assumed to have a strong drive for distributive fairness. Support for social
and political institutions are therefore contingent on whether such
institutions are perceived to distribute outcomes fairly. Just as “economic
man” is assumed to be instrumental and selfish, “distributive justice man”
is interested in the extent to which outcomes are consistent with normative
distributive expectations. And whereas the self-interest perspective assumes
that people pay attention to “the amount” they get, the distributive justice
perspective assumes that citizens ask themselves if that amount can be
regarded as fair.
A related assumption is that people have concrete beliefs about
distributive justice. They have expectations as to what they have a right to
in contacts with public services, and they use these distributive justice
expectations to evaluate their actual outcomes. Welfare state experiences
thus emerge as a “mix” of actually experienced services on one hand, and
distributive justice expectations on the other. An implication of this mix –
which I will refer to as experienced distributive justice – is that whether
experiences are perceived as positive no longer depends entirely on their
short-term material implications.
Previous research suggests considerable heterogeneity in distributive
justice expectations. One source of heterogeneity is the multitude of
potential distribution principles. Scholars typically distinguish between at
least three broad categories of distributive ideals: “equality,” which means
everyone in a particular situation receives the same outcomes, “equity,”
where personal outcomes should match personal contributions, and
“need,” where outcomes vary according to personal need (Deutsch 1985).
Which principle is applied in a given situation often depends on the goal
that an individual attaches to a collective institution. In this vein, Lane
(1986) suggested that equality is a more important ideal in the realm of
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the public sector than in the capitalist market (see also Hochchild 1981).16
And as underscored by Tyler et al. (1997:57), “If people are pursuing
economic productivity as a goal, they should use equity as a principle of
justice. If they are trying to foster enjoyable and harmonious social
relationships, they should use equality [...] Finally, to foster personal
development and personal welfare, people should use need [...] In other
words, the goals people are pursuing should determine the principles of
justice they apply.” In addition, which distributive justice principle is
applied also depends on political values. For example, conservative and
rightist people are usually more prone than others to favour equity, and
less prone to favour equality (Rasinski 1987).
But perhaps the most important source of heterogeneity in distributive
justice conceptions is the nature of the welfare state itself. After all, the
welfare state comprises dozens of rather different institutions. Each
distributes different services with different goals, and each has a distinct
historical record. Distributive justice conceptions should therefore vary
substantially depending on what service we are talking about. Abstract
principles can only take us so far. For instance, the question of exactly
what service is implied by “equality” in the context of, say, childcare
opens up for a bewildering array of possible concrete distributive justice
expectations.
The notion that distributive justice conceptions vary greatly across
institutions received support in a Norwegian study by Ryghaug (1998).
She analysed distributive justice conceptions in concrete settings such as
childcare, hospitals, and job agencies, and found great variation across
institutions and individuals. The same individuals tended to apply rather
different distributive conceptions in different institutional settings.
Similarly, Tyler et al. (1997:56) summarised previous research on the
matter by noting that “principles of distributive justice are situationally
based. People do not simply apply general principles of justice to all
                                                
16 This contention has received empirical support in the context of public service
provision. Biel, Eek and Gärling (1997) analysed Swedish survey data and found
that equality was by far the most preferred distribution principle for public
childcare. Equity was the least popular one.
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settings. Instead, they have situational frameworks that indicate that
different principles of justice matter in different settings.”
In short, citizens’ views on what they have a right to expect in welfare
state contacts are heterogeneous and complex. Therefore, the nature and
origins of distributive justice expectations merit separate in-depth studies.
Our concern, however, is not to investigate distributive justice
expectations as such. Rather, our focus is on the attitudinal effects of
variations in perceived experienced distributive justice. We investigate if
those who personally experience distributive injustice also display lower
levels of support for the political system, for public welfare state products
and for leftist ideology.
What would be the rationale for such patterns? One possibility is that
people simply put a high moral value on distributive fairness (however
defined by different individuals in different situations). Distributive justice
is then an important moral currency in which “distributive justice man”
assesses collective institutions. If so, he may develop negative attitudes
towards public institutions that are perceived to undermine such fairness.
More rational lines of thought are also conceivable. Rothstein (1998,
2001) argues that the welfare state should not just be considered a
redistributor of transfers and services; it is also a creator of various public
goods. The defining feature of public goods is that everyone can enjoy
them, regardless of whether they have contributed to their production.
This typically stops such goods from being offered on profit-driven
markets. Examples of public goods created by welfare state institutions
range from the reduction of transaction and surveillance costs in otherwise
inefficient insurance markets to the reduction of crime and social unrest.
As Barr (1992:754) explains, “a welfare state is justified not simply by
redistributive aims one may (or may not) have, but because it does things
which private markets for technical reasons would either do inefficiently,
or would not do at all.”17 According to this account, support for and
development of welfare state institutions is not just driven by the usual
explanations such as ideology or interests. As Levi (1993, 1997) and
                                                
17 Also quoted in Rothstein (2001:217).
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Rothstein (1998, 2001) argue, support is also contingent on the extent to
which it actually manages to produce the public goods it promises.18
A prerequisite for the ability of a welfare state to create public goods is
reasonably that services and transfers end up where they should.
Therefore, people who experience distributive injustice in welfare state
contacts may infer that the welfare state has problems. As a result, their
feelings about large-scale government intervention and public
arrangements may become hostile. Some may even come to think that the
family or non-profit organisations are better equipped to create the public
goods in question. A parallel line of thought may reduce political trust.
Experiences of distributive injustice are then taken as a sign that
politicians and the political system are not performing well in controlling
and steering the public services they are ultimately responsible for.
Previous empirical research has identified several factors that affect
people’s propensity to support shared institutions supplying public
goods.19 Consistent with the arguments above, one such factor is whether
citizens perceive that institutions manage distributive justice. Building on
his own and others’ results within the field of social psychology, Wilke
(1991) argued that distributive justice matters for co-operation and
compliance in a great variety of different “social dilemmas” involving the
production of public goods. Individuals’ willingness to pay for, comply
with, or otherwise support a common institution or resource tends to drop
if it is not perceived to distribute its products fairly.
As for welfare state services, Eek (1999) analysed the impact of
distributive justice perceptions on Swedes’ willingness to pay for public
childcare.20 Drawing on both experiments and survey data, he found that
                                                
18 Distributive justice is not the only factor that is believed to be conducive to
compliance in social dilemmas. Indeed, Levi’s (1993, 1997)  “theory of contingent
consent” assumes that support for the production of public goods also depends on
whether individuals actually value the public good in question, on procedural
justice factors, and on what Rothstein calls “a just distribution of burdens.”
19 Empirical studies emphasise variables such as personal outcomes, procedural
fairness, group size, perceptions of other group members’ behaviour, and basic
value orientations, as explanations for willingness to contribute and otherwise
support common institutions (see Eek 1999:18-23).
20 See also Biel, Eek & Gärling 1997; Eek, Biel & Gärling 1998.
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a perceived discrepancy between personal distributive justice ideals and the
actual perceived distribution of childcare services, reduced willingness to
support public child care.
A small number of studies have used broader political orientations as
dependent variables. Tyler, Rasinski and McGraw (1985:716) found that
evaluations of Ronald Reagan were positively associated with perceptions
of distributive justice. Those approving of the way benefits were
distributed also tended to endorse the former Hollywood star. In contrast,
such an effect was not apparent when “trust in government” constituted
the dependent variable. However, drawing on American and Norwegian
evidence, Miller and Listhaug (1999) concluded that distributive justice
perceptions indeed affect political trust. This was true both for generalised
“sociotropic” judgements of distributive justice and for personally
experienced distributive justice.
Previous findings thus indicate that our hypotheses are not implausible.
But more research is needed. Not even in social psychology – where
empirical distributive justice research is most developed – have there been
many studies on the effects of distributive justice perceptions on political
attitudes (Eek 1999:28). Therefore, as noted by Miller and Listhaug
(1999:213), further political science research is needed. Heeding their call,
Chapter 8 investigates whether social psychological findings related to
more narrow and well-defined “social dilemmas” can be generalised to the
broader political orientations at focus here. More precisely, we investigate
whether people who have personally experienced distributive injustice
display lower levels of political trust and lower levels of support for the
welfare state and leftist ideology, compared to people who are personally
content in this respect.
When it comes to effects on political ideology, Chapter 8 will also
discuss an alternative hypothesis. As several scholars have pointed out, it is
not self-evident what ideological conclusions people should draw from
negative distributive justice-related experiences. As noted above, social-
psychology findings on social dilemmas suggest that distributive injustice
generally results in weakened support for the common institutions that are
supposed to resolve social dilemmas. However, exactly the opposite is also
logically possible: that distributive injustice actually strengthens people’s
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willingness to accept public spending and more leftist state intervention in
order to come to terms with the problems. Moreover, this opposite effect
could be especially common among people who already display a good
amount of support for the welfare state. Among such people, the natural
reaction to deficiencies such as distributive injustice may be an even
greater willingness to protect and support welfare state arrangements (for
similar points, see Kaase & Newton 1995; Huseby 1995; Pettersen 1995;
Svallfors 2001; Johansson, Nilsson & Strömberg 2001).
This alternative hypothesis poses a real threat to the empirical analysis.
The problem is not just that the overall sign of the effect could be the
opposite of what would be predicted by social psychology research on
issues of social justice. The problem is also that the impact of experienced
distributive justice could have a different sign depending on what
ideological leanings a person had before experiences occurred. And if this
is true, a zero overall effect could hide a great impact that has different
signs in different sub-groups.
In due time we will discuss the viability of these various possibilities.
However, this is best done in the light of the actual empirical findings. And
because the stage is not yet set for such a discussion, we postpone it to the
end of Chapter 8.
Procedural Justice
While the self-interest and distributive justice perspectives have readily
apparent differences, they share the assumption that individuals are
outcome-oriented. People are assumed to respond to personal experiences
on the basis of end results. The self-interest perspective claims that people
react to effects of outcomes on short-term material well-being. According
to the distributive justice perspective citizens are sensitive to how fair
outcomes are. In both cases, individuals evaluate and react politically to
experiences on the basis of outcomes and results. As Lind and Tyler
(1988:1) explain, “In social psychology, as in the behavioral and the social
sciences more generally, people have often been viewed as evaluating
social experiences, relationships, and institutions on the basis of the
outcomes they receive. Theorists have differed in precisely how they think
outcomes are linked to evaluations, but a general focus on outcomes
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characterises some of the most widely accepted explanations of social
behavior.[...] they all assume that people judge their [...] experiences in
terms of the outcomes they receive and that attitudes and behavior can be
explained by these outcome-based judgements.”
But welfare state experiences may involve more than receiving and
evaluating outcomes and results. They also involve an interaction process
between citizen and institution. For example, people who receive social
assistance have had face-to-face contact with a public employee before
receiving benefits. Users of public libraries pay visits to a public building
before borrowing books. Even Swedes receiving the universal child
allowance – sent out automatically to mothers with children – experience
some interaction with the public sector before the actual outcome is
delivered: I am thinking of things like receiving information about child
allowance, or even waiting for the child allowance to be sent out. Again,
the common denominator is that these experiences occur during an
interaction process leading up to an outcome. As we shall see, a frequent
by-product of such processes is politically relevant information that might
influence political orientations. Because of their focus on outcomes,
however, neither the self-interest perspective nor the distributive justice
perspective allows for the discovery of such effects.
Luckily, the procedural justice perspective directs our attention towards
these processes (Thibaut & Walker 1975). This perspective assumes that
citizens attach an independent value to procedural fairness in their
dealings with the public sector. People assess their experiences by
comparing the actually experienced interaction process with a normative
expectation as to what constitutes a fair procedure in a given welfare state
situation. As in the case of distributive justice, the nature and origins of
procedural expectations are probably heterogeneous and complex.
However, what we are interested in here is the impact of perceived
procedural justice and injustice on political orientations.
A fair procedure is not the same thing as a fair outcome. It is perfectly
possible to get a fair final “result,” at the same time as the process that
produced it was deeply unsatisfactory. Lind and Tyler (1988) exemplify
this conceptual point by telling the story of a woman in Chicago who was
charged with a minor traffic offence. The benevolent judge considered
 Self-Interest and Social Justice68
showing up in court and losing a day’s work as a cruel enough penalty. He
dismissed the case without hearing the woman. This meant that the
woman, who was convinced of her own innocence, was not given the
possibility to show photographs she had brought with her. In her mind
they proved that a road sign had not been visible: “After her case was
dismissed (a victory!) she was angry and expressed considerable
dissatisfaction with the court (as well as making several unflattering
remarks about the judge). Outcome-based models might find the woman’s
dissatisfaction difficult to explain, but process-based models would have
little trouble in accounting for her reaction: the woman felt angry because
the outcome she received was not arrived at using a procedure that met
her standards” (Lind & Tyler 1988:2).
Previous research shows that perceived procedural justice is an
important ingredient in individuals’ evaluations of a wide range of
situations (for an overview, see Tyler et al. 1997:Chapter 4). These
situations range from court experiences to work-life settings to
interpersonal relations. People who perceive procedural aspects of
allocation processes as fair are more inclined to express satisfaction, accept
decisions, and comply with rules and restrictions. These effects are
regarded as relatively independent of personal material gain and
perceptions of distributive justice. Procedural justice perceptions thus
influence attitudes even among people who receive comparable outcomes
from a process, and who make similar distributive justice judgements of
those outcomes.
A small number of studies have investigated how political attitudes are
affected by perceptions of procedural justice in experiences with public
institutions. For example, Tyler, Casper and Fisher (1989) interviewed a
sample of prisoners before and after their verdict. The authors found that
even when controlling for attitudes towards government before the
process, judgements as to whether the judicial process was fair strongly
influenced attitudes towards government after the process. Notably, the
severity of the sentence (in other words the outcome) had no impact on
post-verdict assessments of authorities, when controlling for perceived
procedural justice. The authors concluded that “the crucial feature from
the citizen’s perspective is not simply the distribution of burdens or
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benefits. Instead the political impact of the experiences we studied was
driven by judgments of procedural fairness. We observed these strong
procedural effects in one of the most threatening encounters that citizens
can have with their government” (Tyler, Casper & Fisher 1989:645).
Similarly, in their pioneer study of “bureaucratic encounters,” Katz et al.
(1975:Chapter 4) discovered that positive perceptions of procedures
tended to generate positive generalised attitudes towards government and
the political system. Finally, Tyler, Rasinski and McGraw (1985) and
Miller and Listhaug (1999) compared the effects of self-interest,
distributive justice, and procedural justice perceptions respectively. Using
political trust as the dependent variable, regression analyses suggested that
procedures have stronger positive effects than either personal self-interest
or distributive justice perceptions.
Overall, there seems to be some empirical merit to the claim that
procedural fairness in contacts with public institutions affects political
attitudes, controlling for outcome-based variables. However, we still know
more about outcome-related factors (especially self-interest), compared to
procedural effects. In particular, we know surprisingly little about whether
procedural justice perceptions of personal welfare state experiences on
political orientations can be generalised to other settings than the USA.
Voice opportunities as procedural justice
What aspects of procedures are important? Previous research has
highlighted a rather broad spectrum of possible variables. These include
the efficiency and speed with which people get service outcomes (Wilke
1991), whether people are treated with dignity and respect (Rothstein
1998; Lane 1986), and whether there is consistency and predictability in
procedures across time and people (Barrett-Howard & Tyler 1986).21
We will not analyse all possible aspects of procedural justice. Instead,
we focus on the one that has probably received the most attention in
academic as well as non-academic welfare state discourse. Let us refer to
this variable as experienced voice opportunities. The basic idea is that
                                                
21 See Grimes (2001), for a Swedish analysis on the impact of different types of
procedural aspects.
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procedures will be regarded as more fair if people feel that they can
exercise influence and communicate their views to public employees during
the interaction process leading up to welfare state outcomes.
The concept of experienced voice opportunities has two intellectual
sources. The first one can be traced back to Thibaut’s and Walker’s (1975)
work on procedural justice in legal systems. One of their conclusions was
that legal trials are perceived as more fair if they give disputants a greater
amount of control over the presentation of information and evidence in
the process. The more citizens control the facts and evidence that are put
forward, the higher the amount of perceived procedural fairness. Further
research in social psychology has largely confirmed that such voice
opportunities constitute a crucial procedural aspect for citizens in a great
variety of situations (ranging from court procedures to negotiating one’s
salary in employment settings). In addition, it has been shown that positive
procedural justice judgements contribute to the legitimacy of the
institutions and authorities in question even among people who receive
comparable outcomes and who make similar distributive judgements of
those outcomes, in other words controlling for factors related to self-
interest and distributive justice (Lind, Kanfer & Early 1990; van den Bos,
Wilke & Lind 1998).
Recent discussions on the future of the welfare state constitute the
second intellectual origin. Such discussions often begin with alleged
cognitive and value-oriented changes in developed nations. Increasing
educational levels are said to produce greater cognitive capacities, political
efficacy, and administrative self-confidence (Petersson, Westholm &
Blomberg 1989). Individualist or even “postmaterialist” values are
becoming more widespread (Inglehart 1990). These trends are believed to
have consequences for what citizens want out of their welfare state
contacts. It is argued that knowledgeable, self-confident, and individua-
listic citizens will no longer be content with being passive service
recipients. They also want to make their voices and opinions heard in the
process. At the same time, several studies have shown that many citizens
feel they have rather poor opportunities to influence experienced public
service institutions, as well as the personal life situation (Petersson,
Westholm & Blomberg 1989; Petersson et al. 1998).
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Arguments like these have had practical repercussions on the relations
between citizens and the welfare state (see Hoff 1993; Sørensen 1995;
Lindbom 1995). One increasingly popular reform is that users of an
institution (a school, a day care center, or a home for the elderly) are given
the opportunity to collectively elect representatives to a user board. This
board is given real decision-making power, or in some cases an advisory
function, in various local matters that are of varying importance to users
(see Sørensen 1997; Goul Andersen, Torpe & Andersen 2000; Jarl 2001).
Such institutional arrangements for collective influence have been widely
implemented in Denmark and are under way in for instance the Swedish
school system.
In addition to these increasingly popular collective resources for voice,
there is a trend in public services in the direction of market-like
organisational solutions, which among other things are designed to
promote exit-options and freedom-of-choice for citizens in their individual
service contacts. These organisational solutions are inspired by the so-
called “new public management,” and include competition among
different providers of comparable services, contracts between the political
“demand side” and service providers, as well as publicly financed and
regulated “vouchers” that follow citizens in their choices of service
providers (see Blomqvist & Rothstein 2000). Such organisational solutions
are thought to promote voice opportunities because the market-like
competition forces service providers to be more responsive to the
preferences of citizens who personally experience the institutions in
question.
The impact of experienced voice opportunities
Both social psychological research on procedural justice as well as the
institutional welfare state development raise questions about the actual
effects of experienced voice opportunities. Here, the theoretical literature
has identified a rather large number of potential effects.22 One category of
alleged consequences has to do with the quality of public services; quality
                                                
22 For more detailed discussions about the pros and cons of user influence and
voice opportunities, see Dahlberg & Vedung (2001:chapter 4) and Jarl (2001:54-
7).
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is often believed to improve if institutions take into account the opinions
and points of view of those who directly experience a service. According to
this argument, patients, parents of schoolchildren, users of libraries and so
on, have wishes and knowledge that are useful if welfare institutions are to
deliver appropriate services.
Another possible effect is found in arguments used to buttress the case
for improved collective voice opportunities. Inspired by participatory and
deliberative democratic ideals (see Pateman 1970; Mansbridge 1980;
Barber 1984; Elster 1999), proponents of collective voice opportunities
typically claim that such opportunities have positive democratic effects on
citizens. For example, service users who participate in discussions and
meetings with politicians, employees and other users are believed to
develop an increased understanding for the constraints and dilemmas of
the political process. Also, their general interest and engagement in politics
is thought to be boosted, especially when user boards are given real
decision-making power in important local issues.
How realistic are such predictions? The best answer is that we do not
really know. As Jarl (2001) and others have emphasised, there is a dire
need for further research. A smaller number of studies have investigated
the impact of participation in collective and institutionalised user influence
resources such as user boards (see Duit & Möller 1997; Kristensen 1998;
Goul Andersen & Hoff 2001). In an overview of these and other studies,
Jarl (2001:134-43) notes that while such participation may stimulate
political knowledge and engagement, the uncovered effects so far appear
confined to the institution in question. They have rarely been shown to
“spill over” to general political engagement and knowledge.
Further, from the perspective of this study, it is especially interesting to
note that experienced voice opportunities are often believed to affect
general political attitudes such as political trust and ideology (see Möller
1996; Rothstein 1998; Vedung & Dahlberg 2001). Attitudes towards both
the current political system as well as towards the welfare state are
believed to grow more positive if people feel that they can directly exercise
influence during their interaction with system outputs and services. In fact,
this was a main reason that the Swedish Social Democratic government
initiated the development towards increased user influence in the early
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1980s (Strandberg 1998:327-29). Indeed, “By giving users improved
opportunities to influence the public services one uses personally, the
Social Democrats hoped to avoid that citizens seek private alternatives”
(Jarl 2001:61).23 Similar concerns have been raised about a negative
impact of poor voice opportunities on political trust. There is a widespread
worry that citizens in large welfare states end up in “the black hole of
democracy” (Rothstein 1998). In this dark place, people depend greatly on
public service and welfare production for everyday life to function. At the
same time, there is too little opportunity to have an influence on those
services. The power to determine both one’s own life project, and to
influence public policies is limited. Such limited opportunities are often
believed to foster negative attitudes towards the democratic system as it
functions in practice.
The underlying assumption here is that citizens regard voice
opportunities as an important procedural value during contacts with
welfare state services. People do not just want to be passive recipients of
satisfactory public services; they also want to “have a voice.” Moreover,
to the extent that this assumption is correct, it becomes conceivable that
good experienced voice opportunities increase both the popularity of a
large welfare state as well as the legitimacy of the existing democratic
process. Given that people value voice, the legitimacy of both welfare state
arrangements and democratic institutions may increase when citizens
notice that the system and its employees are interested in and responsive to
people’s opinions. In contrast, those who experience a public sector that
does not seem to bother about registering citizens’ views may take this as a
sign that welfare state institutions and the political system are not
performing its democratic tasks very well. This may result in negative
attitudes towards the welfare state, and towards the political system and
its politicians.
These hypotheses are not terribly well researched either. However, they
have indeed received some empirical support when it comes to effects on
political trust. Möller (1996) provided qualitative interview evidence of a
link between experienced voice opportunities and broader political trust:
                                                
23 My translation from original Swedish.
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people who perceived good opportunities to exercise influence in their
contacts with childcare and elder care tended to use this as arguments in
their reasoning about the responsiveness of the political system at large.
Using Swedish survey data from the end of the 1980s, Assarson (1995)
came to similar conclusions.
Chapter 9 discusses the concept of experienced voice opportunities
further and continues the empirical research program on the link between
experienced voice opportunities and political orientations. In doing this,
Chapter 9 tries to make a contribution to both the more general research
on procedural justice, as well as to the scholarly debate on voice
opportunities and the future organisational look of the welfare state.24
Social justice as self-interest in disguise (or is social justice really social?)
So far I have discussed the three theoretical perspectives one by one. Little
has been said about their interrelations. This conveys the impression that
self-interest, distributive justice, and procedural justice have little to do
with each other beyond providing potential explanations of political
attitudes. To relax this exaggeration, I close the chapter by considering the
relations between variables representing the three perspectives.
The notion of three unrelated families of independent variables is rooted
in the two social justice perspectives. These perspectives build on the
assumption that people put great value on experiencing social justice, as
well as on the assumption that people tend to develop expectations as to
                                                
24 Note that this study investigates the effects of voice opportunities during
individual personal welfare state experiences. Unlike for instance Jarl (2001), we
do not analyse participation in collective resources for voice and user influence
such as representative user boards. It should be pointed out that some of the
alleged positive democratic effects – especially those on citizens’ political
involvement and knowledge – are built on the notion that users of public services
are actually provided with real decision-making responsibilities and that they
“deliberate” with each other in collective settings such as user boards, not just that
they individually experience voice opportunities in their personal service contacts.
In contrast, the predictions about how voice opportunities affect political
orientations do not seem as sensitive to whether we are talking about participation
in collective user influence, or about experienced voice opportunities in strictly
personal contacts with services. Given that people value voice opportunities, and
given that they at all update political orientations as a result of personal
experiences, there should reasonably be an impact of voice also in strictly personal
contacts.
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what outcomes and procedures people rightly deserve in a given welfare
state situation. Assessments of experienced justice reflect independent and
intellectually honest comparisons between normative expectations and
actual experiences. These independent and intellectually honest compari-
sons are not biased by each other or by self-interest concerns.
If this is correct, we have no reason to expect strong correlations
between variables representing the three different perspectives. There is for
instance no reason that those satisfied with the distributive aspect of
experiences should also be satisfied with procedures. By the same token
there is no reason why those whose material well-being is greatly
improved by the welfare state should perceive procedures and distribution
more favourably than others. Self-interest, distributive justice, and
procedural justice simply constitute independent dimensions of welfare
state experiences.
 In particular the self-interest perspective challenges these ideas. Self-
interested citizens are not believed to hold meaningful normative
expectations that they subsequently compare with actual experiences in an
intellectually honest and independent way. Rather, judgements of
experienced social justice reflect strongly the degree to which experiences
have actually served short-term material self-interest. As Tyler (1990:173)
puts it, “Economic analysts have suggested that ethical judgments are no
more than socially appropriate justifications for evaluations and behavior
actually governed by concerns of self-interest. If this is true, then empirical
research will not be able to separate concerns about justice from
judgments of personal gain and loss. If fairness judgments are only
rationalizations for judgments based on outcome favorability, we should
be able to predict individuals’ fairness judgements by knowing whether or
not they benefited from the outcome.”
According to this account, it is more socially acceptable for self-
interested citizens to assess welfare state institutions using arguments of
social justice than arguments relating to one’s own economic interests.
Because people are essentially driven by self-interest, and because they
usually seek a politically and socially correct disguise for that interest,
citizens who gain a lot from the welfare state in general or from a
particular institution will typically tell you they have experienced
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distributive and procedural justice. Conversely, people who gain less for
themselves will tend to judge justice aspects of experiences unfavourably,
thus rationalising their poor outcomes and resulting dissatisfaction. Social
judgements are not particularly social at all, but rather function as a
disguise for strictly personal interests.
In contrast to theories of social justice, then, the self-interest perspective
predicts that levels of personal economic gain from public services strongly
predict perceptions of experienced justice. Therefore, in addition to
investigating attitudinal effects of experiences, we must consider
empirically the internal relations between variables representing the three
theoretical perspectives. To what extent are social justice judgements
nothing but self-interest variables in disguise? This question is answered
particularly throughout Chapters 8 and 9.
Chapter 3
The Institutional Interface

p until now we have thought about personal welfare state
experiences in an individualist fashion. We have made a case for
why personal welfare state experiences may have greater attitudinal
effects than personal economic experiences. Moreover, individual
welfare state experiences were conceptualised in terms of self-interest,
distributive justice, and voice opportunities. Hypotheses were
developed as to how such experiences may affect political trust and
ideology.
In this chapter, however, we begin to think about the collective
structures behind individuals’ experiences. More to the point, we
consider institutional explanations for differences in experiences, and
in their political effects. We note that different people in the same
country experience radically different kinds of welfare state
institutions. The hunch to be developed is that some types of
institutions are better than others at generating positive experiences
and, in turn, support for the welfare state and the political system.
How does this task fit into the greater purpose of the study?
Consider Figure 1.1 – our causal playing field. One feature of this
model is that personal experiences and “perceptions” of the same
experiences are conceptually distinct: the experience effect is the result
of a process where “actual” experiences give rise to perceptions of
experiences, perceptions from which some political conclusion is
drawn (either directly or through “sociotropic” generalisation). Thus,
an implication of the model is that we should find empirical
correlations between actual personal experiences on the one hand, and
experience perceptions and political orientations on the other.
Unfortunately, testing such implications is difficult: it presupposes
external observations of actual personal experiences that are
independent of the individual’s own perceptions. Such independent
information could be used to create measures of actual experiences in
U
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terms of self-interest (“how much did experiences contribute to
material well-being”), distributive justice (“did the person actually get
the service she deserved?”) and voice (“did someone actually listen to
her views?”). Unfortunately, such information is extremely difficult
and expensive to collect for analyses of survey data comprising
thousands of respondents.1 It is easier to measure perceptions of
experiences as obtained through subjective survey questions to
respondents themselves.
For at least two reasons, however, it is not very satisfying just to
consider subjective perceptions of experiences. First, from a
substantive point of view, such measures would only offer tests of a
rather amputated version of the model represented in Figure 1.1. The
research problem covers the full causal chain specified in this model,
and we therefore want information about whether actual experiences
affect political orientations, not just about the effects of subjective
perceptions. Second, from a methodological point of view, it is easy to
become suspicious of survey measures of personal experience
perceptions. As will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 5, one
risk is that subjective accounts of experiences are mainly projections of
already existing political predispositions, rather than true reflections of
actually experienced events. Of course, this suspicion becomes
somewhat less problematic if it can be verified that subjective
perceptions do correlate with measures of actual experiences.
This study attempts to deal with “actual” personal experiences in
two ways. First, Chapter 7 will develop measures of both the
“objective” extent to which welfare state arrangements satisfy a
respondent’s self-interest, as well as subjective perceptions of interests.
The theory behind the second attempt is outlined in this chapter. By
conceptualising differences in which types of welfare state institutions
people have actually experienced, the following discussion develops a
framework for thinking about and measuring objective differences in
actual personal experiences, and not just perceptions thereof.
                                                          
1 More than this, in order for such measurement to be meaningful, one needs
clear conceptual yardsticks for the social justice variables in various welfare
state situations. And as discussed in chapter 2, the purpose of this study is not
to analyse exactly what citizens mean, or should mean, by distributive justice
and experienced voice opportunities in various situations.
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The new institutionalism in political science
The theory in this chapter is inspired by “the new institutionalism” in
political science. This research program suspects that the organisation
of various political institutions systematically structures individuals’
political preferences and behaviour (see March & Olsen 1984, 1989;
Skocpol 1994; Steinmo, Thelen & Longstreth 1992; Ostrom 1995;
Rothstein 1996; Immergut 1998; Thelen 1999; Peters 1999; Rothstein
& Steinmo 2002). March and Olsen (1984:734) explained the point of
departure like this: “a new institutionalism has appeared in political
science [...] The resurgence of concern with institutions is a cumulative
consequence of the modern transformation of social institutions and
persistent commentary from observers of them. Social, political, and
economic institutions have become larger, considerably more complex
and resourceful, and [...] more important to collective life.”
The research agenda of the new institutionalism is broad and
heterogeneous. It theorises the nature, the causes, and the political
effects of a great variety of institutions. These institutions involve for
example party systems, government structure, electoral systems, court
systems, and so on (see Rothstein 1996; Peters 1999).2 From our
perspective, it is interesting to note that several scholars see welfare
state institutions as causal factors influencing orientations towards
welfare state arrangements and the political system. Such arrange-
ments, it is argued, are not just endogenous results of political
preferences and interests among the population. They are also seen as
independent variables in their own right, with a potential capacity to
exercise a reciprocal influence on citizens’ preferences. In Cox’s
(1998:2) formulation, “the attention of scholars has shifted. Until the
1980’s, researchers sought to define and explain the development of
the welfare state. In the current period, scholars take it as a given that
the welfare state exists and seek to discover what effects it has [...] the
welfare state was once the dependent variable, and now it is employed
as the independent variable.”
The literature abounds with variants of this basic idea. Rothstein
(1998:135) argues that “Opinions, interests, values, ideology [...] all
influence institutions and policy. But policies and institutions also
influence opinions, etc.” Welfare state arrangements are said to
                                                          
2 For an extensive discussion on how political institutions should be defined,
see Rothstein (1996).
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“generate their own conceptions of justice, morality and distribution”3
(Svallfors 1996:18), and to affect “the way individuals define what is
rational and what their preferences should be” (Jacobs & Shapiro
1994:13; see also Korpi 1980; Skocpol 1994; Pierson 1994).
These scholars identify an interesting direction for public opinion
research. However, most claims in this vein are too general to contain
falsifiable propositions, and we need to shed more theoretical and
empirical light on the problem. It is no coincidence that statements like
the ones above almost always lack references to empirical studies. We
have surprisingly little empirical knowledge about which welfare state
institutions have which political effects on citizens.
                                                          
3 My translation from original Swedish.
For sure, there is no shortage of theorising. Typically, the idea that
welfare state institutions affect public opinion comes in either of two
versions. First, it has long been argued that the sheer size and
generosity of welfare state institutions influence how people in
different social groups perceive their political interests. For instance,
according to a common hypothesis, welfare states that extend services
to the well-off middle classes build self-interested support for
themselves also among these groups (see Dunleavy 1979; Taylor-
Gooby 1986; Zetterberg 1985; Esping-Andersen 1990; Baldwin 1990;
Pierson 1994; Svensson 1994). Essentially, this hypothesis is a macro
version of the self-interest perspective discussed in Chapter 2.
Second, it has been suggested that not only size, but also design,
matters (see Schneider & Ingram 1997; Rothstein 1998; Soss 1999).
Here, welfare state design refers to the structure of the direct
encounter between citizens and welfare state institutions. From this
perspective, the focus is not so much on what people eventually get
from an institution. Rather, similar to the social justice perspectives,
the emphasis is on institutional characteristics that affect what people
see, hear and feel when experiencing institutions. Different ways of
structuring the encounter between the individual and the organisation
teach people different lessons about the welfare state and the political
system. It has been suggested that such differences in “the institutional
interfaces” seen by citizens during experiences can give rise to
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systematic differences in experiences and, in turn, political attitudes. In
this spirit, Rothstein (1998:222) argues that in designing welfare state
institutions “we also in large part determine the normative attitudes
citizens hold about welfare policy.” Similarly, Schneider & Ingram
(1997:200) contend that welfare state design “is an important
independent variable that shapes citizens’ orientations.”
The idea that welfare state design affects public opinion is founded
on two important assumptions, displayed in Figure 3.1. First, welfare
state design is believed to affect citizens’ personal experiences with
welfare state institutions. Second, citizens are believed to generalise
their personal experiences when forming broader political orientations
(see Soss 1999). Very specific experienced facts thus “spill over” into
very general political orientations.
Figure 3.1 Welfare state design affects experiences. Experiences
affect orientations
The three boxes and two arrows in Figure 1 constitute five
intriguing theoretical problems to be addressed before empirical
analysis of the problem can begin. We have the three questions of how
to conceptualise institutions, experiences, and orientations respectively.
Also, we are in need of testable hypotheses representing the two causal
arrows. Fortunately, chapter 2 has already conceptualised experiences,
and chapter 4 will explain why political trust and ideology constitute
our dependent variables.
The work to be done in this chapter is to explain what welfare state
design means in this study, and to present hypotheses about how
experiences with different types of institutions may produce different
effects on political orientations. Chapter 10 undertakes empirical tests
of these hypotheses. In a nutshell, the question is whether the extent to
which institutional interfaces empower citizens matters for how
Personal
welfare state
experiences
General
political
orientations
Design of
experienced
welfare
state
institutions
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citizens’ perceive experiences, and in turn for political trust and
ideology.
Conceptualising institutions
There is still a discrepancy between the frequency with which neo-
institutionalist arguments about popular preferences have been put
forward, and the amount of individual-level evidence there is to
support them (see Svallfors 1996; Edlund 1999b). In fact, the
discussion has only recently begun to influence empirical public
opinion research. Let us, however, take a look at some of the empirical
studies that do exist. In particular, we are interested in how these
studies have conceptualised differences across welfare state institu-
tions.
Most studies to date have drawn on Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s
(1990) welfare state regime typology. Building on Titmuss (1974),
Esping-Andersen argued that the nature and development of Western
welfare states fall into three qualitatively distinct categories, or
“worlds of welfare.”4 In brief, he discerned one “liberal” welfare state
regime where the capitalist market is the main provider of welfare for
most citizens. Public welfare consists of not particularly generous flat-
rate benefits, which are distributed on the basis of economic means-
testing, and cater largely to the poor or otherwise needy segments of
society. Archetypal countries in the liberal world of welfare are for
instance the US and Australia. A second welfare state regime category
is the “conservative” one, containing countries such as Germany,
France, and various southern European countries. Here, benefits are
both more encompassing and generous than in the liberal regime.
However, benefits are typically related to past income, and are often
differentiated according to occupational affiliation. Moreover,
conservative welfare state arrangements encourage the traditional role
of the family as welfare providers; a principle of “subsidiarity”
prescribes that the public sector intervene mainly where the family can
no longer adequately care for its members. The third regime type is
labelled “social democratic.” Here, most public benefits are both
generous and universal in that they are connected to citizenship, rather
                                                          
4 There has been a vigorous debate on whether the regime framework should
be expanded and/or reconstructed so that it comes to reflect institutional
circumstances and effects not originally incorporated by the regime
framework. This discussion lies outside the purposes of this study, and
interested readers may want to take a look at for instance Sainsbury (1996)
and Castles & Mitchell (1992).
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than to occupational status as in the conservative regime, or means-
tested as in the liberal regime. Still, most benefits are income-related.
As Esping-Andersen (1990:28) explains, “all strata are incorporated
under one universal insurance system, yet benefits are graduated
according to accustomed earnings.” Finally, social democratic welfare
state arrangements do not try to promote the traditional social role of
the family, but rather seek to develop universal services such as child
care and elder care. The Scandinavian countries together with the
Netherlands are typically seen as social democratic welfare states.
A series of comparative studies have tested the predictions that the
regime framework makes about cross-country differences in political
attitudes and conflict patterns. For instance, it has been investigated
whether citizens in liberal welfare states display more ideological
resistance to public welfare, and whether people in “social
democratic” regimes endorse such policies. A second hypothesis
derived from the regime framework is that the effect of social class on
welfare state support is stronger in liberal welfare regimes and weaker
in social democratic regimes. The causal mechanism would be that in
social democratic regimes public services are heavily used also by the
middle classes. Where differences in the degree of public service usage
is less correlated with traditional social structure, the impact of social
structure on welfare state support might be diluted (Dunleavy 1979;
Esping-Andersen 1990).
Recent empirical findings have not been entirely kind to these
hypotheses (Papadakis & Bean 1993; Svallfors 1993, 1997; Papadakis
1993; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Lapinski et al. 1998; Edlund 1999a,
b). It seems to be a stable result that the effect of social class does not
vary much across welfare regimes. When it comes to the over-all level
of welfare state support, there is more uncertainty. Bean and
Papadakis (1993, 1998) and Svallfors (1993) analysed cross-national
variations and found only weak support for the prediction that welfare
support is lower in liberal regimes. On the other hand, Svallfors (1997)
and Edlund (1999b) discerned cross-country differences consistent
with the regime framework. Svallfors (1997), however, still concluded
that the differences in the strength of class effects predicted by the
regime framework were not to be found.
The status of the regime framework in the conceptual toolbox of
opinion research will be decided by future findings. However, several
scholars have suspected that this conceptualisation is not ideal for
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uncovering institutional impact on opinion. Bean and Papadakis
(1998:231) argue that “the [...] approach represents a fairly blunt
instrument for trying to identify the influence of politics on opinion.”
Similarly, Lapinski et al. (1998:21) contend that “Esping-Andersen
and others have constructed elaborate theories of welfare state
development. Our analysis raises questions about the microfounda-
tions of these theories. What are needed are institutional and political
analyses [...] anchored in accurate models of public perceptions,
attitudes and behavior.”
Shifting the attention towards individuals’ experiences of welfare state
design
From the viewpoint of individual-level opinion formation, there are at
least two problems with the regime framework. First, this otherwise
useful typology is a macro concept whose natural unit of analysis is
the state. In other words, the typology hovers quite far above the
experiential and informational factors that influence individuals
politically. As a consequence of this conceptual characteristic, many
studies have used comparative data sets from the World Values Studies
or the International Social Survey Program. In addition to its many
strengths, this strategy involves measuring crucial factors such as
“interaction with welfare institutions” with rough proxy variables
such as whether or not respondents live in a social democratic,
conservative or liberal welfare state.
Second, the regime framework focuses on welfare state size. People
are thought to be affected by welfare state relations through group- or
self-interest. Other types of experienced information such as perceived
distributive and procedural justice are largely absent as causal factors.
The focus on welfare state size and interests has left other hypotheses
about experience effects of welfare relatively neglected. Particularly
variations in the institutional interfaces which citizens see during
processes leading up to welfare outcomes are under-conceptualised.
In contrast to much previous research, this study investigates how
different welfare state designs within one country structure individuals’
experiences, and which effects these experiences have on broader
political orientations. Hence, we do not bundle diverse micro-level
experiences together into single macro-level welfare regimes. Also,
rather than probing mainly interests and outcomes, it offers an
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analysis of institutional differences as to how contacts between citizens
and the state are designed.
Empirically, Chapter 10 will utilise a sample drawn from the
Swedish population. Interestingly, although all respondents obviously
live in the same welfare regime, there is nevertheless great variation
within this regime as to the number and nature of individually
experienced welfare state institutions. A central argument is that if
such within-regime institutional variation is conceptualised and
measured, we gain important insights about the impact of welfare state
design on opinion formation.A similar approach was used by Soss
(1999) who compared Americans with experiences of the AFDC (Aid
to Families with Dependent Children) and the SSDI (Social Security
Disability Insurance) respectively. Drawing on both in-depth
interviews and the American National Election Studies, Soss found
that AFDC experiences had negative effects on electoral participation
and beliefs about the responsiveness of government whereas SSDI
experiences did not. This difference could not be attributed to socio-
economic differences that existed prior to welfare interaction. Rather,
the differences were attributed to the AFDC having more power over
its clients than the SSDI, and to the AFDC being worse at considering
clients’ views and preferences. By giving citizens the feeling of being
underdogs in relation to the state, AFDC experiences generated
negative attitudes towards public institutions and the political system.
Very similar conclusions were reached by Möller (1996) in his in-depth
interview study of Swedes with experiences from either child care or
elder care.
I extend previous studies using the described strategy by
simultaneously considering a large number of institutions (rather than
just two), and by using survey data (rather than mainly in-depth
interviews). Before that, however, I will outline the crucial concept to
be used in formulating hypotheses about which institutional designs
have which effects on political orientations.
The concept of institutionalised citizen empowerment
The concept of institutionalised citizen empowerment is a tool for
thinking about differences in how the institutional interface between
citizen and organization is structured. The concept emphasises welfare
state design rather than welfare state size and generosity of outcomes.
Although the concept can be traced back in the literature some thirty
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years (see Katz & Danet 1973; Katz et al. 1975; Lipsky 1980;
Goodsell 1981, 1983; Petersson, Westholm & Blomberg 1989; Nilsson
1996a; Schneider & Ingram 1997; Sørensen 1997, 1998; Goul
Andersen, Torpe & Andersen 2000; Peters & Pierre 2000), it has only
recently inspired empirical research into the link between welfare
design and political preferences (Hoff 1993; Möller 1996; Soss 1999).
Outside of public opinion research, however, the concept of
empowerment has been increasingly discussed. For instance, we noted
in Chapter 2 the worry that citizens in large welfare states can end up
in “the black hole of democracy” (Rothstein 1998), and that this
worry has resulted in various institutional changes in the direction of
more user influence.
The concept of institutionalised citizen empowerment can be
thought of in terms of a power balance, which can weigh over to either
the citizen or the public institution. In abstract parlance, the citizen
becomes more powerful (or “empowered”) the more she can influence
circumstances that the public agency or the citizen herself values. The
citizen becomes less powerful, the greater control the agency has over
circumstances that the agency or the citizen values (Hoff 1993:78-79).
An important assumption is that the degree of citizen empowerment
is partly affected by how an encountered institution is designed and
organised. To use the concept of empowerment in empirical analysis,
we must thus identify institutional factors that in reality determine the
power balance in the encounter between the citizen and the public
agency. The abstract definition above gives few hints. Its wide and
vague nature opens up for an, in principle, endless list of relevant
variables. Empirically, this study emphasises the two most important
institutional factors highlighted in the literature: (1) the
presence/absence of bureaucratic discretion, and (2) the extent of
realistic exit-options. The next section considers these two factors,
after which I discuss additional institutional traits that are theoretically
relevant.
Bureaucratic discretion and exit-options
Bureaucratic discretion refers to the degree of decision-making power
that public service institutions and their officials have in determining
whether or not an individual shall be granted access to the services
that the institution distributes (Lipsky 1980; Vinzant & Crothers
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1998; Schierenbeck, forthcoming).5 In some public services the amount
of discretion is low. A Swedish example is the child allowance, which
is an instalment that is automatically sent to all mothers with children
between 0 and 16 years of age. Here, the bureaucratic allocation
decision is reduced to an unambiguous registration of objective facts.
Given the availability of appropriate official records, the decision is
easy enough for computers to handle (Rothstein 1998). Other public
schemes are allocated in accordance with less objective policy
guidelines that are subject to interpretation. Potential beneficiaries
have to make credible that they fulfil linguistically constructed
entitlement conditions. Decision-making of this kind cannot be made
by computers. On the contrary, it presupposes human interpretation
and application of more or less ambiguous and vague rules to each
individual case.
An important assumption – elaborated by Michael Lipsky (1980) in
his studies of “street-level bureaucracies” – is that the citizen usually
becomes less powerful the larger discretionary power bureaucrats
have. Conversely, citizens are empowered when discretionary power is
decreased. Lipsky argued that street-level bureaucrats must often
compensate the vagueness inherent in centrally decided allocation
principles by developing further principles of an informal, subjective
and less explicit character. Such an informal praxis is often developed
in the face of a considerable workload, and serves to make the difficult
decisions manageable to solve without an unrealistic effort.
From the perspective of the citizen, the existence of informal rules
and praxis means that there is always a risk that civil servants to some
extent use “prejudice, stereotype, and ignorance as a basis for
determination” (Lipsky 1980:69). Hence, the bureaucrat exercises
great influence over something that is highly valued by the citizen: the
service that she wants to access. Since services do not have the
character of social rights, but rather that of negotiable and
                                                          
5 Following Rothstein, I do not include decisions made on more informal
professional grounds in the concept of discretion. Rothstein (1998:20-1)
points out that it is “a different thing to be denied a certain medical treatment
because the responsible physician deems it medically unsuitable, and to be
denied a certain public service because the responsible official judges one to
possess sufficient means to purchase it on the open market.” Hence, when
referring to discretion, what I have in mind is not professionals applying
occupation-specific norms (as in the case of the physician). Rather, the
concept refers to means-testing of an economic kind, or when a bureaucrat
applies other more or less formalised rules and policy instructions to
determine whether a citizen belongs to a target category.
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interpretable goods, it is more difficult for the citizen to “be tough” in
the interaction with the agency. At the same time, bureaucrats have
incentives to signal that the informal praxis around which their work
is partly built is not open for discussion or influence. Discretion thus
gives rise to an asymmetric power relation in which the citizen is well
advised not to “rock the boat” with too much persistence.
In addition to discretion, exit-options are important power
resources for citizens. The possibilities for people to turn their backs
on a public agency in the case of discontent influences the degree of
empowerment (Hirschman 1970). Exit-options come in two major
versions. First, there may be one or several other organizations –
private or public – offering a comparable service. Second, citizens may
sometimes exit a public service without re-entering another
comparable service at all.
A theoretical assumption is that public agencies and their
bureaucrats usually perceive an incentive to “keep its customers.” For
instance, librarians would not prefer it if people would use private
bookstores instead of libraries. Public schools do not desire an exodus
in the direction of private education. Thus, as exit-options improve,
bureaucrats and public employees become more likely to listen to
citizens’ complaints, adjust to their preferences, treat them with respect
and so on. In sum, exit-options make the power balance lean over to
the citizen.
In order for exit-options to have an influence on the degree of
empowerment, an important requirement must be met: options must
be realistic. While in principle it is true that citizens are almost always
free to leave public services, they are often tied down by economic
considerations. When it comes to services such as social assistance,
unemployment benefits etc., there are rarely real exit-options. Even
when they exist, emotional costs might make them unrealistic (as in
the case of moving your child from a public kindergarten to a private
alternative). To the extent that options are not realistic, and as long as
bureaucrats are aware of it, options cannot be expected to increase the
degree of empowerment.
Finally, one may add the requirement that exit-options must be
potentially costly to the public agency. Lipsky (1980:55) points out
that the demand for certain public services sometimes greatly exceeds
the supply. In such instances, the fact that some citizens choose an
exit-alternative might serve as a relief rather than as an incentive for
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responsiveness. Therefore, theoretically speaking, it is not obvious
whether there is a positive net effect of larger exit opportunities on the
degree of empowerment. Empirically, however, several studies have
yielded results that highlight the difference that exit-options make. For
example, Möller (1996) concludes that citizens who encounter service
institutions where there are real exit-opportunities seem to exercise
more influence over their public agency. When exit-opportunities are
low or non-existent, influence decreases. Furthermore, Petersson et al.
(1998) examined survey data over time and discovered that Swedish
reforms designed to improve exit-options and freedom of choice in the
areas of health care and primary education seem to have increased
opportunities to affect services, as perceived by respondents.
Other factors affecting the degree of empowerment
Discretion and exit-options are not the only institutional aspects that
contribute to the level of citizen empowerment (see Hoff 1993). For
instance, as discussed in Chapter 2, it has been increasingly debated
whether public service institutions should be designed so that they
allow opportunities to directly influence services. As previously
mentioned, in Danish public schools parents have the right to elect a
representative board with a significant amount of decision-making
power in matters concerning the school (Sørensen 1998; Lindbom
1998; Goul Andersen, Torpe & Andersen 2000; Jarl 2001). A
somewhat different type of user influence has to do with the extent to
which citizens’ opinions are registered as an inherent part in policy
evaluation of public services (see Dahlberg & Vedung 2001).
Moreover, the extent of citizen empowerment may be affected by
the extent to which service entitlement and quality are “individually
enforceable.” To what extent do citizens have specified, detailed and
legally binding rights to a certain kind of service, in a certain kind of
situation, within a certain time frame? Interestingly, the degree to
which public service rights are individually enforceable varies
substantially. For instance, Karlsson (2000) shows that British citizens
have more specified rights in relation to the National Health Service
through the so called “Patient’s Charter,” than do Swedes in contacts
with their health care system.
A further institutional empowerment factor suggested in the
literature is the extent to which citizens are isolated from each other in
contacts with an institution (Lipsky 1980). In some public services
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citizens do not meet, see, communicate with, or otherwise encounter
other people who interact with the agency. The middle-aged
homeowner who experiences an unfriendly voice on the phone when
trying to get through to the tax authorities cannot determine whether
the unfriendliness is a general pattern or simply the result of a single
public employee having a bad day. However, when the same
homeowner – who desperately needs a book on brick-laying – has to
wait forever for help in the public library, he has much better odds of
discovering that he is not the only one in the same situation.
As stated more generally by Lipsky (1980:118), “Isolated clients are
more likely to think of themselves as responsible for their situations.
They are unlikely to see their condition as a reflection of social
structure and their treatment as unacceptable.” When viewed from this
angle, increased citizen interaction means enhanced citizen power. To
see or hear of other people experiencing the same problems as oneself
makes individuals more inclined to regard problems as something that
the agency – not the citizen – should solve. Citizens become more
confident and persistent in their interaction with bureaucrats.
Complaints become more common and intense. Hence, the agency is
more likely to solve problems in manners consistent with citizens’
preferences.
Yet another institutional empowerment factor is the extent to which
institutions demonstrate power using physical and architectural
symbols. For instance, Goodsell (1977) used direct observation to
measure occurrences of for instance symbols indicating responsiveness
and service-mindedness, such as soft and comfortable waiting room
furniture, name badges or plates giving the receptionist’s name,
decorative pictures or calendars, informative signs or instructions
(“walk in,” “apply here”), plants or flowers visible to visiting citizens,
and so on. Conversely, Goodsell also registered symbols indicating
authority, such as flags, counters with risers or barriers between
citizens and employees, emblems, certificates, diplomas, and so on (see
also Fernlund 1988).
Finally, while these additional factors are inherent parts of the
theoretical concept that could enrich future empirical research on the
issue, they cannot be explicitly considered in our particular empirical
analysis. First, although discussions and experimentation concerning
institutionalised voice opportunities and citizen charters are currently
going on in Sweden (Karlsson 2000; Jarl 2001), they are at present too
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unusual to contribute empirically to this study. In contrast, the extent
of citizen interaction, the use of citizen-oriented program evaluation,
and the use of physical power symbols are institutional factors that
offer a real-world variation that can already be exploited in empirical
analysis. However, to measure these aspects, one would probably want
to consider qualitative approaches that deal more intensely with a
smaller number of citizens and institutions than is the case in this
study. It is likely that these aspects vary substantially across different
offices, hospitals, public schools and so on. Direct observation and in-
depth interviews are methods that seem better equipped than survey
analysis to register such variation (see for instance Goodsell 1977).
Here, it should be kept in mind that most previous research on the
effects of institutionalised empowerment has used qualitative
approaches to deal with a small number of institutions, and one
advantage of this study is that it simultaneously analyses experiences
with a large number of institutions among a large representative
sample of citizens. However, the price to be paid is that we cannot
consider all conceivable theoretical aspects built into the concept of
citizen empowerment. Instead, our classification of institutions will be
based on two major institutional factors highlighted in previous work
– discretion and exit-options. These aspects are more manageable in
the context of our research strategy because they give rise to a
relatively clear-cut classification as to how much different institutional
interfaces generally empower citizens. This is the task to which we
now turn.
Classifying institutions with respect to the degree of empowerment
Ultimately, we are interested in making predictions about attitudinal
effects of experiences with institutions with different levels of citizen
empowerment. A step towards formulating such hypotheses is to
classify real-world institutions according to how much their
institutional designs empower citizens. Following Hoff (1993) and
Möller (1996), the adopted approach involves coding different service
institutions along an ordinal empowerment variable with three
categories, as introduced in Table 3.1.  The categories are labelled
customer institutions, user institutions and client institutions,
respectively.
In the left-hand column we find the customer institutions. The label
is indicative of the fairly high amount of power and influence that
The Institutional Interface92
citizens enjoy in their contacts with these public agencies. Customer
institutions rarely make discretionary decisions as to whether one shall
get service access. Moreover, experiences are structured by the fact
that exit-options are frequent and realistic. Citizens can usually choose
either some kind of private alternative, or do without the service
altogether. In customer institutions, therefore, the power balance leans
more to the citizens’ side than otherwise.
Table 3.1 Swedish public service institutions categorised according
to degree of institutionalised  citizen empowerment
Customer institutions
(higher degree of
empowerment)
User institutions
(medium degree of
empowerment)
Client institutions
(lower degree of
empowerment)
Public transportation Kindergartens Elder care
Public sports facilities Child health care Social assistance
Public libraries Local health care Housing allowance
Public culture activities Hospitals Public transportation subsidies
Public leisure time activities Public job agencies
Public dental care Handicap care
It should be pointed out that Hoff (1993) and Möller (1996) use the
word consumer to denote a high degree of empowerment.6 I have
chosen the term customer instead because I think it captures the
market similarities better: All citizens who use a public service are –
strictly speaking – consumers of that service, regardless of the
characteristics of the institution in question.
The right-hand column contains client institutions. The term signals
that citizens enjoy a low degree of empowerment in relation to the
public institution. For instance, clients are usually dependent on a
discretionary decision. Also, to the extent that exit-options exist, they
are often less realistic or easily exploited in that they are associated
with economic costs. In addition, there are often emotional and
                                                          
6 Note that Hoff (1993) and Möller (1996) use the word “autonomy” in
their respective Scandinavian languages for what is here called empowerment.
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physical costs involved in exiting from these institutions: Elderly
people, for instance, are in all likelihood fairly reluctant to move (see
Möller 1996).
In the middle column, we find institutions that can be regarded as
compromises between the customer and the client extremes.
Consequently, a term that is relatively neutral - user institutions - has
been chosen. The word bears with it little in the way of market
connotations as does the word customer. This indicates that citizens
cannot be regarded as free-to-leave autonomous actors. Neither does it
conjure up the underdog picture of a client with little influence over
what his representative does on his behalf. Typically, there are few or
no alternatives to user institutions; exit-opportunities are scarce,
thereby reducing the degree of institutionalised empowerment. Again,
to the extent that exit-opportunities exist, there are emotional costs
involved that reduce their effectiveness (most people would hesitate
before sending their child to a different, perhaps private,
kindergarten). As a counterweight to this, however, users are not in
the hands of a street-level bureaucrat making ultimately subjective
interpretations in order to reach a discretionary allocation decision.
Who shall be granted access to user institutions is usually relatively
unambiguous. Entitlement is connected to citizenship, which enhances
the degree of institutionalised empowerment.
Hypotheses
It is now time to put the conceptual building blocs together into
concrete hypotheses. An important prediction is that higher degrees of
institutionalised citizen empowerment tend to yield more positive
welfare state experiences in terms of perceived distributive and
procedural justice. Here, one causal mechanism is that empowering
institutional interfaces signal that it is a legitimate role for the citizen
to voice opinions and criticism (Schneider & Ingram 1997). When
citizens do not feel like powerless clients but rather like empowered
customers, they may be more likely to communicate preferences
concerning procedural and distributive aspects to employees.  At the
same time, enhanced empowerment often increases an institution’s
incentives to adjust to citizens’ expectations. In particular, the
existence of exit-options means that a public institution runs a certain
risk of losing its customers unless it is responsive. In summary, if
citizens are more likely to voice expectations about outcomes and
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procedures, and if public institutions and employees are more likely to
be interested in them, experienced distributive and procedural justice
might reasonably grow more positive (for similar arguments, see
Lipsky 1980; Goodsell 1981; Möller 1996; Rothstein 1998; Soss
1999).
Moreover, bureaucratic discretion may produce negative distribu-
tive judgements through an additional mechanism. Since discretion is
usually associated with more or less ambiguous, vague or otherwise
difficult policy guidelines interpreted by a powerful bureaucrat, things
are bound to “go wrong” more often than in universal public services
(for similar arguments see Lipsky 1980; Goodsell  1981; Rothstein
1998). Some of those who, according to guidelines, are actually among
“the deserving” will occasionally be denied access, and less deserving
applicants will occasionally be granted access. A related problem is
that some citizens may make problems worse by exploiting the
difficulties created by bureaucratic discretion. This involves misusing
public services by cheating, lying or otherwise trying to be perceived as
a deserving service recipient. Even the honest majority of citizens who
have no such intentions may notice that such possibilities exist for
others.
Discretion might also complicate procedural aspects of experiences.
This is a possibility both when it comes to experienced voice
opportunities, as well as when it comes to other procedural aspects like
being treated politely and respectfully, and receiving service swiftly
and efficiently. Again, the point of departure is that client experiences
involve a more asymmetric and perhaps less pleasant relation between
the citizen and the state, compared to other experiences. As a
consequence, the confidence and opportunities to communicate
opinions to the agency often decrease (Möller 1996). In fact, the
discretionary powers of client institutions can even mean that the
citizen sees a greater incentive “not to cause problems” by
complaining (Lipsky 1980). Experienced voice perceptions may thus
grow negative. Also, the absence of exit opportunities in client
experiences may reduce employees’ incentives to appear interested in
and responsive to citizens’ views and preferences.
In contrast, think about customer experiences. The relatively high
degree of power that customers exercise could give the citizen
confidence and opportunity to voice discontent with distributive and
procedural aspects of service provision. At the same time, bureaucrats
                                                                      The Institutional Interface 95
no longer have the same incentives to appear tough and unresponsive
to guard against criticism of an informal discretionary praxis. Also,
exit-options are an additional resource for welfare state customers.
This resource should often give institutions incentives to be responsive
to procedural and distributive preferences among citizens. For
instance, incentives may increase to “keep customers” by means of
swift and polite service delivery than would otherwise be the case.
Finally, as elsewhere in this study, we are interested in the extent to
which citizens generalise experiences into more overarching political
orientations. To what extent do people draw general inferences from
specific and personally experienced facts when forming broader
political orientations? Do experiences with different types of
institutions affect, not only perceptions of experienced distributive and
procedural justice, but also general political orientations?
Specifically, we will investigate whether experiences have a more
positive impact on support for state intervention, satisfaction with
democracy, and trust in politicians, the more empowering institutional
interfaces are perceived to be. This hypothesis is basically an extension
of the hypotheses presented in the sections on social justice in Chapter
2. Experienced distributive and procedural justice judgements are seen
as information relevant to the formation of political orientations. For
instance, experienced distributive justice may inform people about the
extent to which the welfare state functions in practice (“do service and
help end up where they should?”), and about how well the political
system is managing the welfare state. Likewise, procedural aspects
such as efficiency, politeness, and the quality of voice opportunities say
something about how the public sector and the political system treats
citizens, and how responsive to popular preferences the political
system and its implementing institutions are.
But experienced distributive and procedural justice are not the only
mechanism through which these effects may work. In particular it is
possible that especially discretion structures views, not only of what
one has personally experienced, but also one’s view of other citizens.
We have opened for the possibility that discretionary services have a
higher probability than other institutions to raise suspicion concerning
cheating and abuse. It is therefore conceivable that personal exposure
to discretionary services tend to stimulate negative views on other
people’s morality and trustworthiness (Rothstein 2001). Indeed, based
on one of the data sets used in this study, it has been demonstrated
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that the greater the number of discretionary public services individuals’
have recently experienced, the lower the level of generalized trust in
other people they tend to display. This effect is present also after
controlling for political ideology, personal life satisfaction, and a range
of socio-economic and demographic variables (Kumlin & Rothstein,
forthcoming). These findings are interesting as generalised trust in
other people in turn has a certain tendency to increase both political
trust as well as support for leftist ideology and state intervention (see
Newton 1999). Hence, in addition to experienced distributive and
procedural justice, generalised trust might be an additional causal
mechanism through which the hypothesised institutional effects might
operate.
In conclusion, these hypotheses build on the theoretical contention
that the design of experienced welfare state institutions affects political
orientations. As underscored by Schneider and Ingram (1997:200-
201): “The theory of design presented here contends that attitudes and
participation are influenced by public policy [...] Public policy is an
important independent variable that shapes citizens orientations and
perpetuates certain views of citizenship.” Chapter 10 will tell us
something about whether this theoretical line of reasoning is
empirically fruitful.
Chapter 4
Political Trust and Ideology

n the first three chapters, we thought mainly about the explanatory
side of our research problem – how personal welfare state
experiences affect political orientations. We have discussed potentially
influential aspects of welfare state experiences, and how different sorts
of welfare state institutions may systematically affect these aspects.
However, while Chapter 1 gave away the basic information that the
dependent variables will be political trust and ideology, little has
actually been said about these political orientations and the processes
through which they may be affected by personal welfare state
experiences.
We have proceeded like this with good reason. The main research
puzzle outlined in chapter 1 has to do with a will to learn more about
political effects of personal welfare state experiences, rather than an
aim to explain a maximum amount of variation in any given
dependent variable. Nevertheless, we are left with a theoretical gap
and the purpose of this chapter is to fill it.
It begins by discussing different possible mental processes
underlying experience effects, a discussion that is structured by a
distinction between “memory-based” opinion formation and “on-line”
opinion formation respectively. This discussion leads to the two major
groups of dependent variables: political trust and ideology. After
having pondered definitions of, and alternative explanations for, these
political orientations, we consider the possibility that the ingredients of
the experience effect vary across trust and ideology. Specifically, we
raise the suspicion that the relative importance of self-interest and
social justice varies depending on whether political trust or political
ideology constitutes the dependent variable.
I
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The experience effect: memory-based or on-line?
A fundamental assumption of new institutionalism is that individuals
have limited cognitive capacity. In a complicated and volatile world,
individuals look to stable institutions and standard operating
procedures for guidance as to what attitudes and behaviour are
appropriate (see March & Olsen 1989; Steinmo, Thelen & Longstreth
1992; Rothstein 1996). Interestingly, while explicitly acknowledging
limited cognitive capacity, the literature often implicitly promotes
over-optimistic views on how politically sophisticated and motivated
citizens are. Individuals are assumed to keep track of a large number
of socio-political orientations, including values, norms, identities,
opinions, attitudes, and ideologies. Also, people are assumed to be
motivated enough to update these orientations in the light of new
relevant information emanating from institutions. As expressed by
March and Olsen (1996:249), “Institutions organize hopes and
dreams, and fears as well as purposeful actions [...] emotions and
expressions of emotions [...] sentiments of love, loyalty, devotion,
respect, friendship, as well as hate, anger fear, envy, and guilt.”
Likewise, Rothstein (1998:135) argues that “Opinions, interests,
values, ideology [...] all influence institutions and policy. But policies
and institutions also influence opinions, etc.”
The implicit assumption that people hold and update a large
number of political preferences is problematic. It has long been known
that citizens’ political belief systems typically fall short of the classical
ideal when it comes to scope and crystallisation (Converse 1964;
Luskin 1987; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). People simply do not walk
around with a great number of preexisting political attitudes that are
all changed in the light of new information. Therefore, we want to
specify in more detail what type of political attitudes might reasonably
be affected by experiences with welfare state institutions.
A first step in the search for realistic dependent variables is to
distinguish between two broad categories of opinion formation
models: memory-based opinion formation and on-line opinion
formation respectively. It should be pointed out right from the start
that the intention is not to explicitly test the empirical viability of these
models. This would be a task for many separate studies. Instead, we
take advantage of the research that has accumulated around these
models. This discourse will eventually help us in selecting dependent
variables that are meaningful when looking for political effects of
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welfare state experiences. In fact, as we will eventually see, the choice
of dependent variables is based on the idea that on-line opinion
formation is often the more realistic model for such effects.
Memory-based opinion formation
According to memory-based models, the immediate cause of an
attitude is the information about the object in question that can be
remembered at the time of forming the attitude. An attitude is the
outcome of the particular mix of “pros and cons” or “likes and
dislikes” one can recall at the time of forming the attitude. Memory-
based explanations of political attitudes and behaviour are common.
For example, according to Kelley’s and Mirer’s (1974:574) theory of
“the simple act of voting,” “the voter canvasses his likes and dislikes
of the leading candidates and major parties involved in an election [...]
he votes for the candidate toward whom he has the greatest number of
net favourable attitudes.”1
An important category of memory-based models build on the notion
of agenda-setting (McCombs & Shaw 1972). As in the case of other
memory-based models, one of the assumptions made by agenda-
setting-based models is that politically unmotivated citizens do not
consider a great amount of information. Rather, they draw on the
facts that are immediately available in memory, in which there is just
space for a limited number of considerations at a given time. Because
of such limited cognitive capacity and motivation, people do not form
attitudes on the basis of all potentially relevant issue areas, but mainly
those that are easily accessible in memory. Models building on the
notion of agenda-setting include those of “priming” (Iyengar & Kinder
1987; Miller & Krosnick 1996) and of “party competence” (Schmitt
2001). According to these models, citizens evaluate parties and
candidates based on perceived performance and future competence in
salient issue areas (that is, issues that are high on the agenda and
readily available in memory).
Yet another example of a memory-based model is Zaller’s (1992:49)
model of opinion formation. According to this model, opinions are
usually not formed before the survey researcher asks for them. If
prompted for an opinion, the respondent forms it “on the spot” aided
by the information that happens to be immediately available in
memory: “persons who have been asked a survey question [...] answer
                                                          
1 Also quoted by Lodge & Stroh (1993:226).
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the question on the basis of whatever considerations are accessible “off
the top of the head.” In some cases, only a single consideration may be
readily accessible, in which case people answer on the basis of that
consideration; in other cases, two or more considerations may come
quickly to mind, in which case people answer by averaging across
accessible considerations.”
Memory-driven opinion formation is somewhat problematic in the
context of personal welfare state experiences. Such effects would
presuppose that a person memorises a personal experience and recalls
it as a political argument when at some later point it is time to make a
political choice. This is an extremely demanding psychological
foundation for experience effects. The problem is that the subsequent
political choice – perhaps casting a vote or answering a survey
question – typically lies far away in the future. And we know that
most people are not greatly motivated to remember political
information for future opinion formation. Rather, citizens are prone to
forget political information, facts and arguments rather quickly
(Lodge, Steenbergen & Brau 1995). Specifically, it is has proven
empirically unlikely that political arguments drawn from “the top of
the head” are products of personal experiences. Rather, as
demonstrated by Zaller (1992) and others, immediately available pros
and cons in salient issues are likely to be the result of recent media
attention to partisan and expert elites. Such elite messages are often
more readily available in memory as arguments than personally
collected information.
Of course, some welfare state experiences are not just discrete,
isolated events that people forget easily. Contacts with institutions like
kindergartens, schools, public transportation and so on, often entail
regular repetition of more or less the same experience. Memory-based
experience effects seem more plausible if people are repeatedly
reminded of for instance a deficiency in a service that is important to
them. Such repeated experiences could carry a rather stable salience
weight that survives shifts in the elite discourse. On the other hand,
many welfare state experiences are in fact not repetitive processes.
Visiting an emergency room, applying for housing allowance,
borrowing books in the library, and many other types of experiences,
are often best depicted as rather discrete events; it may take a long
time before one has a comparable experience again.
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Sometimes political choices are made soon after personal
experiences have occurred. At the time of an election or opinion poll,
many citizens have had some recent contact with one welfare state
institution or the other. These experiences can reasonably stay
available in memory for a number of days or weeks, so as to
automatically pop up as a pro or contra argument when it is time to
form the preference. But then again, such memory-based experience
effects clearly denote a rather short-term impact: only very recent
experiences matter, whereas past experiences are inconsequential as
they are no longer readily available in memory.
Here, it should be pointed out that elite discourse and the mass
media may remind us of the political relevance of past everyday
experiences. Mutz (1998:147) launched the hypothesis that the mass
media has the power to “contextualise” and “politicise” personal
experiences: “By weaving discrete events into a continuing story,
media may enable people to see their problems and concerns as part of
a broader social pattern [...] mass media contribute to the
politicisation of personal experience by exposing people to the similar
experiences of others. It is through media coverage that the
unemployed worker learns she is one of many thousands nationwide
and that the crime victim learns his robbery was not an isolated
incident, but rather part of a pattern of increasing drug-related crime.”
Empirically, Mutz examined the impact of personal unemployment
concerns on ratings of US presidential performance. She found that
under a period of heavy unemployment coverage in the media, the
causal link between personal unemployment concerns and presidential
ratings was strengthened by increased media usage. In a similar vein,
Johansson (1998) discovered that the agenda-setting power of local
mass media in the health care area was greater among Swedes with
recent personal health care experiences. Taken together, these studies
suggest mutually strengthening interaction effects between the political
impact of personal experiences and that of mass media coverage: both
personal welfare state experiences as well as mass mediated welfare
state information become more influential when the two are similar to
each other (see also Iyengar & Kinder 1987).
Memory-based accounts of personal experience effects appear more
realistic if the media remind people of an otherwise forgotten political
relevance of personal experiences. However, the prerequisites are
tough. In fact, Mutz (1998) found that mutually strengthening
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interaction effects only happened when personal experience
perceptions and media coverage were similar to each other, that is
when the media were depicting unemployment in ways that
“matched” or “fitted with” many people’s personal situation. Mutz
(1998:151-2) concluded, “it is only when media coverage of the
impersonal world coincides with personal experience that these
experiences appear to take on additional political significance.” More
than this, the data even indicated that when personal experience
perceptions and sociotropic perceptions did not match, personal media
usage even had a weakening, depoliticising influence on the link
between personal experiences and political attitudes.2
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that memory-
based accounts of personal experience effects are problematic. While
memory-based experience effects certainly occur, the memory
limitations on which the model is founded also seem to disarm the
political force of a dismayingly large number of welfare state
experiences. In fact, if we were to base personal experience effects
exclusively on memory-based assumptions, many politically relevant
personal experiences could in fact not play a great causal role. Rather,
such impact would be reserved for recent or reoccurring experiences.
Alternatively, impact would be reserved for experiences that fit with
current extensive media reports about welfare state institutions.
Clearly, this group of experiences only makes up a small portion of the
total amount of personal welfare state contacts.
On-line opinion formation
The on-line model tells a different story about how people transform
incoming political information into political attitudes (see Hastie &
Park 1986; Lodge, McGraw & Stroh 1989; Lodge & Stroh 1993). The
point of departure of this model is that people often have an easier
time telling you their opinion on some issue or party than they have
                                                          
2 In addition, while media exposure may (at times) strengthen the direct
personal-political link, it often simultaneously undermines the indirect link
flowing through sociotropic perceptions. This occurs because media exposure
tends to increase one’s general level of information and knowledge about a
problem. And as discussed in Chapter 1, more general and accurate
information tends to decrease the need to fall back on personal experiences as
an information source for the formation of sociotropic perceptions. Personal
experience becomes more politically important the lower the knowledge about
relevant macro conditions (Conover, Feldman & Knight 1986; Weatherford
1983).
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giving an accurate account of the information and facts behind their
stand. Affective elements such as values, opinions, and evaluations are
thus believed to stick in memory with more persistence than the facts
and information that once created them, especially when individuals
lack motivation.
Moreover, in contrast to the assumption that only information that
sticks in memory matters, the on-line model states that incoming
information is more or less immediately translated into a new attitude
(or, more commonly, into an updated version of an already existing
attitude). After this operation, the information that caused the update
of the attitude is forgotten. However, while the information itself is
forgotten, the attitudinal result of that forgotten information lingers
on. In this way, the on-line model explains why years later we may still
know perfectly well whether we liked, say, a movie, at the same time
as we have long forgotten the data that created our evaluation: scenes,
actors, plots, or even how it all ended.
The on-line model thus predicts a difficult time for citizens in
answering accurately questions about the facts, events and information
behind their evaluations and attitudes. Of course, that people do not
give accurate answers does not mean they cannot provide some kind of
answer. But as formulated by Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau
(1995:311), “At best, citizens’ recollections will represent a biased
sampling of the actual causal determinants of the [...] evaluation.” Or
as Rahn, Krosnick and Breuning (1994:585) argued in the context of a
study of US congressional candidate evaluation “voters do not
necessarily store all of those specific pieces of information in memory,
and they are likely to forget some of those they do store as time passes
[...] Therefore, they are likely to remember only a subset of this
knowledge on election day, and that subset may well be
unrepresentative of the larger pool of information on which their
overall candidate evaluations were based.” More than this, such
recollections might be nothing but rationalisations that do precious
little to reveal the real informational basis of attitudes. Indeed, “a
great number of studies have now shown that people are unaware of
many of the most important causes of their preferences [...] when
asked to explain their preferences, people are biased toward
mentioning reasons that sound rational and systematic” (Rahn,
Krosnick & Breuning 1994:584).
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The on-line model facilitates a realistic way for personal welfare
state experiences to bring about political effects. According to the on-
line model, citizens do not need to store experienced facts for some
distant point in time when it might be needed for opinion formation,
voting, or for making some other political decision. They only have to
update an attitude at the time of the experience, after which they can
safely forget all its political connotations. When the researcher after
some time asks why a person holds a certain opinion, she will hardly
come to think of the experience as a prominent reason. Still, although
its political connotation is not remembered, the experience may have
played a causal role. If this is the case, we should find a correlation
between experience measures and attitudes.
The on-line model opens for a more long-term political impact of
experiences, as the attitudinal update brought about by an experience
can linger on after its political relevance has been long lost. This also
means that a greater number of experiences can play a political role,
compared to memory-based opinion formation: experiences that did
not occur recently, as well as those that are not of the re-occurring
kind, can indeed matter for political attitudes. Likewise, political
impact is no longer reserved mainly for experiences that fit with
current and intensive media reports that remind citizens of a forgotten
personal-political connection that would otherwise not be remem-
bered.3
Preconditions for on-line opinion formation
Based on the discussion above, it seems sensible for this study to use
dependent variables that could reasonably be affected, not just by
information immediately available in memory, but also through on-
line opinion formation. But we must be cautious: while memory-based
effects could occur for just about any opinion, attitude, or orientation,
                                                          
3 Of course, people still need to notice the political relevance of an experience
at the time it occurs. As discussed in Chapter 1, a suspicion in this study is
that welfare state experiences, by virtue of their direct links to public policies
and responsible politicians, are more likely to stimulate political thinking
compared to personal economic experiences. However, beyond these basic
differences between the two policy domains, it is still likely that increased
media attention on a particular welfare state institution would to an even
greater extent politicise people’s experiences of that institutions, at least if
media reports fit with many people’s experiences. This possibility is discussed
further in Chapter 5.
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on-line processes are realistic for a rather limited number of potential
dependent variables.
We may discern a number of preconditions for on-line opinion
formation (see Feldman 1995; Huckfeldt et al. 1999; Lavine 2002).4
First of all, in contrast to the implicit but unrealistic assumptions in the
neo-institutionalist literature, the number of continuously updated
attitudes must be quite limited. We thus subscribe to Zaller’s
(1992:50) observation that “Although a fair amount of evidence
supports the on-line model, there are strong reasons for doubting that
it holds generally within the domain of political attitudes [...] it is
wildly unrealistic to expect citizens to use each piece of incoming
information to update all of the ‘attitudes’ to which it might be
relevant. Thus, for example, a news story about the suffering of
homeless people would, in the idealized world of on-line processing,
require updates of attitudes toward the welfare system, the value of big
government, the efficiency of capitalism, the president’s attempts to
trim welfare spending, voluntary charity, the American way of life,
among others – which is to say many more subjects that a person
could possibly rethink at the moment of encountering each new piece
of political information.” This quote, then, illustrates that the notion
of limited political cognitive capacity and motivation among citizens is
clearly violated if we begin to assume that people apply the on-line
strategy to each and every political judgement for which there might
be survey data.
Second, on-line opinion formation becomes more realistic when
people see it as a useful exercise for the future. For instance, based on
experimental data, Hastie and Park (1986) found that on-line opinion
formation was more common if subjects were instructed beforehand
that they would later be asked for the particular evaluation in
question, whereas memory-based processes dominated when subjects
were not supplied with this information. It thus appears as if keeping
track of an attitude, and updating it in an on-line manner in the light
of new information, becomes a more meaningful and common exercise
if people expect to make some use of the attitude in the future.
                                                          
4 Lavine (2002) discusses a large number of factors governing the extent to
which memory-based and on-line opinion formation processes respectively
occur. These include, not only variation across different political choices, but
also variation across different individuals, as well as across time and contexts.
Here, I concentrate on variation across political choices, and do not consider
the other types of variation as the purpose is restricted to the selection of
realistic dependent variables for personal welfare state experience effects.
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From this one may deduce that on-line opinion formation becomes
more realistic if an attitude is of a general and overarching character,
so that it will be relevant for many political choices in the future.
Many studies emphasise that although most citizens do not walk
around with firm, pre-existing opinions on a large number of concrete
issues, they often have a small set of general political orientations or
values. These orientations can be described as “shortcuts” to concrete
opinions, or as “ideological schemas” that are used for interpretation
of new incoming information. They are affective/moral orientations
towards large classes of political objects and issues, but are not
necessarily accompanied by a great amount of knowledge,
information, and facts that could serve as rational arguments for such
basic political stands (Lau & Sears 1986; Popkin 1991; Sniderman,
Brody & Tetlock; van Deth & Scarbrough 1995).
Furthermore, frequent use of an attitude has two additional
consequences that both facilitate on-line processes. One is that
frequently used attitudes have a tendency to grow emotionally stronger
and are held with more intensity than “new-born” opinions formed
“on the spot.” And because emotionally strong attitudes typically have
an easier time staying accessible in memory, they are also more likely
to be subject to on-line updating. Another facilitating condition
created by frequent use is related to “evaluative repetition,” that is, the
number of times an individual recalls, uses and updates an attitude.
The idea is that people gradually learn to notice the implications of
new information for the attitude in question, thus gradually getting
better at updating it in an on-line fashion (Lavine 2002).
Finally, there is an empirical rule-of-thumb for identifying attitudes
to be potentially affected by on-line processes. More specifically, such
attitudes should be much more stable over time than memory-based
attitudes made “on the spot” based only on immediately available
information drawn from off “the top of the head." This is because in
the on-line case the respondent reports a firm pre-existing score along
the measured dimension, one that only changes gradually due to new
information. In contrast, in the pure world of memory-based political
choice, attitudes are dependent on whatever considerations that are
currently available in memory. Because the mix of such immediate
considerations are typically very unstable over time, and because they
are recalled from memory in a highly probabilistic fashion, memory-
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based opinion formation fosters attitude instability to an extent that
on-line processes do not (Feldman 1995).
The above discussion has implications for which dependent
variables should be chosen in a study of personal welfare state
experiences and political attitudes. More exactly, as hinted at the end
of Chapter 1, this study analyses mainly two categories of political
orientations. These are political trust (general attitudes towards
politicians and the political system), and political ideology (left-right
related orientations towards the size of the public sector and the level
of state intervention in society).
Chapter 2 showed that these political orientations are common in
theoretical accounts of political effects of personal welfare state
experiences. To this we may now add an additional argument for why
we focus on these particular dependent variables. It is argued that
these orientations are suitable candidates for on-line opinion
formation: First, they are few in number, which means we do not
make unrealistic assumptions about citizens’ motivations for opinion
formation. Second, as we will see below, these orientations have a
general relevance for a very large number of political situations, facts,
issues, actors, parties, and debates. This time-persistent and general
relevance are reasons to believe that they function as basic “schemas,”
“shortcuts” or “heuristic devices” for handling and evaluating
information about the political world. And of course, a high
probability that an orientation will often be of use should increase
citizens’ motivation and ability to remember and continuously update
the orientation in the light of new-experienced facts. Third, analyses of
panel data have shown that these orientations exhibit a rather high
individual-level stability among the Swedish population, thus
indicating that on-line updating is not unrealistic (Granberg &
Holmberg 1988, 1996; Bennulf 1994; Oscarsson 1998; Holmberg
1999).5
                                                          
5 To this one may add that whereas these general political orientations are
common in theoretical accounts of political effects of personal welfare state
experiences, they are actually quite uncommon in empirical research. Most
Swedish studies on political effects of personal welfare state experiences have
looked at rather concrete dependent variables, such as evaluations of service
quality in a particular institution or support for increased public spending on
that institution (see Nilsson 1997; Sannerstedt 1981). It therefore seems
warranted to expand this research by also considering effects on more general
and abstract political orientations.
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In the coming sections I discuss political trust and ideology in more
detail. This involves conceptual discussions as well as a brief
presentation of some of the most important alternative explanatory
perspectives previously investigated. I start by discussing political trust
orientations and later move on to ideological orientations.
Political trust
Just like most past research on what we refer to as political trust6, we
draw on David Easton’s (1965, 1975) typology of “political support.”
The starting point of this conceptualisation is that orientations
towards the democratic system have several conceptually and
empirically distinct aspects. Indeed, “the concept of political support is
multidimensional. Rather than talking about “political trust” in every
case we need to specify its object. Just as “social trust” can refer to
trust towards one's family and friends, one’s neighbours and
community, or to citizens in different countries, so political trust
depends upon the object” (Norris 1999:1).
In this spirit, Easton distinguished between political support for
three basic groups of objects in the political system. First, and most
basically, people may to various degrees endorse their “political
community.” That is, they may or may not feel that a particular
geographical area and its population constitute appropriate units for
common democratic decision-making. The second and third objects of
political support are “the political regime,” and “political authorities.”
Borrowing Klingemann’s (1999:33) explanation, “The regime is
constituted of those principles, processes and formal institutions that
persist and transcend particular incumbents. And the political
authorities are those officials occupying governmental posts at a
particular time.”
Recently, Norris (1999) expanded the Easton framework by
delineating three sub aspects of regime support: First, support for
“regime principles” denotes support for basic democratic principles
such as political equality and freedom of speech, as well as one’s rating
of democracy compared to authoritarian systems. Second, support for
“regime performance” refers to how people think the democratic
                                                          
6 Throughout I use “political trust” and “political support” interchangeably.
This seems to be a common practice in the current literature. In the original
formulation, however, trust was considered a particular version of what
Easton called “diffuse” support. (See below for a discussion on “diffuse”
versus “specific” support.)
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system actually functions; to what extent are regime principles actually
realised in practice? The third type of regime support entails attitudes
towards “regime institutions,” such as the parliament, the executive,
or the civil service.
The conceptual expansion has proven fruitful. Based on global
comparative survey data, one major conclusion drawn by the
contributors to Norris (1999) was that support for democratic
governance depends greatly on which of the five levels is analysed. In
fact, citizens in modern democracies increasingly resemble a notion of
“critical citizens.” Such citizens strongly support the idea of
democratic governance in their country, as well as basic democratic
principles. But they are sceptical or at times even cynical about how
the beautiful principles are being realised in practice.
The notion of critical citizens underscores the importance of
distinguishing different types of political trust. Unfortunately, Norris
laments, “These distinctions are often blurred in practice, when
popular discussions about declining confidence in legislatures, trust in
politicians, and support for democratic values are treated as though
interchangeable. This practice has led to considerable confusion about
claims and counter-claims in the literature” (Norris 1999:1).
In sum, the expanded concept of political support specifies a
hierarchy of five objects in the political system that citizens orient
themselves towards. At the top of the hierarchy, the question is
whether people on an abstract level are willing to co-operate politically
with other people living in an area. At the bottom of the hierarchy, the
question is to what extent citizens trust politicians in general or
particular incumbent representatives and officials. Hence, as clarified
by Dalton (1999:58), “in reality this is a continuous dimension from
evaluations of the immediate actions of government officials to
identifying with the nation state.”
Government performance should affect mainly concrete objects of
political trust
On which levels of political support should we look for effects of
personal welfare state experiences? The answer starts with yet another
conceptual distinction: In addition to identifying the five different
objects of political support, Easton also separated between “specific”
and “diffuse” kinds of political support. There are several defining
differences between the two. For instance, whereas diffuse support
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takes the shape of a durable and emotionally or morally based
identification, specific support is instrumental and cognitive in nature.
A related difference is that they are subject to different causal
forces. More exactly, “the uniqueness of specific support lies in its
relationships to the satisfactions that members of a system feel they
obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political
authorities.” (Easton 1975:437) In contrast, diffuse political support
“refers to an evaluation of what an object is or represents [...] not of
what it does. It consists of a reservoir of favourable attitudes or good
will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are
opposed [...] Outputs and beneficial performance may rise and fall
while this support in the form of a generalized attachment, continues.
The obverse is equally true. Where [diffuse] support is negative, it
represents a reservoir of ill-will that may not easily be reduced by
outputs and performance” (Easton 1975:444).
While the type of support is conceptually distinct from the object of
support, most authors suspect that they covary empirically. Support
for abstract objects such as the community and regime principles are
typically believed to be of the diffuse kind (long-term, affective
identifications). Conversely, support for more concrete aspects of the
political system such as regime performance, regime institutions, and
trust in politicians are thought to be specific in nature (short-term,
instrumental, cognitive).
This is to say that support for the community and the abstract
principles of democracy are hardly affected by poor short-term policy
performance, at least not in reasonably established democracies. Many
years of democratic government, the argument goes, slowly create an
affective reservoir of diffuse support for the ideas and principles of
democracy (Almond & Verba 1963; McAllister 1999). This reservoir
is not easily drained by short-term hardship. Decades of both good and
bad times teach citizens to distinguish between, on the one hand, the
democratic system as a set of abstract principles, and, on the other
hand, democratic institutions and political actors as they function in
practice. Thus, short-term performance such as economic trends,
unemployment, or welfare state performance affect mainly trust in
current political actors, parties, or the democratic system as it
functions in practice. At the same time, such dissatisfaction does not
undermine support for the more basic aspects of political support, such
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as identification with the community or basic beliefs in democratic
principles.
Empirical research largely supports the suspicion.7 For instance, in
her extensive eight-country study of government performance and
political support, Huseby (2000:245) found that short-term
government performance “first, and foremost, influenced less general
objects of political support [...] While support for political authorities
and regime processes were strongly influenced by performance
evaluations, there was little evidence of a relationship between
evaluations of government performance and priority between
democracy and dictatorship.” Similarly, based on the 1987 German
Socio-Economic Panel, I reported elsewhere that both economic
evaluations and evaluations of social security clearly affected the
extent to which West Germans were satisfied with the way democracy
works in practice in their country. In contrast, evaluations were not
related to how respondents felt “about democracy, not an existing
democracy, but rather the idea of democracy” (Kumlin 2002; see also
Listhaug 1995).
Consistent with these results, what we have in mind when
wondering whether “welfare state experiences affect political trust,” is
impact on trust in the practical functioning of the current democratic
system and its actors, rather than on basic support for democratic
principles or for the political community. Therefore, we will use as
dependent variables measures of “trust in politicians” and the extent
to which respondents are “satisfied with the way democracy works.”
These indicators will be presented further in Chapter 6.
Causes of political trust: government performance
Let us look at some of the most important explanations of variation in
political trust investigated in past research. Needless to say, the
discussion will not be able to exhaust the available theories and results
(for more complete introductions, see Fuchs & Klingemann 1995;
Borre & Scarbrough 1995; Kaase & Newton 1995; Nye, Zelikov &
                                                          
7 However, based on Canadian data, Kornberg and Clarke (1992:121)
reported that evaluations of the economy were more strongly related to
support for the political community than to attitudes towards leaders.
Moreover, attitudes towards the European Union is an interesting exception.
Past analyses have shown that macroeconomic concerns and evaluations affect
Swedes’ attitudes towards the European Union (Jenssen 1998; Oskarson &
Ringdal 1998; Kumlin 2001a).
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King 1997; Norris 1999; Pharr & Putnam 2000). Instead, the purpose
is to give a very brief introduction. In doing this, we learn more about
political trust, and lay a foundation for the selection of control
variables to be included in subsequent multivariate models.
Personal welfare state experiences belong to a larger category of
independent variables that are labelled government performance. Such
explanations build on the idea that citizens’ attitudes towards their
political system partly hinge on the extent to which that system is able
to produce satisfactory policy outcomes in issue areas that citizens
deem important. As explained by Huseby (2000:10), the major
hypothesis is that “poor government performance in salient political
issues leads to negative evaluations of government performance, which
in turn influences the citizens’ support for the political system.”
Government performance explanations are rooted in a particular
model of representative democracy. According to this model, a
functioning representative system is characterised by independent
political leadership and retrospective accountability (see Schumpeter
1942; Held 1995). While political outcomes and results are rarely
considered democratic values as such, poor performance is nevertheless
problematic to the extent that political accountability is at all difficult
to manage. Such difficulties have many sources, including frequent
power shifts, fractionalised coalitions, and government attempts to
cloud performance failures or blame them on someone else. Yet
another source is the multi-level structure of political systems in which
several levels share political responsibility for the same policy areas. Of
course, political systems vary greatly along these variables across space
and time. However, because political accountability is hardly ever
perfect in these and other respects, there is always a risk that poor
government performance translates into negative attitudes towards the
democratic system. As the lines of political responsibility become
unclear, it also becomes harder for citizens to express their
dissatisfaction through the vote or through other types of participation
aimed at responsible political actors. Dissatisfied voters who want to
“throw the rascals out,” but cannot because of fuzzy political
responsibility, are seen as particularly prone to develop negative
attitudes towards the democratic system, not just towards incumbents
(see Powell & Whitten 1993; Huseby 1999; Taylor 2000; Royed,
Leyden & Borelli 2000).
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Chapter 1 discussed the impact of citizens’ perceptions of economic
performance and welfare state performance in the context of the
debate on sociotropic perceptions versus personal experience. As for
political trust, we noted that past research has found a moderate but
consistent influence of sociotropic economic perceptions on political
trust variables. Recently, it has been shown that other policy areas
than the economy are of importance. Using comparative survey data,
Huseby (2000) examined the impact of government performance in
three policy areas – the economy, basic social welfare, and the
environment – she found that all three were of clear relevance for
political support variables. Also, while the author concluded that
economic performance was slightly more influential than welfare state
performance, she pointed out the need for further research using data
designed especially for these purposes (Huseby 2000:chapters 8 and
10; Miller & Listhaug 1999).
The conclusion that evaluations of public services matter has also
received support in the Swedish context. For instance, Nilsson (1997)
reports a rather strong correlation between Swedes’ overall satisfaction
with public services in the municipality and satisfaction with how
democracy works in practice in the municipality (see also Johansson,
Nilsson & Strömberg 2001; Kumlin & Oskarson 2000). In a similar
vein, Holmberg (1999:122) investigated political trust at the national
level and concluded, “without a doubt the most important political
explanation has to do with government performance – with people’s
evaluations of what they get from government and their assessments of
what the government does. Government performance, and people’s
perceptions of that performance, are the central factors.”
In sum, we have good reason to suspect from the outset that
evaluations of both economic and welfare state performance affect
political trust.8 Moreover, to reiterate the major points of previous
chapters, the distinct contribution made by this study to the literature
on government performance and political trust is that we explicitly
consider the distinction between personal experience and sociotropic
judgement, that we distinguish different aspects of experiences (self-
interest, distributive justice, voice), and that we analyse institutional
variation that might structure experiences and, in turn, political trust.
                                                          
8 See Chapter 1 for more references.
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Causes of political trust: other perspectives
Government performance is certainly not the only explanatory factor
emphasised in past studies. One major alternative explanation is the
“policy distance hypothesis” (Miller 1974). According to this
hypothesis, people compare personal political opinions and policy
preferences in salient issues with the actual policies that are perceived
to be implemented by incumbents. The assumption is that the closer
the match between personal preferences and actual policies, the more
favourable attitudes towards the political system. The policy distance
hypothesis thus predicts that a political system will enjoy greater
support when policies in salient issues to a greater extent resemble
those of many citizens. This hypothesis has been refined by for
instance Petersson (1977), who argued that what matters is not so
much policy distance to the policies of the incumbent. Rather, the
crucial distance is that between the citizen and the particular party she
votes for. According to this hypothesis, a political system will enjoy
greater support the better parties are at advocating policies in salient
issues that lie close to the average preferences of its particular voter
group. Finally, several empirical studies support these hypotheses. Not
least in Scandinavian countries, individuals’ policy distance to
responsible political actors seems to affect political trust (see Borre
1995; Borre & Goul Andersen 1997; Aardal 1999; Holmberg 1999).9
                                                          
9 There is a kinship between hypotheses about policy distance and
hypotheses about government performance. As Huseby (2000:16) explains,
“Both models argue that dissatisfaction with implemented policies or political
outcome could lead to dissatisfaction with the political system and
consequently to a decline in the levels of political support.” Having said this,
there is also a fundamental difference. Using a classic distinction introduced
by Stokes (1963), policy distance models are concerned with “position
issues,” where different people prefer different courses of political action.
Hence, people take different “positions.” In contrast, government
performance hypotheses typically focus on “valance issues,” where an issue or
aim as such generates no political disagreement in the sense that some people
are intrinsically against it whereas others are intrinsically for it. Examples of
valances issues are “a good economy,” or “well-functioning public services,”
or “a healthy environment,” the idea being that virtually nobody is
fundamentally against such things, though people may differ for instance as to
how important the issue is, as well as how aims should be reached. In terms of
this discussion, we consider welfare state experiences to be “valence issues,” in
the sense that we assume that very few people want others or themselves to
have bad experiences. This assumption is clearly reflected in the hypotheses
put forward in Chapters 2 and 3, where all positive experiences are believed
to create support for the political system and for the welfare state, whereas all
negative experiences are believed to undermine support.
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A different category of explanations for political trust highlights,
not so much what politicians and parties do, but rather the way
journalists and the mass media portray them. It has been suggested
that highly negative, dramatic and critical modes of reports about
politics and politicians have a tendency to undermine citizens’ trust in
politicians and faith in the functioning of the democratic system. For
example, by spending a disproportionate amount of time and space on
depicting politics as a game between strategic actors (so called “game
frames”), rather than on the actual political substance (“issue
frames”), the mass media is believed to activate and strengthen images
of crooked, egoistic and dishonest politicians (Cappella & Jamieson
1997). Moreover, such assumptions are typically linked to the idea
that things have become worse over time. Here, the development of
more independent and professionalised journalists, as well as the
emergence of television as a main source of political information, is
among the important underlying trends (Sabato 1991).
Empirically, several studies indicate that journalists have become
more critical, independent, and perhaps also more negative in their
political coverage (Westerståhl & Johansson 1985; Patterson 1993;
Esaiasson & Håkansson 2000; Djerf-Pierre & Weibull 2001).10
However, it is less certain whether the effects on political trust are
really negative. Several studies have found a rather weak impact of
various measures of media usage on political trust (Holmberg 1999;
Strömbäck 2001). Moreover, in contrast to the view that the media
breed cynicism, several researchers argue that the media can have a
mobilising impact on citizens. There are indications that media
negativity is correlated with a good deal of real political conflict and
polarisation, something that may counter-balance or even outweigh a
negative impact of media usage on political trust (Brants & van
Kempen 2002).
Explanations of trust have also been sought outside the political
system altogether. Three more concrete categories of explanations are
especially important. First, it has been suggested that socio-economic
status variables like social class, education, and income, may play a
causal part. Well-educated middle-class citizens, the argument goes,
have more resources and political confidence. They therefore also tend
                                                          
10 At the same time, there are studies indicating that the rhetoric and
messages of Swedish parties and politicians have remained surprisingly stable
over time (Esaiasson 1996; Håkansson 1999).
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to see more of the bright side of the political system and thus evaluate
its performance more positively. Empirical results, however, have not
been overly kind to such predictions. The effects of variables such as
class, income, and education are typically moderate at best. Using
Holmberg’s (2000:35) summary of the findings, “a sociological model
is not very useful when it comes to explaining political trust.” Still, this
should not be taken as a sign that socio-economic factors are
irrelevant. Differences between groups along any single socio-
economic status variable are “often very small but taken together the
results form a pattern. Dissatisfaction is greater in certain vulnerable
groups compared to more established and well-to-do groups”11 (see
also Aardal 1999). This observation is underscored by the fact that
subjective personal assessments of the extent to which individuals are
satisfied with the lives they lead have proven to be relatively strongly
related to political trust (Kornberg & Clarke 1992). Happy people are
often happy with the political system.
A second category of non-political explanations is related to
Inglehart’s (1977, 1990, 1997) work on post-materialism and post-
modernisation. Societal trends such as economic development and
increasing educational levels are believed to produce fundamental
value changes as generations are replaced. These value changes include
an increased focus on personal well-being and intellectual stimulation
as opposed to material issues and economic security. Moreover, as
mentioned above, the process of post-modernisation is believed to
create “critical citizens.” On the one hand postmodern citizens are
deeply committed to the basic principles of democracy. On the other
hand they have less respect for authorities than previous generations,
and they are sceptical about the traditional hierarchical institutions of
representative democracy as these do not leave enough room for more
direct individual forms of political participation and post-materialist
self-expression. Or as Inglehart (1999:236) explains, “The post
modern phase of development leads to declining respect for authority
[...] but at the same time, it gives rise to growing support for
democracy [...] the same publics that are becoming increasingly critical
of hierarchical authority, are also becoming increasingly resistant to
authoritarian government, more interested in political life, and more
apt to play an active part in politics.” (See also Petersson, Westholm &
Blomberg 1989:Chapter 10.)
                                                          
11 My translation from original Swedish.
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A third vein of research seeking explanations of political trust
largely outside the political system is inspired by the theory of “social
capital” (Putnam 1993, 2000; see also Pharr & Putnam 2000). Here,
citizens’ participation in voluntary organisations is seen as a crucial
independent variable. Frequent engagement in civic activities, the
argument goes, entails an increased number of inherently positive
contacts with fellow citizens. In turn, such contacts are believed to
bring about an increased sense of generalised interpersonal trust
among these citizens. Moreover, generalised trust is thought to have
positive effects on views on the political process as well as on trust in
politicians. Interestingly, the theory of social capital has recently
suffered some empirical damage when it comes to explaining political
trust (at least at the individual level, see Newton & Norris 2000). For
instance, Newton (1999) reported weak correlations between measures
of inter-personal and political trust respectively. The interpretation has
been that “Assumptions that social and political trust go together,
move in harmony, or are somehow causally related, do not seem
justified. In other words, social capital is not necessarily translated into
political capital” (Newton 1999:185). What is more, Stolle (1998)
analysed panel data and seriously questioned whether the correlation
between measures of civic voluntary engagement and interpersonal
trust is really created by the former causing the latter (and not the
other way around).
Political ideology: state intervention orientations and left-right self-
identification
We now move to the second category of political orientations to be
potentially explained by personal welfare state experiences – political
ideology. More exactly, we are interested in orientations related to the
classic political conflict between the Left and the Right. Such
orientations mirror what has for more than half a century been the
most important substantive political struggle in the Swedish party
system. This struggle, as we will see, has close links to the question of
how generous, ambitious, and encompassing welfare state
arrangements should be.
Past research emphasises that left-right related attitudes and beliefs
offer a widely used mental framework for Swedes to understand and
evaluate the political world (see Särlvik 1974; Petersson 1977; Gilljam
& Holmberg 1993; Bennulf 1994; Holmberg 2000). For instance,
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Oscarsson (1998:308) analysed extensively the dimensionality in
citizens’ party evaluations during forty years and concluded,
“Undoubtedly, throughout the period 1956-1996, the left-right
dimension has been Swedish voters’ most important tool for handling
and evaluating information about the ideological conflicts between the
parties.”
These findings are in line with Granberg and Holmberg’s (1988)
and Niemi and Westholm’s (1984) comparisons of Swedish and US
voters. Their results indicated that whereas left-right related
ideological belief systems are not particularly stable or internally
coherent among Americans (Converse 196412), they are so to a much
greater extent among Swedes. Moreover, measures of left-right related
ideology are powerful predictors of party choice (Gilljam & Holmberg
1995), as well as specific issue opinions (Gilljam 1988; Kumlin
2001b), and there are no immediate signs that they will lose their
prominence in this respect (Holmberg 2000).
All these findings are important for this study as we regard personal
experience effects operating through on-line opinion formation as
more realistic if the orientation in question is frequently used in
political reasoning and choice. As discussed above, frequent usage
increases the likelihood that people will call to mind and update an
orientation in the light of a new personal welfare state experience.
Given this prerequisite, and given the research referred to above, left-
right related ideological orientations seem to be a good place to look
for effects of personal welfare state experiences in Sweden.
Based on past research, we separate between two somewhat
different approaches to conceptualising and measuring left-right
related ideological orientations: (1) “state intervention orientations,”
and (2) “left-right self-identification.” Let us consider each in turn.
State intervention orientations
State intervention orientations can be defined as a general attitude
towards the extent to which public schemes, policies, and regulation
should intervene in the market economy. This classic ideological
conflict is intimately related to the industrial-age class-based conflict
                                                          
12 Converse’s (1964) publication stimulated a vigorous debate on the extent
to which American voters were in fact “innocent of ideology.” For
introductions to this very large literature, see Nie, Verba & Petrocik 1976;
Smith 1989; Niemi & Weissberg 1993; Dalton 2002.
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between workers and capitalists (see Lipset & Rokkan 1967; Franklin,
Mackie & Valen 1992; Oskarson 1994). Thus, a sensible alternative
label could have been “economic” or “materialist” left-right
orientations. As explained by Knutsen (1995:65), “In industrial society
the left-right division was related to the materialist struggle which
emerged from the labour market conflicts between workers and the
owners of the means of production. The political values underlying the
industrial “left”-“right” polarisation were conflicts related to econo-
mic inequalities, differences in ownership to the means of production,
and conflict over the desirability of a market economy.”
There is a conceptual kinship between orientations on state
intervention and the welfare state. This kinship is constituted by the
fact that the size and nature of welfare state arrangements strongly
affect the degrees of “market economy,” “inequality,” “redistribu-
tion,” and “public ownership of the means of production,” in a
society. Consequently, state intervention orientations are often
measured in surveys by asking questions concerning the preferred
general size, generosity, or form of welfare state arrangements. Such
questions include suggestions about “reducing the size of the public
sector,” or about the extent of “privatisation,” and “redistribution.”
And as will be evident in Chapter 5, this is also the type of indicators
that we will use. In this study, then, state intervention orientations
stand for general attitudes towards the size and generosity of welfare
state arrangements in society.
Having said this, we know that not all reasonable measures of state
intervention orientations are necessarily related to measures of general
support for welfare state arrangements. For instance, based on
comparative data from nine Western European countries, Borre and
Viegas (1995) examined attitudes towards how much the government
should intervene in the economy using a number of strategies, many of
which were not directly related to welfare state policies. Their data
included opinion items on “wage control,” “price control,”
“government management of the economy,” and  “government owner-
ship of industry,” and showed that such items rarely correlate very
strongly with welfare-related state intervention responses such as “cut
government spending.”13
It seems unsafe, then, to assume that attitudes towards all types of
“state intervention” form one single dimension. This study focuses on
                                                          
13 For similar findings in Sweden, see Holmberg (1981) and Bennulf (1994).
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measures of state intervention orientations that have a clear
connection to general support for the welfare state, believing that this
orientation is more likely to be affected by personal welfare state
experiences. Hence, when we speak about state intervention
orientations we mean support for intervention in the sense of general
attitudes towards the size of the welfare state and the public sector.
Left-right self-identification
The second approach to conceptualising and measuring ideological
orientations is “left-right self-identification.” This concept is widely
used in past research and has proven to be important for
understanding opinion formation and voting behaviour in a large
number of Western democracies (see for instance Inglehart &
Klingemann 1976; Granberg & Holmberg 1988; Holmberg & Gilljam
1987; Fuchs & Klingemann 1989; van der Eijk, Franklin & Oppenhuis
1996; Oscarsson 1998; Borre & Andersen 1997; Aardal & Valen
1995; Knutsen 1998a). The concept is typically measured by asking
respondents to place themselves on a scale ranging from, for instance,
zero (labelled “far to the left”) to ten (“far to the right”).
Left-right self-identification is conceptually distinct from state
intervention orientations. This is because, taken on their own, left and
right are substantively undefined political categories, and strictly
speaking left-right identification refers to nothing but individuals’
tendency to identify politically with the spatial metaphors of left and
right. Indeed, as emphasised by Knutsen (1998a:294), these metaphors
“can be considered as empty containers ready to be filled with political
content.” In contrast, state intervention orientations are political
values with inherent political substance and implications. And it is an
empirical, not conceptual, question whether subjective left-right self-
identification is correlated with various substantive political values. In
fact, nothing prevents left and right from having different substantive
meaning at different points in time, in different countries, or among
different groups of citizens.
What political content do citizens attach to the left-right semantics?
There are two major answers. A first possibility is that answers to
questions about left-right self-identification reflect respondents’ party
preferences. This interpretation is typically referred to as the “partisan
component” of left-right self-identification (Inglehart & Klingemann
1976; Granberg & Holmberg 1988; Knutsen 1998c). According to this
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interpretation, people who say that they stand “far to the left” have
inferred their position from their party preference, or mean that they
support a leftist party. However, this partisan component does not
necessarily reveal much about policy-related values or attitudes.
The second major possibility is that left-right identification reflects
“real” values that have policy implications. In fact, past research
suggests several possible value-based interpretations of the left-right
semantics (see van Deth & Scarbrough 1995), three of which have
been especially successful in empirical studies. The first one has to do
with state intervention orientations as defined above, where left means
a stronger support for a larger intervening public sector. A second
possible interpretation has to do with “Christian traditionalism.”
According to this interpretation, Christian traditionalists, who hold
positive attitudes towards “Christian values,” “the family,” “law and
order,” and “national traditions” define themselves as further to the
right than others. The third important interpretation is rooted in
theories of “new politics” (Inglehart 1977, 1990; Minkenberg &
Inglehart 1989). Such politics is driven by a value conflict between
“materialists” on “the new right” (who value economic consumption
standard and physical protection) and “postmaterialists” on “the new
left” (who emphasise non-material values such as quality of life,
democratic principles and a healthy environment). This new value
conflict would structure not only the meaning attached to left-right
semantics, but also attitudes towards a wide range of topics such as
ecology issues, democratic principles, decentralisation, political
activism etc.
How widespread are the various value-based interpretations of left-
right semantics among ordinary citizens? Knutsen (1995) studied eight
Western European countries and found that state-market orientations,
Christian traditionalism, and post-materialist orientations all affect
citizens’ subjective left-right identification (see also Inglehart 1990).
Notably, in recent years there has been a tendency in many countries
for post-materialist orientations to become more strongly associated
with left-right identification. These results demonstrate that “the left-
right semantics have an impressive absorptive power. This is an
overarching spatial dimension capable of incorporating many types of
conflict lines, and with different meanings to different people”
(Knutsen 1995:86-7).
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In comparison to other West European electorates, Swedes appear
more one-dimensional and stable in their understanding of left-right
semantics. In particular, Oscarsson (1998:308) found that “The
substance of the left-right dimension has not changed during the last
thirty years.” His results showed that left and right continuously seem
to be defined in terms of industrial-age questions concerning the extent
of state intervention, the size of the public sector, and the extent of
privatisation. In addition, past Swedish research contends that new
post-materialist politics does by no means form Swedish political
conflict with the same strength as old materialist politics (Bennulf
1994; Bennulf & Holmberg 1990).
We may conclude from the discussion that both state intervention
orientations and left-right self-identification can to some extent be seen
as two somewhat different indicators of generalised welfare state
support. State intervention orientations denote support for interven-
tion in the sense of general attitudes towards the size of the welfare
state and the public sector. Left-right self-identification reflects (among
other things) both such state intervention orientations, as well as an
inclination to vote for and otherwise support leftist parties. And of
course, in Sweden it is the leftist parties (most notably the Social
Democrats) who have been and continue to be the primary political
forces behind a large public sector and welfare state (Esping-Andersen
1985). Conversely, to the extent that there has been resistance in this
respect, it has come from the right (most notably the Moderate Party).
Complex welfare state attitudes
At this point, it is important to admit that these ideological
orientations by no means capture all aspects of people’s attitudes
towards welfare state arrangements. Past research clearly shows that
such attitudes are more complex and multidimensional than can be
neatly captured by state intervention orientations and left-right self-
identification.
For example, in The Scope of Government (Borre & Scarbrough
1995), Roller (1995) and Pettersen (1995) examined West Europeans’
attitudes towards the particular parts of the welfare state that are
mainly aimed at the creation of “equality” (including policies aiming
at redistribution or equal life chances)  and “security” (including for
example public health care, basic pensions, and unemployment
benefits). The results showed that “although equality policies receive
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relatively high support, they are, none the less, the less popular part of
the welfare state” (Roller 1995:196). The interpretation was twofold.
First, “Because of the ambiguous character of “equality” in Western
societies [...] we suggest that policies designed to achieve socio-
economic security win more support than policies designed to achieve
socio-economic equality.” Second, it was argued that more people
have an interest invested in certain security policies: “the basic
legitimacy of old age pensions and health services is derived from the
universality of ageing and the risks of illness” (Pettersen 1995:188).
These authors also made a fruitful distinction between the range and
degree aspects of welfare state attitudes. The former refers to the range
of policy areas and tasks within which citizens think the government
bears a responsibility for solving problems. Degree refers to how much
or with what intensity the government should intervene within a
particular area (see Huseby 1995:87).
Using a somewhat different approach, Svallfors (1989, 1996, 1999)
has demonstrated that Swedes’ attitudes towards their welfare state are
complex and multidimensional. First, he distinguished between general
and specific welfare state attitudes. General attitudes, which are
essentially the same as what we have called state intervention
orientations, refer to “a more diffuse and general support which is
expressed in attitudes towards ‘welfare state politics,’ ‘the public
sector,’ ‘social reforms,’ and the like.” (Svallfors 1996:49).14 One of
the major conclusions is that general welfare state support is often
weaker, more polarised, and more volatile (on the aggregate level),
compared to specific attitudes towards concrete programmes or
aspects of the welfare state. Whereas the former appear to move in a
cyclical fashion, the latter display stability and widespread support for
welfare state arrangements.
Moreover, such specific attitudes fall into no less than four
dimensions, all of which are measured by multiple items referring to
various concrete welfare state institutions and services. One dimension
taps the extent to which people support increased public spending on
especially means-tested institutions like social welfare, and housing
allowance. A second dimension taps whether people think a number of
different services should be delivered by the state, by private
companies, or by the family; this dimension is similar to what was
subsequently called “range of support” by the contributors to Borre
                                                          
14 My translation from original Swedish.
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and Scarbrough (1995). The third and fourth dimensions are
concerned with how various programmes should be financed, (taxes or
fees), and the extent to which various programmes are plagued by
abuse and cheating respectively.
In sum, past research suggests that the totality of citizens’ welfare
state attitudes is considerably more complex than what we can hope to
capture with general measures of state intervention orientations and
left-right self-identification. Having said this, we still have good reason
to stick to a small set of general dependent variables in the context of
the present study, as the purpose is not to describe and explain all
conceivable aspects of welfare state attitudes. Instead, we are
interested in political effects of personal welfare state experiences, and
given this choice, ideological orientations (and political trust) offer
good places to look. These orientations are so generally useful for
interpretation and evaluation of political information, that citizens
may update them in an on-line fashion as a result of new relevant
personal welfare state experiences.
Causes of ideology: other perspectives
In order to learn more about state intervention orientations and left-
right self-identification, let us take a brief look at some of the
alternative explanatory perspectives (for more complete introductions,
see Coughlin 1980; Taylor-Gooby 1985; Borre & Scarbrough 1995).
Some of these explanatory factors will be represented by control
variables in later multivariate analyses.
We noted above that left-right related ideological orientations are
regarded as emanating from the cleavage between people with
different professional and social relations to the means of production
(Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Consequently, the most emphasised
explanations for variation in such orientations are variables related to
socio-economic status and class. Empirically, it has often been shown
that working class affiliation, lower income, and lower education
strongly increase individuals’ propensity to both define themselves as
standing further to the left as well as display support for greater state
intervention (see Särlvik 1974; Petersson 1982; Svallfors 1997;
Oscarsson 1998). Moreover, while there has been a reduction in the
extent of class-based voting in Western countries during much of the
second half of the twentieth century  (Franklin, Mackie & Valen 1992;
Oskarson 1994), the link between class and ideological welfare state-
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related orientations remains surprisingly strong. For instance, drawing
on data spanning three decades and a large number of West European
countries, Pettersen (1995:230) concluded that “theories of class
formation provide a superior explanation for people’s public spending
preferences over the entire time period analysed.”
The link between socio-economic status and welfare state support is
brought about by several causal processes. For example, it is typically
assumed that those with lower socio-economic status perceive that
their interests are better served by leftist and state interventionist
policies (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Further, it has been emphasised that
individuals in different socio-economic groups live in very different
informational environments. By this logic, it is usually easier for, say,
upper class citizens to adopt anti-welfare and rightist preferences for
the simple reason that so many people in their vicinity communicate
mostly information that foster such preferences (Katz & Lazarsfeld
1955; Huckfeldt & Sprague 1995). Also, the link between socio-
economic status and political orientations seems to operate through
early family socialisation mechanisms, where parents’ political
orientations are adopted by their children. With regard to ideological
orientations in Sweden, Westholm (1991) found that among a sample
of early adolescents and their parents, both left-right self-identification
and attitudes towards “social welfare” were strongly affected by such
family socialisation. Such findings, taken together with the fact that
also socio-economic status is often inherited as well as with the
observation that ideological orientations are quite stable, help explain
why we often find a correlation between an individual’s socio-
economic status and her ideological orientations.
A very different group of theories are concerned with explaining,
not so much differences between individuals, but rather with aggregate
opinion differences across time and across countries. For instance, the
theory of “government overload” predicts that as welfare states
expand, citizens will gradually come to expect that it is the state’s
responsibility to solve new problems that appear on the political
agenda by means of public schemes. The initial implication of this is
that welfare state attitudes will gradually become even more
expansionist as welfare states themselves expand. At some point,
however, the demands on the government become so high that, for
fiscal and other economic reasons, many of them can no longer be met.
When the performance of the welfare state falls short of the public’s
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expectations, the result will be widespread dissatisfaction which
undermines the public’s belief in the welfare state as a social problem
solver (Crozier, Huntingdon & Watanuki 1975). According to
overload theory, then, “the revolution of rising expectations makes
today’s luxuries tomorrow’s necessities [...] Politicians promise more
and more at election time, but the more demands they recognize [...]
the less likely they are to deliver [...] Government becomes overloaded
and society becomes ungovernable. As a result, public opinion
becomes increasingly cynical and disillusioned. Ultimately, it
withdraws its support from the state, so undermining the system of
government” (Kaase & Newton 1995:71-2).
Overload theory has not always survived confrontations with data.
For instance, comparative Western European surveys do not reveal a
spiral of rising demands on governments, nor systematically declining
levels of support for welfare state institutions during the 1970s and the
1980s. Instead, public endorsement of welfare state arrangements and
leftist ideology seems to move in a more cyclical fashion (Pettersen
1995). Moreover, in stark contrast to what is predicted by overload
theory, demands for state expansion has proven to be higher in
countries with less developed welfare states and a higher level of socio-
economic inequality (Roller 1995; Borre & Viegas 1995). This
research suggests that “public opinion is not irreversible,” but rather
that “demands for government spending on some services seem to level
off in wealthier nations compared with poorer ones. In short, the spiral
of rising expectations of the public sector has been replaced – to some
extent at any rate – by a spiral of falling expectations” (Kaase &
Newton 1995:73). Similarly, within Sweden, Johansson, Nilsson and
Strömberg (2001:Chapter 6) found that demands for increased public
efforts in different public service areas have typically decreased over
time as actual services have expanded.15
In retrospect, then, overload theory seems to have been a rather
time-specific product of the early 1970s. While it fitted well with the
                                                          
15 In support of overload theories, Birgersson (1975) reported the existence
of a “service paradox.” That is, evaluations of public services were more
negative, and demands for more public efforts higher, in Swedish
municipalities whose services were already more developed. However, in a
later analysis that was also extended to the individual level, Sannerstedt
(1981:132-53) could not find support for the service paradox. Similarly, in a
Danish study, Lolle (1999) found virtually no effects at all of the level of
public spending on different service areas and citizens’ satisfaction with those
areas (see also Johansson, Nilsson & Strömberg 2001:177-8)
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emerging neo-liberal criticism of the welfare state, its predictions about
public opinion have rarely been confirmed in empirical studies. So for
mundane empirical reasons, overload theories “seem to have gone the
way of bell-bottoms, Afghan coats and patchouli oil” (Norris 1999:5).
The failure to detect long-term linear developments in welfare state
opinion has pointed towards more short-term factors. These factors
include both economic trends and opinion formation by political elites.
In Borre’s (1995:385-6) formulation, “On the one hand, policy
demands are not to be considered autonomous phenomena but
malleable by government and opposition parties as well as the mass
media. On the other hand, policy demands are clearly related to
objective needs.”
As far as “objective needs” are concerned, welfare state attitudes
are not only more expansionist in poorer countries with more socio-
economic inequality. Also within countries over time, they have a
tendency to become more expansionist in times of recession and
unemployment. Such economic hardship appears to fuel demands for
state intervention and increased welfare state spending, because it
highlights a number of social problems and inequalities. This factor
was clearly at play in Sweden during the economic malaise of the early
1990s. After a decade of neo-liberal ideological trends in public
opinion16 (Gilljam & Holmberg 1993), a couple of years of rising
unemployment and poor growth seem to have had the effect that
attitudes quickly shifted back in the direction of increased general
support for public sector spending and greater suspicion towards
privatisation of central welfare state institutions (see Nilsson 1996b,
1997; Johansson, Nilsson & Strömberg 2001).
Finally, not only economics but also politics affects ideological
orientations. Many authors have noted that opinion shifts in the
rightist, anti-welfare direction are often preceded by active opinion
formation attempts by elite actors and parties.17 The usual suspects
                                                          
16 As Svallfors (1996) demonstrates, this trend in general ideological
orientations was not necessarily paralleled by similar changes in concrete
attitudes towards specific programs or aspects of the welfare state.
17 The elite-actor explanation has been popular also in Sweden. Interestingly,
the focus has not been on political parties, but rather on trade unions (LO)
and the employers’ organisation (SAF). First, according to “the power
mobilisation hypothesis,” it has long been emphasised that the former
organisation had a crucial role in mobilising support for social democratic
welfare state policies, especially among the working class (Korpi 1983).
Conversely, the latter organisation is widely believed to have had a strong
impact on the general shift towards liberalisation of political discourse that
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include Mogens Glistrup and his anti-tax party in Denmark in the
1970s, as well as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the US
and Britain in the 1980s. As Pettersen (1995:229) explained in the
context of his study on the “security” dimension of the welfare state,
“there is no evidence that welfare states, or specific programmes, are
generally losing support over time [...] rather, there are ups and downs
in their popularity. The “downs” seem to be connected to general
changes in the national political mood. Vigorous conservative
campaigns, sometimes leading to electoral victories, are accompanied
by a decline in the proportion of the public demanding expansion of
the welfare state, or even an increase in the proportion supporting
reductions in spending” (see also Svallfors 1996).
The ingredients of the experience effect may vary across trust and
ideology
We have discussed at some length the two categories of dependent
variables – political trust and political ideology. The next step is to
consider differences between political trust and ideology with respect
to how they are affected by personal welfare state experiences. Do the
ingredients of the experience effect vary between trust and ideology?
We take as our starting point the three perspectives that were
introduced in chapter 2 – self-interest, distributive justice, and voice.
Our question is whether the relative importance of these aspects can be
expected to vary depending on whether political trust or political
ideology constitutes the dependent variable. The answer is yes. As the
discussion below will explain, we have reasons to expect that the
relative impact of self-interest versus distributive justice and voice is
greater for ideological orientations than for political trust.
                                                                                                                          
occurred in Swedish politics during the 1980s. In particular, Boréus (1994)
has documented its attempts to influence elite-level discourse through a
network of organisations aimed at opinion formation and the spreading of
neo-liberal ideas. There is some evidence that these attempts actually brought
about a neo-liberal trend in important news-papers during the 1980s, and that
these ideas were gradually diffused in the public, beginning with the most
politically attentive citizens and later the electorate at large (Kumlin 1997).
Finally, it is notable that much of this opinion formation occurred in the
context of the “wage earner funds issue,” illustrating the important point that
ideological opinion formation from above often occurs in the context of a
specific issue, which serves as a vehicle for more general changes in
overarching ideological orientations (see Gilljam 1988).
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Chapter 2 explained that self-interest variables have usually been
shown to bear a weak relationship to public opinion (Sears & Funk
1991). This generalisation notwithstanding, it is not that difficult to
find exceptions in this large literature (see for instance Sears & Citrin
1982; Dunleavy & Husbands 1985: Nilsson 1996b; Sannerstedt 1981;
Pettersen 2001; Winter & Mouritzen 2001). It appears as if citizens
sometimes align in the patterns suggested by the self-interest
perspective. One wonders whether we are dealing with trifling
randomness, or whether we have systematic variation at hand.
Past research comes down in favour of the latter possibility. In the
most extensive study on the topic, Self-Interest, Public Opinion and
Political Behavior, Donald Green (1988) discovered that there are
several factors that systematically increase the impact of self-interest
on public opinion. In fact, “the contention that self-interest has little
influence on public opinion is overstated. The point is not merely that
there are exceptions. Our objection is rather that the class of
exceptions constitutes an important subset of those political issues that
are submitted before the court of public opinion” (Green 1988:334).
Green found that the impact of self-interest depends on the extent to
which several conditions are fulfilled. For example, the individual must
recognise the sources of differences in self-interest. Self-interest cannot
affect attitudes towards, say, housing benefits unless people know
whether they are potential beneficiaries. In other words, people must
know whether their objective life circumstances imply entitlement to
housing benefits. Those who do not have knowledge about such
conditions are not in a position to calculate benefits and costs in a very
meaningful way. Another precondition is that the individual pays
attention to self-interest. When citizens are not attentive to self-interest
considerations, the impact of variables measuring actual self-interest
will decrease. Moreover, it is necessary to have accurate information
about the costs and benefits implied by different political positions. To
the extent that people do not possess cost-benefit information, they
cannot make accurate self-interest calculations, and self-interest
variables will explain less. Finally, although people might recognise the
sources of self-interest, be attentive to self-interest considerations, and
possess accurate cost/benefit information, self-interest might still fail to
influence political decisions. This occurs if a person regards self-
interest concerns as inappropriate or immoral in the political sphere.
Green’s (1988:29) results suggested that “One person’s conscience may
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not permit him to shrug off his obligation to the public good in pursuit
of private gain; another person may feel no remorse at all.” Only
among the latter type of citizens did self-interest variables display a
sizeable impact.
The level of abstraction and the nature of the stakes
Green’s results implied that the degree to which these conditions are
fulfilled varies across individuals, across socio-political contexts, and
across different types of political choices (Green 1988:Chapter1).
Because our present concern is potential differences across political
trust and ideology, the following discussion focuses on choice-related
variables.18 More precisely, we will now in turn consider two
important variables that could govern the extent to which conditions
of self-interest effects are fulfilled. We refer to these governing
variables as “the level of abstraction” and the “nature of the stakes,”
respectively.
First, a distinction between concrete and abstract choices has proven
useful (Green 1988; Sears & Citrin 1982; Sears & Funk 1991). Several
scholars argue that the more concrete an issue is the more likely one is
to recognise its potential relevance for objective living conditions
giving rise to different interests. Moreover, concreteness means that
the potentially relevant information about costs and benefits of
different alternatives becomes more limited and manageable.
If we take as an example the rather concrete proposal to “raise the
unemployment benefits,” it is immediately clear that there is a distinct
group of people – the unemployed – that have a particular interest in
                                                          
18 See Green (1988:Chapter 2) for more information about these variables.
At the individual level, an important variable is the degree of cognitive
political sophistication, where it is believed that sophisticated citizens are
better equipped to make cost-benefit analyses in political issues. A further
individual-level variable is the degree of postmaterialism. Here, the hypothesis
is that the more an individual values material well-being, the larger the effects
of self-interest on political choices. Moreover, it is seen as important in which
contextual setting the political choice is made. When political elites devote
more attention to politically relevant objective life circumstances, individuals
might be expected to perceive those conditions more accurately. Here, the
probability of political egoism increases because self-interest considerations
are more frequently activated in short-term memory. Hence they are also more
readily accessible when a political choice has to be made. Furthermore, self-
interest is believed to grow in importance when countries are struck by
recessions. Some studies strongly suggest that as a “crisis awareness” develops
among the electorate, individuals temporarily come to value material well-
being more than usual (Inglehart 1981). Parallel to this development, self-
interest political concerns might gain in legitimacy.
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the enactment of that policy. And it is not a daunting task to figure out
about how much they have to win or lose in the personal, material,
short-term sense. Conversely, when I make the abstract suggestions to
“increase the size of the public sector,” or “introduce more market
economy” it is not equally clear who gains, and how much. Because
the amount of potentially relevant information is large, and involves
complicated trade-offs between the impact of many specific policies, it
would take quite some effort to figure it out. And probably the result
would easily be open for discussion.
Consistent with these remarks, Chapter 2 showed that past research
doubts whether more abstract political orientations are affected by
self-interest. (A doubt that will be put to further tests in chapter 7). To
this we may now add that several studies show that, when it comes to
really concrete opinions on specific public services, attitudes are indeed
influenced by self-interest. For instance, in a detailed study of attitudes
towards a great variety of local public services, Sannerstedt (1981)
found that personal usage of a given public service is a crucial variable
in explaining whether individuals want more spending on that service.
Similarly, Nilsson (1996b, 1997; see also Johansson, Nilsson &
Strömberg 2001) has demonstrated that personal usage of a public
service greatly increases the propensity to express satisfaction with,
and support for, that particular service. Also, drawing on data from
several European countries, Pettersen (1995; 2001) has found that self-
interest structures people’s acceptance for increased spending on
various specific welfare state programmes.
Sannerstedt’s (1981:163)19 conclusions nicely illustrate that
concrete welfare state opinions may be aptly explained by self-interest:
“factors related to citizens’ personal demands, wishes, and actual
usage of services matter. Those living in multi-family houses have
greater demands when it comes to housing policy. Those who live
outside the urban centre have greater demands for public
transportation, roads, schools, water, and sewage. [...] Those with
schoolchildren have higher demands for schools. Those with pre-
school children have higher demands for child-care, especially if they
do not have place in a kindergarten, but desire one. The old have
higher demands for elder care, the young for childcare, sport facilities
and leisure time activities. Low-income groups have higher demands
for social welfare. The highly educated have higher demands for
                                                          
19 My translation from original Swedish.
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libraries and culture. Those who visit libraries have higher demands
for that service area than those who do not, and so on” (see also
Johansson, Nilsson & Strömberg 2001:137-45).
The second choice-related factor regulating the impact of self-
interest is “the nature of the stakes.” This concept may be further
divided into the size of stakes and the visibility of stakes. As far as size
is concerned, the straightforward assumption is that individuals will be
more motivated to evaluate different political stands in terms of
economic self-interest if different alternatives have larger implications
for one’s short term material situation (Sears & Citrin 1982).
Moreover, in addition to rising motivation, such large costs and
benefits might make it easier to shrug off one’s obligation to the
common good.
Visibility of stakes refers to the extent to which benefits and costs
are concealed from citizens. Hence, the focus is not so much on
whether self-interest is moderated by morality and motivation. Instead,
the concern is whether the information at hand permits and stimulates
people to make political cost-benefit analyses. In a series of
experiments, Green (1988:Chapter 4) demonstrated that the impact of
self-interest on concrete policy opinions was increased so as to match
that of general ideological orientations, if respondents were provided
with clear information about costs and benefits (see also Hadenius
1986; Sears & Funk 1991). This suggests “the influence of self-interest
hinges on the degree to which people think about material costs and
benefits when evaluating a particular policy. When people are
reminded of their material interests or confronted with a policy choice
that lays out the costs and benefits in an explicit fashion, material
considerations exert a sizeable influence on policy preferences. In the
absence of such cues, mass political decision making is for the most
part unaffected by personal interests” (Green 1988:212).
Political trust and ideology compared
What does this discussion reveal about how the ingredients of the
experience effect vary across political trust and ideology? It suggests
that the relative impact of self-interest, versus distributive justice and
voice, will be stronger on political ideology than on political trust.
Think first about state intervention orientations and left-right self-
identification. As an earlier section in this chapter explained, the
defining elements of these ideological conflicts concern issues of
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redistribution, and the generosity and size of welfare state
arrangements. One must not have a vivid imagination to come up with
the idea that some lose and some win depending on which course of
political action is taken in these overarching conflicts. This is to say
that the defining elements of ideological orientations are intimately
intertwined with significant economic stakes. Because interests and
ideology are conceptually intertwined, people may indeed update these
orientations based on self-interest related aspects of welfare state
experiences. Of course, it is likely that more concrete opinions on
specific programmes and services are even more sensitive to personal
costs and benefits, by virtue of making stakes more visible and cost-
benefit information more tractable. Nevertheless, because ideological
orientations are conceptually intertwined with economic stakes, the
self-interest perspective has some credibility in the context of political
ideology.
In contrast, think now about political trust. Chapter 2 introduced
the theoretical possibility that the political system is evaluated in terms
of whether its policies satisfy personal interests. This possibility
notwithstanding, we must admit that political trust judgements are not
conceptually intertwined with large or visible stakes. While thinking
about state intervention and left-right almost by definition forces us to
start thinking about politics of redistribution and welfare state
generosity, thinking in general terms about the democratic system
seems less likely to stimulate such thoughts. This becomes clear when
one considers the indicators typically used to gauge political trust, for
instance questions about how satisfied respondents are with the
current democratic system, or how much faith they have in politicians
and parliament. Compared to state intervention orientations and left-
right identification, these “political choices” are further removed
conceptually from interest related politics, and so they are less likely to
draw one’s attention to policies involving large or visible stakes. In
terms of personal welfare state experiences, it should therefore be
easier to start thinking about self interest-related ingredients of
experiences if one is updating ideological orientations, compared to if
experiences inform political trust orientations.
These remarks pertain to the nature of stakes. But what about the
level of abstraction? It is readily apparent that this factor does not vary
all that much across political trust and ideology. Both are over-arching
orientations that can be used by citizens to understand and evaluate
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many types of political information and situations. More than this, it
is the general and abstract qualities of these orientations that make
them suitable candidates for on-line opinion formation.
However, while the variance in the level of abstraction across
political choices could be greater, it is probably not a constant. In fact,
it may be argued that political trust orientations are slightly less
concrete than ideological orientations. While political trust refers to
citizens’ attitudes towards the totality of the political system, its
performance, or its actors, ideological orientations refer to somewhat
more concrete evaluations of policies and actors within that system.
Left-right related orientations would therefore have a more concrete
connection to everyday politics than political trust. And as we saw
above, concrete political choices seem more susceptible to self-interest.
In conclusion, we expect that the ingredients of the experience effect
vary across political trust and ideology. More exactly, we expect a
stronger relative impact of self-interest on political ideology compared
to political trust. Moreover, given that people have limited cognitive
capacity, as well as limited motivation for carefully extracting the
political relevance of experiences, experience aspects pertaining to
distributive and experienced voice may be partly “crowded out” as the
importance of self-interest rises, thus producing a weaker impact of
those experience aspects.
* * *
The theoretical stage is set. The empirical action can begin. In the
next chapter the reader is invited to take a sneak preview at the data
and the case. After that we begin to use the data in order to test the
hypotheses presented in Chapters 1-4. These tests will tell us more
about how, and how strongly, personal welfare state experiences affect
political trust and ideology.

Findings

Chapter 5
The Data and the Case

he theoretical framework laid out in previous chapters will be
tested using Swedish cross-sectional survey data. The purpose of
this chapter is to present these data and to think about their strengths
and weaknesses. We begin by discussing Sweden as a laboratory for
studying political effects of personal welfare state experiences. The
chapter then proceeds to a brief presentation of the primary and
secondary data sources. It closes with a discussion on potential perils
of cross-sectional data: in particular, we consider how political
orientations held prior to experiences may affect or interact with the
impact of experiences.
Sweden as a laboratory for observing political effects of welfare state
experiences
Most of the empirical analyses will build on survey data that were
collected in Sweden during 1999. This choice of empirical setting is by
no means the result of a carefully crafted research design. Rather, it
followed naturally from the fact that I have worked in a research
environment specialised in collecting such data in Sweden. As the
reader will notice, the opportunity to influence primary data collection
in a cumulative research environment has been important, not least as
measuring personal welfare state experiences rarely has been a major
concern for primary investigators of public opinion surveys. The
obvious drawback, on the other hand, is that the hypotheses will be
tested in just one particular country during a limited period of time.
Because Sweden is a choice of convenience rather than of research
design, the empirical results of this study cannot tell us much about
whether results can be generalised to other countries and contexts. By
and large, this is something that will have to be sorted out by future
studies.
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Nevertheless, to the extent that the framework receives support in
the present study, at least two circumstances suggest that future tests
may bear some empirical fruit as well. First, the most basic
proposition put forward in this study – that welfare state experiences
could be more politically important than personal economic
experiences – should be at least logically valid elsewhere too. The
supply of parsimonious and not overly disputed sociotropic
information should, in many countries and contexts, be better in the
economic realm. Likewise, many people in many places should
reasonably perceive a clearer political responsibility for welfare state
services compared to the fuzzy link between the personal pocketbook
and political decisions.
Second, some hypotheses have already undergone partial tests in
other countries (though they have not necessarily been part of
encompassing studies of welfare state experiences). For example, the
contention that people manage to draw general political conclusions
from specific personal welfare state experiences, and the hypothesis
that these conclusions vary systematically with the level of
empowerment built into institutional designs, have been put forward
most convincingly by an American scholar (Soss 1999) based on
American data (both qualitative interviews and the American National
Election Studies). Likewise, the self-interest based hypothesis that state
intervention support is higher among those who personally consume
public services received at least some support in Britain in the 1970s
(Dunleavy 1979; 1980), even though those studies typically drew on
rather sparse data on welfare state consumption. To this one may add
that theories of distributive and procedural justice have to a large
degree been developed and tested in the US. Some of these tests,
though far from all, have involved studies of personal encounters with
various public authorities (Tyler et al. 1997).
Having pointed out these indications of generality, an important
indication of specificity must now be acknowledged. It starts with the
straightforward observation that the salience of welfare state related
political issues varies across countries and contexts. Much of the time
in advanced industrial democracies, topics such as health care, public
education, social benefits, are rather high on the agendas of parties
and the media. Yet, some of the time such topics are crowded out
altogether by completely different concerns. What is more, we know
from research on the agenda-setting capacities of political elites and
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the mass media that in the latter situation, welfare state-related issues
will be perceived as less important by citizens than when such issues
are extensively emphasised by politicians and journalists (see Asp
1986; Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Johansson 1998).
The impact of such salience variation on the processes under study
here is not immediately self-evident. As discussed in Chapter 4, the on-
line model of opinion formation does not presuppose that a personally
experienced welfare state institution is salient at the time of reporting
an attitude or otherwise making a political choice. It is enough that
the experience – which may have occurred a long time ago – made an
attitudinal imprint at the time, after which the information that
created that imprint may well be forgotten. For example, in order for
health care experiences to affect political trust or ideology, it is not
necessary that a person is still thinking about health care issues and
experiences at the time of expressing the attitude. It is enough that
health care issues were seen as important at the time of the experience,
and that the experience triggered a political conclusion.
However, salience could affect the extent to which another pre-
condition for personal experience effects is fulfilled. The likelihood
that experiences stimulate opinion formation should increase if – at
the time of the experience – people perceive that the experienced
institution belongs to a politically important issue. To put it simply, if
people feel that their personal experiences tie in to an area or problem
that is politically important, the greater the chance that their
experiences will stimulate political thinking and perhaps an update of
political orientations.
Of course, such salience does not hinge exclusively on media and
elite coverage. Rather, past research shows that the personal
experience itself greatly enhances the probability that an experienced
welfare state institution is thought of as an important political topic
(Johansson 1998; McCombs 1999). People who have personal
experiences with, say, health care are more likely than others to regard
health care issues as politically important. Nevertheless, if on top of a
direct experience, a person is also exposed to heavier health care
coverage and debate at about the time of the health care experience, it
becomes even more likely that the experience will trigger political
thinking.1
                                                          
1 Note that this presupposes that personal experiences and media/elite
coverage convey similar pictures of the experienced welfare state institutions.
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In conclusion, the political emphasis and coverage devoted to
various parts of the welfare state can be expected to vary across space
and time. In turn, such variation may affect the magnitude of
experience effects. This is interesting as past research suggests that the
last years of the 1990s in Sweden was a context where many of the
policy areas under study were heavily emphasised by political parties
and by the mass media (Holmberg & Weibull 2000; Johansson 2000).
Also, the top priorities of voters in the 1998 election campaign had to
do with issues such as health care, education, child care, and elder care
(Holmberg 2000). It seems, then, that “Sweden 1999” is hardly an
environment that is hostile to political effects of personal welfare state
experiences. This means that our hypotheses are probably not exposed
to the hardest conceivable tests. On the other hand, one could argue
that we test them in something like a typical context, at least if one
agrees that, in the long run, welfare state issues are almost always
among the most salient political topics in developed welfare states.
Finally, these informed speculations shall not overshadow the main
message in this section: “Sweden 1999” was not chosen by design, but
because it made primary data collection possible. Therefore, we need
studies that test similar hypotheses in other contexts and countries.
They will tell us more about the extent to which the results are
possible to generalise.
The data
The main data source of this study is The 1999 West Sweden SOM
Survey.2 It was conducted by The SOM Institute, which is managed
jointly by the Institute for Journalism and Mass Communication, the
Department of Political Science and the School of Public Admini-
stration at Göteborg University. Since 1986, the SOM Institute has
conducted interdisciplinary survey research in Sweden on the topics of
Society, Opinion and Media, hence the name SOM.3
                                                                                                                          
As discussed in chapter 4, and as shown by Mutz (1998), media coverage can
at times weaken the impact of personal experiences, provided that what has
been personally experienced does not fit with the image conveyed by the
media.
2 All datasets used in this study will be available for scientific purposes from
the Swedish Social Science Data Archive (SSD) at Göteborg University
(http://www.ssd.gu.se).
3 The SOM Institute is directed by a steering committee consisting of
Professor Sören Holmberg, Department of Political Science, Professor Lennart
Weibull, Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, and Senior
Lecturer Lennart Nilsson, School of Public Administration. For more
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Ever since 1986, a main activity has been the administration of an
annual nation-wide mail survey (see Holmberg & Weibull 2002).
Since 1992, the SOM institute has also conducted a number of local
and regional surveys, including an annual survey in West Sweden. In
the early West Sweden SOM surveys, the sampling area covered
Göteborg and a smaller number of municipalities near the city. In
1998, the survey was expanded so as to cover the entire Västra
Götaland region. This region contains 1.5 of the 8.9 million Swedish
inhabitants. Göteborg, the second largest city in Sweden, is located in
the region.
Financed by the Swedish Council for Social Research, this project
collected primary data under the auspices of the 1999 Västra
Götaland SOM survey (referred to below as the 1999 West Sweden
SOM Survey). Questionnaires and return envelopes were sent to a
random sample of 5900 individuals between 15 and 80 years of age,
living in the Västra Götaland region, out of which 3760 completed
and returned the questionnaires by mail. The net response rate was 68
percent. The data were collected between October 1999 and January
2000 (for more information, see Nilsson 2000; Nilsson & Olsson
2000).
Collaborating with the West Sweden SOM survey was fortunate as
one of its main research topics has always been usage of and
satisfaction with welfare state services (see Nilsson 1996b, 1997;
Johansson, Nilsson & Strömberg 2001). By adding survey items
particular to the present study – related to for instance self-interest,
distributive justice, and procedural justice – alongside items routinely
included in the survey, a data set was created that is extremely useful
for studying the political impact of personal welfare state experiences.
The various items will be presented as we go along through Chapters
6 through 10.
The fact that the data are collected in only a part of the country
does not seem to pose much of a problem. Many previous analyses
suggest that parameter estimates yielded by unweighted West Sweden
SOM data are typically very similar to those generated by the nation-
wide SOM studies or by national election studies (see Johansson &
Nilsson 2002). In fact, this contention will receive further support in
                                                                                                                          
information about the SOM Institute and its surveys, see Holmberg and
Weibull (1997, 1999, 2000, 2002; Nilsson 2000), or visit its website at
http://www.som.gu.se/.
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Chapter 6 where in some instances we can compare West Sweden
SOM estimates with those for the whole country. It is thus unlikely
that any major conclusions would have been radically different had
the data been collected in the country as a hole.
Apart from the 1999 West Sweden SOM survey, we will
occasionally draw on two auxiliary data sources. One is The 1999
European Parliament Election Study, which was conducted by the
Swedish Election Studies Program in cooperation with Statistics
Sweden (SCB). The Swedish Election Studies Program is located at the
Department of Political Science, Göteborg University, and is currently
directed by Sören Holmberg. Its activities – which were initiated by
Jörgen Westerståhl and Bo Särlvik in the early 1950s – include voter
surveys at the time of each national parliamentary election and
national referendum, surveys with members of parliament, and media
content analyses.4
The 1999 European Parliament Election Study is a post-election
survey involving face-to-face interviews. The sample is drawn from a
population of Swedish citizens between 18 and 80 years of age, and
the interviews were carried out by trained SCB interviewers between
June 14 and September 27 1999 (the election was held on June 13).
The number of interviewed respondents was 2022, which means the
net response rate was 75 percent (for more information, see Hedberg
2000). As I participated in the main report of this study (Holmberg et
al. 2001), I was given the opportunity to include some questions on
both personally experienced public services as well as on “sociotropic”
evaluations of public services. These items will be put to use in
Chapter 6.
A second auxiliary data source is provided by The 1992 Swedish
Living Standard Survey.5 The principal investigator of this survey was
Björn Halleröd, Department of Sociology, Umeå University (see
Halleröd et al. 1993; Halleröd 1994). The data were collected in the
spring of 1992 by means of face-to-face interviews, again carried out
by trained SCB interviewers. The sample was drawn from individuals
in the Swedish population between 20 and 75 years of age. Out of a
                                                          
4 For more information about the Swedish Election Studies Program, see
Holmberg 2000; Esaiasson & Holmberg 1996; or visit
http://www.pol.gu.se/sve/vod/vustart.htm.
5 The 1992 Swedish Living Standard Survey data were distributed to the
author by the Swedish Social Science Data Archive (“Svensk Levnadsstandard
1992,” SSD 0492). Neither the archive nor the primary investigator bear any
responsibility for the analyses and interpretations presented here.
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total sample of 1075 people, 793 were interviewed, which makes for a
response rate of 74 percent. An interesting feature of this study is that
information from public records about benefits from transfer systems
and social insurances have been added to the data set. This
information will be useful in Chapter 7 when it comes to constructing
measures of welfare state self-interest.
Selecting, projecting, resisting, and constructing experiences?
Let us close this chapter by considering potential perils of cross-
sectional data. The point of departure is the basic causal model
illustrated in Figure 1.1. This causal scheme is a parsimonious and
non-recursive account of a complicated process. It does not
incorporate the rather obvious fact that citizens do not enter
experiences as new born babies (except for in maternity hospitals).
Rather, people take with them pre-existing values, beliefs and attitudes
into their experiences. Such predispositions may in various ways affect
the extent to which people get in contact with welfare state
institutions, and how they perceive and react politically to their
experiences. As Zaller (1992:6) puts it, “Every opinion is a marriage
of information and predisposition.” From this perspective, Figure 1.1
is simplified as it only models political effects of an information source
(personal experiences), while being silent about how predispositions
may affect and interact with the process.
Adjusting as best as we can for these deficiencies, the final task in
this chapter is to think about four possible versions of the suspicion
that predispositions affect, and interact with the impact of, welfare
state experiences. In turn, we will discuss the possibilities that,
depending on their predispositions, people select, rationalise, resist,
and construct personal welfare state experiences. I first describe the
intellectual origins of these four possibilities, after which I explain why
this study unfortunately cannot consider them to any great empirical
depth.
A first possibility is that people “select” experiences. This means
that predispositions affect the extent to which people actually get in
contact with various welfare state institutions. Individuals with certain
attitudes are to a greater extent than others drawn to (certain) public
services, regardless of their “objective needs” – income, health, age,
number of children, and so on. In statistical language, selection effects
operate directly, controlling for objective needs.
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Theoretically, selection effects lie outside the scope of this study.
Our substantive interest is effects of, not explanations for, personal
experiences. Empirically, however, some of the attitudinal
predispositions that drive the selection of experiences may be (earlier
versions of) the dependent variables political trust and ideology. And
because the empirical analysis will be based on cross-sectional data,
we might not always be able to sort out what affects what.
Especially pre-existing ideological orientations might play a role
here. For example, those who already hold rightist and anti-state
orientations might be less likely than others to seek out public help
and services of various sorts. They are more prone to regard non-
public entities such as the individual, the family, or non-profit
organisations as the appropriate locus of welfare production. It is thus
possible that such attitudes make them more likely to refrain from
using public services if they can, and opt for some form of non-public
alternative.
The notion of selection effects has consequences for the empirical
analysis. Consider the hypothesis that more frequent personal usage of
welfare state products produces greater self-interested support for
state intervention and leftist ideology. Chapter 7 tests this prediction
by examining the cross-sectional relation between ideology measures
and variables counting the number of welfare state institutions from
which respondents are currently receiving service. If there is such a
correlation, it may be interpreted in at least two ways. First, in line
with the self-interest perspective, the correlation could reflect a real
causal impact of differences in welfare state consumption. Second, in
line with the notion of selection effects, it may be that those who
already support state intervention are more prone to seek out
organisations that they already like.
Consider in a similar fashion the hypothesis that experiences have a
more positive impact on ideology, the more empowering institutional
interfaces are. As discussed in Chapter 3, one mechanism would be
that institutionalised empowerment improves judgements of
experienced social justice. But again the perspective of selection effects
offers an alternative interpretation. It starts with the observation that
more empowering experiences involve more exit-options. And it is
possible that empowering experiences correlate more strongly with
leftist ideology, not because of improved judgements of experienced
social justice, but because this is the part of the welfare state where
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selection effects are allowed to operate freely. User institutions like
libraries and sports facilities are open for selection effects in a way
that client institutions like social assistance and elder care are not.
This could explain why experiences of user institutions have a stronger
positive relation with ideology.
A second risk is that people “project” experiences (see Krosnick
2002). This could occur for instance when we ask them to subjectively
describe or evaluate their experiences in terms of distributive justice or
experienced voice opportunities. The risk is that answers to such
questions are, not so much judgements of actual experiences, but
rather rationalisations of pre-existing political attitudes. Take as
example a cross-sectional correlation between perceived distributive
justice and state intervention support. According to the “projection”
hypothesis, the explanation is not that negative welfare state
experiences lead people to question the practical utility or the
legitimacy of big government. Instead, the argument goes, it is people
who already endorse anti-state attitudes who tend to bring their
answers to experience questions in line with their political
orientations.
Though selection and projection denote different processes, they
lead to similar methodological problems in the context of this study.
More precisely, the problem is the theoretical possibility of reciprocal
causation, coupled with the empirical analysis of cross-sectional data.
It is not self-evident how we should interpret a cross-sectional
correlation between experiences and political orientations. There are
logically reasonable interpretations of a causal impact in both
directions, and the data could be consistent with both.
 A third possibility is that people “resist” experiences. The point of
departure is the well-known tendency that individuals are more
susceptible to political information that is perceived to fit with their
pre-existing orientations. In fact, virtually all successful theories of
mass political preferences have, in some form, and to some extent,
incorporated the notion of resistance (or “selective perception”).6 For
instance, in the classic Michigan model of voting behaviour,
“Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which
the individual tends to see what is favourable to his partisan
orientation” (Campbell et al. 1960:1333). Likewise, more recent
models subscribe to the axiom that “People tend to resist arguments
                                                          
6 For an introduction, see Eagly & Chaiken (1993:595-99).
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that are inconsistent with their political predispositions” (Zaller
1992:44; see also Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee 1954; Klapper
1960; McGuire 1985; Eagly & Chaiken 1993). As for welfare state
experiences, the resistance axiom implies that people might very well
notice some positive or negative aspect of an experience, but they may
not accept the information as “valid,” “fair,” “representative,” or the
like, because the observation does not jibe well with pre-existing
political orientations. And such resisted observations should exercise a
smaller impact.
Such processes pose a potential threat to our general hypotheses.
These hypotheses all build on the idea that negative and positive
experiences – conceptualised in terms of self-interest, distributive
justice, or voice – have a general impact on political trust and
ideology. This impact is general in the sense that it operates with the
same strength and direction, regardless of what political orientations
and leanings a person subscribed to before experiences occurred.
However, if resistance processes were widespread, one would expect a
pattern where people who are already sceptical about the welfare state
and the political system are more susceptible to negative experiences.
Conversely, one would expect citizens with preexisting positive
feelings about these entities to give greater political weight to positive
experiences.
Here, it should be pointed out that we are talking about tendencies.
People tend to resist inconsistent information, and predispositions are
thus never perfect information filters. People are almost never
motivated or sophisticated enough, and the evaluative implications of
predispositions are rarely clear enough, so as to allow for perfect
resistance to uncongenial information. Most people, therefore, will
typically reject some information that is reasonably consistent with
pre-existing orientations, and accept some information that is
reasonably inconsistent with those orientations (Gerber & Green
1999). This means that the notion of resistance draws our attention to
a gradual interaction effect: The impact of experiences on subsequent
political orientations gradually increases the greater the consistency
between experiences and pre-existing orientations. However, because
pre-existing orientations are no perfect information filters, there
should usually be a certain small effect of a particular type of
experiences even among people where experiences do not fit
predispositions.
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Moreover, two objections can be made against the notion of
resisting incompatible information in the context of personal welfare
state experiences. These objections somewhat diminish the threat
posed to our general hypotheses. First, the idea of resistance stems
from research on opinion persuasion, for instance persuasion by
political elites through the mass media. It has been shown that people
often use their pre-existing political orientations to selectively sort and
evaluate this type of information. Moreover, many people do this
because they are not motivated to examine in detail, or carefully
deliberate on, political elite information. Instead, they use
predispositions towards the political world as informational shortcuts
(Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock 1991; McGraw &
Hubbard 1996). As an example imagine a leftist pro-welfare person
who hears a conservative politician arguing that a public service
should be privatised. This person will typically not examine in detail
the logical coherence or factual accuracy of the message. Rather, he or
she may opt for the convenient informational shortcut that “I know
that I don’t like that sort of politics and politicians,” thus resisting the
information based on political predispositions.
Of course, this can only occur to the extent that there are easily
available cues that make it clear how a piece of information fits with
predispositions. And this assumption is probably more fulfilled in the
context of elite messages than in the context of personal welfare state
experiences. In the former context, messages often come with
information about how different politicians, parties and interest
organisations describe reality. Based on such cues, and based on how
the individual is predisposed towards these actors and their ideologies,
a person can take convenient shortcuts in the information jungle. In
contrast, personal welfare experiences generate a more raw and less
pre-packaged type of information that does not contain equally self-
evident cues to what one “ought to” think about it. Moreover,
because “The key to resistance [...] is information concerning the
relationship between arguments and predispositions” (Zaller
1992:44), resistance processes may be less widespread for personal
experiences than they have proven to be in the case of persuasive
communication with political elites.7
                                                          
7 A related remark is that resistance should be more widespread when people
expect to encounter persuasive messages and to engage in political thinking.
When people follow political debates and issues at the elite level, they know
that different political interests will present pros and cons for their positions.
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Second, resistance processes could be less widespread when
personal involvement rises. Normally, citizens are not sufficiently
motivated and involved in order to carefully examine political
arguments and information. Because most citizens follow politics with,
at best, one eye open, they have a need to make swift predisposition-
based judgements of new incoming information (Popkin 1991). In the
absence of motivation and involvement, careful examination of the
logical and empirical relevance of such elite-level information would
be unbearably tedious and time consuming. Indeed, “people process
information superficially and minimally unless they are motivated to
do otherwise [...] people must have sufficient motivation to turn to
more effortful, systematic forms of processing” (Eagly and Chaiken
1993:674).
This study, however, investigates a type of information that may be
able to arouse considerably more involvement and motivation than the
average news story. After all, we are talking about direct, personal and
potentially important events, not just any distant and obscure political
issue or debate that one may notice from the corner of the eye. It
seems plausible that people are more interested in carefully thinking
about such political information, compared to the average day-to-day
politics reported in the mass media (Fiske 1986:51). If so, people no
longer have the same chronic need to use simplifying predispositions
as shortcuts to swift decisions on what information should be resisted
and endorsed respectively.
Past research lends some credibility to these remarks. Especially
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) have, based on a series of experiments,
found that individuals with no personal involvement with an issue are
more likely to be lazy and rely on easily accessible cues concerning
information source (“who says it”). They are also less likely to be
affected by the actual nature and quality of the information.
Conversely, subjects with greater personal involvement are less
concerned with easily accessible cues and informational shortcuts, and
are prone to examine in more detail the information at hand.
Resistance to arguments based on source cues is thus less widespread
                                                                                                                          
Moreover, citizens know that they like some of those interests and actors more
than others. They therefore have good reason not to automatically accept all
information they encounter, but to turn resistance filters on. In contrast,
personal welfare state experiences often occur in a seemingly harmless
everyday context in which politically relevant information may catch people
off guard (see Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955)
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among the personally involved and motivated (see Eagly & Chaiken
1993:287-9).
Finally, let us think about the possibility that people “construct”
experiences. We start by observing that our hypotheses more or less
take for granted what political conclusions should be drawn from
negative and positive experiences respectively. More precisely, our
hypotheses suggest that a positive experience (in terms of self-interest,
distributive justice, or voice) is information that should typically
produce positive effects on political trust, and leftist effects on
ideological orientations. The assumption is thus that everyone draws
more or less the same political conclusions of such experiences.
Expressed differently, the political meaning of negative and positive
experiences respectively is regarded as self-evident and invariant.
This assumption is not only embraced by our hypotheses, but also
by the notion of “resisting” experiences: Predispositions serve to
detect whether one should reject or endorse political information.
However, the actual political meaning of the information – what
conclusions it should logically lead to – is seen as unproblematic. It is
assumed to be more or less self-evident what political response a given
piece of information should stimulate if it is accepted. Of course, some
may reject the information whereas others may endorse it. But the
information means the same political thing to everyone.
This somewhat rigid assumption is relaxed by the notion of
“constructed experiences.” The basic idea is that there are not always
definitive answers to the question of what political conclusions should
“logically” follow from a given piece of accepted information (see
Neuman, Just & Crigler 1992; Gamson 1992; McQuail 1994).
Rather, political meaning must often be “constructed.” It must be
figured out by the individual, based on his or her pre-existing political
attitudes and knowledge. More than this, depending on
predispositions, very similar information may be interpreted
differently, and hence produce very different “effects” among different
people. In other words, construction processes draw our attention to
an interaction effect of predispositions into the relationship between
experiences and subsequent political orientations.
Actually, Chapter 2 identified a specific version of the general idea.
We observed that the literature on distributive justice assumes that
poor assessments of distributive justice reduce support for common
institutions. However, it was also noted that the opposite effect is
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conceivable, especially among individuals who already strongly
supported such institutions before experiences occurred. Specifically,
among pro-welfare state citizens, the natural response to, say, strongly
inadequate health care experiences might not be an increased
negativity towards public sector arrangements. On the contrary, they
may draw the conclusion that such arrangements have too little
resources and must receive even more resources and support in the
future.8
One may of course think of other possible constructionist threats to
our unconditional predictions. Imagine for example two citizens – one
with a large portion of political trust, the other an incurable political
cynic – who both experience good voice opportunities in contacts
with, say, public schools. To the extent that these experiences trigger
political reasoning, what conclusions will be drawn? According to our
hypothesis, the answer is that both these individuals will develop more
positive attitudes towards the political system and its actors. However,
from the constructionist perspective, the political cynic could very well
deviate from the supposedly general pattern: he or she may regard the
voice opportunities as new arguments for not trusting the political
system. To the cynic, voice opportunities may be constructed as just
another sign of political hypocrisy, as another indication that “they
just pretend to care about our opinions, and then disregard them
anyway.” Conversely, the trusting citizen is more likely to frame
experienced voice opportunities as indications of a genuine desire to
incorporate citizens’ views in the implementation and evaluation of
public policy.
These examples demonstrate that the political meaning of
comparable personal welfare state experiences is not necessarily self-
evident or invariant across people. Rather, such meaning must be
mentally constructed, and these constructions as well as their effects
may vary.
Dynamic theories – static data
In conclusion, it is likely that Figure 1.1 is too parsimonious to do full
justice to the complexity of experience effects. All four possibilities
identified in the previous section are worth taking seriously and merit
further research. Such research would teach us more about how,
                                                          
8 The viability of this possibility is discussed further in Chapter 8.
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when, and to what extent people select, project, resist, and construct
personal welfare state experiences.
While this study takes these four possibilities with utmost
theoretical seriousness, it cannot pursue them to any great empirical
depths. The reason, as already hinted at, is that we will use static,
cross-sectional survey data collected at one point in time. Of course,
from the viewpoint of selection, projection, resistance, and
construction processes, this is unfortunate because all four possibilities
demand some form of dynamic data. To isolate them empirically we
would need to measure, not only respondents’ political attitudes after
experiences have occurred, but also their predispositions before the
experience. Such variables would then be included as control variables
and interaction variables in our statistical models. However, because
we use cross-sectional data we will not be able to do this, meaning
that it is not empirically possible to separate “genuine” experience
effects from reciprocal selection and projection, or investigate whether
the direction and strength of experience effects are conditioned by
resistance and construction processes.
Having pointed out these shortcomings, there are at least two
arguments for the chosen research strategy. A first point has to do
with the actual purpose of this study. The main objective is not a
desire to sort out once and for all the extent to which people select,
project, resist, and construct personal welfare state experiences.
Rather, the research task is to push the (admittedly simplistic) non-
recursive framework in Figure 1.1 out of the economic realm and into
welfare state territory. What will happen when we do this? Do
personal experiences become more important than personal economic
experiences have proven to be? If so, what aspects of experiences
matter? And are experience effects channelled by sociotropic
perceptions or not? When these questions have been addressed in a
fair amount of studies, it is reasonable to move on to testing (even)
more sophisticated assumptions about how predispositions affect, and
interact with, personal welfare state experiences. But as I hope the
empirical chapters will show, there is at this point a lot of illuminating
cross-sectional information to be extracted. The proof of the pudding
will – hopefully – be in the eating. 9
                                                          
9 In fact, the typical progression of research programs on political behaviour
and opinion formation is exactly to start out with cross-sectional data and – to
the extent that the cross-sectional data are supportive – later move on to
panel, time series, or experimental designs, which can accommodate more
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A second point – equally important but perhaps less intellectually
satisfying – has to do with the available survey data. It would of
course be nice to have a panel data set that allowed the inclusion of
predispositions at t-1 for most of the analyses performed in this study.
However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no Swedish panel data
set that simultaneously contains (1) nearly as much welfare state
experience information as the cross-sectional data sets used here, and
(2) nearly as much information about the dependent variables. Hence,
we are at present not sufficiently well equipped to investigate the
presence of selection, projection, resistance, and construction
processes in studies of political effects of personal welfare state
experiences.
                                                                                                                          
complex assumptions such as those discussed in the last section. As Krosnick
(2002:120) explains, “Nearly every causal hypothesis of significance in
political psychology is tested initially using cross-sectional data. [...] Although
we all know that a correlation does not document causality, there is a
tendency at times to describe a correlational result as documenting causality,
especially when it is based on a multivariate regression.” Krosnick (2002:144)
further notes, “There is no doubt that cross-sectional data can be informative
regarding the validity of a causal hypothesis. If an expected correlation fails to
appear, this certainly casts doubt on the causal process that implied it [...]
once an initial convincing demonstration of correlational support is provided,
it seems essential to move quickly on to employing either longitudinal data
analysis methods [...] or experimental methods.” From this point of view, an
argument for the chosen research strategy would be that research on personal
welfare state experiences has not reached quite as far as for instance studies on
the effects of economic perceptions: we still know little enough about cross-
sectional effects of personal welfare state experiences to make such analyses
interesting.
Chapter 6
The Welfare State
and the Economy

hroughout the summer of 2001, Swedish newspapers reported
extensively on the apparently dropping quality of public health
care. For instance, the major paper in the Göteborg area arranged a
phone-in where readers called journalists and shared their personal
health care experiences.1 One man told the following story:
“Politicians should not use the word welfare anymore when talking
about Sweden. My wife had to wait for four hours with a broken arm
at the local health care central in Falkenberg. Then she was sent to
Varberg for another five hours of waiting. All in all, it took twelve
hours before her arm was in a cast. It’s a scandal.” The whole event
was summarised like this: “ ... they all told similar stories. They all
expressed anger, fear, and disappointment. Several said the staff
should not be blamed, but rather the organisation and, ultimately, the
politicians.”
These quotes illustrate nicely the type of effects we are looking for:
Very specific personal contacts with welfare state institutions become a
basis for the formation of very general political judgements and
attitudes.
However, in contrast to the common-sense-feeling conveyed by
these quotes, academic research concludes that politically relevant
personal experiences are typically not very consequential for political
attitudes. Instead, what matters to a much greater extent are
“sociotropic perceptions” of the collective state of affairs. When
forming political attitudes, the argument goes, citizens rarely wonder
“what are my personal experiences?” They are much more inclined to
ask themselves sociotropic questions like “what has the collective
                                                          
1 The phone-in was reported in Göteborgs-Posten, August 25, 2001 (“Många
berättade om sina skräckupplevelser på akuten”).
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experienced?” and adjust their attitudes accordingly.2 Judging from
this research, citizens in modern mass democracies are better described
as “sociotropic animals,” than as egocentric ones.
Furthermore, according to these studies, sociotropic perceptions are
very weakly correlated with direct personal observations and
experiences. People experiencing personal financial crises are not more
likely than others to infer from their personal situation that the whole
economy is in trouble. Collective-level perceptions do not seem to be
informed by personal-level reality. In Mutz’s (1998:66) words,
“Despite the accessibility and obvious salience of personal experiences,
they very seldom have a large or significant effect on judgements about
collective-level reality.” Rather, previous research concludes, socio-
tropic views of the collective state of affairs are the products of elite
interpretations of social reality. These interpretations are typically
communicated to us via the mass media
These conclusions originate mainly in research on personal
economic experiences. This chapter, however, studies personal
experiences and sociotropic perceptions of both the economy and the
welfare state. We have reasons to believe that the nature of opinion
formation changes when we move out of the economic realm and into
welfare state territory. More exactly, we have hypothesised that
personal experiences are more consequential to political attitudes in
the welfare state territory than in the economic realm.
Chapter 1 discussed two potential reasons for this difference. The
first one has to with the  differing nature of political responsibility.
Experiences of welfare state institutions are the immediate results of
decisions taken by responsible politicians. After all, we are talking
about experiences with the very institutions that are supposed to
implement political decisions. In contrast, there is only an indirect and
unclear political responsibility for citizens’ personal economies. In
Western societies, the personal economy is largely a personal, not
political, responsibility. The firmer link between personal welfare state
experiences and responsible political actors might be better at
stimulating political thinking than the weaker link between personal
economy and political actors.
The second reason has to do with the nature of political
information. The economic policy realm offers a small set of
memorable and informative macro-economic indicators (“unemploy-
                                                          
2 For references, see Chapter 1.
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ment,” budget deficits,” “inflation,” and so on). This set of indicators
lends itself naturally to the formation of accurate economic sociotropic
perceptions. We all know whether the economy is going up or down,
and such views are easily separated from personal economic
experiences. In contrast, the welfare state offers heterogeneous and
potentially conflicting sociotropic information. Whether the welfare
state is improving or deteriorating is typically a more difficult question
than how the economy is doing. Welfare state personal experiences
might therefore be a more important political information source than
personal economic experiences.
Figure 1.1 suggested two paths by which personal experiences are
generalised into political preferences. The paths represent two
potential ways in which personal experiences are more important than
personal economic experiences. The first possibility is that direct
effects of personal experiences on political orientations are
strengthened as we move out of the economy and into the welfare
state: People find it so difficult to form sociotropic welfare state
perceptions, and personal welfare state experiences appear so easy and
relevant, that sociotropic perceptions become disconnected from
politics altogether. Controlling for sociotropic perceptions, differences
in personal experiences then have a direct effect on preferences.
The second possibility is that the indirect effects of personal
experiences increase. If so, it is still sociotropic perceptions of
collective experience that are of immediate importance to political
orientations, and citizens may still be accurately described as
“sociotropic animals.” However, sociotropic perceptions are in turn
partly products of personal experience. Because of the more difficult
sociotropic information, and because of the greater political relevance
of personal experience, sociotropic welfare state perceptions will be
more tightly linked to personal experiences.
By and large, research on economic perceptions has analysed two
kinds of dependent variables: (1) support for the governing party, and
(2) political trust orientations such as satisfaction with democracy and
trust in politicians. The conclusions that sociotropic perceptions matter
more than personal experiences have proven to hold for both. This
chapter analyses exactly these two groups of dependent variables. Of
course, for reasons discussed in Chapter 4, later chapters will focus
entirely on overarching affect-laden political orientations, rather than
more short-term and concrete opinions such as support for the
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governing party. However, at the moment our main concern is what
happens when welfare state perceptions are added as independent
variables to previously tested models. Given this concern, it would not
make sense to change the models on both the independent and the
dependent side, a situation in which it is unclear which change actually
caused any differences compared to previous research.
Here is how the chapter is organised. First, we familiarise ourselves
with the independent variables. Second, we examine the link between
personal experiences and sociotropic perceptions, both in the economic
realm and in the welfare state. Third, we estimate full causal models of
the relations between personal experiences, sociotropic perceptions,
and political attitudes in the two policy domains. Fourth, inspired by
the observation that economic perceptions are more positive than
views on personally experienced public services, we make a
counterfactual thought experiment: how much would the percentage
of government sympathizers increase if personally experienced public
services were viewed as favourably as the economy? Fifth, we draw
conclusions and look forward to later chapters.
Measuring personal experiences and sociotropic perceptions
Just as it would make no sense to analyse different dependent variables
than previous research, it would be unwise, given our purposes, to
change the format for measuring independent variables. Hence, to
measure economic judgements, a question that has been included in
many surveys in different countries was included in the 1999 West
Sweden SOM Survey. This question asked retrospectively about trends
in economic conditions: “According to your view, how have the
following economic conditions changed in the last twelve months?”
Respondents answered with respect to “your personal economic
situation” as well as with respect to “the Swedish economy.”3 For each
item, three response alternatives were offered: “improved,” “remained
about the same,” and “got worse.”
                                                          
3 For both the economy and for public services, people were also asked about
the situation in their municipality. These variables are left out of the analysis
because our aim is to investigate what happens when personal experiences and
sociotropic perceptions are added as independent variables alongside the
economic variables used in much previous research. This research has rarely
investigated perceptions at different levels in the political system. Two
exceptions to this rule are Gilljam & Nilsson (1994), and Mondak, Mutz &
Huckfeldt (1996).
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A similar question was asked about public services: “According to
your view, how has the quality of public services changed during the
last two or three years?” Respondents answered with respect to both
“public services I have been in contact with,” and “public services in
Sweden.” The response alternatives were the same as for economic
perceptions.4
Table 6.1 Retrospective perceptions of the economy and public
services in the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey
(WSOM99), and the 1999 European Parliament
Election Study (EUP99)
Personal economy
Personally experienced
public services
WSOM 99 EUP99 WSOM 99 EUP99
Got better 29 30 4 5
Remained the same 51 54 67 69
Got worse 20 15 28 26
Sum percent 100 100 100 100
Number or respondents 3615 1268 3448 1168
The Swedish economy Public services in Sweden
WSOM99 EUP99 WSOM99 EUP99
Got better 43 56 3 3
Remained the same 39 34 50 51
Got worse 19 10 47 46
Sum percent 100 100 100 100
Number of respondents 3458 1210 3431 1226
Comment: See related main text for question wording.
As mentioned in Chapter 5, I also had the opportunity to include
virtually the same questions in the 1999 Swedish European Parliament
                                                          
4 Whereas the economic questions refer to “the last twelve months,” the
public service questions in the SOM Survey ask about “the last two, three
years.” The reason is that economic information tends to be more quantifiable
and periodically exact than information about public services. Therefore, I felt
it would be somewhat strange to ask about public services during a very
recent and exactly specified period of time. In the Swedish European Election
Study, however, all retrospective questions referred to the last twelve months.
It turned out that this had little effect on the results.
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Election Study. Univariate frequencies for all these independent
variables may be inspected in Table 6.1.
In 1999, Swedes were more satisfied with economic development
than with public services.5 For instance, between 43 and 56 percent
thought the Swedish economy had gotten better, whereas only 3
percent chose the same alternative with respect to Swedish public
services. The items tapping personal experiences of the economy and
public services respectively registered similar differences.
People were certainly not wrong in thinking the economy was
improving as Sweden had been recovering for several years after the
crisis of the early 1990s. Interestingly, this crisis also resulted in
sizeable cutbacks in many parts of the public sector (see Svallfors
1996). And although the governing Social Democrats, along with
several other parties, built their 1998 election campaign on promises to
improve public services, citizens apparently did not perceive that these
expectations were being fulfilled.
There are only small percentage differences in the results from the
West Sweden Survey (a mail survey conducted between October and
January) and the European Parliament Election Study (face-to-face
interviews conducted between June and September). The only
deviation worth mentioning is that the respondents in the European
Parliament Election Study viewed the Swedish economy more
favourably (56 percent, versus 43 in the West Sweden Study, thought
the economy had gotten better.)
The relation between personal experiences and sociotropic judgements
Previous research on economic perceptions contends that the link
between personal experiences and sociotropic judgements is weak or
non-existent. In the economic realm, people do not seem very good at
drawing general conclusions from their own experiences of politically
relevant phenomena. However, we have opened for the possibility that
this link is strengthened when we move into welfare state territory.
The relative lack of parsimonious macro indicators, coupled with the
clearer connection between welfare state experiences and responsible
politicians, means such experiences could be a more important source
of political information than personal economic experiences. As
indicated above, this information might affect political orientations
                                                          
5 See Kumlin & Oskarson (2000), and Kumlin (2001a), for in-depth analyses
of these differences.
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directly, without being generalised into a more general sociotropic
perception. However, it is also possible that personal experiences affect
political orientations because experiences are an information source
for sociotropic perceptions, perceptions that in turn impact on political
orientations. This implies that welfare state experiences are more
important than economic ones because they are more tightly linked to
sociotropic perceptions.
The idea is supported by the findings presented in Table 6.2. It
displays correlation coefficients for pairs of items having “parallel”
wording for both personal experiences and sociotropic judgements. In
addition to the items introduced in Table 6.1, I also included some
more specific measures of experiences and sociotropic judgements.
These will show up later in the book in analyses of the impact of
experienced distributive and procedural justice. But for now we are
only interested in the correlation between experiences and sociotropic
judgements.
The classic finding in previous research is replicated by these data.
There is only a rather moderate correlation between perceptions of the
personal economy and sociotropic perceptions of the country’s
economy (between .14 and .20). However, the link is strengthened
when we enter welfare state territory. Here, the correlations between
personal experiences and sociotropic judgements are about twice as
large or more, compared to the economic realm. The correlations
between change in personal experience and change at the collective
level are even three times as large in the welfare state. This latter
difference was found in the West Sweden Survey (.63 versus .20), as
well as in the European Parliament Election Study (.47 versus .15).
So far, the results fit the prediction. Whereas personal-level and
collective-level judgements of politically relevant phenomena are fairly
separate in the economic realm, they are intimately intertwined in the
welfare state.
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Table 6.2 The relation between personal experiences and
sociotropic judgements (Pearson’s r)
1999 WEST SWEDEN SOM SURVEY
The Economy
Change in personal economy – Change in Swedish economy .20
The Welfare State
Change in personally experienced public services – Change in Swedish public services .63
I was treated correctly – In general, people are correctly treated .42
In my experience, public employees worked efficiently – In general, public employees work
efficiently
.48
I could affect how services were run – In general people can affect how services are run .36
I have received the service and help I have a right to – In general, people receive the service
and help they have a right to
.43
1999 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTION STUDY
The Economy
Change in personal economy – Change in Swedish economy .15
Change in personal economy – The situation in Swedish economy .14
The Welfare State
Change in personally experienced public services – Change in Swedish public services .47
Change in personally experienced public services – The situation in Swedish public services .30
Comment: The last four welfare state-related pairs of items in the West
Sweden SOM survey emanate from a question battery that is described in
conjunction with Tables 8.1 and 9.1. Furthermore, the sociotropic variables
tapping the situation in the economy and in public services respectively were
only included in the European Parliament Election Study. These variables
have five categories: very good (coded 1), rather good (2), neither good nor
bad (3), rather bad (4), and very bad (5). For information about the remaining
items, see Table 6.1.
Modelling direct and indirect effects of personal experiences
We now turn to a multivariate investigation of the hypothesis that
personal welfare state experiences are more important in the opinion
formation process than personal economic experiences. Again, our
causal scheme opens for the possibility that personal experiences may
affect political attitudes both directly as well as indirectly. The indirect
effects would operate through sociotropic perceptions, reflecting a
process in which people generalise their experiences into collective-
level judgements, judgements that play a role in the formation of
political attitudes. The findings in the last section certainly underscore
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this last indirect possibility. Figure 6.1 reiterates our causal model
graphically. Essentially, it is the same model as the one presented in
Chapter 1. The only difference is that perceptions of public services are
now included side by side with economic perceptions.
Figure 6.1 Personal experiences, sociotropic judgements and
political attitudes
Using OLS regression analysis, I estimated the various effects in the
model for each of three dependent variables: government approval,
satisfaction with the way democracy works, and trust in politicians
(Table 6.3). The independent variables were retrospective perceptions
of changes in the economy and in public services. In addition, each
equation in these causal models includes a number of control variables
that are known to affect the dependent variables (as discussed in
Chapter 4), and that could also be suspected to influence retrospective
accounts of the economy and/or the welfare state.
Before proceeding to commenting on the results, a note on the
construction of dependent variables might be in order. The
government approval variable was generated by a question in the 1999
European Parliament Election Study asking how “the Social
Democrats have done as a government party since the 1994 election.”
Respondents answered using an eleven-point scale ranging from –5
Personal
economic
experience
Sociotropic economic
perception
Personal
public
service
experience
Sociotropic public
service perception
Political
attitudes
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(the government has done a bad job) to +5 (the government has done a
good job). The negative coefficients in Table 6.3 mean that average
government approval drops as views on the economy and the welfare
state grow negative.
Furthermore, this study analyses two indicators of political trust.
Both are standard indicators employed in the literature, and both are
measures of relatively concrete objects of “political support,” rather
than of more diffuse support towards the political community. The
first indicator taps “satisfaction with the way democracy works.” A
second indicator of political trust taps the degree of “trust in
politicians.” In the parlance of the political support typology discussed
in Chapter 4, the former measure is most directly related to “regime
performance.” It is thus seen as tapping attitudes towards the
democratic system as it actually functions. The second measure is
concerned, not so much with the political regime itself, but rather with
general support for political authorities and actors.
The 1999 West Sweden Survey offers ample opportunities to
measure political trust. In order to generate a measure of overall
satisfaction with democracy, I factor analysed three items tapping the
degree to which people are satisfied with how democracy works in
practice in Sweden, in the Västra Götaland region, and in the
municipality respectively. Similarly, to obtain a measure of trust in
politicians, I factor analysed items tapping trust in politicians in the
three geographical units respectively.6 The means of the resulting
factors equal zero, and standard deviations equal 1. They were scored
so that higher values mean greater political trust.
                                                          
6 For the satisfaction with democracy items, the alternatives were very
satisfied (coded 1), rather satisfied (2), not very satisfied (3), not at all satisfied
(4). For the trust in politicians items, alternatives were very much trust (coded
1), quite some trust (2), neither much nor little trust (3), quite little trust (2),
very little trust (1), and don’t know (3). The loadings on the satisfaction with
democracy factor were as follows: satisfaction with democracy in Sweden
(.78), in Västra Götaland (.80), in the municipality (.77). The loadings on
trust in politicians were: trust in national politicians (.72), trust in Västra
Götaland politicians (.66), trust in municipality politicians (.75). Finally, the
correlation between the two factors was r=.50, which indicates that although
satisfaction with democracy and trust in politicians are kept separate
conceptually, they are nevertheless empirically related; people who are
satisfied with democracy are more likely to also trust politicians.
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Table 6.3 Causal model of how retrospective perceptions affect
government approval, satisfaction with democracy, and
trust in politicians (unstandardised OLS estimates)
Total effect Direct effect
Dependent variable:
Government approval
(0-10, higher value=higher approval of
the way the government is doing its job)
Personally experienced public services -.69*** -.26
Personal economy -.48*** -.27**
Swedish public services -.70*** -.70***
Swedish economy -1.00*** -1.00***
Number of respondents 983
Dependent variable:
Satisfaction with democracy
(higher value=greater satisfaction)
Personally experienced public services -.27*** -.17***
Personal economy -.12*** -.09***
Swedish public services -.12** -.12**
Swedish economy -.19** -.19***
Number of respondents 2565
Dependent variable:
Trust in politicians
(higher value = greater trust)
Personally experienced public services -.35*** -.25***
Personal economy -.12*** -.09***
Swedish public services -.13*** -.13***
Swedish economy -.19*** -.19***
Number of respondents 2642
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Comment: The basic structure of the three causal models can be inspected in
Figure 6.1. For information about dependent variables, see main text. The
government approval analysis was done using the 1999 European Parliament
Election Study, whereas the analyses of satisfaction with democracy and trust
in politicians were done using the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. All
displayed independent variables are coded between 1 (improved) and 3 (got
worse); for more details, see Table 6.1. The models also contain a number of
exogenous control variables, the estimates of which are not displayed (For
government approval: ideological left-right self-placement, income, subjective
class affiliation, education, age in years, gender, trade union membership
(LO), and public sector employment. For satisfaction with democracy and
trust in politicians: incumbent party preference, no party preference,
education, subjective class identification, age in years, subjective life
satisfaction). All these control variables were coded in the same way as in
other analyses throughout the book (see for instance Table 7.6). Finally, the
models also contain intercepts that are not displayed.
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Consistent with much previous research, voters’ perceptions of
economic trends matter for their attitudes towards their elected
government. Holding the control variables constant, those perceiving
negative trends in the economy are likely to express more
dissatisfaction with the government. And just like in past studies,
collective-level “sociotropic” perceptions of the country’s economic
affairs (-1.00) are more tightly linked to government approval than
perceptions of ups and downs in the personal pocketbook (-.48). If we
add to this the previously noted weak link between personal economic
experiences and sociotropic views of the economy, the personal and
the political appear relatively disconnected in the economic realm.
Moreover, the total effect of personally experienced public services
is larger than that of personal economy (-.69 versus -.48). While this
difference is not significant (p=.31) it is in the direction of the
hypothesis. People are more likely to disapprove of the way the
government is handling its job, the more people think that public
services they have experienced personally have deteriorated. This effect
is somewhat stronger than that of personal economic experiences.
Note that much of the impact of personal public service experiences
is channelled through overall sociotropic perceptions. About two-
thirds of the total personal experience impact disappears when
sociotropic perceptions are added to the equation. Given this finding,
and given the mainstream assumption that experiences and sociotropic
perceptions correlate because the former affects the latter, it is clear
that stronger personal experience effects in the welfare state are not
necessarily at odds with sociotropic concerns for the collective well-
being. On the contrary, judging from the relatively sizable impact of
sociotropic perceptions, people still appear to consider the collective-
level state of affairs when thinking about public services and
incumbent performance. However, because of differences in the nature
of political information and political responsibility compared to the
economic policy area, personal experiences become more important as
an information source in the formation of sociotropic perceptions. And
because these sociotropic perceptions in turn affect government
approval, personal welfare state experiences will become more
influential than economic ones.
While the analysis of government approval only reveals traces of
such differences, our hypotheses receive more clear-cut support in the
analysis of political trust. For both satisfaction with democracy and
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trust in politicians, the total effects of personal public service
experiences are about two to three times as strong as those of personal
economic experiences (-.27 versus -.12; p=.002; and -.35 versus -.12,
p=.000). Actually, for both dependent variables, the impact of welfare
state experiences is also somewhat stronger than that of sociotropic
economic perceptions (-.27 versus -.19 and -.35 versus -.19). This is a
difference compared to the analysis of government approval, where
sociotropic economic perception was still the most influential factor.
Still however, a fair share of welfare state experience effects on
political orientations is channelled through sociotropic welfare state
perceptions. About one-third of the impact vanishes when the
sociotropic measure is entered into the models of satisfaction with
democracy and trust in politicians. This observation, together with the
fact that sociotropic service perceptions impact also on these
dependent variables (-.12 and -.13), means we should not throw the
notion of “sociotropic animals” overboard. Citizens care about
collective experiences also when it comes to drawing political
conclusions of welfare state views. However, those views are more
tightly linked to personal experiences than are economic collective-
level views. The personal and the political spheres are less separated in
the welfare state compared to the economy.
Finally, let me mention a curiosity in these causal models. I
discovered that personal public service experiences affect sociotropic
perceptions, not just of Swedish public services, but also of the
Swedish economy. Conversely, in one of the data sets there is a certain
impact of personal economic experiences on sociotropic public service
perceptions. While our theoretical framework does not directly
anticipate such effects, it is perhaps possible to think of reasonable
explanations. For instance, some people in contact with poor public
services may infer that public finances are declining and that this might
have something to do with the general economic climate. Similarly,
some of those experiencing personal financial decline could take this a
symptom of a more general recession, and that this is affecting public
services.7
                                                          
7 The models in table 6.3 allow for these effects to be estimated. This means
that a small part of the indirect effect of one personal experience variable is
channelled by sociotropic perceptions in “the other” policy domain. However,
it should be pointed out that because the effects in question are relatively
minor they do not change any substantive conclusions compared to models
that exclude them.
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What if public services had been as thriving as the economy?
It is always difficult to assess effects of one survey item on the other.
Whether effects should be regarded as weak, moderate, or strong is a
largely arbitrary question. One part of the problem is that survey items
typically lack an intuitive metric. Of course, in a statistical sense, we
grasp statements such as “one unit of change along the public service
experience variable produces .69 units of change along the 11-point
government approval scale.” However, while we understand the
variable’s statistical importance, we may still feel unsure of how
influential it is in a more substantive sense.
A common solution is to compare effects of different variables with
one another. By comparing the impact of a novel independent variable
to that of a well-known one, we learn more than just looking at one
single coefficient. Here, it may be argued that the most relevant
yardstick for welfare state experiences variables is sociotropic
economic perceptions. The latter variable is well known, it has a
relatively respectable impact on government approval and political
support, and it is measured using parallel question wording and
identical alternatives. This comparison has already been done, and
personal public service experiences had a slightly weaker effect in the
case of government approval, and a slightly stronger effect in the case
of satisfaction with democracy and trust in politicians. Based on this
comparison with a respected explanatory factor, personal public
service experiences appear to add an element to our understanding of
how these political orientations develop.
Yet, some readers might not be entirely satisfied with this relativist
view on assessing effects. Indeed, it may be argued that comparing
changes along one unintuitive scale with changes along another
unintuitive scale, does not take us where we want to go. Therefore, we
now adopt an additional approach to grasping the impact of welfare
state experiences. The question is how politically important the
reported effects are.
Technically speaking, we use individual-level effect estimates to
make “counterfactual comparisons” between different aggregate-level
distributions along the independent variables. Based on the individual-
level effect coefficients, and given our causal interpretation of those
coefficients, we calculate how the percentage supporting the
incumbent party ought to shift as distributions change.
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The reader may recall that in 1999, Swedes were clearly more
satisfied with overall economic development than with public services:
Whereas between 43 and 56 percent thought the Swedish economy
had gotten better, only about 5 percent chose the same alternative with
respect to personally experienced public services. The 1999 situation
will be compared with a hypothetical – but not unrealistic – scenario:
What if people would have perceived personal public services as
favourably as the economy?
This counterfactual scenario is informative for two reasons. First, it
highlights an alternative societal situation that at least many Swedes
have a feeling for. In 1999, the economy had improved for several
consecutive years. At least the direction of easily available macro
indicators rarely gets much better. The feeling that “the tough years
are over, it’s time to harvest” was clearly reflected both in people’s
perceptions of the economy as well as in government rhetoric
(Holmberg & Weibull 2000; Kumlin & Oskarson 2000). At the same
time many public services had suffered badly from almost a decade of
cutbacks (see Starrin & Svensson 1998). This was evident both in
public opinion as well as in elite discourse. Consequently, for virtually
all parties, the major emphasis in the 1998 election campaign was on
public sector improvements and reforms (Swedes may remember the
somewhat tedious mantra “vård-skola-omsorg”).
The second reason why our counterfactual scenario is informative
has to do with the simplicity of the dependent variable (the proportion
of the electorate that supports the government). This is intuitive
because differences between scenarios can be understood in terms of
gains and losses in support for the rulers. Effects on such gains and
losses are easier to grasp than effects on awkward survey scales.
The first step is the logistic regression reported in Table 6.4. The
dependent variable is a dichotomy taking on the value 1 if the
respondent thought that the incumbent Social Democrats was the best
party, and the value zero if another party was favoured. Respondents
who did not favour any party or had otherwise “invalid” responses
were left out of the analysis.
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Table 6.4 Logistic regression model of effects on preference for the
incumbent Social Democratic party (logit coefficients)
Logit coefficient
Personally experienced public services (1-3) -.44***
Personal economy (1-3) -.02
Swedish economy (1-3) -.30***
Left-right self-placement (1-5) -.82***
Age in  years (15-80) .01***
Education (1-3) -.20***
Subjective class affiliation (1=middle class) -.46***
Public sector employment -.04
Household income (1-9) .05
Gender (1=woman) -.17
Trade union member (LO) .24*
Life satisfaction (1-4) -.34***
Constant 3.38***
Model chi-square (degrees of freedom) 457.9 (12)
Pseudo R-squared 0.18
Number of respondents 2166
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. The
dependent variable is a dichotomy taking on the value 1 if the respondent
thought that the incumbent Social Democrats was the best party, and zero of
another party was favoured. The public service variable, and the economy
variables, are coded as in table 6.3. The left-right self-placement variable has
five categories: 1=clearly to the left, 2=somewhat to the left, 3=neither left nor
right, 4=somewhat to the right, 5=clearly to the right. The education variable
was coded 1=basic primary education, 2=second-level education, and
3=studied at the university level. The information about subjective class comes
from a question where respondents were asked to describe their present
family. The variable was coded 0=working class family, 1=middle class family
(white collar, farmer, academic, or private enterprise). Public sector
employment is a dummy taking on the variable 1 if the respondent is
employed in the public sector. The family income variable measures
respondents’ estimation of the annual household. It has eight categories
representing intervals of 100 000 kronor, and varies from 1=100 000 or less,
to 8=more than 700 000. Preference for incumbent party was coded 1=Social
Democrats, 0=other party. Finally, respondents were asked about how
satisfied they, on the whole, are with their lives. The alternatives were coded
1=not at all satisfied, 2=not very satisfied, 3=rather satisfied, 4=very satisfied.
The model includes the previously used independent variables. The
one exception is sociotropic public service perceptions, which is left
out. The reason is that we are now interested in grasping the total
effects of personal service experiences. Because sociotropic perceptions
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are believed to partly function as a causal mechanism for personal
experiences effects, and because this variable is excluded, the total
effect of personal experiences is now completely contained in the
personal experience coefficient. Of course, the previous analyses have
already confirmed that a substantial part of these effects are
channelled through collective-level sociotropic perceptions. The logit
model in Table 6.4 is no exception as about 50 percent of the personal
experience impact vanishes when sociotropic public service perceptions
are added to the equation. Finally, the model contains a number of
control variables that have been suggested to have an impact on Social
Democratic party preference.
Previous findings are underscored. Those with negative personal
experiences of public services are less likely than others to favour the
incumbent party (-.44), whereas there is no significant corresponding
effect of personal economic experiences. The impact of personal
service experiences is even somewhat stronger than that of sociotropic
economic perception, though this difference is not significant (Chi-
square=1.18, df=1; p=0.28).
Figure 6.2 Predicted probability of supporting the incumbent Social 
Democrats (logit estimates)
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3=got worse
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Comment: The probabilities are based on the logit model in Table 6.4. The
effect of one variable is calculated holding all other variables in the model at
their means. The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey.
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Logistic regression coefficients are not entirely easy to understand.
The reason is that they show effects on the logarithm of the odds that
a respondent falls in category 1, relative to category 0. Therefore,
Figure 6.2 translates the results into effects on the probability of falling
in category 1. More specifically, it shows how the predicted
probability of supporting the incumbent Social Democrats changes as
a function of evaluations of personally experienced public services and
the Swedish economy.8
First, it is illuminating to look at the impact of moving between
extreme categories. Looking at the graph, we see that moving from
saying personally experienced services “improved,” to saying they “got
worse,” lowers the probability of favouring the government party by
17 percentage points (from 18 to 35). The corresponding impact of
sociotropic economic perceptions is 11 percentage points.
We can also use these predicted probabilities to make counterfactual
comparisons. How would the percentage of Social Democratic
sympathisers be affected by a certain average change along an
independent variable, given that the distributions of other independent
variables remain the same? Here, the model predicts that improving
public service experiences from the present poor level, up to the rather
positive level of sociotropic economic perceptions, would increase the
percentage of Social Democrats by 4.3 percent. We may also make the
opposite mental experiment and consider what would happen if
citizens perceived the Swedish economy as unfavourably as they
perceive experienced public services: The model predicts that such a
change would reduce the percentage of Social Democratic supporters
by 2.6 percentage points.
Let us now try the same analysis using the 1999 European
Parliament Election Study. Since this is an election study we can use
probability of voting for the government party as the dependent
variable, rather than just probability of expressing support in a survey.
A problem is that the 1999 turnout was only 38.8 percent, which
means a large proportion of the sample did not actually participate in
                                                          
8 These probabilities were calculated using the formula for logistic regression
(see Long 1997:49): Prob(social democrat) = exp(a+b1x1… bixi) /
1+exp(a+b1x1… bixi). The nonlinearity of the logit model means the effect of an
independent variable on the probability of supporting the incumbent party
varies somewhat depending on the level of the other independent variables in
the model. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the effects when other variables in the
model are held at their means.
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the election.9 Luckily however, respondents who did not vote were
asked what party they would have voted for had they participated. We
may thus construct a dependent variable taking on the value 1 if a
person voted for, or would have voted for, the incumbent Social
Democrats, and the value zero if another party was favoured.
Table 6.5 reports a logistic regression analysis that is virtually
identical to the previous one.10 Again, we observe that negative
personal experiences of public services lower the probability of
supporting the government (log odds effect -.47). Equally consistent
with the hypotheses, there is no significant impact of personal
economic experiences. Furthermore, the impact of personal service
experiences is somewhat stronger than that of sociotropic economic
perception, though again this difference is not significant (Chi-
square=1.25, df=1; p=0.26). Also, once again, a substantial part of the
effects on political attitudes appear to be channelled by collective-level
sociotropic perceptions. A regression model including sociotropic
service perceptions (not shown here) indicated that slightly more than
50 percent of the personal experience impact vanishes when
sociotropic public service perceptions are added as an independent
variable.
                                                          
9 Some may feel that our independent variables are less relevant in the context
of European Parliament Elections as the goal of these elections is to appoint
representatives dealing mainly with issues related to the EU and European
integration. For this reason, and because the parliament is not the most
influential assembly within the European union, it would make less sense to
hold such representatives accountable for mainly national policies and social
trends, such as national public services and the national economy. However,
previous research shows convincingly that voters send signals to the national
government although, formally, more Europe-oriented issues “should” be at
focus in European elections. This pattern, together with the fact that interest
and turnout in these elections are low, has led researchers to characterise these
elections as “second-order national elections” (see van der Eijk & Franklin
1996). This characterisation has proven valid also in Sweden although
European issues are more important to Swedish voters in European
parliament elections than in most other countries (see Gilljam & Holmberg
1998; Holmberg et al. 2001).
10 There are two differences. First, we include people’s opinions on Swedish
membership in the European monetary union (EMU), because EU-related
opinions are especially salient and influential in these elections. Second, the
election study does not contain any measure of subjective life satisfaction.
Judging from the West Sweden survey, however, this seems to be a small
problem: the coefficients of the central independent variables remained
unaltered when I dropped subjective life satisfaction from the model in table
6.4.
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Table 6.5 Logistic regression model of effects on preference for the
incumbent Social Democratic party (logit coefficients)
Logit coefficient
Personally experienced public services (1-3) -.47**
Personal economy (1-3) -.09
Swedish economy (1-3) -.20
Left-right self-placement (0-10) -.60***
Age in years (15-80) .02***
Education (1-3) -.66***
Subjective class affiliation (1=middle class) -.55***
Public sector employment .01
Family income (10 000 SEK) .00
Gender (1=woman) -.17
Trade union member (LO) .10
Constant 5.21***
Model chi-square (degrees of freedom) 263.0 (12)
Pseudo R-squared 0.27
Number of respondents 840
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Comment: The data come from the 1999 European Parliament Election Study.
The dependent variable takes on the value 1 if a person voted for, or would
have voted for, the incumbent Social Democrats, and the value zero if another
party was favoured in these respects. For information about independent
variables see Tables 6.1 and 6.4; the only difference to the previous analyses
was that left-right self-placement was measured using an 11-point scale
running from 0 (far to the left) to 10 (far to the right).
Figure 6.3 shows how the predicted probability of supporting the
incumbent Social Democrats changes as a function of evaluations of
personally experienced public services and the Swedish economy
respectively.11 The basic observation is that the graph is very similar to
the previous one based on the West Sweden Survey. This time, the
impact of moving from believing personally experienced services
“improved,” to believing they “got worse,” lowers the probability of
favouring the governing party by 16 percentage points (from 15 to
                                                          
11 Like before, the effects are calculated holding other variables in the model
at their means.
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31). The corresponding impact of sociotropic economic perceptions is
5 percentage points.
Figure 6.3 Predicted probability of supporting the incumbent Social 
Democrats (logit estimates)
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services
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Comment: The probabilities are based on the logit model in Table 6.5. The
effect of one variable is calculated holding all other variables in the model at
their means. The data come from the 1999 European Parliament Election
Study.
Making the same counterfactual comparisons as above, the model
predicts that improving service experiences from the present poor level,
up to the positive level of sociotropic economic perceptions, would
increase the percentage of social democrats by 5.9 percentage points.
Again, the opposite mental experiment is to consider what would
happen if perceptions of the Swedish economy were as negative as
those of experienced services: the model predicts that such
deterioration would reduce the percentage of government supporters
by 2.1 percentage points.
In summary, we may conclude that the effects of personal welfare
state experiences seem worth taking seriously. These effects are at least
as strong, and occasionally somewhat stronger than the impact of
sociotropic economic perceptions (an explanatory factor which is
generally respected by most political behaviour researchers).
Moreover, we can now conclude that while public service experiences
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are not the most important single explanatory factor behind
government support, personal welfare state experiences are influential
in a very substantial and political sense. Our estimates indicate that the
governing party would have gained 4 to 6 percent of the electorate if
public service experiences had been judged as favourably as the
Swedish economy. And in 1999, such an improvement would certainly
have been extremely welcome for the Social Democrats as they
struggled with some of their worst poll results in history (between 30
and 35 percent throughout most of the year). Naturally, we need to
take the exact size of these estimates with a grain of salt: They depend
both on the correct identification of statistical models as well as on
correct causal interpretations of coefficients.
Conclusion
Previous political behaviour research suffers from an economistic bias.
While this research has yielded invaluable insights that will continue to
be useful, the (often implicit) assumption that citizens mainly take into
account economic outcomes when thinking about government
performance has also biased our understanding of the subject. It is
telling that while economic voting is a mature research field there is no
developed parallel research program looking for “welfare state
voting.”
Such a program would not lack a theoretical nor empirical
foundation. Our results indicate that in a service democracy like
Sweden, trends and outcomes linked to the welfare state are just as
important to government support and political trust as economic
judgements. People appear to connect the quality of welfare state
services to the way the present government is doing its job as well as to
the overall functioning of the democratic system.
The results belong to a line of research indicating that our
understanding of opinion formation is enriched if one simultaneously
considers, not just the economy, but also other salient policy areas
(Huseby 2000). Of course, we are not suggesting that economic
perceptions are any less consequential than they have seemed in
previous research. Indeed, in the first model of government approval,
sociotropic economic perception was the most powerful of the four
independent variables at focus. Rather, our argument is that previous
research has examined retrospective judgements of government
performance and policy output through a too narrow lens. Future
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researchers may want to consider how citizens perceive performance in
yet other policy domains such as the environment, law and order, and
so on. As Newton and Norris (2000:73) emphasise, we need to answer
“the important question of which measures of government
performance matter most to citizens ...”.
The economistic bias has not only limited our view on what matters
in public opinion formation. It has also formed our view on how the
process works. Economic voting research portrays modern citizens as
“sociotropic animals.” When thinking about politics, such animals
care more about collective-level experiences than about personal
experience. They are not willing and/or able to translate personal
events into political judgements. This makes them dependent on the
mass media and elite actors for politically relevant information. The
personal and the political are believed to constitute separate life
spheres.
In contrast, we predicted and supported empirically that the opinion
formation process changes when we move out of the economic realm
and into welfare state territory. Because welfare state experiences are
more immediate results of decisions taken by responsible politicians,
and because welfare arrangements offer heterogeneous and potentially
conflicting sociotropic information, personal welfare state experiences
are a more important source of political information than personal
economic experiences. Empirically, we have seen stronger correlations
between personal experiences and sociotropic judgement, as well as
stronger total effects of experiences on political attitudes, in the area of
public services. Again, this does not mean that sociotropic perceptions
are unimportant in the welfare state. Rather, it means that sociotropic
public service perceptions are informed by personal experiences to a
much greater extent than economic perceptions. Whereas personal-
level and collective-level judgements are fairly separate in the economic
realm, they blend together in the welfare state.
* * *
So far, we have only scratched the surface of personal welfare state
experience effects on political attitudes. We want to know more about
the causal processes that the uncovered effects represent. What have
those discontent with “public services I have been in contact with”
really gone through? The following three chapters tackle this problem
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from three different theoretical angles: Chapter 7 investigates the role
of self-interest. Chapter 8 then adds the distributive justice perspective:
does it matter whether people think they have personally received the
service and help they have a right to? In Chapter 9, we broaden the
conceptual horizon further and look at political consequences of
procedural voice aspects of welfare state experiences.
Chapter 7
Self-Interest

t’s always the same. Come election year, political commentators
begin to criticise governments for trying to buy votes with increased
welfare state spending. The nastiest critics portray the ministers as a
bunch of populists focused on staying in power, even if it takes
irresponsible short-term increases in public spending on services and
transfers. Such spending, it is argued, is irresponsible because it
threatens economic stability and the long run health of public finances.
In Anglo-Saxon countries, alleged attempts to buy votes with
welfare are referred to as “pork barrel,” whereas Swedish
commentators tend to use the equally derogatory expressions
“valfläsk” (election pork) or in recent years “väljargodis” (voter
candy). These metaphors conjure up the image of irresponsible power-
maximising politicians, as well as that of irresponsible citizens who do
not care to consider the common good or the long-run impact of
political choices. Rather, according to the cynics, citizens are naïve and
self-centrered kids who cling to any political alternative that for the
moment offers more voter candy.
Both nasty commentators and populist politicians seem to assume
that citizens react politically to differences and changes in how much
they get from the welfare state. This assumption is also shared by
many social scientists. In fact, “pork barrel” and “voter candy” are
just cynical symptoms of the perhaps most basic mental tool for
thinking about political effects of welfare state experiences: the self-
interest perspective. From this theoretical vantage point, welfare state
experiences have a political impact on citizens by affecting their
personal, material, short-term interests.
As we shall soon see, almost all Swedish citizens have occasional
contacts with at least one welfare state institution or the other. Still,
some people gain more than others in terms of personal services and
transfers from these institutions. This variation in welfare state related
I
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self-interest is believed to structure political attitudes. According to the
self-interest perspective, then, opinion formation in modern welfare
states is not mainly about labour versus capitalism, economic ups and
downs, religious cleavages, or centre versus periphery. Rather, the
crucial feature is “who gets how much from the welfare state.”
In this spirit, Swedish sociologist Hans Zetterberg (1985) argued
that the most important voter group for the Swedish Social Democrats
is no longer the industrial working class. Rather, public sector
employees and recipients of public services and transfers make up the
crucial voters. In Zetterberg’s parlance, the Swedish electorate has
become “an electorate in the grips of the welfare state.” The generosity
of welfare state institutions coupled with the short-sighted egoism of
individual citizens mean that seriously anti-welfare parties and
ideological viewpoints can no longer receive extensive support.
We have seen that the self-interest perspective is adopted by
influential students of welfare state development at the macro level
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Baldwin 1990; Pierson 1994; Rothstein
1998). While these researchers differ from each other in terms of focus,
theory and methods, they share the assumption that individual citizens
to a significant extent adjust their political leanings to their welfare
state interests. It is believed that people consuming a large quantity of
welfare state services will differ politically from those consuming a
small amount. Typically, high-level consumers are considered more
likely to stand to the left ideologically, more likely to support state
intervention in the market economy, and more likely to vote for leftist
parties. This assumption underlies for instance Esping-Andersen’s
(1990:27-28) account of how the political left and its universal social
policies draw support in Scandinavian welfare states: “All benefit; all
are dependent; and all will presumably feel obliged to pay.”
Empirical research at the individual-level sends radically different
signals. Sears and Funk (1991:76) summarised the literature like this:
“The conclusion is quite clear: self-interest ordinarily does not have
much effect upon the ordinary citizen’s sociopolitical attitudes.”
Evidence suggests that people do not calculate the personal benefits
and costs implied by every new concrete political choice. Instead, in
order to arrive at specific opinions, people tend to fall back on
“symbolic orientations” such as party identification, general ideology,
or group identification. Symbolic orientations, the argument goes,
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have typically been shaped by socialisation processes occurring long
before any future interests could be calculated
However, some scholars have discussed the possibility that symbolic
orientations themselves are in turn affected by short-term self-interest.
This is the question dealt with in this chapter. To what extent can
general political orientations such as left-right self-placement, state
intervention orientations, satisfaction with democracy, and trust in
politicians be explained by variables measuring short-term welfare
state-related self-interest?
In the next section, I notice that previous research on self-interest
and symbolic orientations has used rather rough indicators of welfare
state interests. I will then go on to a conceptual distinction not yet
considered: that between objective and subjective self-interest. After
that, we are ready to look at the empirical indicators and hypotheses
tests. In the concluding section I discuss the viability of the self-interest
perspective on welfare state experiences.
Rough measurement in previous research
If people make self-interested political choices, there will be political
differences between people with different interests. But how can we
measure differences in interest? Actually, given that the dependent
variable is concrete, it may not be all that difficult. Consider for
instance attitudes towards increased spending on public child care. A
simple dichotomy separating those with children in child care from
other respondents would take us a long way. We would then have two
groups that are radically different in terms of how personal short-term
well-being is affected by increased spending on child care. Granted,
there may still be some within-group variation in terms of self-interest.
For instance among current users some may utilise services more than
others, and we would ideally wish to capture this variation too.
Nevertheless, it would appear that the self-interest variation between
the two groups is much larger than that within the groups, so that we
have a useful measure of variation in self-interest.
But here we are interested in very general political orientations. We
want to know for instance if those who currently use a lot of welfare
state services and transfers are more inclined to embrace leftist
ideology. It then becomes more difficult to measure self-interest, as
such large and general political choices have implications for one’s
personal short-term well-being in a great number of ways. In principle,
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when assessing the impact of self-interest on generalised attitudes
towards the welfare state and the political system, the whole gamut of
welfare state institutions becomes potentially relevant.
Much previous research has been forced to use data – typically from
election studies – that were not collected specifically for these
purposes. Because a wide range of theoretical considerations inspires
such studies, they rarely contain extensive information about personal
welfare state usage. Such data constraints have forced scholars to rely
on rather rough measures of short-term welfare state self-interest.
For instance, Dunleavy (1979) drew far-ranging conclusions about
the importance of sectoral cleavages for voting behaviour based only
on two types of indicators: public housing and car access. The absence
of a car was taken as an indication that a respondent in fact used
public transportation. The study thus ignored fundamental
components of public intervention in private consumption patterns,
such as education, health care, public insurance systems, child care,
leisure activities, and many others.1 Similarly, Hadenius (1986) used a
small number of dummy variables as indicators of welfare state self-
interest (whether people were pensioners, had received sickness
benefits, had children at home, or whether they had received
unemployment benefits). These indicators proved to have weak effects
on attitudes towards public expenditure and taxation. Hadenius
(1986:104)  concluded that “there hardly exists any exclusive “client-
based” demand for public expenditure” and  that “People appear to a
very minor extent to assess the public sector from the viewpoint of
personal utility” (1986:121). Finally, based only on information about
whether Danish respondents were unemployed, disabled, early retired,
or old-age pensioners, Goul Andersen (1993:37-8) “found virtually no
evidence confirming that people’s personal relationship to the welfare
state [...] has any impact upon their welfare state attitudes.” He
concluded that “interests are almost irrelevant as determinants of
welfare state support in Denmark” (Goul Andersen 1993:43).
It is possible that using so few indicators facilitates less than optimal
tests of the impact of self-interest. After all, citizens receive services
and transfers from the welfare state in a multitude of shapes and
situations, and ideally this should be reflected as clearly as possible by
measures of welfare state interest.
                                                          
1 See Taylor-Gooby (1986:594) for a similar point.
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The data analysed here certainly have their limitations too. But they
do offer more complete information about personal welfare state self-
interest than those typically used in previous research. The data sets
contain extensive information about current usage of a large number
of public service institutions. All in all, we will be able to tap whether
respondents have a short-term self-interest invested in each of about
twenty-five different welfare state services and transfers. It is believed
that this puts us in a more fortunate situation than many previous
studies when it comes to assessing the impact of welfare state interest.
Objective and subjective self-interest
A self-interest effect denotes the process by which a person becomes
more likely to support a political alternative (a party, an ideological
point of view etc.) because that alternative has the most positive
implications for her personal, material, short-term situation. Based on
this definition we may now discern two ways of conceptualising and
measuring welfare state-related self-interest. Objective self-interest
refers to differences between individuals in the extent to which their
short-term self-interest is actually satisfied by welfare state
arrangements. Here, the question is to what extent and with what
frequency an individual actually enjoys benefits and services emanating
from the welfare state. This variable, typically measured using quite
sparse information, taps objective characteristics in the sense that
respondents do not have to be aware of them.2
Subjective self-interest, on the other hand, denotes perceptions of
the extent to which one gains from welfare state arrangements and
public services. To measure subjective self-interest, then, the researcher
must get inside the minds of people. Does the citizen think of herself as
someone who gains nothing, a little, or a lot, from the public sector?
To what extent does she think she would win or lose if welfare state
spending was increased or decreased?3
                                                          
2 Note the limited sense in which interest is regarded as “objective.” It only
means that it is the researcher who, based on a particular conceptual
definition, decides values along the variable, not the respondent herself. Of
course, among researchers, the question of how objective interests should be
defined may still be a highly subjective matter.
3 Distinctions between objective characteristics as determined by the
researcher, and subjective perceptions of characteristics, are ubiquitous in the
social sciences. For instance, our distinction is analogous to that between
objective occupational/social class and subjective class identification (Lipset &
Rokkan 1967; Petersson 1982; Oskarson 1994). Another example is the
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In this chapter, we will have the possibility to measure both
objective and subjective self-interest. This is fortunate not the least as
it allows us to get a handle on the full causal chain specified in Figure
1.1. Whereas several other chapters only has access to perceptions of
personal experiences, this chapter has access to information also about
“actual” experiences.
The standard model of self-interest depicts objective and subjective
self-interest as nothing but different phases in one causal process (see
Green 1988:25):
Objective self-interest              Subjective self-interest perceptions           Political choices
According to this model, differences in objective interest give rise to
different subjective interest perceptions, which in turn have attitudinal
or behavioural effects. Objective interests are thus temporally distant
from the final political choice, whereas subjective interests are close to
it. In the welfare state context, the model implies that citizens have
well-developed subjective perceptions, in the sense that they are
substantially correlated with actual objective interests. Self-interest
effects on political orientations occur when people consciously match
such perceptions with political choices (“I support government
spending on welfare state services because I’m a person who benefits
greatly from such spending,” “I trust and support the existing
democratic system because the output of the system is of great benefit
to me.”) Or as Dunleavy (1980c:14) explained the process in his work
on consumption cleavages and voting behaviour: “voters can be seen
as aligned instrumentally towards the party most clearly identified
with the interests of their consumption location.”
A critique against the standard model is that subjective interest
perceptions are difficult to form. This becomes a problem especially
when the dependent variable is general political orientations. The
generality opens for a multitude of interest sources, basically the whole
gamut of welfare state institutions. Forming welfare state interest
perceptions based on a multitude of sources may be a too demanding
or too uninteresting exercise for many citizens, and perceptions may
therefore not be formed at all. Alternatively, individuals may form
                                                                                                                          
separation found in the economic voting literature between objective
economic conditions – as measured by for example unemployment and
income – and subjective perceptions of the situation (see Mutz 1992).
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incorrect perceptions, in the sense that they do not correlate with
objective self-interest.
In this vein, Franklin and Page (1984) and Taylor-Gooby (1986)
criticised “consumption cleavage theory” as formulated by Dunleavy
(1979, 1980a,b,c) for being silent on how objective differences in
patterns of public consumption are translated into differences in
political preferences. Whereas traditional cleavage theory emphasises
that it all depends on which social differences are politicised by the
party system, as well as on socialisation within primary groups,
consumption cleavage theory seems to suggest that objectively existing
social differences between citizens automatically translate into
differing political preferences. Franklin and Page (1984:526)
formulated the critique like this: “Existing research provides no
evidence to support the presence of a mechanism which would ensure
that people became aware of their ‘objective interests’ [...] Indeed one
of the distinctive contributions that political science has made to the
social sciences has been in its treatment of the relationship between
social stratification and political cleavages, especially electoral
alignments, as problematic. [...] This caution required in equating
social differences with political conflicts does not appear in the
consumption approach to electoral behaviour.”
However, Franklin and Page (1984:527) also identified two ways to
escape the criticism. First, if party platforms clearly politicised
different consumption interests, people might develop meaningful
subjective interest perceptions accurately reflecting their objective
interests. This would entail that some parties to a greater extent than
others explicitly profile themselves as protectors of the interests of
public service users. However, while the authors acknowledged that
this precondition “may indeed have existed at times for issues related
to consumption cleavages,” they also argued that it is by no means
consistently present.
A second possibility would be that objective interests translate into
political preferences through socialisation mechanisms. Of course, this
is the micro-foundation of classic cleavage theory: individuals
belonging to the same class, religion, or geographic area have more
contact with each other than they have with people from other groups.
Moreover, because political preferences within a group are socially
contagious, a strong correlation between objective interests and
political preferences may emerge, even if nobody but a few
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sophisticated “opinion leaders” have clear perceptions of their interests
(see for instance Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955).
But again there are problems. First, socialisation processes are very
different to the standard model above, as effects of objective interests
are not channelled through subjective interest perceptions. Indeed, as
pointed out by Franklin and Page (1984:528), socialisation processes
would not lead us to expect “that perceptions of objective interests
have any part to play in the process.” Second, the socialisation
explanation seems far-fetched, as groups with similar welfare state
interests are not necessarily concentrated to a particular social
environment. Indeed, the whole point of consumption cleavage theory
is that public consumption patterns are weakly correlated with
traditional social bases of political alignment, such as the workplace,
the neighbourhood, geographic areas, and religious affiliation. This
means that whereas, say, industrial workers live and work in the same
places, heavy welfare state users are more “spread out” in society. It is
therefore not obvious where and how they would gather to socialise
each other. Of course, some categories of public service users such as
parents of schoolchildren have natural places to meet. But then again
numerous other groups such as beneficiaries of social insurances
appear rather isolated from each other. Socialisation theory is
therefore not entirely credible as an account of how objective welfare
state interests translate into political preferences. This difficulty is also
recognised by proponents of consumption cleavages. As Dunleavy
(1979:413) stated, “We cannot simply assume that political alignment
brushes off by rubbing shoulders in the street.”
So we still need to explain how objective differences in objective
welfare state interest could translate into attitudinal differences. The
“on-line” model of opinion formation that was introduced in chapter
4 provides such an explanation. It suggests that, in the light of new
relevant information, citizens gradually update a small set of general
political orientations. They then forget the information that caused the
update, remembering only the affective imprint on the political
orientation left behind by the information (Lodge, McGraw & Stroh
1989; Lodge, Steenbergen & Brau 1995). The model means that even
if people never perceive their welfare state interest use as a whole, it
could nevertheless have political effects. Objective interest effects are
then achieved by piece-meal, gradual updating rather than by means of
a sophisticated one-shot synthesis of many experiences.
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Imagine a mother who receives a sum of money in the form of
public child allowance. Given that this experience triggers some
political reasoning at all, and given that self-interest is her political
driving force, she will react politically on the basis of how much her
material well-being was improved by the experience. According to the
on-line model, she does this by updating her political preferences so as
to integrate the new information into these preferences. After the
process, she remembers the updated preferences but forgets the
information that caused the update. Thus, if later an interviewer asks
for the reason behind her preference she would not think of the
experience. This process is reiterated whenever she encounters another
welfare state service that makes some contribution to her self-interest.
The result will be a correlation between objective interests and
political orientations.
Note how different the on-line process is compared to the standard
model of self-interest effects. According to the latter, people have
memorised perceptions of the overall extent to which they gain from
the welfare state, perceptions which in turn affect political variables. In
contrast, according to the on-line model, effects of objective self-
interest bypass subjective self-interest perceptions, provided the final
choice to be explained is general “updateable” orientations.
It has been suggested that people update mainly overarching,
affectively based, and repeatedly used political orientations that will
probably be of use in the future (Feldman 1996; Huckfeldt et al 1999).
Chapter 4 argued that ideological left-right orientations and political
trust orientations constitute “updateable” political judgements into
which new information may gradually be incorporated.
Below we use measures of both objective and subjective self-interest
as independent variables. We estimate full causal models that take into
account, not only the direct impact of interest variables on political
orientations, but also the internal relation between objective and
subjective self-interest. This allows us to analyse both the extent to
which objective interests affect orientations, as well as the extent to
which such effects are channelled by subjective interest. If effects are
largely indirect, flowing throw subjective interest, then the two
variables simply denote different locations in one causal process as
suggested by the standard model. However, if objective effects are
largely direct, thus bypassing subjective perceptions, we would regard
this as support for the on-line model of opinion formation.
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Measuring self-interest
To create a measure of objective welfare state self-interest in the 1999
West Sweden SOM survey, I used the following question: “Please
indicate below which of the following services you yourself or a family
member use.” Respondents were presented with a list of welfare state
institutions, mainly locally distributed human services. For each
service, there were three response alternatives: “I use the service
myself,” “I don’t use the service, but a family member does,” and
“neither I, nor a family member, use the service.” Second, I took
advantage of the question “Please indicate to which of the following
groups you belong at present.” Among other things, respondents
indicated if they were pensioners, early retired, or participated in
labour market schemes. The objective welfare state interest measure
was then created by counting the number of public service institutions
That individual respondents use.4 The measure may be inspected in
Table 7.1.
The table nicely illustrates the pervasiveness of the Swedish welfare
state: less than five percent do not define themselves as users of any of
the measured public services. The mean number of currently used
institutions is 4.6. Still, there is enough variation around this mean to
make the variable interesting as a potential explanatory variable in
analyses of political orientations: only 15.8 percent fall in the modal
category (4), and the standard deviation is 2.6.5
                                                          
4 More exactly, the measure covers usage of the following public institutions:
public child care, public schools (gymnasium and grundskola), children’s
health care (barnavårdscentral), local health care (vårdcentral), hospitals,
public dental care, elder care, social welfare, transportation subsidies
(färdtjänst), handicap care, housing allowance, public transportation, public
sport facilities, public libraries, public leisure time activities, job agencies and
participation in unemployment schemes (AMS-arbete, AMS-utbildning,
kunskapslyftet etc.), and early retirement benefits. Cases were coded as
missing if they had invalid answers on all the items following the head
question “Please indicate below which of the following services you yourself
or a family member use.” Finally, it should be pointed out that, in the case of
public schools, I have allowed both parents and pupils to define themselves as
users of an institution. The logic is that the interests of both categories are
affected by their relation to schools, and that both actually experience directly
the school environment.
5 A nice aspect of this variable is that it is based on a larger number of
institutions than has been used in much previous research. Still however, we
are not dealing with a perfect measure of the extent to which welfare state
arrangements satisfy one’s short-term self-interest. In particular, there is
variation among users of the same institution as to how much and how often
one receives service. Of course, our variable does not record that variation as
it is based only on usage versus non-usage.
                                                                                        Self-Interest 189
Table 7.1 Univariate distribution of the objective welfare state self-
interest variable in the 1999 West Sweden SOM survey
(percent)
Number of utilised services Percent
0 4.7
1 6.8
2 10.4
3 14.2
4 15.8
5 14.4
6 10.9
7 8.8
8 6.5
9 3.7
10 or more 3.8
Sum percent 100
Number of respondents 3685
Mean 4.6
Standard deviation 2.6
Comment: The variable counts the number of public service institutions that
individual respondents receive service from. See text for a more detailed
description. The proportion of respondents with values larger than 10 is less
than one percent.
Subjective self-interest was measured by asking respondents about
the extent to which a reduction of the public sector would benefit
them personally. A five-category scale running from 1 (“would be of
no benefit”) to 5 (“would be of great benefit”) was used. The head
question was: “How do you think the following suggestions would
affect your own personal situation, and the situation of the Swedish
people in general, if they were realised? To what extent do you think
they would be of benefit to yourself and for the Swedish people
respectively?” For each of seven political suggestions, respondents
simultaneously indicated the extent to which they think they would
gain personally, as well as the extent to which the Swedish people in
general would benefit.6
                                                          
6 When answering these questions it might be difficult to separate between
personal and collective losses and gains. After all, if I believe that a smaller
public sector will generate some collective gain (such as a more efficient
market economy), this should benefit most people in society including myself.
Hence, I might answer that I will in fact benefit personally from a public
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We are interested in perceptions of overall welfare state interest.
The analysis is therefore based on the item concerning the extent to
which a reduction of the public sector would benefit them personally.
The univariate distribution can be inspected in Table 7.2. To get an
intuitive scoring, the variable was reversed so that it varies from low to
high subjective welfare state interest.
Table 7.2 Perception of how the personal situation would be
affected if the public sector were reduced (subjective
welfare state interest) in the 1999 West Sweden SOM
survey (percent)
1 Benefit greatly 10
2   9
3 29
4 11
5 Not at all benefit 41
Sum percent                            100
Number of respondents                          3457
Comment: See text for exact question wording and construction. The variable
has been reversed compared to the questionnaire, so that higher values reflect
greater perceived welfare state interest.
The results show that we are not only dealing with a pervasive
welfare state in the objective sense. Many of its citizens apparently also
perceive a welfare state interest: no less than 41 percent think that a
reduction of the public sector would not at all be of benefit to them
personally. Another 10 percent chose the category next to this extreme
alternative. Only 19 percent perceive that they would benefit
personally from a reduction in the public sector, in the sense that they
place themselves on the low-interest side of the mid-point.
The SOM data contain mainly information about local human
services. This is natural since the academic focus of the West Sweden
                                                                                                                          
sector reduction, even if I perceive my personal interest in the welfare state to
be high. Of course, the logic is that I, as well as everyone else, will enjoy the
positive effects of a more efficient market economy. To avoid such confusion,
I incorporated items into the question battery that explicitly differentiate
between personal benefits and benefits for the Swedish people in general. To
make the distinction clearer, items concerning personal and collective gains
respectively were placed immediately next to each other in the questionnaire.
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SOM surveys is on local socio-political issues and processes (see
Nilsson 1999, 2000). However, from our perspective this is slightly
problematic since our hypotheses cover also state transfer systems such
as unemployment insurances, sick leave benefits, child allowances,
student aid, and so on.
Therefore, I will also take advantage of a data set containing
information about contacts with such transfer systems. More exactly,
while the 1999 SOM data focus on local human services, the 1992
Swedish Living Standard Survey (SLEV) highlights usage of central
public insurance systems. I thus test the same basic predictions using
information about a different kind of welfare state interest.
Table 7.3 Univariate distribution of the objective welfare state
interest level variable in the 1992 SLEV survey
(percent)
Number of utilised transfers Percent
0 15
1 49
2 19
3 12
4 or more 5
Sum percent 100
Number of respondents 789
Mean 1.5
Standard deviation 1.1
Comment: The variable counts the number of welfare state transfers that the
respondent received service from. See text for a more detailed description. The
proportion of respondents with values larger than 4 is less than two percent.
The SLEV data on welfare state usage were collected differently
compared to the SOM data (see Halleröd et al. 1993; Halleröd 1994).
Public records rather than survey questions were used to gather
information about reception of social transfers in 1991.7 (Interviews
were carried out in the spring of 1992.) In contrast to the SOM survey,
                                                          
7 More exactly, the measure covers usage of the following public institutions:
housing allowance, unemployment insurance, sick-leave benefits, parental
benefit (föräldrapenning), unemployment support (KAS), student aid, social
assistance, child allowance, early retirement benefits, and old-age pension.
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then, respondents did not provide information about welfare state
usage themselves. The available information was used to create a
variable counting the number of welfare state institutions that
respondents had received transfers from. The distribution of this
indicator of objective self-interest is displayed in Table 7.3.
What we see is yet an alternative illustration of how pervasive the
Swedish welfare state is. No less than 85 percent of the sample had in
the previous year received benefits from at least one of the institutions
for which there was information in the data set. The single most
common situation was to have received a benefit from one of the
measured institutions (49 percent).
The subjective interest measure in SLEV can be inspected in Table
7.4. It was generated by the following question: “Do you think you
would win or lose if income equality were increased in Sweden?” The
response alternatives were “win” (coded 3), “neither win nor lose” (2),
“lose” (1), and “don’t know” (2). A variable was thus created, which
varies from low subjective welfare state interest (1) to high subjective
welfare state interest (3).
Table 7.4 Perceptions of how the respondent would be affected if
income equality were increased in Sweden (1992 SLEV
survey) (percent)
1 would lose 12
2 neither win nor lose 53
3 would win 35
Sum percent 100
Number of respondents 757
Comment: The variable measures the extent to which respondents perceive
that they would win if “income equality were increased in Sweden.” It is
coded 1=would lose, 2=neither win nor lose/don’t know, 3=would win. Ten
respondents answered don’t know. See text for exact question wording. The
variable has been reversed compared to the questionnaire.
Again, it seems that many Swedes perceive that they have interests
invested in the welfare state. Only 12 percent think they would lose if
income equality were increased. More than one-third think they would
win if such a change occurred.
There are some notable differences compared to the question used
in SOM. For example, the SLEV question concerns changing income
equality rather than the size of the public sector as such. Hence, in
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order for the variable to be a valid measure of subjective welfare state
self-interest, respondents must themselves make the connection to the
welfare state. Although the question makes no reference to welfare
state services, people must “understand” that it is the public sector and
its transfer programs that are supposed to influence income equality.
The usefulness of the measure thus builds on the premise that frequent
beneficiaries infer that they are the ones who will benefit the most if
the state decides to spend more on transfers.
Moreover, given that respondents make this connection, the phrase
“income equality” probably shifts the attention from the entire public
sector to certain parts of it. Particularly transfer systems redistributing
actual money, rather than human services, spring to mind. This is,
however, less of a problem since the measure of objective welfare state
outcome in SLEV focuses on exactly such parts of the welfare state.
We are thus still in a situation where, in addition to estimating direct
effects, it makes sense to investigate the relationship between objective
and subjective interest.
I close this section by considering a further problem related to the
subjective measures. The problem is that the wordings of subjective
interest items are very close to those of items used to tap ideological
orientations. Closely interrelated words such as “public sector”,
“privatisation,” “left/right,” and so on will be employed to measure
both subjective interest as well as ideology variables. In one case, the
subjective interest measure is generated by a question about how much
one thinks one would be affected if the “public sector were reduced.”
One empirical indicator of state intervention orientations in the SOM
survey will be based on virtually the same phrase (“reduce the public
sector”.)
While these questions are not tautological it is still possible that
some respond to both of them based on ideological considerations. A
strong correlation then emerges even though subjective interest does
not have a causal effect. In the terminology of Sears and Funk
(1991:69-70), the subjective measure is then “reactive” in relation to
dependent ideology variables. The latter explains the former, not the
other way around. Fortunately however, the problem is much smaller
when orientations like “satisfaction with democracy” and “trust in
politicians” serve as the dependent variables. The problem is smaller as
the linguistic difference between words such as “democracy” and
“politicians” on one hand, and “the public sector” on the other, is
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greater than that of  “left/right” and “privatisation” on one hand, and
“the public sector” on the other. This observation parallels Sears and
Funk’s (1991:70) goals “to make the subjective measures as unreactive
as possible,” by ensuring “that the subjective measures of self-interest
have not simply been slightly altered versions of the dependent
variable.”
These remarks provide a minimum criterion for when statistical
effects of subjective interest measures can be taken seriously. More
specifically, it becomes difficult to interpret effects as reflections of
causality if they only appear when problems of “reactiveness” are
great (as in the case of ideological orientations), but not when such
problems are smaller (as in the case of political trust). In other words,
we mistrust subjective self-interest measures if they do not affect
variables such as satisfaction with democracy and trust in politicians.8
The impact of self-interest
We now begin to analyse the impact of self-interest on political trust
and ideology. The former is measured by the “satisfaction with the
way democracy works” and “trust in politicians” factors that were
introduced in Chapter 6. Moreover, throughout the rest of this book,
state intervention orientations will be measured by an additive index
summating responses to questions about suggestions to “reduce the
public sector” and “introduce more private health care.” These two
items are widely used in Swedish electoral research as reliable measures
of state intervention orientations, as indicated by a quite strong cross-
sectional correlation between the two items (r=.46), and by the re-
occurring observation that their aggregate distributions change in a
very similar fashion over time (see Johansson, Nilsson & Strömberg
2001; Kumlin 1997). The index, which ranges from 1 to 9, was scored
so that higher values mean greater support for state intervention. (See
methodological appendix at the end of this chapter for more
information.)
                                                          
8 One might discern a second circumstance that would give us reason to
mistrust subjective interest effects. It occurs when objective and subjective
measures are largely independent of one another. Reasonably, the risk of
objective interest being reactive in relation to ideological variables is smaller
than the corresponding risk for subjective perceptions. If subjective interest is
firmly rooted in objective interests, then, subjective variables become
increasingly credible as measures of meaningful perceptions rather than as
second-rate indicators of the dependent variable.
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Left-right self-placement, furthermore, was generated by the
following question: “It is sometimes said that political opinions can be
placed on a left-right scale. Where would you place yourself on such a
scale?” The response alternatives were “clearly to the left” (coded 1),
“somewhat to the left” (2), “neither left nor right” (3), “somewhat to
the right” (4), and “clearly to the right” (5).
Finally, the access to dependant variables is more limited in the
1992 SLEV survey. However, there are sufficient opportunities to
measure state intervention orientations. To achieve this, I factor
analysed three opinion items from two different question batteries. A
unidimensional factor solution was obtained, and the first factor was
saved for future analysis.9
Before proceeding to multivariate analysis, Table 7.5 shows
bivariate correlations between self-interest measures and political
orientations. Several of the hypothesised relationships emerge. Looking
first at the SOM data, individuals with a high objective welfare state
interest are more likely to place themselves further to the left than
others (-.11), more likely to support state intervention (.09), and to be
satisfied with democracy (.07). While none of these relationships are
exceedingly strong, they are stronger than the significant, but very
weak, bivariate correlation between objective interest and trust in
politicians (.05).
Moreover, the subjective self-interest variable has sizeable bivariate
correlations with left-right placement (-.33) and state intervention
orientations (.55), but weak correlations with satisfaction with
democracy (.03) and trust in politicians (.05). So far, then, it seems
that the subjective variable does not pass the test with respect to
political trust.
It is also interesting to note that the link between objective and
subjective welfare state interest is not strong (.10). This is interesting
as we have noted that at the aggregate level many Swedes benefit from
welfare state arrangements both in the objective sense, as well as in the
                                                          
9 The first item was “it’s better to raise taxes than to cut social reforms”
(loading .56). Here, respondents answered along a balanced five-point scale
(1=agree completely, 3=neither/nor, 5=do not agree). The second and third
items respectively were “work towards a society with more private enterprise”
(loading -.56) and “work towards a society with small income differences”
(loading .53).  The response alternatives for these two items were very good
suggestion (coded 1), rather good suggestion (2), neither good nor bad
suggestion (3), rather bad suggestion (4), very bad suggestion (5), and don’t
know (3).
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subjective sense that many perceive a welfare state interest. Now we
see that this relationship does not necessarily hold at the individual
level. Perceptions of self-interest are only weakly related with the
objective extent to which people consume services. The SOM data,
then, support the suspicion that accurate subjective perceptions of
objective interests cannot be taken for granted (Franklin & Page
1984). We shall get back to this finding.
Shifting the attention to the SLEV data, we find the expected
positive relationship between both objective (.19) and subjective (.24)
interest and state intervention orientation. Also, the link between
objective and subjective interest is somewhat tighter in this data set
(.25).
Table 7.5 Objective self-interest, subjective self-interest, and
political orientations (Pearson’s r)
1999 West Sweden SOM Survey
Objective welfare state interest / Left-right self placement -.11
Subjective welfare state interest / Left-right self placement -.33
Objective welfare state interest / State intervention orientations .09
Subjective welfare state interest / State intervention orientations .55
Objective welfare state interest / Satisfaction with democracy .07
Subjective welfare state interest / Satisfaction with democracy .03
Objective welfare state interest / Trust in politicians .04
Subjective welfare state interest / Trust in politicians .05
Objective welfare state interest / Subjective welfare state interest .10
1992 SLEV Survey
Objective welfare state interest / State intervention orientations .19
Subjective welfare state interest / State intervention orientations .24
Objective welfare state interest / Subjective welfare state interest .25
Comment: Correlation coefficients are calculated based on 3162 (SOM) or
747 (SLEV) respondents or more. For information about variable
constructions, see main text.
The data thus suggest that at least some orientations are affected by
welfare state self-interest. But there are reasons to be cautious, as
bivariate correlations might be biased by omitted “third variables.”
Such variables might have an impact on both the independent and the
dependent variable. For instance, the strong correlations between
subjective variables and ideological orientations might be exaggerated
by spurious influences of income and class; we know that the poor and
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the working class tend to stand further to the left ideologically, and
they might score higher on interest variables. By a reversed logic,
omitted third variables could suppress some of the correlations
between interest and political trust; we know that the poor and the
working class tend to distrust the political system and politicians
somewhat more than others (Nye, Zelikov & King 1997; Norris 1999;
Holmberg 2000). To come to terms with the third variable problem I
now proceed to multivariate tests. The task is to examine the
relationships between welfare state self-interest and political
orientations, under control for a number of potential third variables,
the theoretical background of which were discussed in Chapter 4. This
means that the multivariate analyses yield interesting information
about how strong interest effects really are compared to those of some
previously well-researched control variables. Moreover, we pay
attention not only to direct effects, but also to indirect effects of
objective interest channelled by subjective interest.
Figure 7.1 Conceptual diagram of estimated causal models reported
in Tables 7.6 to 7.8
The remainder of this chapter reports five estimated causal models.
The first two contain effects on satisfaction with how democracy
works and trust in politicians in the 1999 West Sweden SOM survey.
The third and fourth models are based on the same data set and deal
with effects on left-right self-placement and state intervention
orientations respectively. The fifth model estimates effects on state
intervention orientations in the 1992 SLEV survey.
Subjective
welfare state
self-interest
Objective
welfare state
self-interest
Control
variables
Political
orientations
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Figure 7.1 shows the conceptual structure of these models. First,
they involve direct effects of objective and subjective self-interest on
the dependent political orientation measures. Second, we model the
indirect effects of objective self-interest flowing through subjective
perceptions. Third, the model contains exogenous control variables of
mainly socio-economic/demographic character, which are included as
independent variables in all equations. The short triple headed arrows
illustrate this feature without cluttering the picture.
Table 7.6 Causal models of self-interest effects on satisfaction with
democracy and trust in politicians (unstandardised OLS
estimates)
Dependent variable:
SATISFACTION WITH
DEMOCRACY
(higher value = more
satisfaction)
Dependent variable:
TRUST IN
POLITICIANS
(higher value = more
trust)
Direct
effect
Total
effect
Direct
effect
Total
effect
Objective welfare state interest (0–10 ) .02*** .02*** .02** .02**
Subjective welfare state interest (1–5 ) .01 .01 .02* .02
Perception of Swedish economy -.20*** .20*** -.22*** -.21***
Preference for incumbent party .37*** .38*** .42*** .43***
No party preference -.16** -.16** -.19*** -.19***
Age in  years (15–80 ) -.004*** -.005*** .00 .00
Education (1–3 ) .02 .03 .06** .05**
Subjective class affiliation (1=middle
  class) .06 .06 .05 .04
Life satisfaction (1–4 ) .19*** .19*** .18*** .17***
Adjusted R-squared .09 .10
Number of respondents 2630 2710
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. For
more information about the interest variables, see Tables 7.1 and 7.2, and
related text. The dependent variables were described in Chapter 6. Preference
for incumbent party was coded 1=Social Democrats, 0=other party. For
information about how other independent variables were coded, see Tables
6.3 and 6.4.
We are now ready to look at results from the first model (Table
7.6). We see that the objective self-interest variable has a significant
total effect on both satisfaction with democracy (.02) and on trust in
politicians (.02). The more public services individuals consume, the
more democratic satisfaction and political trust they tend to express.
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In contrast, subjective welfare state interest has weak and mostly
statistically insignificant coefficients. In turn, this means that little of
the impact of objective self-interest can be channelled through
subjective interest perceptions. The direct effects of objective interest
are equal to its total effects. This indicates that the reason why high-
level welfare state consumers tend to display greater political trust is
not that they perceive a greater welfare state interest. Rather, the data
support the idea that citizens gradually update their political
orientations at the time of each new welfare state experience. After this
process has taken place, they seem to forget the information that made
them update the initial orientation.
How strong is the impact of objective welfare state self-interest?
One way of answering the question is to compare with effects of other,
better known, variables. For example, as described in Chapter 4, three
factors that are known to have respected effects on political trust are
perceptions of the country’s economy (Huseby 2000), preference for
the incumbent party (Miller 1974; Borre 1995; Holmberg 1999), and
personal life satisfaction (Kornberg & Clarke 1992). These variables
provide yardsticks against which interest effects may be assessed.
When comparing coefficients for objective self-interest with those of
economic perceptions, one discovers that the self-interest impact is
smaller than economic effects. For instance, the predicted difference in
democratic satisfaction between someone who does not use any of the
measured public institutions, and someone using 10 of them, is .20
(.02 x 10).10 In comparison, the predicted effect of shifting from
perceiving that the economy has “gotten worse,” to perceiving that it
“improved,” is .40 (.20 x 2). Alternatively, we may compare with the
effects of preferring the incumbent party (.37). This reveals that the
influence of a maximum change in objective interest is about half that
of shifting between the incumbent party and the opposition. Finally, a
comparison with personal life satisfaction (.57 = .19 x 3) is even less
flattering for the objective self-interest effect on political trust; the
impact of the former is about three times as large as the latter.
We now move on to the third and fourth models in Table 7.7. They
involve effects on state intervention orientations and left-right self-
                                                          
10 As can be seen in Table 7.1, about 5 percent used 10 or more institutions.
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placement.11 A main finding is that the more public services individuals
consume, the more likely they are to support state intervention (.07)
and to be located to the left (-.04).
Table 7.7 Causal models of self-interest effects on state
intervention orientation and left-right ideology
(unstandardised OLS estimates)
Dependent variable:
STATE INTERVENTION
ORIENTATION
(higher value = greater
support
for intervention)
Dependent variable:
LEFT-RIGHT
SELF-PLACEMENT
(higher value = further to
the right)
Direct effect Total effect Direct effect Total effect
Objective welfare state
interest (0-10)
.04** .07*** -.03*** -.04***
Subjective welfare state
interest (1-5)
.82*** .82*** -.24*** -.24***
Employed in public sector .54*** .92*** -.14*** -.26***
Subjective class affiliation
(1=middle class)
-.58*** -.83*** .57*** .65***
Family income (1-8) -.08*** -.10*** .05*** .06***
Gender (1=woman) -.07 .12 .02 -.06
Education (1-3) -.07 -.10* -.02 -.02
Adjusted R-squared .34 .20
Number of respondents 2559 2625
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. For
more information about the interest variables, see Tables 7.1 and 7.2, and
related text. For information about how other independent variables were
coded, see Tables 6.3 and 6.4. The dependent variables were described
previously in this chapter.
These effects of objective interest are partly indirect, flowing throw
subjective interest perceptions. However, while not all of the impact is
direct, more than half of it is. Again, we interpret this as support for
the notion of gradual updating and on-line opinion formation: Much
of the objective interest effect does not seem to arise because people
integrate many welfare state contacts into a meaningful over-all
                                                          
11 I have also experimented with larger versions of this model, including
variables such as occupational class, age, education, and unemployment. The
inclusion of these variables did not change any of the observations made.
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interest perception that is stored in memory and subsequently used in
opinion formation.
How strong are the objective interest effects? Here, the toughest
yardstick in the model is the total effect of subjective class affiliation.
It is a suitable yardstick as many readers have a feeling for political
differences between workers and the middle class (see Petersson 1982;
Franklin 1985; Oskarson 1994).12 When comparing someone not using
any of the measured public institutions, and someone using ten, the
predicted total effect on state intervention orientations is .70, which
approaches the impact of subjective class. The corresponding predicted
change in left-right ideology is -.40, which amounts to about two-
thirds of the class effect (.65).
Looking at effects of subjective interest perceptions, one discovers
that these are very strong (.82 and -.24). However, there is the risk
that subjective interest is affected by political orientations rather than
the other way around. The problem, as we have noted, is that the
                                                          
12 The simple class dichotomy is a crude measure compared to the more fine-
tuned classifications used in studies that specifically examine class effects on
political attitudes and behaviour (see Oskarson 1994; Svallfors 1996).
However, it turns out that this simpler measure is generally sufficient for
purposes of statistical control in the context of this study. In fact, all analyses
throughout this book have been performed under control for the original five-
category subjective class variable (split into four dummy variables), and these
“tougher” controls only produce insignificant changes in estimates of
experience effects. I reached the same conclusion when I controlled, not for
subjective class identification, but rather for a more elaborate occupational
class variable containing the following categories: non-skilled worker, skilled
worker, lower white-collar, middle white-collar, higher white-collar, and self-
employed (including the few farmers in the data set). Having said this, it
should also be pointed out that more elaborate class controls generally reveal
stronger class effects, as they allow large differences between relatively
unusual extreme groups such as industrial workers and the self-employed.
This means that effect comparisons between a variable such as objective self-
interest and the subjective class dichotomy is rather kind to the impact of the
former. Finally, there is another reason why effect comparisons between
objective self-interest and class variables are somewhat kind to the impact of
self-interest. The reason is that no attempt has been made to model the
internal structural relations between the “control variables” in Figure 7.1. In
other words, the total class effects reported in Tables 7.6-7.8 denote the
impact of class holding other control variables constant. It may be argued that
this is somewhat unfair to the impact of class as one would expect class to
exercise indirect effects also through variables such as education and income.
In practice, however, including these additional portions of class effects in the
effect comparisons do not make that much of a difference. In fact, the
bivariate effects of class on state intervention orientations are -.95 (West
Sweden SOM) and -.46 (SLEV), coefficients which are not radically different
to the total effects reported in tables 7.6-7.8. Similarly, the bivariate impact of
class on left-right ideology is .67 (West Sweden SOM).
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wordings used to measure ideology are very similar to those used for
subjective perceptions: expressions such as “public sector” are
employed to tap both dependent and independent variables and it is
therefore possible that many respond to the subjective interest
questions based on ideological considerations. Borrowing the language
of Sears and Funk (1991:69-70), the subjective measure is potentially
“reactive” in relation to the dependent ideology variables. A strong
correlation might thus result although subjective interest has no causal
effect on ideology.
Table 7.8 Causal model of self-interest effects on state intervention
orientation (unstandardised OLS estimates)
Dependent variable:
STATE INTERVENTION ORIENTATION
(higher value=greater support for intervention)
Direct effect Total effect
Objective welfare state interest (0-4) .13*** .15***
Subjective welfare state interest (1-3) .24*** .24***
Employed in public sector .33*** .36***
Occupational class -.31*** -.38***
Monthly household income (1000 SEK)         -.009** -.011**
Gender (1=woman) .08 .25***
Education (1-3) -.10* -.09*
Age in years .012*** .009***
Adjusted R-squared .16
Number of respondents 720
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Comment: The data come from the 1992 SLEV Survey. For more information
about the interest variables, see Tables 7.3 and 7.4 and related text. The
dependent variable was described previously in this chapter. Occupational
class is coded 0 for workers and 1 for middle class (tjänstemän, företagare
jordbrukare, ledande befattningar, fria yrkesutövare med akademiyrken). The
household income variable measures monthly income after tax in thousands
of SEK (mean=16208, SD=8409). The education variable was coded 1=basic
primary education, 2=second-level education, 3=studied at the university level.
We have cautioned against interpreting subjective effects as genuine
reflections of causality if such effects only appear when the problem of
“reactiveness” is great (as in the case of ideological orientations), but
not when the problem is smaller (as in the case of political trust).
Unfortunately, this is exactly the situation at hand. While subjective
interest strongly correlates with state intervention and left-right self-
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placement, it does not correlate much with satisfaction with
democracy and trust in politicians. Since subjective interest effects
were non-existent when “reactiveness” was slightly less problematic, I
suspect that much of its covariation with dependent ideology variables
may be generated by a reversed causal impact.
Let us look at the fifth model (Table 7.8). It is based on data from
the 1992 SLEV survey and uses state intervention orientations as the
dependent variable. The general pattern is similar to the one revealed
by the SOM data. Objective welfare state interest has a significant
positive effect on support for state intervention. Most of its total effect
(.15) is direct and does not flow through subjective interest. Moreover,
subjective self-interest once again has a rather strong independent
impact on support for intervention (.24). Still, however, the problem of
reactiveness is large as the term used to tap subjective interest
(“equality”) is indeed similar to the state intervention indicators
(“social reforms,” “income differences,” and so on.)
These findings, too, are consistent with the notion that people do
not walk around with meaningful overall perceptions of their welfare
state interest. Rather, since objective self-interest is nevertheless
influential, it seems that orientations have been gradually updated as
suggested by the on-line model.
On-line opinion formation or poor measures of subjective self-interest?
It should be admitted that the measures of subjective self-interest used
in this chapter are not perfect. Perhaps people do think in terms of
welfare state interests, though in less abstract and “academic”
concepts than the ones I have used to capture this thinking. For
instance, it would be interesting to analyse questions about interest
perceptions that somewhat clarify the connection between proposed
policies on the one hand, and everyday life and personal self-interest
on the other. This could entail asking about “public services” instead
of the public sector, or something like “public safety net” instead of
“income equality.” One could also imagine trying somewhat longer
questions containing explicit references to various concrete
institutions. Perhaps they would indicate that subjective interest indeed
affects dependent variables where the problem of reactivity is
reasonable? And perhaps such variables would show that there is
indeed a strong relationship between objective interests and subjective
interest perceptions?
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We cannot rule out these possibilities. What we can say is that this
study, just like much past research, has rather negative experiences
with subjective self-interest measures: effects are typically weak when
question wordings for interest perceptions are clearly different from
those used to measure dependent variables, thus diminishing the
problem of “reactiveness” (Sears & Funk 1991:69-70). Our results
point in a similar direction.
So far, then, there is little evidence that people do have
consequential over-arching welfare-state self-interest perceptions that
are not just reflections of already developed political orientations.
Rather the uncovered effects of objective welfare state interest appear
to operate in a more piece-meal fashion, where self-interest effects are
the results of gradual updating, rather than the results of synthesising
perceptions of the totality of one’s welfare state self-interest.13
Services, transfers and the visibility of stakes
The effects of objective interest appear stronger in the analysis of the
SLEV data compared to that of the SOM data. The predicted
difference in intervention support between someone who does not use
any of the measured institutions, and someone using four of them, is
.60 (.15 x 4).14 This effect is greater than both that of occupational
class (-.38), as well as that of public sector employment (.36).
Why are effects of objective welfare state interest stronger in the
SLEV data than in the SOM data? First, there is a difference in the
measurement of welfare state usage. The fact that the SLEV data come
from records about benefit reception should reduce measurement error
substantially. In contrast, SOM respondents provide information
about public service usage themselves. It is likely that (some) people
forget, lie, or otherwise underestimate the extent to which they use
welfare state services.
                                                          
13 Holmberg and Asp (1984:355) provided an interesting parallel to these
findings by in their study of the 1980 Swedish referendum on nuclear power.
They found that very little of the variance in voting behaviour could be
accounted for by perceptions of how different referendum alternatives affected
one’s personal job market interests. The reason was that “most people did not
perceive a concrete connection between their jobs and the alternatives in the
referendum.” Rather, the data showed that some 60 percent of respondents
were piled up on the midpoint (“neither improve nor worsen”), and where
another 5 percent chose the don’t know alternative.
14 As can be seen in Table 7.3, about 5 percent of the respondents have
received service from 4 or more of the included institutions.
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Second, there is a difference between the experience of receiving
money (such as unemployment benefits) and the experience of
receiving a human service (such as using libraries). As noted, the SLEV
measure taps mainly reception of monetary benefits, whereas the SOM
survey is focused on human services. And as discussed in Chapter 4,
previous research on self-interest contends that the impact of personal
economic concerns rises with the visibility of stakes (Sears & Citrin
1982; Green 1988; Sears & Funk 1990, 1991). Further, transfer
systems make personal stakes less difficult to discover compared to
human services. After all, it is quite easy to tell whether and how much
one gains from an institution like the unemployment insurance. In
contrast, it is more difficult to tell when it comes to an institution like
libraries, as “benefits” are not clearly spelled out in monetary terms.
Because of the difference in the visibility of stakes, interests emanating
from transfer systems might be more politically salient to citizens than
those emanating from human services. If so, it makes sense that the
effects of the latter are weaker.
Conclusion: A half-full, half-empty glass
We conclude that objective welfare state self-interest has statistically
and substantially significant effects on political ideology and political
trust. These effects are present both for transfers as well as for services.
The more such arrangements satisfy citizens’ short-term self-interest,
the more likely people are to embrace leftist ideology and to display
higher levels of political trust.
The effects are quite decent compared to those of some respected
variables representing other theoretical perspectives. For example,
objective interest effects on support for state intervention and left-right
ideology are sometimes at par with those of the working class/middle
class dichotomy. Having said this, welfare state interest was still not
the most influential variable in the multivariate analyses. There was
usually some other variable that was more important, such as class or
sociotropic economic perceptions.
So do we have a half-full or half-empty glass at hand? As usual, the
answer to such questions depends entirely on one’s initial expectations.
Given previous public opinion research, the self-interest glass looks at
least half-full. This research contends that short-term self-interest
effects on general, “symbolic” political orientations are negligible or
non-existent. In the welfare state context, results have indicated that
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“interests are almost irrelevant as determinants of welfare state
support,” (Goul Andersen 1993:43) which in turn has suggested that
people seem  “to a very minor extent to assess the public sector from
the viewpoint of personal utility” (Hadenius 1986:121). Similarly,
Sears and Funk (1991:56) noted that “Materialist theorists often
propose that ideology, party preferences [...] are themselves mere
creatures of real economic interests.” But summarising empirical
research they found that “In fact, self-interest proves to be almost
uncorrelated with these symbolic predispositions.” To be very exact,
they noted that the median correlation in these studies “was a non-
significant +.05.”
This chapter has painted a somewhat different picture. In plain
empirical language, we have noted correlations between objective
welfare state interest and political orientations up to +.19. This
suggests that interest effects on general political orientations have been
somewhat underestimated in previous research: interests are certainly
not “irrelevant,” and “symbolic” orientations appear somewhat less
symbolic, and more rational also in the short-term-sense, than they
have often seemed.
Actually, this point is twofold. First, effects on previously analysed
ideological orientations appear somewhat stronger than those typically
reported. Second, objective welfare state interest also influences
variables that have rarely been placed under the magnifying glass: in
addition to effects on ideology, we have seen a certain impact on
satisfaction with how democracy works and trust in politicians.
What is the reason for the partial discrepancy between our
conclusions and those of many past studies? In my view, the most
plausible reason is that much previously analysed data – typically
national election studies – contain too little information about welfare
state interests. By necessity, objective self-interest has been tapped with
information about usage of a small number of institutions. The data
used here have allowed for more detailed and valid measurement.
This measurement-related argument has recently received support
elsewhere. Drawing on more recent Danish data, Goul Andersen
(1999) has somewhat modified his previous clear-cut conclusion that
welfare state self-interests are “irrelevant.” He analysed a more
elaborate independent self-interest variable referred to as “labour
market position.” This index contained four categories: privately
employed with no unemployment experience, privately employed with
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some unemployment experience, public employees, and publicly
supported (essentially consisting of the unemployed, the disabled,
people on parental or maternity leave etc., and early retirement
pensioners). He finds that both public employees as well as the
publicly supported display higher general welfare state support and are
more likely to vote for socialist parties than other categories and that
these effects approach those of social class. Goul Andersen (1999:27-8)
concluded that “we face a polarity between a minority of ‘core
insiders’ in the private sector at the one pole, and a minority of
publicly supported at the other [...] Clearly, this polarity is politically
important, in some respects equally important as social class [...]
Clearly, then, labour market position is a quite important interest
factor.”
Results such as these fit well with those presented here: more
detailed measurement reveals stronger self-interest effects. Yet, we did
not have access to one data set offering information about the entire
welfare state: in a perfect scientific world there would have been a
survey that simultaneously focused on both human services (like the
SOM survey) and on transfer systems (like the SLEV survey). Based on
my findings, I would expect indices covering the full welfare state
range to further tighten the relation between interests and orientations.
But let us close this chapter in a more self-critical fashion: If the self-
interest glass seems half-full from the perspective of previous opinion
research, it appears half-empty from the viewpoint of much macro
welfare state theory. While we have seen statistically and substantially
significant interest effects, this impact is still not enormous or
dominant. Even when self-interest is given a really fair chance, then, it
fails to provide the single best explanation for variation in political
orientations. Rather, welfare state interest is but one of several
independent variables telling us something about how political
orientations are formed. It would therefore appear that many scholars
exaggerate the potency of welfare state interests in structuring political
alignments. Given our results, it seems too simple to assume that just
because “All benefit,” then all will “feel obliged to pay” (Esping-
Andersen 1990:27-8). By the same token, general support for welfare
state arrangements depends on much more than just “the outcome of
narrowly based battles between antagonistic interests” (Baldwin
1990:293-4).
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In conclusion, to say that the Swedish electorate is  “an electorate in
the grips of the welfare state” (Zetterberg 1985) is to overstate the
case for self-interest.  Rather, Swedes seem to have a healthy – but not
perverse – taste for voter candy.
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 7: Comments on
how to measure state intervention orientations
Throughout this book, state intervention orientations are measured by
an additive index summing responses to questions about suggestions to
“reduce the public sector” and “introduce more private health care.”
Both items offered the following response alternatives: very good
suggestion (coded 1), rather good suggestion (2), neither good nor bad
suggestion (3), rather bad suggestion (4), and very bad suggestion (5).
It should be pointed out that these two indicators are not the only
conceivable measures of state interventions orientations offered by the
1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. For instance, there are two items on
“let private companies handle elder care,” and “introduce more
friskolor” (private schools that receive public funding). But I decided
to leave out these items for three reasons. First, health care services are
more important in the sense that they occupy a considerably larger
portion of the total size of the public sector than elder care and
“friskolor.” In this sense, the health item should reveal something
more fundamental about feelings about state intervention than the
other items. Second, “friskolor” are non-public schools that
nevertheless receive much of their funding from the public sector. It is
thus ambigous whether state intervention is reduced just because more
“friskolor” are introduced. Third, to this one may add that the two
additional items do not add much empirical information that is not
captured by the health care item (the correlation between the latter
item and an additive index based on all three indicators is r=.91).
Moreover, the data also contain a couple of taxation items (“lower
the taxes” and “increase local taxes instead of cutting services”).
While these items probably capture variation in state intervention
orientations, I have nevertheless left them out for two reasons. First,
tax items may be particularly sensitive to tax-paying experiences, and
particularly insensitive to experiences of public sector outputs. As
noted in Chapter 2, it has been suggested that taxation issues make the
costs of public services salient at the expense of its outputs (Downs
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1960). In fact, this contention received support in an analysis where
objective self-interest (counting the number of “outputs” that the
individual uses personally) and income constituted the independent
variables. It turned out that while both variables had significant effects
on the state intervention index used in this study, only income
significantly affected an additive index based on the two taxation
items. In conclusion, because taxation measures seem to be sensitive
mainly to taxation experiences but not to output experiences, and
because this study does not analyse tax-paying experiences, the
taxation items were left out of the state intervention measure.
A second reason to be cautious about the taxation items has to do
with their internal structure. Recent research on attitudes towards
taxation in Sweden suggests that such attitudes do not form a single
pro/contra dimension that could fit nicely into an even more general
state intervention dimension (Edlund 1999a). Rather, public opinion
on taxation seems to have a multidimensional structure
Finally, to be on the safe side, all empirical analyses in this study
were also conducted with an alternative measure of state intervention
orientations, one which involved all remotely reasonable indicators.
This measure was generated by a factor analysis of opinions on the
proposition to “reduce the public sector,” as well as of two additive
indices measuring attitudes towards taxation and privatisation
respectively. The privatisation index (Cronbach’s alpha = .84) was
based on questions about “introducing more private health care,” “let
private companies handle elder care,” and “introduce more private
friskolor.” The taxation index (Cronbach’s alpha = .56) was based on
the questions about “lower the taxes” and “increase local taxes
instead of cutting services.” The response alternatives for all involved
items were: very good suggestion (1), rather good suggestion (2),
neither good nor bad suggestion (3), rather bad suggestion (4), very
bad suggestion (5). The loadings on the state intervention factor were
as follows: “reduce the public sector” (.64), privatisation index (.61),
taxation index (-.52). It turned out that this more encompassing
measure produced virtually identical conclusions compared to the less
inclusive state intervention index used in the reported analyses. This is
not surprising as the correlation between the two was exceedingly high
(r=.93).

Chapter 8
Distributive Justice

he self-interest perspective is a parsimonious theory. Because of its
parsimony it is not surprising that it fails to explain certain
portions of political attitudes and behaviour (Mansbridge 1990; Lewin
1988; Green & Shapiro 1994; Udéhn 1994). One parsimonious
assumption is that public service delivery always has positive effects on
support for leftist ideology and political trust. This assumption
underlies the hypotheses tested in the last chapter, which claimed that
heavy public service usage generates support for the system and the
institutions providing services. The self-interest perspective thus
ignores the possibility that welfare state usage sometimes reduces
support through negative experiences: Given that citizens are driven by
short-term, economic self-interest when evaluating the welfare state
and the political system, and given that welfare state services make at
least some minimal contribution to that self-interest, it follows that yet
another welfare state experience will always be conducive to greater
system support. Adapting Zetterberg’s (1985) language, citizens are
“in the grips of the welfare state” in the sense that they must always
react positively to service experiences – that is, by increasing their
support for the system providing the service.
A more subtle perspective
We now begin to acknowledge that welfare state experiences might
involve more action than just assessments of personal, material, short-
term outcomes. In all the remaining empirical chapters this idea is
present in one way or the other. For example, the social justice
perspective assumes that people do not necessarily react positively to
the level of welfare state outcome they receive, as assumed by the self-
interest perspective. Rather, what they want out of their contacts with
public institutions is different forms of social justice. People do not just
want as much welfare state outcome as possible for themselves. They
also want to experience fairness and justice. Since the perceived
T
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fairness of personal welfare state outcomes and procedures can vary,
so can the political effects of experiences. Sometimes experience effects
on support for the system are positive and sometimes they are
negative.  In this sense, the social justice perspective is a subtler and
less deterministic theoretical perspective.
In this chapter we investigate effects of distributive justice
judgements (“have I received what I have a right to”). In Chapter 9,
we deal with one particular aspect of procedural justice: experienced
voice opportunities.
Based on past social psychological research on social justice, we
have hypothesised that higher degrees of experienced distributive
justice produces more ideological leftism, more state intervention
support, more satisfaction with democracy, and more trust in
politicians. Conversely, experiences of poor distributive justice (“I did
not get the service I have the right to”) tend to produce ideological
support for the right, less positive views on state intervention, less
satisfaction with democracy, and less trust in politicians.
These predictions deserve some qualification. More specifically, we
expect experienced distributive justice to be more influential for
political trust orientations than for ideological orientations. In Chapter
4, we reviewed literature suggesting that self-interest matters more
when the political choices have greater and more visible implications
for one’s personal, economic, short-term situation (Sears & Citrin
1982; Green 1988; Sears & Funk 1991). As economic “stakes” get
larger and more visible, self-interest considerations become more
influential. And given that citizens have limited cognitive capacity and
motivation for careful political deliberation, arguments pertaining to
distributive and procedural justice should be crowded out in the
process.  Since the choice between, for example, trusting politicians or
not has small implications for short-term material self-interest,
experienced distributive justice should have its greatest effects on such
variables. In contrast, because the choice between leftist and rightist
policies has substantial implications for citizens’ personal economies,
self-interest considerations will matter more, and social justice
considerations will matter less, for such choices.
Before the empirical analysis begins, I will briefly remind the reader
about a couple of theoretical considerations, which have implications
for how the impact of experienced distributive justice should be
analysed and thought about.
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Self-interest in disguise?
The social justice perspective assumes that people in contact with
public services have a normative expectation as to what constitutes a
fair service outcome or procedure. It is when the expectation is
compared with the actual experience that a judgement of experienced
social justice is formed (see Tyler et al. 1997: 45-50).
The self-interest perspective challenges this idea. People are not
believed to compare normative expectation with actual experience in
an intellectually honest way. Rather, judgements of experienced justice
are but reflections of the extent to which experiences have served one’s
short-term material self-interest (Tyler 1990:173). It is more socially
acceptable to assess public institutions using arguments of social justice
than arguments relating to self-interest. Because people are essentially
driven by self-interest, and because they usually seek a politically and
socially correct disguise for that interest, citizens who gain a lot from
the welfare state will typically say that they have experienced
distributive and procedural justice. Conversely, those who gain less
will tend to judge justice aspects of experiences unfavourably. The self-
interest perspective thus predicts that higher levels of individual gain
from public services will be strongly correlated with positive
perceptions of experienced justice. Moreover, once self-interest has
been controlled for, there is no independent political effect of
perceptions of experienced justice.
In this chapter, and in Chapter 9, I try to assess empirically how
serious damage these objections do to the social justice perspective. For
instance, I look at the correlation between the level of welfare state
interest and judgements of experienced justice: The social justice
perspective predicts that this correlation is not exceedingly strong.
Also, I control effects of justice judgements on political orientations for
self-interest: The social justice perspective predicts that there are
significant effects also when controlling for self-interest.
Personal experience and sociotropic judgement
Chapter 1 introduced the basic model that has inspired most previous
research on the relation between personal experiences and political
attitudes and behaviour (see Figure 1.1). This model links personal
experiences to dependent variables in two ways: First, there is a
potential direct effect of experiences. In this case, citizens react
politically to experiences in a direct manner. They form political
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attitudes based on personal experiences that are particular to the
person in question. Second, there is a possibility of an indirect effect
component flowing through sociotropic judgements of how the nation
as a whole is doing and what the collective as a whole has experienced.
Here, people are more inclined to look at sociotropic judgements of
common experiences. While personal experiences are not the decisive
causal trigger, sociotropic judgements are in turn partly affected by
specific personal experiences. According to this second account, then,
personal experience effects are perfectly compatible with the prevailing
image of the modern voter as a “sociotropic animal,” with the
addition that sociotropic judgements are in turn partly informed by
personal experiences.
In Chapter 1, I suspected that the link between experiences and
sociotropic judgements might be tighter in the welfare state territory
than in the economic realm. One argument was that macro
information about the welfare state is less accessible than macro
information about the nation’s economy. A second argument was that
there is a clearer political responsibility for personal welfare state
experiences, as opposed to private economic experiences. Taken
together, worse accessibility of sociotropic information and greater
political relevance make welfare state experiences more influential in
attitude formation than economic experiences. This hypothesis
received empirical support in Chapter 6.
In some of the analyses presented in this chapter we will have access
to measures of personally experienced distributive justice, as well as
measures of sociotropic perceptions of what people in general
experience. Hence, to the extent that personally experienced
distributive justice affects attitudes, we can continue to track which of
the two described paths effects take.
Overall judgements of experienced distributive justice
Experienced distributive justice was measured in two ways. The first
strategy involved asking about people’s overall experience with public
services. The second strategy was to ask about “institution-specific”
experienced distributive justice in contacts with six different public
services. The overall measure will be analysed in this section, while the
institution-specific items are used in the two sections to come.
The overall measure of experienced distributive justice was included
in a question battery with the following head question: “If you look
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back on your own personal contacts with public authorities and
services during the last twelve months, to what extent do the following
statements fit with your own experience.” The response alternatives
were “fits very well,” “fits rather well,” “fits rather poorly,” “fits very
poorly,” and “have not been in contact.” As can be seen in Table 8.1,
43 percent of respondents reported positive experiences (fits very or
rather well”), while 20 percent reported experiences on the negative
side.
Table 8.1 Experienced and sociotropic distributive justice
perceptions (percent)
EXPERIENCED DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
“I have received the service and help I have the right to”
fits very well 8
fits rather well 35
fits rather poorly 13
fits very poorly 7
have not been in contact 37
Sum percent
Number of respondents
100
3460
SOCIOTROPIC DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
“In general, people receive the service and help they have the right to”
fits very well 4
fits rather well 43
fits rather poorly 25
fits very poorly 8
don’t know 20
Sum percent
Number of respondents
100
3531
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. The
measure of experienced distributive justice was included in a question battery
with the following head question: “If you look back on your own personal
contacts with various public authorities and services during the last twelve
months, to what extent do the following statements fit with your own
experience?” The measure of sociotropic distributive justice was included in a
question battery with this head question: “If you instead think about how
public authorities and services function in general, how well do the following
statements fit with your general view?”
Interestingly, 37 percent placed themselves in the “have not been in
contact” category. This should not be taken as a sign that many
Swedes do not have any actual personal public service contacts during
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a year. We know from Chapter 7 that only 5 percent of respondents
had managed to avoid all the public services for which actual personal
usage was measured. Rather, it seems likely that “have not been in
contact” functions as a residual category for people who do not know
or do not remember either positive or negative experiences. It seems
reasonable to assume that most of these people have actually had
relatively neutral experiences that did not stick out from the ordinary.
Consequently, the no contact category will be treated as a middle
category in the analyses to come (coded 0). The other categories will
be coded: fits very well (+2), fits rather well (+1), fits rather poorly (-
1), and fits very poorly (-2).
The measure of sociotropic distributive justice in Table 8.1 was
included in a question battery with the following head question: “If
you instead think about how public authorities and services function in
general, how well do the following statements fit with your general
view.” The response alternatives were “fits very well,” “fits rather
well,” “fits rather poorly,” “fits very poorly,” and “don’t know.” In
the analyses to come, the variable will be coded in the following
manner: fits very well (+2), fits rather well (+1), don’t know (0), fits
rather poorly (-1), and fits very poorly (-2).1
Interestingly, experienced distributive justice does not correlate
much with the various measures of welfare state self-interest used in
Chapter 7. It has a non-significant correlation with “objective” welfare
state interest (less than .01), and a significant but weak correlation
with “subjective” welfare state interest (.05).2 Apparently, there are
many people consuming small quantities of public service who
nevertheless believe that they receive the service they have a right to.
                                                          
1What is the justification for treating non-contact along the experience
variable, and don’t know along the sociotropic variable, as neutral middle
categories? While there are no strict theoretical reasons I found empirically
that these categories actually tend to function as middle categories with
respect to the dependent variables. In other words, although non-
contact/don’t know must still be regarded as “categories apart” on a
conceptual level, no empirical information is lost by simply treating them as
middle categories in analyses of the dependent variables used here. Expressed
differently, no significant increases in model fit are gained by splitting the two
variables into subsets of dummy variables, thus avoiding the theoretically
arbitrary restriction that values on the dependent variables change linearly
when moving from negative experiences, to no experiences/don’t know, to
positive experiences. Because of this finding, and because I see a value in
expressing results as parsimoniously as possible, I have chosen the simpler
way of treating the independent variables.
2 See chapter 6 for more detailed descriptions of these variables.
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Conversely, there are many people who use lots of public services and
nevertheless feel that they do not get distributive justice in their
contact with public institutions. These low correlations are a problem
for the assumption that perceptions of experienced justice are mainly a
politically correct way of expressing content or discontent with the
extent to which one’s economic self-interest is satisfied. Rather, the
low correlations strengthen the social justice perspective, which
considers perceptions of experienced justice to be results of
intellectually honest comparisons between actual experience and
normative distributive justice expectations.
Moreover, there is a strong correlation between experienced
distributive justice and sociotropic judgements as to whether people in
general get the service and help they have the right to (.43).3 This
observation fits the suspicion that the link between personal experience
and sociotropic judgement is tighter in the area of the welfare state
than it has proven to be in the economic realm (Mutz 1998). To the
extent that sociotropic judgements affect attitudes, sociotropic
judgements may channel parts of the effect of personal experience.
What are the effects of experienced distributive justice on political
orientations? Table 8.2 answers this question with respect to state
intervention orientations and left-right ideology. For each of these
dependent variables I estimated three OLS regression equations. The
first model contains the bivariate effect only. The second model
controls that effect for the same control variables that were used
previously. Model 3 adds the measure of sociotropic distributive
justice, thus allowing us to see how much of the effect of experiences is
direct and how much is indirect, flowing through sociotropic
judgements.
                                                          
3 This correlation was also included in Table 6.2.
T
able 8.2     T
he im
pact of experienced distributive justice in contacts w
ith public agencies on state intervention
                     orientation and left-right ideology (unstandardised O
L
S estim
ates)
Dependent variable:
STATE INTERVENTIO
N
O
RIENTATIO
N
(higher value = greater support for intervention)
Dependent variable:
LEFT-RIG
HT
SELF-PLACEM
ENT
 higher value = further to the right
M
odel 1:
Experienced
distributive
justice
M
odel 2:
M
odel 1
+ control
variables
M
odel 3:
M
odel 2 +
Sociotropic
distributive
justice
M
odel 4:
Experienced
distributive
justice
M
odel 5:
M
odel 4
+ control
variables
M
odel 6:
M
odel 5 +
Sociotropic
distributive
justice
Experienced distributive justice (-2 – 2 )
    .07*
.08*
.08**
-.03**
-.05**
-.05**
O
bjective welfare state interest (0 – 10 )
       -
.06***
.06**
-
-.03***
-.03***
Em
ployed in public sector
    -
.91***
.91***
-
-.25***
-.25***
Subjective class affiliation (1=m
iddle class)
  -
-.86***
-.85***
-
.64***
.64***
Fam
ily incom
e (1 – 8)
    -
-.10***
-.11***
-
.06***
.06***
G
ender (1=wom
an)
    -
.08**
.07**
-
-.02
-.02
Education (1 – 3)
    -
-.11**
-.11**
-
-.01
-.01
Sociotropic distributive justice index (-2 – 2)
 -
-
.003
-
-
.001
Constant
6.82***
.7.17***
7.17***
2.94***
2.66***
2.67***
Adjusted R-squared
.001
.11
.11
.001
.12
.12
Num
ber of respondents
2487
2487
2487
2591
2591
2591
2 1 8    D i s t r i b u t i v e  J u s t i c e
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01
C
om
m
ent: T
he data com
e from
 the 1999 W
est Sw
eden SO
M
 Survey. For m
ore inform
ation about the tw
o distributive justice
m
easures, see T
able 8.1, and related text. For inform
ation about the objective w
elfare state interest variable, see T
able 7.1 and
related text. For inform
ation about how
 other independent variables w
ere coded, see T
ables 6.3 and 6.4. T
he dependent variables
w
ere described in C
hapter 7.
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There are significant direct effects of experienced distributive justice
on support for state intervention (.08) and on left-right self-placement
(-.05). As we have hypothesised, the tendency is that the greater
distributive justice people feel they have experienced, the more they
tend to support state intervention and leftist ideology. These effects,
however, are weak. And taken on its own experienced distributive
justice explains less than one percent of the variation in the dependent
variables. Moreover, there are no effects of sociotropic distributive
justice judgements on state intervention orientations and left-right self-
placement. In sum, neither personal experiences of distributive justice,
nor sociotropic judgements of collective experience are overly related
to political ideology.
What is the impact on political trust? Table 8.3 answers this
question with respect to satisfaction with the way democracy works
and trust in politicians. Here the impact of experienced distributive
justice is greater. This shift is in line with the hypothesis that social
justice concerns are more important for political trust than for
ideological left-right orientations. When the control variables are
included the experience variable still has a relatively sizable impact on
satisfaction with democracy (.15) and on trust in politicians (.19).
Taken on its own, experienced distributive justice explains four and
six percent respectively of the variation in the dependent variables.
T
able 8.3    T
he im
pact of experienced distributive justice in contacts w
ith public agencies on satisfaction w
ith
                   dem
ocracy and trust in politicians (unstandardised O
L
S estim
ates)
D
ependent variable:
SATISFAC
TIO
N
 W
ITH
 D
EM
O
C
RACY
 (higher value=m
ore satisfaction)
D
ependent variable:
TRU
ST IN
 PO
LITIC
IAN
S
(higher value =m
ore trust)
M
odel 1:
Experienced
distributive
justice
M
odel 2:
M
odel 1
+ control
variables
M
odel 3:
M
odel 2 +
Sociotropic
distributive
justice
M
odel 4:
Experienced
distributive
justice
M
odel 5:
M
odel 4
+ control
variables
M
odel 6:
M
odel 5 +
Sociotropic
distributive
justice
Experienced distributive justice (-2 – 2)
.19***
.15***
.07***
.24***
.19***
.12***
O
bjective welfare state interest (0 – 10)
-
.02***
.02**
-
.01*
.01
Perception of Sw
edish econom
y (1 – 3)
-
-.19***
-.18***
-
-.18***
-.17***
Preference for incum
bent party
-
.34***
.32***
-
.39***
.37***
N
o party preference
-
-.14**
-.13**
-
-.18***
-.17***
Age in years (15 – 80)
-
-.005***
-.005***
-
.00
-.00
Education (1 – 3)
-
.01
.01
-
.04
.04
Life satisfaction (1 – 4)
-
.17***
.15***
-
.14***
.13***
Subjective class affiliation (1=m
iddle class)
-
.06
.04
-
.07
.06
Sociotropic distributive justice (-2 – 2)
-
-
.19***
-
-
.18***
C
onstant
-.03
.65***
.62***
-.06***
.29**
.26**
Adjusted R
-squared
.04
.11
.15
.06
.13
.16
N
um
ber of respondents
2580
2580
2580
2653
2653
2653
 2 2 0    D i s t r i b u t i v e  J u s t i c e
* p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
C
om
m
ent: T
he data com
e from
 the 1999 W
est Sw
eden SO
M
 Survey. For m
ore inform
ation about the tw
o distributive justice
m
easures, see T
able 8.1, and related text. For inform
ation about the objective w
elfare state interest variable, see T
able 7.1 and rext.
For m
ore inform
ation about other independent variables, see T
ables 6.3, 6.4, and 7.6. T
he dependent variables w
ere described in
C
hapter 6.
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It is interesting to compare the total effects of experienced
distributive justice with those of perceptions of the economy. Of
course, the effects of the latter variable are the single most important
reason why previous research has come to the conclusion that modern
voters are “sociotropic animals.” When forming political judgements,
such animals are prone to consider collective information about the
population as a whole, rather than information generated by personal
experience. In the economic area, this has proven to be a valid
conclusion both for vote choice and government approval (see Lewis-
Beck 1988), as well as for political trust (see McAllister 1999; Huseby
2000).
It turns out that personally experienced distributive justice has
stronger effects on both satisfaction with democracy and trust in
politicians than do sociotropic perceptions of the Swedish economy.
For satisfaction with democracy, the total effect of moving between
the extreme categories along the experience variable is .60 ( = .15 x 4).
The corresponding effect of economic perceptions is .38 ( = .19 x 2).
Likewise, for trust in politicians, the effect of moving between the
extreme categories along the experience variable is .76 ( = .19 x 4).
Here, the corresponding effect of economic perceptions is .36 ( = .18 x
2).
These findings do not imply that Swedes do not consider collective
information in the welfare state area. On the contrary, sociotropic
distributive justice has a strong impact on both dependent variables; as
a matter of fact, it has a stronger maximum effect than that of
economic sociotropic judgements. We also see that the coefficients of
the experience variable decrease when the sociotropic measures are
entered. This observation, together with the strong correlation
between personal experience and sociotropic judgement (.43), means a
sizable chunk of the total personal experience effect is in fact
channelled through collective sociotropic judgements. Such indirect
effects demonstrate that personal experience effects and sociotropic
considerations do not necessarily constitute rival pictures of opinion
formation.
Having said this, it is also clear that experienced distributive justice
has direct effects. Among people who make the same sociotropic
judgements, personal experiences still significantly affect orientations.
More precisely, between half and two thirds of the experience effect
remains even when sociotropic judgements are controlled for (see
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models 3 and 6). We interpret this as evidence that also a more direct
generalisation of personal experiences has taken place, a process that
is independent of sociotropic judgements.
In conclusion, the total effects of experienced distributive justice on
political trust seem to travel along both the suggested generalisation
paths. The data are consistent both with the idea of an indirect
generalisation process, in which experiences inform sociotropic
judgements, as well as with a direct generalisation process, in which
experience effects bypass sociotropic judgement. These findings fit well
with those of Chapter 6.
Experienced distributive justice in six institutions
Thus far, we have measured experienced distributive justice using a
single question about overall experiences with public service
institutions. There is something to be said for this method as it is an
economic way of getting at meaningful information. On the other
hand, it is not necessarily an easy question for respondents. For
instance, those who have been in contact with two or more public
services must construct a rather strange average of experiences or
otherwise strike a balance between different experiences with different
institutions. This introduces difficulties on top of the pure memory
problems that arise when survey respondents are asked to recall their
own past.
Respondents who do not care to go through that difficulty have at
least two options, both of which introduce additional measurement
error. First, people can choose the “have not been in contact”
category. We noted that 37 percent ticked this option when
confronted with the general distributive justice item, although virtually
all Swedes are in contact with one welfare state institution or the other
on a regular basis. Second, there is an increasing risk for the
“projection” processes that Chapter 5 warned of. Because the question
is relatively imprecise and general, it may bring to mind pre-existing
stereotypes about how the public sector treats people, rather than
recollections of actual experiences.
To partly come to terms with these difficulties I tried an alternative
method. I included in the questionnaire a question battery with this
head question: “If you look back on your contacts with the following
services in the last twelve months, to what extent do you feel you have
received the service and help you have the right to?” For each of six
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institutions, respondents were asked to answer along a five-point scale
between 1 (have not received the service and help I have the right to)
and 5 (have received the service and help I have the right to). Also,
people could indicate that they had not been in contact with the
service in question.
The advantage of this measurement strategy is that people will not
be forced to construct error-prone averages of different experiences of
different institutions. This should reduce the risk that they flee to the
“have not been in contact” category. Also, because the question refers
to concrete institutions it should stand a greater chance of calling
actual experiences to mind, rather than stereotypes and prejudice.
Table 8.4 Experienced distributive justice in personal contacts with
six welfare state institutions (percent)
EXPERIENCED DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
5
I have received
 the service and
help I have a right to
1
I have not received
the service and
help I have a right to
        Sum
      percent N
1 5
Health care 6 6 15 21 52 100 2836
Childcare 5 5 10 25 55 100 613
Social assistance 2 12 23 16 27 100 198
Public transportation 3 5 16 28 48 100 1977
Job agency 1 13 21 24 27 100 676
Housing allowance 1 10 17 13 45 100 375
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. The
question was formulated as follows: “If you look back on your contacts with
the following services in the last twelve months, to what extent do you feel
you have received the service and help you have the right to?” For each of the
six institutions, respondents answered using a five-point scale between 1 (have
not received the service and help I have the right to) and 5 (have received the
service and help I have the right to). Also, people could indicate that they had
not been in contact with the service in question. This group has been left out
of the table.
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But there are also drawbacks. Due to space limitations in the
questionnaire, it was impossible to include in the battery all
conceivable public service institutions. A selection had to be made.
The following six public institutions were included: health care,
kindergartens, social welfare, public transportation, job agencies, and
housing allowance.1 Table 8.4 shows the univariate distributions.
Experienced distributive justice varies substantially; between 55 and
27 percent of those who have been in contact think they have received
what they have a right to. I urge readers who find these differences
interesting to hold their horses. Such institutional differences will play
a key role in Chapter 10. At the moment, we are interested in the
effects on political orientations of these institution-specific measures of
experienced distributive justice. As a first step towards this end, Table
8.5 shows effects of single items among users of the institution in
question. Specifically, the first column displays bivariate correlation
coefficients. The second column contains unstandardised OLS
coefficients for the same bivariate relation. The third column controls
for the variables included in previous analyses in this chapter. The
fourth column shows how many respondents have had contact with a
particular institution and have a valid value on the dependent variable.
This time we do not have parallel sociotropic judgement measures
for the six institution-specific experience items. So here we do not have
the possibility to investigate whether experience effects are direct or
whether they are indirect, flowing through sociotropic perceptions of
what people in general usually experience.
The impact of experienced distributive justice on state intervention
orientation and left-right ideology is largely absent. While there are
small but significant effects on the state intervention index in one case
(public transportation), there is no significant impact whatsoever on
left-right self-placement.
                                                          
1 It was difficult to have an a priori opinion about in which institutions one
should look for politically influential experienced distributive justice. Still, a
selection of institutions had to be made, and I aimed for a trade-off between
three criteria. First, it was seen as desirable to choose services that greatly
affect the everyday lives of citizens in contact with the institution in question.
Second, I wanted services that are used by as many citizens as possible. Third,
I also wanted variation along the institutional empowerment variable at focus
in chapters 3 and 10. Naturally, based on these criteria one could have
included a number of other institutions.
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Table 8.5 The impact of experienced distributive justice in
contacts with six institutions on political orientations
Pearson’s
r
Bi-
variate
b
Multi-
variate
b
Number of
respondents
(bivariate)
Dependent variable:
State intervention orientation
Health care .04 .07** NS 2622
Kindergarten .03 NS NS 568
Social welfare .02 NS NS 180
Public transportation .03 .07*** .05* 1868
Job agency .01 NS NS 623
Housing allowance .03 NS NS 335
Dependent variable:
Left-right self-placement
Health care -.01 NS NS 2777
Kindergarten .02 NS NS 601
Social welfare .02 NS NS 190
Public transportation -.03 NS NS 1943
Job agency .04 NS NS 654
Housing allowance -.02 NS NS 360
Dependent variable:
Satisfaction with democracy
Health care .16 .13*** .10*** 2592
Kindergarten .12 .10*** .07* 567
Social welfare .21 .17*** .16** 175
Public transportation .17 .16*** .15*** 1819
Job agency .12 .09*** .07** 621
Housing allowance .12 .09** .NS 323
Dependent variable:
Trust in politicians
Health care .15 .13*** .08*** 2671
Kindergarten .06 .05 .07* 582
Social welfare .21 .16*** .14** 182
Public transportation .19 .18*** .17*** 1883
Job agency .15 .12*** .11*** 635
Housing allowance .16 .11*** .08* 336
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  NS=not significant, p-value>.10
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. The
analyses were done among people having been in contact with the institution
in question. For more information about the experienced distributive justice
measure, see Table 8.4, and related text. The multivariate effects are
controlled for the same variables that were included in Tables 8.2 and 8.3
respectively. The dependent variables were described in Chapters 6 and 7.
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As in the previous analysis, experienced distributive justice has
stronger effects on political trust variables, compared to the ideology
variables (the only exception being that experienced distributive justice
in housing allowance contacts does not significantly affect satisfaction
with democracy). Hence, once again the findings fit the assumption
that social justice concerns will be crowded out by self-interest as the
economic implications of political choices increase. Self-interest
becomes more influential, and social justice less so as “the stakes” go
up (Sears & Citrin 1982; Green 1988; Sears & Funk 1991).
The multivariate OLS estimates of the impact of experienced
distributive justice on satisfaction with democracy range from .07
(kindergartens and job agency) to .16 (social welfare). The exact same
pattern is found for trust in politicians. As these independent variables
have five categories one must only multiply the coefficients with four
to arrive at the impact of moving between extreme categories. For
instance, among users of public transportation, the maximum effect of
experienced distributive justice on satisfaction with democracy is .60
(.15 x 4). In other words, the predicted satisfaction with democracy
decreases by about half a standard deviation as we move from public
transportation users who have experienced distributive justice, to
public transportation users who have not. (Recall that the standard
deviations of the political trust factors equal 1.)
Are reports of experienced distributive justice nothing but self-
interest in disguise? Or in other words, does experienced distributive
justice correlate with welfare state interest so that people who
consume more welfare state services than others are also more inclined
to claim they have only received what is fair? Again, the answer seems
to be no.
I arrived at this conclusion by performing two separate tests. First, I
looked at correlations between the six experience items and the
general welfare state interest variables used in the chapter on self-
interest. For objective welfare state interest there were (weak) positive
correlations with only two of the six distributive justice items
(kindergarten, r=.08 and housing allowance, r=.07). Similarly, for
subjective welfare state interest, there were (very modest) tendencies
for greater interest to covary with greater experienced distributive
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justice for three of the six items (health care, r=.05, kindergartens,
r=.05, and public transportation, r=.08).2
In a second test of the self-interest-in-disguise hypothesis I used a set
of more focused measures of subjective self-interest. For each
institution, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which
they would benefit personally if more resources were given to the
specific institution in question.3 A five-point scale was used ranging
from 1 (would not at all be of benefit) to 5 (would be of great benefit).
Table 8.6 reports five regression analyses in which these subjective
interest measures are used as independent variables. The dependent
variable in each regression is the extent to which respondents in
contact with the respective institution have experienced distributive
justice.
Table 8.6 Effects of institution-specific subjective self-interest on
institution-specific experienced distributive justice
(unstandardised OLS estimates)
Pearson’s r b
Number of
respondents
Health care .05 .05** 2738
Public transportation .02 .01 1927
Kindergartens -.03 -.02 602
Social welfare -.04 -.02 189
Housing allowance .12 .12** 351
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. The
dependent variables  in the six OLS regression analyses are the six institution-
specific measures of experienced distributive justice that were reported in
Table 8.4. Each of these institution-specific items was regressed on an
independent variable measuring subjective perceptions of the extent to which
increased public spending on the institution in question would be of personal
benefit. These perceptions were measured on a five-point scale from 1 (would
not at all be of benefit) to 5 (would be of great benefit). See Nilsson (2000) for
the exact wording of individual items. Respondents who had not been in
contact with the institution in question are not included in the analyses.
                                                          
2 See Chapter 7 for more information about the variables tapping objective
and subjective welfare state interest respectively.
3
 Out of the six institutions for which experienced distributive justice was
measured, five were included in the subjective self-interest battery. Job
agencies were not included.
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Again, we discover weak or non-existent links between the extent to
which one gains from welfare state institutions and experienced
distributive justice. For only two out of five institutions is experienced
distributive justice significantly affected by the extent to which one
perceives an invested self-interest in that institution (this time as
measured by perceptions of how much one would gain from increased
public spending on the particular service). These effects, however, are
a matter of weak tendency at best.4
Combining institution-specific experiences into one index
The results in Table 8.5 offered a detailed insight into effects of
institution-specific distributive justice measures on political
orientations. However, a limitation was that analyses were performed
only among citizens who had been in contact with the institution in
question. After all, the hypotheses are concerned with the overall
impact of experienced distributive justice among the whole
population. Therefore, we now bring together all the information
contained in the items into a summary measure of experienced
distributive justice in these six institutions. This measure will then be
related to the dependent variables.
The summary index of experienced distributive justice was
constructed by adding the six five-point scales into a single additive
index. When doing this one needs to decide how to treat the “have not
been in contact” category for each of the items. In the analysis that
follows I treated non-contacts as “neutral experiences.” That is, I gave
such responses the value 3.  Each of the six institution-specific items
thus varies between 1 (have not received the service and help I have
the right to) and 5 (have received the service and help I have the right
to). The mid-point category contains people who either reported
neutral experiences, or had not been in contact at all.5 The resulting
                                                          
4 Note that the analyses reported in table 8.5 are performed only among users
of the institution in question, which reduces the variation in the independent
interest perception variables somewhat. On average, a dichotomy indicating
whether one uses a service or not explains 14 percent of the variation in the
extent to which one perceives that increased spending would be of personal
benefit. (Interestingly, this observation is consistent with the argument made
in chapter 4 that memory-based opinion formation is more influential when it
comes to concrete and specific opinions.)
5
 There are no theoretical reasons to equate non-contact with neutral
experience. Hence, on a conceptual level, they should be kept apart. However,
the chosen procedure is justified by analyses showing that, in terms of the
political orientations of interest here (satisfaction with democracy and trust in
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index varies between 6 and 30 (mean=19.8, standard deviation=2.2).
A value of six means the respondent has been in contact with all six
institutions and reports having experienced maximum distributive
injustice in all six cases. A value of 30 means the respondent has been
in contact with all six institutions and reports having experienced
maximum distributive justice for all of them.
The described index of experienced distributive justice was included
as a dependent variable in six regression analyses reported in Table
8.7. The dependent variables were satisfaction with democracy and
trust in politicians. State intervention orientation and left-right self-
placement are left out as the six institution-specific items on which the
index is based had virtually no effects on ideology.
The results fit the previous findings. Experienced distributive justice
has both statistically and substantially significant effects on political
support variables. Recalling that both dependent variables have
standard deviations of 1, it is interesting that the maximum effect of
the experienced distributive justice index is 1.38 for both dependent
variables (.06 x 23 category leaps). This is the effect of moving from
someone experiencing maximum injustice in contacts with all six
institutions to a person experiencing maximum justice with all six
institutions. Of course, it is unusual to find people that extreme. In
fact, there are only seven of them in the data set. A more interesting
comparison might be that between the 5th and 95th percentiles
respectively; that is between the values 16 and 24. Such an eight-step
move along the independent variable changes both dependent
variables by .48 (.06 x 8) Looking at the table, one sees that this total
effect is on par with those of some other variables emphasised by the
political support literature, such as perception of the economy,
incumbent preference, or life satisfaction.
                                                                                                                          
politicians), those reporting “no contact” tend to be very similar to those who
tick the mid-points along the experienced distributive justice scales. More
specifically, this was checked by splitting each five-point item into five dummy
variables using “have not been in contact” as the reference category. The
measures of satisfaction with democracy and trust in politicians were then
regressed on the five dummy variables together with the controls used
throughout this chapter. In most cases, the dummy representing the mid-point
in terms of experienced distributive justice had an insignificant or modest
regression coefficient. In summary, although there are no theoretical reasons
to equate non-contact with neutral experience, little empirical information is
actually lost by doing so when it comes to effects on the political orientations
examined here.
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Table 8.7 The impact of experienced distributive justice in contacts
with six public agencies on satisfaction with democracy
and trust in politicians (unstandardised OLS estimates)
Dependent variable:
SATISFACTION WITH
DEMOCRACY
(higher value =
more satisfaction)
Dependent variable:
TRUST IN
POLITICIANS
(higher value  =
more trust)
Model 1:
Experienced
distributive
justice
Model 2:
Model 1
+ control
variables
Model 3:
Experienced
distributive
justice
Model 4:
Model 3
+ control
variables
Experienced distributive justice index (6 – 30) .08*** .06*** .08*** .06***
Objective welfare state interest (0 – 10) _ .01 _ .01
Perception of Swedish economy (1 – 3) _ -.19*** _ -.19***
Preference for incumbent party _ .35*** _ .41***
No party preference _ -.13** _ -.18***
Age in  years (15 – 80) _ -.005*** _ .00
Education (1 – 3) _ .02 _ .04*
Life satisfaction (1 – 4) _ .18*** _ .16***
Subjective class affiliation (1 = middle class) _ .07 _ .07
Constant -1.56*** -.58*** -1.60*** -.91***
Adjusted R-squared .03 .10 .03 .11
Number of respondents 2604 2604 2686 2686
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. See main
text for information about the experienced distributive justice index. For
information about the objective welfare state interest variable, see Table 7.1
and related text. For more information about other independent variables, see
Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 7.6. The dependent variables were described in Chapter 6.
As in other analyses in this chapter, the explanatory variables only
manage to account for 10 to 11 percent of the variation in satisfaction
with democracy and trust in politicians. Experienced distributive
justice explains 3 percent in the bivariate analysis. While this may
sound low it should be kept in mind that the institution-specific
experience index used here is based on only six welfare state
institutions. It is likely that the strength of the effect would have gone
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up if we had institution-specific experienced distributive justice
measures for more welfare state services.
Still, some readers might not be satisfied with the explanatory
power of experienced distributive justice. However, previous research
clearly indicates that variation in political trust is a multi-faceted
phenomenon that cannot be entirely explained by one single
theoretical perspective. Very different types of variables are usually
needed to reach reasonable explanatory power in these types of
analyses (Norris 1999; Holmberg 1999). Therefore, when assessing
the explanatory success of experienced distributive justice, the most
relevant yardstick appears to be the impact of variables representing
other theoretical perspectives, rather than the absolute level in the
proportion of explained variance. Experienced distributive justice does
rather well, though not necessarily much better, in comparison with
variables representing other theoretical perspectives that are taken
seriously in research on political trust.
Why weak effects on ideology?
A central finding in this chapter is that experienced distributive justice
has sizeable effects on political trust, but very weak and rare effects on
political ideology. We have provided the explanation that since issues
related to redistribution and equality lie at the heart of the left-right
conflict, such ideological positions are more related to potentially large
self-interest stakes. Previous research contends that larger and more
visible stakes mean that self-interest considerations tend to occupy
more space in citizens’ political thinking (Green 1988; Sears & Funk
1991). From this point of view, the explanation for the weaker impact
of experienced distributive justice on ideology is that social justice
concerns are “crowded out” by self-interest because stakes are high.
But there is an alternative interpretation. It starts with the
observation that it is not self-evident what ideological conclusions are
drawn from experienced distributive justice. While social
psychological findings indicate that injustice generally produces
weaker support for common institutions (Tyler et al. 1997), exactly
the opposite is logically possible. It has been suggested that, in the
welfare state context, deficiencies such as distributive injustice may
actually strengthen willingness to accept public spending and state
intervention in order to come to terms with the problems (see Kaase &
Newton 1995; Huseby 1995; Pettersen 1995; Svallfors 2001;
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Johansson, Nilsson & Strömberg 2001). Moreover, this reverse effect
could be especially common among people who already display a
good amount of support. Among such people, the natural reaction to
distributive injustice may be an even greater willingness to protect and
support welfare state arrangements. Victims of injustice may draw the
conclusion that such arrangements have in fact too few resources and
should receive more – not less – support in the future. This alternative
hypothesis is a nice example of the possibility that different people
actively “construct” very different political meanings from very similar
experiences.6
The alternative hypothesis poses a threat to the conclusion that
experienced distributive injustice has weak negative effects on support
for leftist ideology. The crux is not just that the effect could
theoretically have turned out to run in the opposite direction. Rather,
the problem is that the impact could have a different direction
depending on what ideological leanings a person had before
experiences occurred. People who already subscribed to an anti-
welfare state ideology could react to personal distributive injustice by
becoming even more negative, whereas those who already supported it
draw the conclusion that welfare state arrangements are in trouble and
need even more support. If this is what is going on, a weak overall
effect could hide a great impact that has different signs in different
sub-groups.
As discussed in Chapter 5, we are not that well equipped to
empirically assess “constructionist” predictions. The reason is that we
use static, cross-sectional survey data, which are collected at a single
point in time. In order to assess the alternative hypothesis, we would
need panel data. One would want to measure, not only respondents’
ideological orientations after experiences have occurred, but also
orientations before the experience. Such “t-1” variables would be
included as control variables and interaction variables, so as to check
whether the weak overall coefficients mask an impact that has
different signs depending on political orientations at t-1.
We will have to wait for definitive longitudinal studies of this
particular question. As it stands, however, the current evidence
arguably provides more support for the hypothesis that poor
distributive justice reduces ideological support, as well as the
hypothesis that these effects are weaker than those on political trust.
                                                          
6 See further the discussion in Chapter 5.
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On the occasions when we have found an effect on ideology, the
results have indeed indicated negative effects of negative experiences
on general ideological support. For instance, using the overall measure
of experienced distributive justice, Table 8.2 showed a weak tendency
for negative experiences to produce effects in a rightist direction. The
same goes for effects of the institution-specific measures related to
health care and job agencies on state intervention orientations (Table
8.5). On no occasion did we find negative experiences to produce
overall coefficients indicating increased support for leftist ideology.
These findings are a problem for the hypothesis that negative
experiences are constructed as arguments for increased ideological
support.
Of course, one could object that the coefficients for the entire
sample do not tell us what we want to know. Rather, according to the
“constructionist” hypothesis, it is mainly people who already
displayed considerable doses of leftist support before experiences
occurred that should react to distributive injustice by developing even
more support. Again, it is difficult to respond in a definitive way to
this, as we do not have the right sort of longitudinal data.
But a couple of preliminary points can be made. First, if it were true
that people who already support state intervention react to negative
experiences by further increasing their support, one would have
expected this process to at least occasionally produce overall
coefficients with the right sign, especially as welfare state policies are
typically popular among a majority of Swedes (Svallfors 1996, 1999).
Therefore, even if it were true that different subgroups react
differently, one would have expected the effect of this type of
“construction” to at least occasionally be the dominant one,
producing overall coefficients indicating that distributive injustice
strengthens support. Moreover, in a “poor man’s” attempt to simulate
the desired t-1 interactions, I performed split-sample versions of the
regression analyses in Tables 8.2 and 8.5. These analyses compared
results for the whole sample with those among the extreme quartiles
along the state intervention variable, assuming that these two groups
were different in terms of ideology also before experiences occurred.
Admittedly, this is a crude test. Nevertheless, for what it is worth, the
results did not reveal any great differences in the direction of the
effects on political ideology among pro- and anti state intervention
respondents respectively. Effects were typically insignificant in both
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groups for most institutions. Having said this, two interesting
exceptions may be noted: for public transportation and job agencies,
experienced injustice did indeed push people slightly towards the left
on the self-placement scale. However, this effect was not present for
state intervention orientations, or for any other of the measured
institutions. Also, the impact was still very weak, for instance
considerably weaker than that of objective self-interest. These results,
then, are still consistent with the interpretation that self-interest
dominates when stakes are high.
Finally, it is crucial to remember that the above discussion is
concerned with general ideological orientations (“a large public sector
is a good thing”), not concrete opinions about specific services and
institutions (such as “more resources to kindergartens”). It would
appear that those suggesting that poor distributive justice increases
welfare state support are usually talking about rather short-term and
specific opinions, rather than general ideological orientations. In fact,
it is perfectly possible that poor distributive justice simultaneously
produces both increased and decreased welfare state support, albeit at
different levels of abstraction. For example, think of someone having a
highly negative health care experience (involving long waiting times
and, after a quick examination, being sent home with painkillers).
This negative experience may very well simultaneously result in both
demands for increased short-term spending on public health care, as
well an increased general scepticism towards the public sector, state
intervention, “big government,” and the like.
This is indeed the empirical picture that emerges if we add the
findings presented here with those of previous studies. Whereas we
have found that experienced distributive injustice has (very weak)
negative effects on support for leftist ideology, we know from previous
research that public service dissatisfaction indeed tends to breed
demands for more spending on those concrete services that are targets
for dissatisfaction (Johansson, Nilsson & Strömberg 2001:148). This
pattern was further corroborated when I investigated the effects of the
institution-specific measures of distributive justice on whether one
prefers increased spending on the same institutions. Poor experienced
distributive justice with a welfare state institution seems to make
people more willing to give public resourses to that particular
institution. However, to the extent that more general ideological
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orientations are at all affected, the impact on support seems to be
negative.
Conclusions
Experienced distributive justice affects political orientations. However,
while on occasion we have seen significant effects on support for state
intervention and left-right self-placement, the effects appear to operate
mainly on political trust. Social justice concerns, it seems, are more
important when self-interest stakes involved in political choices
decrease.
Moreover, the extent to which citizens experience distributive
justice is not the same empirical thing as the extent to which welfare
state institutions satisfy citizens’ economic self-interest. Rather, in
addition to being conceptually distinct, self-interest and experienced
distributive justice constitute two quite independent empirical
dimensions of personal welfare state experiences. We have seen that
the empirical link between the two is generally weak and that
distributive justice effects on attitudes are clearly present also when
controlling for welfare state interests. That is, among citizens having
roughly the same self-interest invested in the welfare state, experienced
distributive justice still varies greatly, a variation that has respectable
effects on political trust. These findings do not fit with the idea found
in public choice theory that personal justice judgements are merely
socially and politically correct rationalisations of self-interest. Instead,
the findings are more in line with the distributive justice perspective,
from which people are believed to make intellectually honest
comparisons between a normative welfare state expectation and actual
experiences. In short, experienced distributive justice is not self-interest
in disguise.
Much previous opinion research contends that citizens in modern
developed democracies can be described as “sociotropic animals.”
When forming political attitudes, such animals consider over-all
sociotropic information about collective rather than personal
experiences. At first glance one might think that effects of experienced
distributive justice are incompatible with the notion of “sociotropic
animals.” But this is not true. Sociotropic judgements of collective
distributive justice also have a respectable impact on political trust. In
addition, corroborating findings from Chapter 6, quite a lot of the
total impact of experienced distributive justice is in fact channelled via
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sociotropic judgements, though there is also evidence of a more direct
generalisation mechanism. In summary, welfare state experiences and
sociotropic welfare state judgements “blend together” much more
than has proven to be the case in studies of economic perceptions and
political preferences (see Mutz 1998). Because simple quantifiable
information about collective welfare state experiences is hard to come
by, and because there is direct political responsibility for what people
experience in welfare state contacts, sociotropic welfare state
judgements are more experience-driven than sociotropic economic
judgements.
The self-interest perspective implicitly assumes that welfare state
experiences always have positive effects on system support. Given that
citizens are driven by short-term, economic self-interest, and given that
services make at least some minimal contribution to that self-interest,
it follows that yet another welfare state experience will always be
conducive to greater system support.
Of course, things look different from the social justice perspective.
Whether experiences have positive attitude effects hinges on whether
experiences match normative expectations concerning various forms of
social justice. If experiences fall short of expectations, extensive
welfare state usage will be detrimental to system support. Hence,
citizens are not “in the grips of the welfare state” in the sense that they
can only respond to welfare state experiences by developing more
positive attitudes towards the system they are experiencing.
This chapter provides a certain dose of empirical support for these
theoretical ideas in the context of political trust orientations. Whether
heavy consumers of welfare state services are satisfied with democracy
and trust politicians depends, not only on self-interest but also on
whether they see their personal outcome as just. The same goes for
citizens who get little or nothing from the welfare state.
Chapter 9
Voice

very winter morning during the past few years I have taken the
tram to the university in downtown Göteborg. It is usually a dull
trip, offering no excitement and no surprises. But one day, while on
my way to continuing this chapter, I caught sight of a fascinating
commercial sign in the tram:
THE GÖTEBORG JOB AGENCY
NOW COMING CLOSER TO YOU!
EASIER TO GET SERVICE!
EVERYTHING IN ONE PLACE!
Below the large headlines there was information in small print as to
how accessible and user-friendly public job agencies would now be.
Interestingly, there was no information about the actual services that
job agencies might offer, such as job opportunities.
Now recall the Chicago woman from Chapter 2. As the reader
might remember, she was charged with a minor traffic offence and the
court decided losing a day’s work was a cruel enough penalty for the
insignificant offence. The woman thus escaped getting fined altogether,
which must be seen as a personal victory. Yet, she was very angry and
made unflattering remarks about the judge. The reason was that,
although she escaped the fine, court procedures did not allow her the
possibility to show some photographs that relieved her from suspicion
(Lind & Tyler 1988).
Neither the theories of self-interest tested in Chapter 7, nor those of
distributive justice investigated in Chapter 8, make these episodes
understandable. Both the Chicago woman and Gothenburgers in
contact with job agencies appear to care about more than just the
results, outcomes and decisions they eventually receive from public
institutions. More exactly, both stories highlight procedural aspects of
E
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the processes generating outcomes and results. Procedural aspects of
experiences are not directly related to the outcomes or end results of
that interaction. For instance, the Göteborg job agency believes that
citizens care about the agency being “close,” and that everything is “in
one place,” and not just about what the agency delivers once citizens
get there. Similarly, the Chicago woman was primarily interested in
having the opportunity to communicate her personal view to the jury,
rather than in not being punished.
In the beginning of Chapter 8, I remarked that the social justice
perspectives are more subtle than theories of self-interest. The reason is
that the former links personal outcomes and gains from the welfare
state with a normatively charged expectation of what the individual
has a right to in a given situation. The procedural justice perspective
takes us yet another step away from pure self-interest effects. Unlike
the chapters on self-interest and distributive justice, we are no longer
concerned with the material outcomes and end results people get from
institutions. Rather, we now bring into focus various procedural
aspects of the interaction process between citizen and institutions.
Chapter 2 discussed several procedural aspects that have been
highlighted in previous research (see Tyler 1997:Chapter 4). One
particular procedural aspect will be analysed here: the extent to which
citizens have the opportunity to make their voices heard and exercise
influence in the process. Such procedural values have increasingly been
at the forefront of debates on the future of the welfare state (see
Petersson, Westholm & Blomberg 1989; Schneider & Ingram 1997;
Petersson et al. 1998; Lindbom 1998; Goul Andersen, Torpe &
Andersen 2000; Jarl 2001). It is assumed that citizens do not just want
satisfactory service outcomes from their welfare state experiences.
People also want to have their opinions and views recorded in the
process leading up to outcomes, and they want to affect how these
public institutions operate. Citizens have an independent desire to
“have a say,” and “to make a difference.”
The chapter proceeds in several steps. First, I elaborate the
independent variable – experienced voice opportunities. I then present
the first of three different indicators of the independent variable, and
bring up some measurement related difficulties. Third, we analyse
whether experienced voice opportunities are in fact nothing but “self-
interest in disguise,” and, fourth, the extent to which they correlate
with experienced distributive justice. Fifth, we ask ourselves whether
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there is an interaction effect between experienced voice opportunities
and service satisfaction. The next three sections then investigate the
relationship between the three indicators of experienced voice and
political orientations. The concluding section summarises the findings
and establishes an intellectual link to Chapter 10.
Conceptual remarks and hypotheses
Let me put experienced voice opportunities in their conceptual context.
Hirschman (1970) made a generally useful distinction between two
different methods of signalling discontent, which are at the disposal to
those dissatisfied with what an organisation does for them: exit and
voice.1 First, people may turn their backs on the organisation to either
the benefit of a comparable service or, at times, to no service at all
(exit). Alternatively, individuals may stay with the organisation and
communicate their complaints with the aim that things change for the
better (voice). Generally speaking, it is voice opportunities – as
perceived by citizens – that constitute the independent variable in this
chapter.
Our independent variable can be specified further using the concept
of political efficacy. This concept has been developed in research on
voting behaviour and political participation (see Campbell, Gurin &
Miller 1954; Almond & Verba 1963), and may be defined as “the
feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an
impact on the political process [...] It is the feeling that political and
social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part
in bringing about this change” (Campbell, Gurin & Miller 1954:187).
Moreover, it is customary to distinguish between internal and
external efficacy.2 Internal efficacy has to do with the citizen’s personal
political confidence and competence. The question is: to what extent
do individuals think that they themselves have the knowledge, the
resources, and the strength to be able to make a difference. External
efficacy refers to whether people feel that a political institution is
interested in, and responsive to, one’s opinions. (“If I tried to influence
                                                          
1 For accessible introductions to, and some critical comments on,
Hirschman’s reasoning, see Möller (1996:Chapter 9) and Goul Andersen,
Torpe & Andersen (2000:Chapters 1 and 4).
2 See the literature cited in Niemi, Craig & Mattei (1991).
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this institution, would it consider my views and weigh them into its
decisions?”) Here, we are interested in external efficacy.
Finally, it is useful to distinguish between political efficacy at
different political levels. For example, people may have great political
efficacy at, say, the local government level, whereas the regional or
national political systems might be perceived as harder to influence
(Andersen 2000). Also, the situation can be different depending on
whether we are talking about elected politicians and parliaments, high
ranking civil servants, or street-level bureaucrats with which citizens
have face-to face contact.
In sum, we are interested in external efficacy in personal contacts
with public services. To what extent do people perceive that the
welfare state institutions and services they have been in contact with
have offered possibilities to affect institutions and services? I will refer
to this independent variable as  “experienced voice opportunities.”
The hypotheses to be tested is that greater experienced voice
opportunities create more support for the welfare state, for leftist
ideology, more satisfaction with democracy, and greater trust in
politicians. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the underlying assumption
is that people put great value on the voice aspect of procedural justice
in their personal welfare state experiences. If this is true, people who
experience poor voice opportunities may use such experiences as
general arguments against the leftist idea of a large welfare state
(“bureaucracies are unresponsive and with little interest in the views
and needs of ordinary people.”) And since the responsibility for such
matters ultimately resides with elected politicians, dissatisfaction with
experienced voice opportunities may also foster negative views on how
democracy and its policies function in practice.
As in the chapter on distributive justice, the expectation is that
procedural justice has greater effects on political trust variables than
on ideological left-right variables. More specifically, self-interest
should matter more when political choices have greater and more
visible implications for one’s personal, economic, short-term situation
(Sears & Citrin 1982; Green 1988; Sears & Funk 1991). As such
“stakes” increase, economic self-interest becomes more influential and
experienced distributive and procedural justice less so. Of course, we
believe that the choice between, for example, trusting politicians or not
has small implications for short-term economic self-interest. Therefore,
experienced justice should have its greatest effects on such variables. In
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contrast, because ideological choices between left and right, or
between little state intervention or a lot of state intervention, have
potentially substantial implications for one’s material situation, self-
interest will matter more, and social justice less, for such variables.
Just like theories of distributive justice, the procedural justice
perspective acknowledges the possibility that welfare state experiences
can have both positive and negative effects on support for the welfare
state and for democratic institutions and actors. This is a crucial
difference compared to the self-interest perspective, which builds on
the parsimonious assumption that public service delivery always has
positive effects on these variables: Given that citizens are driven by
short-term, economic self-interest when evaluating the welfare state
and the political system, and given that welfare state services make at
least some minimal contribution to that self-interest, welfare state
experiences will always be conducive to support. The electorate is “in
the grips of the welfare state” (Zetterberg 1985) as they must always
react to welfare state contacts by increasing their support for the
system and the institutions providing the service. The procedural
justice perspective continues to challenge this notion by claiming that
whether experiences will have positive effects on support depends on
whether experiences meet procedural expectations.
Overall judgements of experienced voice opportunities
Experienced voice opportunities will be tapped in three ways. A first
strategy involves asking about people’s overall experience with public
services. Second, we will analyse five institution-specific indicators of
experienced voice. Third, we look at effects of failure and success in
actual attempts to influence public service institutions. The overall
measures are analysed in the following five sections, while the
institution-specific items, and the “actual attempts” measure, show up
later in the chapter.
Two aspects of overall experienced voice opportunities will be
analysed. First, recent debates on collective user influence highlight
what we can call formal voice opportunities. Here, it is seen as
important that people have real power to affect institutions. A radical
and increasingly popular solution is that users of an institution (a
school, a day care center, or a home for elderly) are given the
opportunity to elect representatives to a user board. This board is
given real decision-making power, or sometimes an advisory function,
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in local matters (see Sørensen 1997; Goul Andersen, Torpe &
Andersen 2000; Jarl 2001). Such institutional arrangements have been
widely implemented in Denmark and are under way in for instance the
Swedish school system. These changes are interesting to us as they
highlight a direct and “real” aspect of voice opportunities: that citizens
feel that they – collectively or individually – can have a real impact on
a public service institution in question. Empirically, we will measure
such formal voice opportunities by tapping citizens’ perceptions of
their possibilities to actually affect how experienced welfare state
institutions are run.
Second, we analyse a more informal voice aspect. The idea is that
experiences involving possibilities to express opinions and feelings to a
public employee stand a greater chance of producing system
legitimacy, even if these voice opportunities are not obviously, visibly,
or directly linked to actual decisions and changes. Consistent with this
idea, both researchers and political actors emphasise the importance of
institutions being interested in recording citizens’ views in the
interaction process, regardless of citizens’ actual power to influence
real decisions. Writing in the Danish context, Goul Andersen
(2000:47)3 notes that “One of the most important formal changes in
the 1990s has been the introduction of user boards [...] But parallel to
formal user influence, politicians have encouraged citizens and public
employees to also informally put users and their preferences at focus.”4
The distinction between formal and informal voice has interesting
parallels in American research on procedural justice and voice in the
legal system. A basic finding is that informal voice opportunities are as
important as formal opportunities to have a real impact on decisions.
For instance Lind, Kanfer and Early (1990) found that giving people
the opportunity to present evidence after relevant decisions had been
made – thus rendering voice opportunities meaningless from an
                                                          
3 My translation from the original Danish text.
4 It should be pointed out that the distinction between informal and formal
voice opportunities is by no means equivalent to the distinction between
collective resources for user influence (such as user boards), and voice
opportunities in the strictly personal experiences with services that are at focus
in this study. For instance, in many collective user influence settings, users
have mainly an advisory function, thus making it possible that participants
perceive good possibilities to communicate opinions and views (informal
voice), whereas they may very well think that the opportunities to actually
affect services are poor.
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instrumental point of view – nevertheless enhanced their judgements of
procedural justice. Tyler and his collegues (1997:90) summarise the
significance of informal voice opportunities: “people value the
opportunity to speak even when they think they are having little or no
influence on the decision-maker. People’s desire to have a voice [...] is
not simply instrumental. They also value the opportunities to speak for
other reasons.”
Both aspects of voice opportunities were measured in the question
battery with overall experience items in the 1999 Western Sweden
SOM survey.5 The item “I have had the possibility to affect how
services are run” tapped the more formal and instrumental aspect of
voice, whereas “employees have been helpful and listened to what I
had to say” measured the informal aspect. For both items, the response
alternatives were “fits very well,” “fits rather well,” “fits rather
poorly,” “fits very poorly,” and “have not been in contact.”
Table 9.1 Experienced voice opportunities in contacts with public
institutions (percent)
Employees were
helpful
and listened to me
I had opportunities
to affect
 how services are run
fits very well 10   6
fits rather well 36   2
fits rather poorly 12 15
fits very poorly   4 26
have not been in contact         38 51
Sum percent
Number of respondents
100
3469
100
3435
Comment: The data come from a question battery with the following head question: “If
you look back on your own personal contacts with various public authorities and
services during the last twelve months, to what extent do the following statements fit
with your own experience?”  The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM survey.
Table 9.1 tells us that informal voice opportunities are judged more
favourably than the formal ones. While 46 percent reacted positively
to the “employees listened” item, only 8 percent did so with respect to
                                                          
5 See chapter 8 for more details on this question battery.
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“affect services.”6 This is perhaps understandable as the more direct
means to influence schools, kindergartens, and elder care institutions,
are only in the beginning of their development. Also, it is probably
easier for employees to convey the feeling that someone records
opinions, rather than the feeling that those opinions have real effects
on actual decisions or bring about change in how institutions operate.
As noted in Chapter 8, many respondents placed themselves in the
“have not been in contact” category. Again, this does not mean that
many Swedes do not have personal public service contacts during a
year. Rather, “have not been in contact” appears to function as a
residual category for people who do not know, or remember neither
positive nor negative experiences. It seems reasonable to assume that
most of these people have actually had relatively neutral experiences
that did not stick out from the ordinary. Consequently, just like in
chapter 8, the no contact category will be treated as a middle category
(coded 0). The other categories will be coded like this: fits very well
(+2), fits rather well (+1), fits rather poorly (-1), and fits very poorly (-
2).7
Let us pause for a minute and consider what we want these
variables to measure. We are interested in experienced voice
opportunities. That is, we hope to register how people actually felt
while at the social welfare office, while in the hospital, when calling
the children’s schoolteacher, and so forth. However, there is a risk that
the questions do not make people remember and report actual
experiences, but instead evaluate aspects of political efficacy that are
less relevant for us. These aspects include personal administrative and
bureaucratic capabilities and general political self-confidence. People
might thus take the questions to mean, not “did you experience voice
opportunities?”, but rather “generally, can you make your voice
heard?” If so, there will be a strong correlation between our voice
measures and other measures of political efficacy, and it becomes
                                                          
6 The correlation between the two experienced voice items was rather low
(Pearson’s r = .13).
7 As in chapter 8, this coding is justified by analyses showing that virtually
nothing is gained in terms of model fit by relaxing this particular type of
linearity constraint on the effects on the dependent variables. In these
analyses, I compared models using the independent variables described in the
text, with models that do not make any assumptions whatsoever about the
form of effects (that is, models that split the five-category voice items into four
dummy variables each).
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difficult to argue that we are measuring actual experiences of voice
opportunities.
Beyond these wording related difficulties, there are causal reasons
for why experienced voice and internal efficacy could correlate. Even if
everybody understands the meaning of the questions, it is still likely
that those high in competence and confidence truly experience greater
voice opportunities. Such persons should exercise greater influence, as
they are better at making complaints and otherwise communicating
their views to employees.
How serious are these problems? The data offer some opportunities
to investigate the relation between indicators of experienced voice and
political efficacy-related variables. First, education is known to
strongly affect people’s subjective competence and confidence in
contacts with public services (see Petersson, Westholm & Blomberg
1989:190-94). People with higher education are much more likely to
feel they can make their voice heard and be influential than those with
low education.8 However, the correlation between education and the
experienced voice measures was low (education / affect services = .11;
education / employees listened = .05). Furthermore, the survey
included a question battery asking people about their possibilities to
affect political decisions at different government levels.9 Responses
regarding two of these levels – Sweden and the municipality – were
combined into an additive index. The correlation between this general
political efficacy index and experienced voice was not exceedingly high
(political efficacy / “affect services” = .12; political efficacy / employees
listened = .15). The same goes for a measure of general “political
sophistication” (sophistication / affect services = -.12; sophistication /
employees listened = .09).10
                                                          
8 For instance, Petersson, Westholm & Blomberg (1989:191) report a
correlation of .31 between education and a measure of subjective
“administrative competence.”
9 Admittedly, this formulation blurs the distinction between internal and
external efficacy.
10 The political efficacy scale is an additive index (Cronbach’s alpha=.83)
summating responses to two questions about the possibilities of affecting
political decisions in Sweden and in the municipality, respectively.
Respondents indicated whether they perceived very good (coded 1), rather
good (2), neither good nor bad (3), rather bad (4) or very bad opportunities
(5), or whether they did not know (3). The index was scored so that it varies
between 1 and 9, higher values=higher efficacy. Cronbach’s alpha was .82. An
alternative index where don’t know answers were coded as missing did not
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None of these correlations between experienced voice opportunities
and efficacy related measures are particularly high, and one even has
the wrong sign. Hence, the experienced voice measures appear to
capture a variation that is reasonably independent from other efficacy-
related variables. Of course, whether this variation is meaningful in the
sense that it impacts on political orientations remains to be seen. And
naturally, given the arguments and results presented above, it will be
important to investigate such effects controlling for the other efficacy-
related factors. We are interested in whether experienced voice
opportunities affect orientations among citizens at the same levels of
other efficacy variables.
Such controls, however, introduce one further curiosity. Internal
political efficacy can probably not be regarded as entirely exogenous in
relation to experienced voice. In fact, variables such as administrative
competence and bureaucratic self-confidence could be one of the
mechanisms through which experienced voice affects political
orientations. It is then experiences of poor voice that have a negative
impact on internal political efficacy, rather than the other way around.
In turn, reduced internal efficacy might have a negative effect on
variables such as satisfaction with democracy and trust in politicians.
Consequently, controlling experienced voice effects for internal
efficacy could make estimates of the former too conservative. The
reason is that we then hold constant one of the mechanisms that could
channel the effect of experienced voice. Portions of the bivariate effects
removed by efficacy controls may thus nevertheless still be consistent
with the idea that experienced voice has a causal impact on
orientations. Therefore, to the extent that we still find voice effects
under control for variables such as education, engagement, and
political efficacy, one would conclude that the hypotheses have passed
rather tough tests.
                                                                                                                          
yield different conclusions about effects on political orientations. The political
sophistication variable (mean=0, standard deviation=1) was generated by
factor analysing three variables: (1) an additive political interest index based
on three items tapping interest in national, regional, and local politics
respectively, (2) a measure of the extent to which the respondent discusses
politics, (3) a variable counting the number of don’t know answers across 11
political attitude items (Q24, Q25, Q26a, Q26b, Q26d, Q41a, Q41b, Q41c,
Q41d, Q44, and Q45; see Nilsson 2000). The factor analysis yielded a strong
unidimensional solution. See Luskin (1987) for an introduction to the concept
of political sophistication.
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Self-interest in disguise?
A basic assumption in the social justice perspective is that social justice
judgements can be distinguished from personal outcomes and self-
interests (see Lind & Tyler 1988:Chapter 1). Judgements of
distributive and procedural aspects of experiences are not merely
rationalisations of the extent to which one has benefited personally.
Rather, they constitute independent dimensions of judgement, which
are distinct from outcomes and self-interest in the process of attitude
formation.
These arguments have empirical implications. More exactly, even
among people who do not differ in terms of self-interest, experienced
voice opportunities should (1) vary substantially, and (2) affect socio-
political attitudes and behaviour. Expressed differently, if experienced
voice is not merely self-interest in disguise, there should not be an
exceedingly strong correlation between measures of self-interest and
measures of experienced voice. Also, to the extent that there is a
correlation, we still expect experienced voice to impact on orientations
when self-interest variables are controlled.
The first implication is supported by the data. The correlations
between the overall measures of experienced voice opportunities and
the previously used welfare state interest variable were all very weak.11
Overall perceptions of voice opportunities do not seem to be self-
interest in disguise. To find out if the second implication holds, I will
later control experienced voice effects for the self-interest measures.
Different dimensions of experienced justice?
Experienced distributive justice and experienced procedural justice are
also potentially related to each other. Such a correlation could be the
result of a reciprocal causal process in which people blur the academic
distinction between distributive and procedural justice. In fact, when it
comes to services like child care, elder care, and public education,
service outcomes are delivered during an extended period of time. At
                                                          
11 There is a very slight tendency (r = .06) for people receiving service from
many institutions to respond more positively to “employees listened.” On the
other hand, the pattern was the opposite, though still weak, for “affect
services” (r = -.09). The same unexpected negative relation was found for
subjective self-interest and “employees listened” (r = -.08). Finally, there was
no statistically significant correlation between subjective self-interest and
“affect services.”
Voice248
the same time, there is an interaction process going on between the
citizen and the public institution.
When procedures and outcomes are not temporally distinct,
judgements of the two aspects might be partly intertwined. For
instance, people might infer judgements of outcomes from judgements
of procedures. In particular, fair procedures might have a legitimising
effect on judgements of outcomes. It is easier to look favourably at
what one gets if one is also treated fairly in the process. Likewise,
those who are unsure of whether it was possible to “affect services,” or
whether “employees listened,” might still have an idea of whether the
outcome seemed fair, and they might reason, “if the result is fair, then
the procedures probably were too.”
Such processes are conducive to a pattern where those reporting
positive experienced distributive justice will also report positive
experienced voice opportunities. And this pattern is exactly what we
find. However, judgements about the more instrumental/formal aspect
of voice opportunities are more independent from experienced
distributive justice than judgements of informal voice: While there is a
strong correlation between “received the service and help I have a right
to” and “employees listened” (.60), there is a much weaker one
between distributive justice and “affect services” (.20).12
These correlations mean that we will want to control the effects of
experienced voice opportunities for distributive justice judgements.
The crucial issue is whether there is an independent effect of
experienced voice, once experienced distributive justice is taken into
account. If the answer is yes, the procedural justice perspective adds to
our understanding of the political impact of welfare state experiences.
Procedural justice: general value or an instrumental tool for self-
interest?
In addition to examining the relation between procedural judgements
and outcome variables such as self-interest and distributive justice, we
also investigate whether attitudinal reactions to procedures are related
to outcome variables. The question is whether voice effects differ in
magnitude depending on how personally beneficial outcomes are.
                                                          
12 Regression analyses show that this difference was not due to the fact that
the “affect services” item has a smaller variance than “employees listened.”
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This analysis informs the question of how generally applicable the
procedural justice perspective is. One view is that procedural fairness is
a general human yardstick for evaluating common socio-political
institutions. Therefore, its impact on attitudes and behaviour towards
such institutions does not vary much across individuals and contexts.
As Tyler et al. (1997:209) explains, “One model of the psychology of
the person suggests that a concern for justice is an inherent human
characteristic. [...] If justice concerns arise from basic human
motivations, we would expect to find common justice concerns across
people, social groups, and societies.”
One implication of these assumptions is that experienced voice
opportunities should have the same impact on political orientations
regardless of how personal outcomes from experiences are perceived.
In statistical parlance, outcome-related variables such as quality
judgements will not interact into the link between experienced voice
opportunities and political orientations, so that this link will be
stronger at certain levels of outcome satisfaction than at others. The
absence of such an interaction effect would indicate that voice is a
procedural value that matters to people even when personal outcomes
from the process are more or less perfect. Procedural justice, in this
case voice, would then not appear as a mere tool for improving
personal outcomes.
The literature on voice opportunities in the welfare state often
challenges this universal view. 13 Researchers do not think of the voice
aspect of procedural justice as a reflection of a basic human inclination
towards voice values. Rather, voice opportunities become important to
people only if they are dissatisfied with service quality. Only then does
the need arise for citizens to be able to affect how institutions are run
and to have their opinions about them recorded by responsive public
employees. Satisfactory service quality, on the other hand, means all is
well and in that case people do not care much about “having a say.”
Voice is a tool for improving outcomes, and the quality of this tool is
irrelevant as long as outcomes are perfectly satisfactory.
                                                          
13 Take the word challenge with a grain of salt. These researchers usually
challenge the universal model of procedural justice without knowing it, as
voice opportunities are rarely thought about in the broader context of
procedural justice research.
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This was the view taken by Albert Hirschman (1970) in his
influential book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Indeed, the subtitle was
Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, which
reflects Hirschman’s economic consumer perspective on relations
between individuals and service providers. People are instrumentally
oriented towards the organisation and the goods it provides. Voice and
exit are nothing but “responses to decline.” That is, voice is an
instrumental strategy for improving service quality. Hence, these
mechanisms kick in only when service delivery is perceived as
unsatisfactory. Voice is not regarded as a basic human procedural
fairness value, but rather as an instrumental tool for improving
personal outcomes from the procedure.
This instrumental view on voice opportunities has received some
empirical support. For instance, Möller (1996:375)14 conducted in-
depth interviews with Swedes using elder care and child care and
concluded: “Service delivery is the central factor. And as long as it
meets expectations, the risk for system distrust is nonexistent. [...]
Voice opportunities are also important but dissatisfaction in this
respect is not enough to trigger distrust. [...] The political system
‘should,’ according to citizens, deliver services and as long as this is
done there are no problems.”
Moreover, Scandinavian survey research on voice opportunities has
reported a positive correlation between dissatisfaction and actual
attempts to affect public service institutions (see Petersson, Westholm
& Blomberg 1989; Hoff 1993; Goul Andersen 2000). Such attempts
involve for example active complaints such as contacting a public
employee. This correlation, too, may be regarded as consistent with
the idea that voice opportunities are more important for dissatisfied
people.
We will explicitly test for an interaction effect between experienced
voice opportunities and service satisfaction. Is voice only important for
attitudes towards the welfare state and the political system among the
dissatisfied? Or do such opportunities constitute more general
yardsticks that are used in the opinion formation process regardless of
what one thinks of public service quality? The answers inform us
about how generally applicable the procedural justice perspective is: to
                                                          
14 My translation from Swedish.
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what extent are we talking about a truly outcome independent
procedural dimension of personal welfare state experiences?
Overall voice opportunities and political orientations
Do the overall measures of experienced voice opportunities affect
political orientations? Table 9.2 answers this question with respect to
state intervention orientations and left-right self-placement. For each
dependent variable, two OLS models were estimated: One with only
the two overall experienced voice measures, and one that adds a
number of control variables to the equation. For reasons discussed
above, we include the measures of political efficacy and political
sophistication in addition to the controls used in previous chapters.
The “affect services” variable is wholly unrelated to the dependent
ideology variables, whereas the “employees listened” item has weak
significant effects. Looking at the controlled equations it has an effect
on both the state intervention index and on left-right self-placement
(.16 and -.07). It thus seems as it is the more informal and less
instrumental version of experienced voice that influences the ideology
variables: People who have been in contact with responsive and helpful
public employees are more likely to endorse leftist ideology and state
intervention policies.
However, even the impact of informal voice is quite limited in this
analysis. Taken on its own, the “employees listened” item explains less
than one percent of the variation in the dependent variables. And
when comparing its maximum effect with the impact of the subjective
class dummy, one notices that the effect of “employees listened”
amounts to between two-thirds and half of the class effect (.16 x 4 =
.64 versus -.94 for state intervention, and .07 x 4 =  .28 versus .68 for
left-right self-placement.) According to this comparison, then,
experienced voice opportunities, are clearly less important for
ideological orientations than the class dummy. Of course, these
comparisons are still quite kind to the voice variable as we are moving
between empirically unusual extreme categories.
Let us now look at the impact of experienced voice opportunities on
satisfaction with democracy and trust in politicians (Table 9.3.) The
main observation matches the hypothesis: People that experience
responsive and helpful public employees, and who perceive possibilities
to affect services, exhibit more political trust. An exception is that
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“affect services” is not significantly related to satisfaction with
democracy.
Table 9.2 The impact of experienced voice opportunities in 
contacts with public agencies on state intervention 
orientation and left-right ideology (unstandardised
OLS estimates)
Dependent variable:
STATE INTERVENTION
ORIENTATION
 (higher value=greater
support for intervention)
Dependent variable:
LEFT-RIGHT
SELF-PLACEMENT
(higher value = further to
the right)
Model 1:
Experienced
voice
opportunities
Model 2:
Model 1
+ control
variables
Model 3:
Experienced
voice
opportunities
Model 4:
Model 3
+ control
variables
Employees listened (-2 – 2) .17*** .16** -.07*** -.07**
I could affect how services are run (-2 – 2) .01 .01 .00 .00
Experienced distributive justice (-2 – 2) - -.01 - .00
Objective welfare state interest (0 – 10) - .06** - -.03***
Employed in public sector - .87*** - -.22***
Subjective class affiliation (1 = middle class) - -.94*** - .68***
Family income (1 – 8) - -.06*** - .06***
Gender (1 = woman) - .11* - -.05
Political efficacy index (1 – 9) - .00 - -.01
Education (1 – 3) - -.13** - .01
Political sophistication - .17 - -.10***
Constant 6.77*** 7.22*** 2.96*** 2.66***
Adjusted R-squared .004 .12 .002 .13
Number of respondents 2364 2364 2450 2450
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. The
dependent variables were described in Chapter 7. For more information about
the voice variables, see previous section on measurement. For more
information about the distributive justice measure, see Table 8.1, and related
text. The objective welfare state interest variable was described in Table 7.1
and related text. The political efficacy scale is an additive index summing
responses to two questions about the possibilities of affecting political
decisions in Sweden and in the municipality, respectively. The political
sophistication measure (higher values=higher sophistication) was obtained
through a factor analysis. Both the efficacy measure and the sophistication
measure are described in more detail in a footnote in this chapter. For more
information about other independent variables, see Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 7.6.
It is informative to compare the maximum effect of the voice
variables with that of other theoretical perspectives, such as incumbent
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party preference and economic perception. For instance, the maximum
effect of voice variables on trust in politicians is .40 (.04 x 4 + .06 x 4).
This might be compared with the effect of moving from a citizen
opposing the ruling party and disapproving of the economy, to
someone who favours the incumbent and approves of the economy.
This effect amounts to .66. When it comes to trust in politicians, then,
it takes two competing variables representing two theoretical
perspectives in order for the effect of experienced voice to be clearly
exceeded.
Remember that these effects are under control for variables such as
welfare state interest and perceptions of experienced distributive
justice. The impact of experienced voice does not disappear when one
investigates it among people at the same welfare state interest level
who make the same distributive justice judgements about their
outcomes. Hence, the voice aspect of procedural justice seems to add
an element to our understanding of welfare state experience effects
that was missing in Chapters 7 and 8. This element is independent in
the sense that it matters to political orientations also when objective
outcomes and peoples’ justice-based judgements of such outcomes, are
taken into account.
Furthermore, it is notable that, taken on their own, the experienced
voice variables manage to explain more of the variation in political
trust variables than was the case for the ideology variables. This
provides some support for the hypothesis that social justice aspects of
experiences become more influential as the economic stakes involved
in political choices decrease. I will get back to this point in later
sections.
We also want to know if the impact of experienced voice
opportunities varies with the level of service satisfaction. Here, one
theoretical position is that procedural justice is a general human
yardstick for judging social experiences and common institutions.
Voice should therefore matter regardless of whether citizens are
dissatisfied or not. A different position is that, in the welfare state,
people look at voice opportunities as something that produces better
outcomes. If this latter instrumental attitude towards voice prevails,
one would expect a stronger impact of poor voice opportunities among
those dissatisfied with services. Conversely, if the former general-value
model of voice is the more accurate one, there should be no interaction
effect of service satisfaction.
Voice254
Table 9.3 The impact of experienced voice opportunities in 
contacts with public agencies on satisfaction with
democracy and trust in politicians (unstandardised
OLS estimates)
Dependent variable:
SATISFACTION
WITH DEMOCRACY
 (higher value=more
satisfaction)
Dependent variable:
TRUST IN
POLITICIANS
(higher value =more
trust)
Model 1:
Experienced
voice
opportunities
Model 2:
Model 1
+ control
variables
Model 3:
Experienced
voice
opportunities
Model 4:
Model 3
+ control
variables
Employees listened (-2 – 2) .17*** .04* .20*** .04*
I could affect how services are run (-2 – 2) .03** .00 .10*** .06***
Experienced distributive justice (-2 – 2) - .10*** - .13**
Objective welfare state interest (0-10) - .01 - .01
Perception of Swedish economy (1-3) - -.19*** - -.16***
Preference for incumbent party - .31*** - .34***
No party preference - -.16** - -.17***
Age in years (15-80) - -.004*** - .00
Education (1-3) - .00 - .03
Life satisfaction (1-4) - .14*** - .09***
Subjective class affiliation (1=middle class) - .08* - .07
Political efficacy index (1-9) - .12*** - .16***
Political sophistication - -.04 - .00
Constant -.03 .14 -.03 -.39***
Adjusted R-squared .03 .16 .05 .22
Number of respondents 2464 2464 2536 2536
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. The
dependent variables were described in Chapter 6. For more information about
the voice variables, see previous section on measurement. For more
information about the distributive justice measure, see Table 8.1, and related
text. The objective welfare state interest variable was described in Table 7.1
and related text. The political efficacy scale is an additive index summating
responses to two questions about the possibilities of affecting political
decisions in Sweden and in the municipality, respectively. The political
sophistication measure (higher values=higher sophistication) was obtained
through a factor analysis. Both the efficacy measure and the sophistication
measure are described in more detail in a footnote in this chapter. For more
information about other independent variables, see Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 7.6.
To test these hypotheses I use two measures of service satisfaction.
The first one was the retrospective personal service satisfaction
measure used in Chapter 6. A dummy variable was created, which
separates people who thought personally experienced public services
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had “become worse” during the last 12 months from those choosing
other alternatives. I then ran the OLS models reported in Tables 9.2
and 9.3 separately within the two groups along the satisfaction
dummy. Also, I added to the original regressions multiplicative
interaction terms together with the main effect of the satisfaction
dummy.
The results did not support the hypothesis that voice effects grow
with dissatisfaction. The only prominent exception was that the effects
of “employees listened” among the dissatisfied on left-right self-
placement and state intervention orientation were significant, but
virtually zero among the satisfied. However, these findings were
contradicted by the fact that there was an impact of “affect services”
on state intervention orientations among the satisfied, but no effect
among the dissatisfied. When it comes to political trust, there was no
interaction effect whatsoever on satisfaction with democracy. For trust
in politicians, the pattern was again reversed with somewhat stronger
effects of experienced voice opportunities among the satisfied.
I also tried the same procedure using an alternative measure of
service satisfaction. This second item tapped people’s retrospective
evaluations of how public services have worked in the municipality
during the last twelve months. People who answered “rather badly” or
“very badly” were separated from other responses and the same
analysis as the one above was performed. Again, the data did not
support the hypothesis that voice effects grow with dissatisfaction. For
left-right self-placement, satisfaction with democracy, and trust in
politicians, no significant differences in the impact of the voice
variables could be observed across different levels of service
satisfaction. The exception was the state intervention factor on which
there were significant positive effects of both “employees listened” and
“affect services” among the dissatisfied, but no such effects among the
satisfied.
In summary, the effects of experienced voice opportunities on
political orientations do not seem to depend much on whether citizens
are satisfied with services and outcomes. Voice seems to be something
from which people draw political conclusions regardless of whether
they are satisfied with the actual quality of services. The model of
procedural justice, and the idea that voice opportunities in particular
are independently valued by citizens regardless of outcome quality,
thus receives support.
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Institution-specific voice opportunities
The overall experience measures used so far are very general. They
cover practically the whole welfare state as respondents are asked to
look back at their “experiences with public authorities and services.”
As noted in Chapter 8, people who have been in contact with several
institutions might find it difficult to compute an average across
experiences. And to the extent that the task is too difficult, they may
opt for the no contact category, or report pre-existing stereotypes and
prejudice rather than actual experiences. Both options produce
measurement error.
Table 9.4 Institution-specific voice opportunities among people
having been in contact with public service institutions
(percent)
TOTAL
Very
good
Rather
good
Neither
good
nor bad
Rather
bad
Very
bad
Don’t
know
Sum
percent N
Childcare 5 28 26 17 17 7 (50) 100 423
Leisure time activities
/culture 2 12 23 18 18 27 (48) 100 176
Health care 1 4 18 20 30 27 (32) 100 249
Public transportation 2 7 18 20 28 25 (35) 100 150
Schools 4 26 26 16 16 12 (38) 100 706
Comment: The data come from the 1998 West Sweden SOM Survey. The
question was formulated as follows: “What opportunities do you think you
have to affect how these services are run, if needed.” The alternatives were
“very good opportunities,” “rather good,” “neither good nor bad,” “rather
bad,” “very bad opportunities,” and “don’t know.” The table shows results
only for people who have been in personal contact with a given institution,
with the exceptions of don’t know percentages within parentheses, which are
calculated for the whole sample.
In order to partly escape these problems, we now begin to use
alternative measures of experienced voice opportunities. In this section,
we analyse institution-specific voice items. Unfortunately, because of
limited space and resources, it was not possible to include such
variables in the 1999 West Sweden SOM survey. Instead, we use a set
of measures available in the 1998 data set. The head question was:
“What opportunities do you think you have to affect how these
services are run, if needed.” For a number of public services,
respondents then indicated whether they perceived “very good,”
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“rather good,” “neither good nor bad,” “rather bad,” or “very bad”
opportunities, or whether they did not know. Table 9.4 contains
univariate distributions for the institutions that will be analysed here.15
For reasons that will soon become clear, the table shows results only
for people who have been in personal contact with the institutions.16
These institution-specific voice items are attractive as they avoid
artificial averages across experiences with different institutions. In
addition, the references to concrete institutions might stand a better
chance in stimulating people to think about personally experienced
situations. But these questions are certainly not flawless, given our
purposes. One readily apparent problem is that, unlike the overall
battery, they make no reference to actual personal experiences. They
simply ask people to rate their voice opportunities without specifying
that we are interested in a particular voice channel, namely the direct
encounter between the citizen and the institution. Of course, one may
think of several other voice channels, including voting and traditional
forms of political participation. However, while the question makes no
explicit reference to direct personal contacts, it was asked towards the
end of a section in the questionnaire that focused heavily on such
contacts. The section included questions about personal usage of a
great number of services, as well as satisfaction with these services.
Because the institution-specific items were preceded by such questions,
it becomes less likely, though still possible, that answers do not reflect
direct personal experience.
Also, the fact that experiences are not mentioned might increase the
risk that effects on political orientations are due to, not just
                                                          
15 Three other types of public services were included: social welfare, elder
care, and environmental protection. However, these have been left out of the
analysis as the number of respondents having experienced social welfare and
elder care respectively was too low for meaningful analysis (n<50 in the
multivariate regressions), and because there was no information about
whether people had been in contact with public services involving
environmental protection.
16 More precisely, in Tables 9.4 and 9.5, “among users” means the following.
Childcare: Respondent indicated that she personally uses municipality
childcare. Leisure time activities/culture: Respondent indicated that she
personally uses either or both of these public services. Health care:
Respondent uses either hospitals, children’s health care (barnavårdscentral),
or local health care (vårdcentral). Public transportation: Respondent indicated
that she personally uses public transportation. Schools: Respondent indicated
that she personally uses public primary schools (kommunal grundskola) or
public secondary schools (kommunal gymnasieskola).
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experiences, but also to internal political efficacy. As discussed above,
responses to questions about experienced voice opportunities may
reflect both actual experiences, as well as assessments of one’s own
resources, abilities, and political self-confidence. Therefore, in order to
avoid spurious effect interpretations, one should control experience
effects for political efficacy variables. Certainly, this recommendation
is not less important when using questions that do not explicitly ask
people about their direct, personal experiences.
Of course, these measurement-related problems should be worst
among people with no personal experiences of a given institution.
Indeed, their answers cannot even logically be regarded as reports of
experienced voice opportunities. Rather, their responses should
entirely be the products of internal efficacy, prejudice, or stem from
alternative information sources, such as the media or inter-personal
communication.
Consequently, I estimate the effects of experienced voice
opportunities only among people who have actually recently been in
contact with the institutions in question. The risk that responses reflect
pre-existing internal efficacy feelings rather than recollection of
experiences, or are mainly assessments of voice channels other than
direct contacts, should reasonably be smaller in these groups. Some
support to this idea is provided by the observation that the proportion
of “don’t know” answers to the questions is (sometimes greatly)
reduced among people having experienced institutions.
Looking at Table 9.4, childcare and schools were perceived the most
favourably. About one-third are satisfied in the sense that they have
“very” or “rather” good opportunities to affect services. These two
institutions clearly receive better voice evaluations than leisure time
activities/culture (14 percent), public transportation (9 percent), and
health care  (5 percent).
The “don’t know” alternative was popular. Among institution
users, up to approximately one-fourth ticked this category.17 The high
                                                          
17 Again, childcare and schools stick out (7 and 12 percent respectively) One
speculation about this difference has to do with the duration and frequency of
citizen’ personal contacts with institutions: Contacts with schools and
childcare may, in contrast to many experiences with for instance culture and
health, involve frequent contacts extending over several years. The more
frequent and long-lasting contacts are the more prone should people be to
express views on experiences.
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percentages of don’t know answers come as no surprise. Our previous
findings indicate that relatively large groups choose categories such as
“no contact” or “don’t know” when asked about experienced
distributive or procedural justice. Many seem to have had neutral
experiences that do not deviate from the ordinary, or that have not
produced any perception at all.
We are now ready to analyse the effects of institution-specific voice
items on political orientations. Table 9.5 shows bivariate correlations,
as well as bivariate and multivariate effects of voice items on the
dependent variables. As left-right self-placement was not included in
the 1998 questionnaire we now only have three dependent variables.
Apart from this deviation, the dependent variables were identical to
the ones in the 1999 survey.
Again, the results apply only to people who had actually been in
contact with the various institutions. In this analysis I collapsed the
“don’t know” and the “neither/nor” categories, thus creating a five-
point independent variable ranging from “very good” (1),  “rather
good” (2), “neither good nor bad/don’t know” (3), “rather bad” (4),
to “very bad” (5). Just like in previous analyses, the collapsed middle
category is permissible as there are no significant differences between
the two categories with respect to dependent variables.18
One main observation is that the institution-specific voice items do
not have many significant effects on attitudes towards state
intervention, taking the previously used control variables into
account.19 Again, we see this as support for the hypothesis that social
                                                          
18 While there are no strict theoretical reasons to equate the mid-point with
don’t know, the chosen procedure is justified in this context by analyses in
which the voice items were split into dummy variables, using “neither nor” as
the reference category. The dependent variables were then regressed on the
dummies together with the controls used throughout this chapter. The
analysis showed that the don’t know dummy had no significant effects.
Hence, little explanatory power is lost by collapsing the mid-point and the
don’t know category.
19 There is only one exception to this generalisation. Strangely enough, poor
voice opportunities in contacts with health care services significantly increase
(!) support for state intervention among users of health care (.09). Given the
theoretical framework, and given the previous results, this finding is indeed
difficult to understand. However, although the finding is in conflict with the
hypothesis, one should perhaps not make too much of it. Given how many
regression analyses that have been, and will be, performed in this study, one
or two instances of seemingly unexplainable coefficients could very well be
produced by pure sampling error, although taken on their own these
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justice aspects of experiences become more influential as the economic
stakes involved in political choices decrease.
Table 9.5 The impact of poor voice opportunities (unstandardised
OLS estimates)
Pearson’s
r
Bivariate
b
Multivariate
b
Number of
respondents
(bivariate)
Dependent variable:  State intervention orientation
Childcare NS NS NS 401
Leisure time activities / culture NS NS NS 1657
Health care .06 .13*** .09* 2306
Public transportation NS NS NS 1394
Schools NS NS NS 654
Dependent variable:  Satisfaction with democracy
Childcare -.27 -.23*** -.19*** 391
Leisure time activities / culture -.15 -.15*** -.14*** 1578
Health care -.14 -.14*** -.15*** 2216
Public transportation -.11 -.11*** -.10*** 1336
Schools -.16 -.15*** -.10** 639
Dependent variable:  Trust in politicians
Childcare -.30 -.25*** -.20*** 408
Leisure time activities / culture -.18 -.18*** -.17*** 1680
Health care -.20 -.20*** -.19*** 2348
Public transportation -.13 -.12*** -.10*** 1423
Schools -.21 -.19*** -.13*** 684
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01  NS=not significant, p-value>.10
Comment: The data come from the 1998 West Sweden SOM Survey. The OLS
regression analyses were estimated only among people having been in contact
with the institution in question. For more information about the experienced
voice measures, see Table 9.4, and related text. The multivariate effects are
under control for the same variables that were included in Tables 9.2 and 9.3.
To the extent that it was possible, these variables were constructed on the
                                                                                                                          
coefficients are statistically significant. Be that as it may, the basic conclusion
must nevertheless be that institution-specific voice items do not affect
intervention orientations.
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basis of questions that were identical to the ones used in the 1999
questionnaire. The only significant alteration has to do with political
sophistication, which is now measured by an additive political interest index
(Cronbach’s alpha=.83) summing responses to three questions as to how
interested respondents are in politics “generally,”  “in your municipality,”
and “in the Västra Götaland region.” Compared to Tables 9.2 and 9.3,
political efficacy and experienced distributive justice were missing in the 1998
data set.
The pattern changes when we shift our attention to political trust.
The institution-specific voice items impact significantly on satisfaction
with democracy and trust in politicians. Citizens who have been in
personal contact with institutions, and who have perceived poor voice
opportunities, are more dissatisfied with democracy and less trustful in
politicians, than those perceiving good voice opportunities.
The multivariate effects range from -.19 to -.10 (satisfaction with
democracy) and -.20 to -.10 (trust in politicians). And as we are
dealing with five-point independent variables, one gets maximum
effects by multiplying these estimates by four. How strong are these
effects? Again, one gets a feeling for these coefficients when comparing
with previously estimated effects of moving from a citizen opposing
the ruling party and disapproving of the economy, to someone who
favours the incumbent and approves of the economy. This effect
amounts to .66. If we accept this comparison as interesting, then,
experienced voice opportunities appear to have a rather respectable
impact on political trust.20
                                                          
20 Unfortunately, two control variables – experienced distributive justice and
political efficacy – are lacking compared to the 1999 survey. How serious is
this problem? As for distributive justice, we have raised the possibility that
perceptions of experienced distributive justice and experienced procedural
justice might be correlated. The potential mechanism was that people do not
separate between different forms of justice. For instance, they might pay
attention mainly to the fairness of end results and outcomes, rather than to
the procedures leading up to such outcomes. Later, when asked about various
procedural aspects of experiences they might infer procedural perceptions
from views on the fairness of the service and help they received. (“If I got the
service I have the right to, then the procedures must have been alright.”)
Because perceptions of distribution and procedures might be correlated, I
stressed the importance of simultaneously including both types of measures in
multivariate analyses. The real question is whether experienced procedural
justice still matters among people with the same perceptions of distributive
fairness. Here, the empirical problem is that no measures of experienced
distributive justice are available in the 1998 data set. That is, the multivariate
regression coefficients in table 9.5 are estimated without controlling for any
items tapping institution-specific perceptions of whether one has received the
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Finally, we turn to the question of whether there is an interaction
effect between the institution-specific voice measures and service
satisfaction. To find out, I used institution-specific measures of the
extent to which respondents were satisfied with services. These
measures formed the basis of five dummies separating those
dissatisfied with the service (“very” or “rather” dissatisfied”) from
other valid responses. Furthermore, for each institution, an interaction
term was generated by multiplying experienced voice opportunities
with the service dissatisfaction dummy. Finally, for each of the three
dependent variables, the regression coefficient of the interaction term
was estimated together with the main effects of voice and satisfaction
respectively. This analysis, which was performed only among
                                                                                                                          
service and help one has a right to. Hence, strictly speaking, we will never
know if the inclusion of such controls would have altered the findings.
Luckily, the overall experience measures in the 1999 data help us making an
informed guess. We have previously reported a strong correlation between
“received the service and help I have a right to” and “employees listened”
(.60), and a moderate one between the former item and “affect services” (.20).
Fortunately for the current analysis, judgements about the more
instrumental/formal aspect of voice opportunities are more independent from
experienced distributive justice than judgements of informal voice. Moreover,
I checked how the effects of the overall voice items were affected by the
omission of experienced distributive justice measures. Typically, the impact of
“employees listened” was doubled when experienced distributive justice was
dropped from the multivariate models in Tables 9.2 and 9.3. The impact of
“affect services,” however, turned out to be completely insensitive. This is
good news: While the absence of institution-specific distributive justice items
in the 1998 data set would probably have compromised estimates for
“employees listened,” the situation seems rather acceptable for the “affect
services” item.
A different problem is that the 1998 data lack information about general
political efficacy. Hence, the regressions in Table 9.5 do not include such a
measure. This might cause spurious effect interpretations as political efficacy
can affect both political support variables and experienced voice
opportunities. Of course, we cannot know for sure how the omission affects
estimates in Table 9.5. However, judging from an analysis of the overall
measures in the 1999 survey, the problem is not gigantic: there were only
insignificant changes in effects when the political efficacy index was dropped
from the multivariate equations in Table 9.3. Finally, it should again be
pointed out that political efficacy is probably not entirely exogenous to
experienced voice opportunities. In fact, as discussed above, efficacy could be
one of the mechanisms through which experienced voice affects political
orientations. Part of the effects removed by efficacy controls may thus still be
consistent with the idea that experienced voice has a causal impact on
orientations. The omission of political efficacy controls probably leads to
slightly exaggerated, though not wildly unrealistic, estimates of the total effect
of experienced voice on political orientations.
                                                                                                 Voice 263
respondents in personal contact with an institution in question,
resulted in fifteen regression equations (5 institutions x 3 dependent
variables).
Again, there was very little support for the hypothesis that the
impact of voice grows with service dissatisfaction. In fact, only one of
the fifteen equations contained a voice*dissatisfaction interaction that
was significantly larger than zero. More specifically, in the leisure
time/culture area, the interaction term revealed a negative effect of
poor voice on state intervention support among the dissatisfied. This
effect was invisible when the dissatisfaction interaction was not taken
into account (see Table 9.5). Also, there were three equations where
the interaction coefficient had the correct sign and was rather
substantial, but not statistically significant.21
Actual attempts to influence institutions
So far we have measured perceptions of potential possibilities to
exercise influence. While these measures are certainly useful, we have
also identified a number of weaknesses. The most prominent weakness
is the risk that respondents report feelings of internal efficacy rather
than experienced voice opportunities: People might take the questions
to mean, not “did I experience opportunities to have a voice,” but
rather “In general, am I a person who can make my voice heard?”
Rather than measuring perceptions of possibilities to exercise
influence, we now investigate actual attempts to exercise influence.
This information was generated by a series of questions in the 1998
data set. It began by asking “During the last year, have you tried to
influence or change any local or regional public services?”22 The
alternatives were “yes, as a private citizen,” “yes, in my profession,”
and “no.” Those who ticked either of the yes alternatives were then
asked further questions. First, they indicated which institution they
                                                          
21 These interaction terms were: voice*dissatisfaction with childcare on
satisfaction with democracy, voice*dissatisfaction with leisure time/culture on
satisfaction with democracy, voice*dissatisfaction with public transportation
on trust in politicians. In all these equations there was a significant main
effect, and a sizable but not significant interaction coefficient suggesting that
the impact of experienced voice is increased by approximately fifty percent
among those dissatisfied with services.
22 The Swedish formulation was “ [...] någon kommunal eller landstingskom-
munal verksamhet.”
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tried to influence. Second, they were given nine alternatives as to how
they attempted to influence that institution. Third, respondents were
asked if they were successful in their attempts.
Measuring real attempts to exercise voice reduces the risk that
people report internal efficacy rather than actual voice-related
experiences. The wording and the structure of the questionnaire makes
it clear to respondents that they are supposed to report actually
experienced events, not general feelings of efficacy or administrative
competence. This is more satisfying than the institution-specific
measures used in the last section. Because the latter did not refer to
actual experiences, some respondents might have reported general
feelings of competence, rather than specific experiences during a
specific event.
But there are also drawbacks with the current measure. The most
prominent problem is that the results of actual attempts might overlap
greatly with the extent to which people’s self-interests were satisfied in
the process. Previous research concludes that while self-interest
typically has a moderate impact on attitudes and voting, it has strong
effects on actual attempts to influence politics in concrete issues (Green
1988). It is often those who think their personal interests are
threatened who attempt to exercise voice by for instance contacting
local politicians and bureaucrats. And if this is true, voice attempts
may be evaluated on the basis of whether personal interests were
eventually satisfied. Therefore, if we find that those being successful in
their attempts also endorse the political system more than those who
failed, it might only be because the former group managed to steer
their personal outcomes in a personally favoured direction. In this
case, the self-interest perspective tested in Chapter 7 offers a
parsimonious explanation, and there is no need to bother about
procedural justice.
In contrast, the procedural justice perspective claims that voice
opportunities matter regardless of self-interest: people put an
independent value on procedural aspects such as voice opportunities.
Evaluations of procedural aspects cannot be sufficiently understood as
reflections of self-interest, and they carry an independent weight in the
process of attitude formation. In order to accurately test this
proposition, I will control for people’s satisfaction with the particular
service they attempted to influence. If we find that success and failure
affect political orientations even among people who are equally
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satisfied, we conclude that voice opportunities have an impact beyond
mere personal interests.
A second problem is that the measure gives no information about
the voice experiences of those who have not gone so far as actually
attempting to exercise influence. Of course, this large group may still
experience and assess the extent to which they could exercise influence
if they tried: One may feel and experience suppression or
empowerment during welfare state experiences without actually testing
whether one’s hunch is correct. However, such experiences are not
captured by the present measure. Consequently, it only makes sense to
perform our analysis among those who report actual attempts. This is
a rather small group (9.6 percent of the total sample), and findings
cannot automatically be generalised to the entire population.
Nevertheless, because of the clear references to actual experiences, the
measure provides interesting information about the effects of
experienced voice opportunities that the previously used measures
could not.
The measure was based on people’s evaluations of the extent to
which their attempts to influence services had been successful. The
response alternatives were  “yes” (coded 1),  “yes partly” (2), “no”
(3), “don’t know” (4). We thus get a four-category variable tapping
success and failure in actual attempts to exercise influence in personal
contacts with public services.23 Three of the nine alternatives
concerning how one tried to influence were deemed to be relevant
given our definition of a personal welfare state experience. These were
“contacted the staff, “contacted a civil servant,” and “participated in a
                                                          
23 While this four-category variable is a nominal-level variable, little is gained
by splitting it into three dummies in the present analysis. That is, the effects of
those dummies on political orientations tended to follow the linear pattern
implied by the 1 – 4 coding.
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meeting concerning a municipal service.”24 Those who had made other
kinds of attempts, or no attempts at all, were left out of the analysis.25
Table 9.6 answers our questions about how success and failure of
actual voice attempts influence political trust: for purposes of
parsimonious presentation, the table does not show the results for state
intervention orientations. Consistent with previous findings in this
chapter, the analysis revealed that there were no effects whatsoever on
this dependent variable.
However, looking at the table, the main observation is that success
and failure of actual attempts does influence political trust.
Controlling for other variables, those who have failed at influencing
services are less likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works in
practice (-.06), as well as less likely to trust politicians (-.08).
Moreover, these effects remain even controlling for overall service
satisfaction with the institution one tried to influence.26 Hence, the
                                                          
24 It may be debated how relevant the “meeting” category is from a welfare
state experience perspective. While many of the respondents in this category
have probably participated in for instance parents’ meetings in schools and
kindergartens etc., others might have participated in meetings that did not
involve a direct experience with public service institutions and employees
(meetings with politicians, internal party meetings, organizational settings
etc.) While we have no good way of filtering out the latter irrelevant cases, the
analysis showed that excluding this category altogether does not affect the
conclusions drawn.
25 The other alternatives were “contacted a politician,” “contacted a paper,
radio, or TV,” “worked in a political party,” “worked in another
organization,” “signed a protest list or participated in a demonstration,” and
“otherwise.”
26 This measure was based on a question battery where people were asked to
state how satisfied they were with various public services in their municipality.
The response categories ranged from 1 (very satisfied) to 5 (very dissatisfied);
the don’t know category was collapsed with “neither satisfied nor
dissatisfied” (coded 3). The satisfaction variable in Table 9.6 measures a
respondent’s evaluation of the very institution she attempted to influence. If,
for example, a respondent has attempted to influence childcare, then this
person is assigned a value on the new variable reflecting her quality evaluation
of childcare. Moreover, a few of the alternatives in the question battery
referred to institutions that are actually made up of several different parts,
each of which citizens experience separately, and for each of which we have
separate service evaluation data. For instance, one alternative was leisure
time/culture; this institution is actually a compound of two institutions, both
of which were evaluated separately in the service quality battery.  The other
compounds were schools (first-level and secondary level education), and
health care (hospitals, children’s health care, and local health care). Because
we cannot say with certainty which of the various sub-institutions a
respondent attempted to influence, an average of the evaluation scores for the
different parts was calculated in these cases. Furthermore, when it comes to
                                                                                                 Voice 267
impact of success and failure does not seem merely to reflect
differences in satisfaction with the outcome. On the contrary, we see
once again that parts of the effects of experienced voice opportunities
are independent of personal outcomes and self-interest.
It is notable that the success and failure coefficients are statistically
insignificant. However, one should bear in mind that the number of
respondents is rather small. The importance of success and failure
coefficients is therefore more accurately judged on the basis of their
magnitude. If we use overall service satisfaction as a yardstick it turns
out that the total effects of success and failure are clearly smaller.
However, it is possible that we are overcontrolling when we include
overall satisfaction. Service satisfaction is a compound construct,
which may reflect many aspects of services, including voice
opportunities. Voice opportunities and service satisfaction might thus
affect each other. This means that service satisfaction could operate as
a causal mechanism for voice effects. Of course, this possibility is not
allowed for in the multivariate analysis as satisfaction is controlled for.
The multivariate voice effects may therefore be rather conservative
estimates of the true effect.
Keeping this conservatism in mind, we may again use as a yardstick
the effect of moving from a citizen opposing the ruling party and
disapproving of the economy, to someone who favours the incumbent
and approves of the economy. This difference amounts to .95 for
satisfaction with democracy and .69 for trust in politicians. By
comparison, the corresponding maximum effects of success and failure
are considerably smaller (.18 = .06 x 3, and .24 = .08 x 03).
                                                                                                                          
attempts to influence, we only have information for eight institutions; people
who ticked the “other service” category were assigned the value from a
variable measuring an overall quality evaluation of how services in the
municipality worked during the last twelwe months (the same scale and
coding as for the variables above). The same was done to those who had tried
to influence more than one institution.
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The inferiority of the voice effects might seem disheartening, even
when considering the possibility that the estimates are somewhat
conservative. However, one needs to bear in mind that the success-
failure variable aims at only a rather small part of the total variation
in experienced voice opportunities. More exactly, it only deals with
the rather unusual occurrences of manifest attempts to exercise
influence over service. It may be argued that those who have
experienced the worst voice opportunities are hardly represented in the
small group of people who have actually bothered to take real action.
Therefore, it is not so much the magnitude of effects that are
interesting here, but that success and failure have effects at all in the
small group of “activists,” effects that are consistent with those
previously produced by alternative indicators.1
Conclusions
Experienced voice opportunities affect political orientations. This
conclusion holds for each of three rather different indicators of the
independent variable – overall experienced voice opportunities,
institution-specific voice opportunities, and success/failure in actual
attempts to influence. The effects are sometimes at par with, but rarely
stronger than, those of variables representing different theoretical
perspectives such as incumbent party preference and economic
evaluations. This reinforces findings from previous chapters. Welfare
state experiences are but one of quite a number of explanatory factors
behind the political orientations dealt with here.
The conclusion, however, does not hold for all the investigated
political orientations. Consistent with Assarson’s (1995) and Möller’s
(1996) conclusions we found an impact of experienced voice
opportunities on political trust variables such as satisfaction with
democracy and trust in politicians. However, experienced voice was
not related to ideological variables such as left-right self-placement
                                                          
1 I also tested for an interaction effect between the success-failure variable and
service satisfaction. For satisfaction with democracy, the coefficient of the
interaction term was significant so that service dissatisfaction tended to
increase the negative impact failed attempts to exercise influence (b= -.09,
p=.100, with all variables in the third column of Table 9.6 included).
Confusingly, the pattern was the opposite for trust in politicians (b = .08, p=
.147). In sum, given these and other findings in this chapter, it is difficult to
sustain the idea that experienced voice effects vary systematically with service
satisfaction.
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and state intervention orientations. This pattern fits with that found in
Chapter 8, which showed that experienced distributive justice affects
political trust but not ideological orientations. Both chapters are
consistent with the notion that social justice concerns become more
important as the self-interest stakes in political choices decrease.
Conversely, the relative importance of self-interest increases when
stakes are higher, such as in the case of ideological left-right
orientations.
Both formal and informal voice opportunities matter. Citizens
appear to care both about having real instrumental power to affect
experienced institutions, as well as about being paid attention to and
having one’s opinions recorded. In fact, in the one case where we
could compare the two voice versions, differences in informal
opportunities (employees listened) turned out to be more important
for political trust than formal ones (I could affect how services are
run). This indicates that public employees who wish to use direct
encounters with citizens to generate system legitimacy are well advised
to signal that the institution is interested in their opinions, even if
there is no simple or direct mechanism through which those opinions
eventually affect the institutions.
Taken together, the last three chapters corroborate one of our
theoretical cornerstones: Personal welfare state experiences are not
one-dimensional events. Rather, we find support for the notion that at
least three theoretical perspectives – self-interest, distributive justice,
and procedural justice – simultaneously enrich our understanding of
how and why citizens react politically to welfare state contacts.
In this spirit, Chapters 8 and 9 have been unkind to the public
choice-inspired idea that social justice related evaluations of
experiences are nothing but self-interest in disguise. We have reported
weak or non-existent correlations between variables tapping self-
interest aspects of welfare state contacts and, on the other hand,
variables tapping experienced distributive and procedural justice. This
indicates that people’s perceptions of experienced social justice are
relatively honest in the sense that they do not reflect the extent to
which welfare state institutions satisfy their personal, short-term
economic interests. Contrary to what public choice theory would
predict, social justice judgements of experiences are not just a
politically correct disguise for self-interest.
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However, the two different dimensions of experienced social justice
overlap internally. Specifically, there is a correlation between citizens’
views on whether they received the service they are entitled to and
views on the quality of voice opportunities. Reasonably, this
correlation is created by a reciprocal causal process, in which some
people make inferences about judgements of one experience aspect to
another. Having said this, it is still the case that the two experience
dimensions affect political trust, controlling one for the other. In other
words, despite the correlation between the two types of experienced
justice, each makes an independent contribution to our understanding
of how experiences affect orientations.
Interestingly, this contribution is unrelated to people’s service
satisfaction. That is, the impact of experienced voice opportunities is
about the same among those satisfied with the overall quality of
services, compared to those dissatisfied. This finding is not compatible
with Hirschman’s (1970) and Möller’s (1996) view that voice
opportunities are mainly an instrument to achieve satisfactory service
delivery; their view implies that voice only matters to people when
service delivery fails. Rather, the data sustain the notion that voice is a
general value. This value is used as an outcome-independent yardstick
for evaluation of public institutions even when the output of those
institutions is perfect. Accordingly, poor voice opportunities hamper
system legitimacy even if the quality of the services are deemed to be
good. In short, voice opportunities seem to be more than mere
instruments for improving personal outcomes.
This finding tells us, not just that people care about voice
opportunities, but also something about why they care. Judging from
the results, voice opportunities are not just an instrument for achieving
accurate service delivery. Rather, they seem to be important in
themselves. Much like the Chicago woman who was not allowed to
show photos in court, Swedes appear to be interested in voice
opportunities, not just in the passive reception of satisfactory goods
and services. And if the opportunities to exercise influence are poor,
welfare state experiences will have negative effects on political trust,
no matter how satisfactory services are.

Chapter 10
The Customer, the User,
and the Client

elfare state experiences have both positive and negative effects
on system legitimacy. This theoretical possibility is a major
point of disagreement between the self-interest perspective and those
of social justice. Whereas the former parsimoniously assumes that any
service delivery is always better than no service delivery, the latter
imply that things can “go either way,” depending on whether
experiences of distribution and procedures match expectations. The
results presented in previous chapters support this idea. At least when
it comes to political trust, the Swedish electorate is not “an electorate
in the grips of the welfare state,” in the sense that they must always
react to welfare state experiences by increasing their level of support.
Rather, to a great extent the impact on political trust depends on
whether people feel they have experienced distributive and procedural
justice.
This chapter will elaborate a similar point. The empirical concern is
whether the nature and effects of personal welfare state experiences
vary systematically across different kinds of welfare state institutions.
Specifically, we are interested in the extent to which institutional
interfaces empower citizens in relation to employees. The theory and
concepts behind our expectations were laid out in Chapter 3. Based on
the extent to which institutions involve discretion and exit-options,
three basic categories of institutions were identified. These categories
were labelled customer institutions (higher degree of empowerment),
user institutions (medium degree of empowerment), and client
institutions (lower degree of empowerment). It was hypothesised that
the more empowerment that is built into institutional designs, the
more positive effects do personal contacts tend to have on perceptions
of personal experiences. In other words, customer experiences are
W
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thought to have more positive effects than user experiences, which are
in turn predicted to have more positive effects than client experiences.
This is the prediction to which we turn first. At the end of the chapter,
we investigate whether empowering institutional interfaces, by virtue
of their more positive effects on experiences, are also better at building
general ideological support for state intervention and political trust.
Does welfare state design shape personal welfare state experiences?
In order to tap justice judgements, the questionnaire included two
detailed question batteries concerning experiences with specific
institutions. The first battery had the following head question: “If you
look back on your own personal contacts with the following public
services during the last twelve months, to what extent do you think
you were treated correctly?” The head question of the second battery
was “If you look back on your own personal contacts with the
following public services during the last twelve months, to what extent
did you receive the service and help you think you have the right to?”
This latter question battery is familiar as it was used in Chapter 8.
As the reader may remember, respondents answered along a five-
point scale for each of six institutions. The scale ranged from 1 = “not
at all correctly treated/did not receive the service and help I have a
right to,” to 5 = “completely correctly treated/have received the service
and help I have a right to.” Also, respondents could answer that they
had not been in contact with the institution in question. The public
services covered by the two batteries were health care, childcare, social
assistance, public transportation, job agencies, and housing benefits.
Univariate results can be inspected in Table 10.1.
Three institutions – health care, childcare, and public transportation
– receive clearly positive personal experience judgements. Their
averages along the five-point scale are all over 4, and the opinion
balance measures are around +70.  However, three institutions – social
welfare, job agency, and housing assistance – produce more lukewarm
judgements, with averages between 3 and 4. Interestingly, all the
institutions receiving comparatively poor experience judgements are
client institutions with a low degree of institutionalised citizen
empowerment: These institutions all perform a significant amount of
discretionary means-testing at the same time as exit options are scarce.
The institutions receiving positive judgements are either user
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institutions (health care and child care) or customer institutions (public
transportation).
Table 10.1 Personal experiences of particular public service 
institutions
Opinion
balance Mean
Standard
deviation
Number of
respondents
“I was treated correctly”
Health care +65 4.10 1.12 2892
Childcare +71 4.17 1.05 651
Social assistance +7 3.10 1.48 220
Public transportation +68 4.12 1.03 2025
Job agency +27 3.42 1.35 692
Housing allowance +29 3.54 1.51 383
“I have received the service and help I have a right to”
Health care +62 4.08 1.19 2836
Childcare +71 4.21 1.10 613
Social assistance +10 3.15 1.50 198
Public transportation +69 4.14 1.03 1977
Job agency +23 3.34 1.39 676
Housing allowance +34 3.65 1.49 375
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. For
information about questions and response alternatives, see main text. The
opinion balance was calculated by subtracting the proportion of respondents
on the negative side of the middle alternative (1 and 2) from the proportion
on the positive side (4 and 5). Hence, more positive opinion balance values
indicate more positive personal experiences.
What do the questions measure? While the second formulation
(“received service I have a right to”) lies close to the definition of
distributive justice, it is less obvious what is tapped by the first
formulation (“treated correctly”). Here, respondents can interpret it as
“received service I have a right to.” Alternatively, in addition to
distributive judgements, people can choose to let also procedural
concerns colour the responses. To test whether “correct treatment” is
in fact interpreted as something partly different from “received service
I have a right to,” I correlated corresponding items among people who
had responded to both. Since all the six resulting correlation
coefficients were exceedingly high (over .76), it seems unlikely that
respondents differentiate between the two questions in Table 10.1. A
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more plausible interpretation is that they both measure distributive
justice concerns.1
Table 10.2 “If you look back on your own personal contacts with
various public authorities and services during the last 
twelve months, to what extent do the following 
statements fit with your own experience?” (percent)
Positive
experiences
Have not
been in
contact
Negative
experiences
Sum
percent
Number
of
respondents
Difficult finding the right
person 31 42 27 100 3437
Employees were helpful
and listened to me 46 38 16 100 3469
Written messages were
difficult to understand 32 44 24 100 3444
I had opportunities to
affect how services are
run 8 51 41 100 3435
Employees worked fast
and efficiently 29 41 30 100 3426
I was treated correctly 49 37 14 100 3541
I have received the
service and help I have a
right to 43 37 20 100 3460
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. For each
item, respondents were offered the following response options to the
statements in the table: “fits very well,” “fits rather well,” “fits rather
poorly,” “fits very poorly,” and “have not been in contact.” Positive
experience means that the respondent answered “fits very/rather well” when
items had a positive formulation, and proportion of “fits rather/very poorly”
when items had a negative formulation. Conversely, negative experience
means that the respondent answered “fits very/rather well” when items had a
negative formulation, and proportion of “fits rather/very poorly” when items
had a positive formulation.
The questionnaire also included a series of items with the following
head question: “If you look back on your own personal contacts with
various public authorities and services during the last twelve months,
                                                          
1 These results indicate that “correct treatment” (“korrekt behandlad”)
means something different to Swedish respondents, than “fair treatment” to
American respondents. While the latter has proven to trigger procedural
concerns in US studies, the former appears to trigger mainly distributive
concerns among Swedes.
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to what extent do the following statements fit with your own
experience?” The question battery contained several items tapping
distributive and procedural aspects of experiences.  For each of the
items, the following response options were offered: “fits very well,”
“fits rather well,” “fits rather poorly,” “fits very poorly,” and “have
not been in contact.” To familiarise ourselves with these variables –
three of which have already appeared in Chapters 8 and 9 – let us look
at their univariate distributions in Table 10.2. For the sake of
simplicity, the percentages indicate the proportion of respondents
reporting negative experiences, positive experiences, and have not been
in contact respectively.
For each of the items, between one-third and half of the respondents
reported positive experiences with public services and agencies. The
exception is “I had opportunities to affect how services are run,”
where only 8 percent indicated positive experiences. Moreover, we see
that between 37 and 51 percent place themselves in the “have not been
in contact” category. As discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, this does not
mean that many Swedes do not have any actual personal contacts with
public services during a year. Rather, “have not been in contact”
appears to function as a residual category for people who do not
know, or remember neither positive nor negative experiences.
What we want now is an analysis in which answers to these
questions can be compared among people exposed to different kinds of
institutions. It has been hypothesised that institutions with higher
degrees of institutionalised citizen empowerment yield more positive
experiences. While we have seen some bivariate evidence of such an
effect, there are “third variables” that must be controlled. Specifically,
resource variables such as education, class, income, and political
engagement might affect the power balance between institutions and
citizens. Highly educated, politically knowledgeable, well-off middle
class citizens usually have more bureaucratic confidence and
competence than others. The same could be true for citizens who are
public employees themselves. Because these groups of citizens are more
likely to know their rights, to protest, and to otherwise put pressure on
institutions, they are more likely to be “winners” in contacts with
public agencies (Sjoberg, Brymer & Farris 1966; Petersson, Westholm
& Blomberg 1989; Bleiklie 1990; Möller 1996). Their behaviour
increases institutions’ and employees’ incentives to adjust distributive
and procedural aspects of experiences to these citizens’ preferences.
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Since usage of various kinds of institutions can be expected to
correlate with social status and engagement variables, it is important
to include the latter ones as controls in analyses of institutional effects
on welfare state experiences.
Table 10.3 Number of contacts with customer, user, and client 
institutions
Number of customer experiences Percent
0 13
1 18
2 19
3 19
4 15
5 11
6 5
Sum percent 100
Number of respondents 3685
Number of user experiences Percent
0 25
1 25
2 37
3 7
4 6
Sum percent 100
Number of respondents 3685
Number of client experiences Percent
0 68
1 24
2 5
3 or more 3
Sum percent 100
Number of respondents 3615
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. The
proportion of respondents with more than three client experiences is less than
one percent.
The first step in the analysis is to create three independent variables
measuring personal exposure to customer, user, and client institutions
respectively. More precisely, based on the classification in Table 3.1,
the three indicators count the number of customer, user, and client
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institutions respectively that respondents were in contact with at the
time of answering the questionnaire.2 Univariate distributions may be
inspected in Table 10.3.
Most respondents (87 percent) were in contact with at least one of
the customer institutions for which usage was measured. Similarly, 75
percent were using at least one of the measured user institutions. In
contrast, only about one-third had been in contact with a client
institution. This last observation underscores the universal character of
the Swedish welfare state. At a given point in time most people are not
exposed to bureaucratic discretion and means-testing. Interestingly,
some scholars have suspected that this might be changing slowly (see
Svallfors 1996; Lindkvist 1998; SOU 2001:79). We shall get back to
this in the concluding chapter.
The next step in the analysis is reported in Table 10.4. It contains
results from seven multinomial logit analyses in which the seven
measures of personally experienced distributive and procedural justice
serve as the dependent variables. These dependent variables were
coded as follows: 1=positive experiences, 2=have not been in contact,
and 3=negative experiences. The crucial independent variables are the
three indices from Table 10.3, counting how many client, user, and
customer institutions respectively a person has experienced.
Since these independent variables are included at the same time, we
adjust for the fact that individuals might simultaneously use client,
user and customer institutions respectively. What we are interested in –
and what the models in Table 10.4 give us – is effects of contacts with
one type of institution controlling for the level of individual contact
with other types of institutions. Hence, we utilise detailed information
about the “institutional mix” that an individual has actually
experienced, compared to studies using nationality as a proxy for
institutional exposure. In addition, unlike the previous univariate data,
these models take into account that our independent variables are
conceptually continuous: Since the assumption is that institutions
communicate political information to citizens during experiences, the
degree of individual exposure to institutions should matter for the
extent to which people notice, remember and politicise various aspects
of these experiences.
                                                          
2 The three variables build on the same information, procedure and
principles for missing data as the objective self-interest measure in Chapter 7.
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A multinomial logit model estimates effects on a dependent variable
measured at the nominal level. Estimated parameters show effects on
the log-odds of respondents being in a category on the dependent
variable, relative to the odds of being in a reference category (Long
1997:Chapter 6). Here, our direct substantive interest is effects on the
odds of reporting negative experiences, relative to the odds of
reporting positive experiences. The coefficients in Table 10.4 thus
show how the relative mix of positive and negative experiences
changes as we move from few to many contacts with a certain type of
institution. A positive sign means the odds of reporting negative
experiences increase as the number of contacts with a given type of
institution increases.1
In order to understand Table 10.4 it is helpful to look at the model
in which “I was treated correctly” constituted the dependent variable.
Here, the results support our predictions in a relatively clear-cut
manner. Client institution contacts tend to increase the odds of not
feeling treated correctly (.39). The same goes for exposure to user
institutions, though this effect is smaller than that of client institutions
and not quite significant (.06). In contrast, the customer coefficient is
negative (-.04). In other words, more personal exposure to customer
institutions tends to decrease the odds of not feeling treated correctly.
These differences are exactly what has been hypothesised. The
larger the dose of empowerment built into institutional designs, the
lower the risk of negative welfare state experiences: Client institution
contacts increase the risk of negative welfare state experiences more
than contacts with user institutions, which in turn increase the risk
more than customer institution contacts.
At the bottom of the table one finds formal statistical tests of these
differences between coefficients. The entries are likelihood ratio tests
                                                          
1 Table 10.4 only reports one of the odds contrasts generated by the
multinomial logit model. The reason was that only this contrast was directly
addressed by theoretically driven expectations. Specifically, effects on the odds
of positive experiences relative to the odds of not having been in contact, and
the odds of negative experiences relative to the odds of not having been in
contact, were left out of the table. An inspection of these effects showed that
all three institutional variables increase the odds of reporting both negative
and positive experiences (relative to reporting not having been in contact).
This is logical (and trivial) since the odds of reporting some kind of experience
always ought to grow as the number of actual contacts with institutions
increase. What we are interested in, and what Table 10.4 informs us about, is
how the risk of negative experiences, relative to positive experiences, change
as a function of exposure to different types of institutions.
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comparing the unconstrained models reported in the table with models
where one pair of coefficients at a time was forced to be equal. For
instance, looking at the “treated correctly” column, we observe that
the client effect is indeed significantly larger than the user effect (Chi-
square = 13.93; p = .000). Similarly, the difference between the user
effect and the customer effect approaches significance (Chi-square =
2.01; p = .157).
In general,  the hypotheses receive rather firm support with respect
to differences between client institutions and user institutions. For five
of the seven dependent variables, client institutions increase the risk of
negative experiences more than user institutions. These differences are
all significantly larger than zero.
The predictions also receive some support with respect to the
relative impact of user institutions and customer institutions, though
the support is weaker. However, for three of the seven dependent
variables the hypothesised differences were not to be found. And for
one dependent variable (“difficult finding the right person”) the
direction of the difference was even opposite to the prediction. Still,
for three of the seven dependent variables, exposure to user
institutions does increase the negative experience odds more than
exposure to customer institutions. These effect differences run in the
predicted direction, but they are smaller than the differences between
client institutions and user institutions, and they only approach
significance.
The coefficients of the control variables reveal some interesting
effects. These effects indicate that people exposed to a comparable
institutional mix still differ systematically in their subjective reports of
personal welfare state experiences. For instance, consistent with the
assumption that individual bureaucratic capacity resources matter,
political efficacy, education, and public sector employment all tend to
decrease the odds of negative experiences. However, the same
prediction is only partially confirmed with respect to class (the middle
class reports less difficulties only in “finding the right person” and in
“understanding written messages”). Income and political
sophistication were hardly related to negative experiences at all.
Finally, it is evident that age often decreases the odds of reporting
negative experiences. As discussed above, it has been shown that the
oldest generations have lower expectations on their welfare state
experiences, which is likely to produce more positive experience
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perceptions (Möller 1996). Also, it is likely that people develop more
bureaucratic competence and confidence as life progresses (Goodsell
1981).
Does welfare state design affect the impact of experiences on political
orientations?
We have seen some evidence that welfare state design (as
conceptualised in terms of citizen empowerment) has a certain impact
on the nature of people’s welfare state experiences (as conceptualised
in terms of subjective reports of distributive and procedural justice).
The lower the level of empowerment built into encountered
institutional interfaces, the greater the odds of reporting negative
welfare state experiences (at least for some aspects of experiences).
Interestingly, this conclusion seems to hold for people with the same
gender, age, education, sector employment, class, income, and political
sophistication level.
I now turn to the more radical prediction that experiences are
generalised into over-arching political orientations. Do experiences
with more empowering institutions yield more support for the political
system, for politicians and for state intervention, than do experiences
with less empowering institutions?
Three OLS regression models test these predictions. The first two
models contain effects on satisfaction with democracy and trust in
politicians, and can be observed in Table 10.5. The by now familiar
institutional experience scales are included as independent variables. In
addition to the previously used socio-economic controls, the model
also includes judgements of the Swedish economy, subjective life
satisfaction, as well as two dummy variables tapping whether or not
respondents sympathise with the incumbent Social Democratic party,
or with no party at all. Finally, we also control for whether the
respondent resides in a rich or poor Göteborg district (with “others”
as the reference group). These additional variables correlate with both
institutional experiences and political orientations and are therefore
held constant in the analysis.2
                                                          
2 The categorisation of Göteborg districts has previously been used by for
instance Lennart Nilsson (1996b), and is based on average household income,
the proportion receiving social assistance, and the proportion of immigrants in
the district. Five percent live in poor Göteborg districts as defined here,
whereas seven percent live in rich districts. Twenty-nine percent of
respondents live in Göteborg, which is the urban centre of the Västra
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Table 10.5 Experience effects on satisfaction with democracy and 
trust in politicians (unstandardised OLS estimates)
Dependent variable:
SATISFACTION WITH
DEMOCRACY
(higher value =greater
satisfaction)
Dependent variable:
TRUST IN
POLITICIANS
(higher value =greater
trust)
Number of client experiences -.08*** -.08***
Number of user experiences .01 -.01
Number of customer experiences .02** .02**
Perception of Swedish economy -.19*** -.19***
Preference for incumbent party .31*** .36***
No party preference -.18*** -.20***
Age in years -.003** -.003**
Education .01 .04**
Political sophistication -.04* .00
Political efficacy index .13*** .17***
Subjective class affiliation .06 .05
Household income .00 -.03***
Life satisfaction .15*** .11***
Poor Göteborg district .20** .04
Rich Göteborg district -.11 .00
Constant .14 -.27**
Adjusted R-squared .15 .20
Number of respondents 2438 2515
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. The
dependent variables were described in Chapter 6. The client-, user-, and
customer variables were described in Table 10.3 and related text. The political
efficacy scale is an additive index summating responses to two questions about
the possibilities of affecting political decisions in Sweden and in the
municipality, respectively. The political sophistication measure (higher
values=higher sophistication) was obtained through a factor analysis. Both the
efficacy measure and the sophistication measure are described in more detail
in a footnote in Chapter 9. For more information about other independent
variables, see Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 7.6.
Consistent with the prediction, experiences with empowering
institutions yield more political trust, than do experiences with less
                                                                                                                          
Götaland region and the second largest city in Sweden. The reference category
“others” thus contains Göteborg residents living in neither rich nor poor
districts as well as non-Göteborg residents.
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empowering institutions. In fact, controlling for other independent
variables in the model, experiences with customer institutions increase
both satisfaction with democracy and trust in politicians (.02 in both
cases), whereas client experiences tend to have negative effects (-.08 in
both cases).
The user coefficients are substantively and statistically insignificant,
indicating that user institutions neither build up nor decrease political
trust. However, this shall not be interpreted as if specific information
from user experiences does not spill over into general orientations.
Rather, from an empowerment perspective, user institutions are
compromises between the client and customer extremes. On one hand,
poor exit options decrease institutionalised empowerment and, in
turn, make social justice aspects of experiences more negative. On the
other hand, the absence of discretion increases institutionalised
empowerment and, in turn, improves experiences. The interpretation,
then, of the insignificant user coefficient is that absence of discretion
and poor exit-options cancel out each other’s political effects, not that
political effects are absent.
To get a feeling for the magnitude of the effects we can compare
different individuals with realistic sets of values along the three
experience variables. Think for instance about a person who has
recently been in contact with the three client institutions social
welfare, job agency, and housing allowance, but not with any user or
customer institutions; the effect of this “experience set” on trust in
politicians is -.08 x 3 = -.24. Now think about someone who enjoys
the services of the four customer institutions public transportation,
sports facilities, dental care, and public libraries, but not those of any
user or client institutions; the effect of this experience set is .02 x 4 =
.08. Hence, the predicted trust difference between our two ideal
typical citizens is .08 + .24 = .32. When comparing this effect with the
coefficients for perceptions of the economy (-.19) and of incumbent
party preference (.36), the design of experienced institutions appears
to have a rather decent (although not dominant) effect.
Let us now probe these issues with respect to support for state
intervention and left-right self-placement (Table 10.6).3 Analogous to
                                                          
3 Table 10.6 includes subjective “life satisfaction” as a control variable.
While this control was not included in models of ideological orientations in
other chapters, it was seen as desirable in this particular analysis. The reason
is that low life satisfaction is correlated with both exposure to different
welfare state designs (clients are more dissatisfied), as well as with ideological
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the political trust pattern, client experiences appear to reduce state
intervention support (-.11), whereas customer experiences appear to
increase it (.12). Again, the coefficient for user experiences is not
significantly larger than zero. Furthermore, when comparing
individuals in the same fashion as above, the predicted positive impact
on intervention support of becoming a typical welfare customer
instead of a client, is .81. This effect approaches the direct effects of
the subjective class dichotomy (-.90) and public sector employment
(.87). The finding is interesting as class and sector employment are
emphasised in previous research as determinants of state intervention
orientations and voting behaviour among the Swedish electorate
(Oskarson 1992; Gilljam & Holmberg 1993; Svallfors 1996).
Looking now at the second column of Table 10.6, our expectations
are only partially confirmed with respect to left-right self-placement. It
is confirmed in the sense that customer institutions appear to be best
at generating experiences that make people more inclined to place
themselves further to the left. The regression coefficient for customer
experiences amounts to -.06, whereas the client- and user coefficients
are not significantly different from zero. The latter observation means
that the hypothesis is not supported with respect to client and user
institutions.
Finally, let me clarify a potential source of confusion. As Chapters 8
and 9 reported only weak effects of experienced distributive and
procedural justice on ideological variables, it may seem strange that
the impact of experiences on state intervention orientations now
appear to depend on the experienced institutional interface. More
exactly, given the weak impact of experienced social justice on
ideology, one may wonder through which causal mechanism the
differences in Table 10.6 operate.
                                                                                                                          
variables (as can be seen in the table, low life satisfaction is associated with
greater support for state intervention and with leftist self-identification).
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Table 10.6 Experience effects on state intervention orientation and 
left-right self-placement (unstandardised OLS estimates)
Dependent variable:
STATE INTERVENTION
ORIENTATION
(higher value =more
support for state
intervention)
Dependent variable:
LEFT-RIGHT
SELF-PLACEMENT
(higher value =further to
the right)
Number of client experiences -.11* -.02
Number of user experiences .02 .00
Number of customer experiences .12*** -.06***
Education -.17*** .04
Public sector employment .87*** -.23***
Subjective class affiliation -.90*** .65***
Household income -.13*** .06***
Gender (1=woman) .09 -.04
Life satisfaction -.18** .06*
Political sophistication .19*** -.12***
Political efficacy index .02 -.02*
Poor Göteborg district .39** -.16*
Rich Göteborg district -.41** .21***
Constant 6.98*** 2.78***
Adjusted R-squared .12 .14
Number of respondents 2436 2529
*p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Comment: The data come from the 1999 West Sweden SOM Survey. The
dependent variables were described in Chapter 7. The client, user, and
customer variables were described in Table 10.3 and related text. The political
efficacy scale is an additive index summating responses to two questions about
the possibilities of affecting political decisions in Sweden and in the
municipality, respectively. The political sophistication measure (higher
values=higher sophistication) was obtained through a factor analysis. Both the
efficacy measure and the sophistication measure are described in more detail
in a footnote in Chapter 9. The Göteborg variables are described in a footnote
in this chapter. For more information about other independent variables, see
Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 7.6.
Based on Chapter 3, I think there are three possible answers. First,
though the effects reported in Chapters 8 and 9 were usually weak,
they were not consistently equal to zero. Rather, the point was that
effects on political trust variables were stronger, although in several
instances both experienced distributive and procedural justice had
certain effects on ideological variables. Second, Chapter 9 looked at
only one particular kind of procedural justice: experienced voice
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opportunities. It is still conceivable that if we tried to measure in a
more detailed manner other procedural aspects such as for instance
polite treatment, there would be effects also on ideology. Third,
experienced distributive and procedural justice are not the only
mechanisms that we have identified as potential mediators of
institutionalised empowerment effects. In particular, Chapter 3
discussed the possibility that discretionary services have a higher
probability than other institutions to stimulate suspicion concerning
cheating and abuse. Exposure to discretionary services may therefore
have a greater tendency to stimulate negative views on other peoples’
morality and trustworthiness. Hence, in addition to experienced
distributive and procedural justice, generalised trust might be an
additional causal mechanism through which the negative effects of
client experiences operate (see Kumlin & Rothstein, forthcoming).
Conclusion
Neo-institutionalist accounts of how welfare states affect citizens
politically have slowly begun to influence empirical public opinion
research. Chapter 3 - The Institutional Interface - identified two ways
of thinking about how differences across welfare state institutions
influence political orientations among mass publics. First, there was
the contention that welfare states have an impact through the quantity
of welfare outcomes they distribute to various groups and individuals
(Dunleavy 1979; Zetterberg 1985). From this point of view, welfare
state size rather than welfare state design emerges as the important
macro level variable. Likewise, at the individual level the crucial
variable is personal interests and outcome levels. Of course, the self-
interest perspective is the label we have used for his way of thinking
about how the welfare state institutions intervene in processes of
attitude formation. It was dealt with theoretically in Chapter 2 and
empirically in Chapter 7.
In contrast, the welfare state design perspective on institutional
impact draws attention to what people experience along the way to
outcomes. It assumes that the structure of the contact interface
between citizen and institution may be just as important as the
generosity of the transfers and services that come out of the process. In
support of the welfare state design perspective, we have seen that the
ability of welfare state institutions to build support for state
intervention and for the political system varies with the level of
The Customer, the User, and the Client290
empowerment built into institutional designs. More exactly, client
institutions tend to undermine support, whereas customer institutions
tend to mobilise it. Somewhat ironically, it is the most market-like
public institutions that excel at generating positive feelings about
collective entities like the welfare state and the political system. The
implications of this irony will be one of the topics in the concluding
chapter.
Implications

Chapter 11
The Personal and the Political
Revisited

he time has come to fulfil an old promise. More to the point,
Chapter 1 outlined the main research problems addressed by this
study, and promised that this concluding chapter would reconsider
them in greater depth in the light of the empirical findings. In fulfilling
the promise, this chapter outlines the broader political, democratic,
and scientific implications of the theories and results previously
presented.
Our purpose is not to reiterate in great detail the empirical findings;
for such repetition the reader may refer to concluding sections in the
respective chapters. Nevertheless, before proceeding to implications, it
may be useful to begin with just a minimal re-statement of the most
important findings that have emerged from the empirical analyses.
Second, the chapter proceeds to a general discussion of a somewhat
neglected – but important – research problem: the question of how
and why basic political orientations gradually change in adult life.
Third, we devote a couple of sections to the implications of the finding
that the personal is more political in the welfare state territory than in
the economic realm. Fourth, we ponder the finding that political
effects of “the personal” appear constituted both by self-interest as
well as by social justice. Fifth, we discuss what the findings imply for
the question of how different ways of organising and shaping welfare
state institutions affect citizens politically.
In the final part of the chapter – the coda – we go well beyond these
more immediately salient research problems. More specifically, we
take on the challenge to think about ongoing democratic trends and
reforms in the light of the empirical discoveries.
T
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Findings in a nutshell
Personal welfare state experiences have substantively significant effects
on political orientations. This is a somewhat different conclusion than
the one found in much previous research – especially the “economic
voting” literature. By and large, this research has reinforced the notion
that the personal is separate from the political, in that it has usually
found relatively weak statistical relationships between, on the one
hand, political attitudes and behaviour, and personal economic
hardship and personal unemployment on the other. In contrast, we
have seen evidence that personal welfare state experiences are more
politically important than personal economic experiences. Whereas the
personal and the political are fairly separate in the economic realm,
they seem to blend together in the welfare state.
Of course, as was emphasised in Chapter 6, this does not mean we
should throw the notion of sociotropic animals overboard when
examining the political impact of welfare state related government
performance. On the contrary, perceptions of collective-level
experiences matter also in the welfare state territory. But sociotropic
public service perceptions are informed by personal experiences to a
much greater extent than economic sociotropic perceptions. And
sociotropic public service perceptions are to a quite large extent the
causal mechanism of personal experience effects. Many seem to
generalise their personal welfare state experiences into collective-level
judgements of what the population as a whole is experiencing. In turn,
collective level perceptions have effects on the political orientations
under study here.
Furthermore, personal welfare state experiences are not uni-
dimensional events. Their political influence cannot be captured by
any single master variable. Rather, the perspectives of self-interest,
distributive justice, and voice opportunities all appear to capture
different aspects of these experiences that are consequential for
citizens’ political orientations. Here, self-interest is influential mainly
for political ideology, with those who gain personally from the welfare
state being more likely to support state intervention and more likely to
stand further to the left. In contrast, experienced distributive justice
and experienced voice opportunities have an impact mainly on
political trust, where those who have personally experienced injustice
are less likely than others to be satisfied with the democratic system
and to trust politicians. Finally, we have seen that the effects of
                                                 The Personal and the Political Revisited 295
personal welfare state experiences appear systematically structured by
“the institutional interface.” Customer institutions – where discretion
is rare and exit-options frequent – are better at generating positive
experiences, and in turn positive effects on welfare state support and
political trust, than client institutions – where discretion is frequent
and exit-options rare.
Having drawn these conclusions, a couple of caveats are worth
repeating. First, we have drawn on cross-sectional data only, which
means we can say little about possible reciprocal influences of political
trust and ideology on measures of personal welfare state experiences.
The extent to which people “select,” “project,” “resist,” and
“construct,” personal welfare state experiences remains an issue for
further exploration. Second, in contrast to what the most optimistic
welfare state theorists sometimes assume, we have hardly found the
holy explanatory grail of public opinion research. Not even in Sweden,
where the welfare state occupies a large portion of political debate,
and is a crucial source of party conflict, are personal welfare state
experiences the sole or the most important causal factor behind
political trust and ideology. In fact, in most of the statistical models
presented throughout this book, there was usually some other
independent variable that exercised about the same, or a greater
influence compared to welfare state experiences. Judging from the
estimates, then, welfare state experiences constitute but one of many
factors that explain variation in political trust and ideology. But this is
not bad, if the reader agrees that political orientations can only be
understood by considering a multitude of perspectives, and that the
holy grail is unlikely to exist.
Political learning in adulthood: a blind spot in the scientific eye
What do these findings contribute to our knowledge about public
opinion formation and political behaviour? The most general answer
is that it makes a small contribution to the filling of a quite large
knowledge gap. That gap is constituted by the fact that we know
surprisingly little – given the by now gargantuan dimensions of the
research field – about how and why citizens’ general political
orientations change in adult life.
This state of affairs is not entirely easy to understand as there has
been so much research on the sources, the nature, and the effects of
general political orientations. As indicated in Chapter 4, we know a
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lot about how pre-adult socialisation lays a foundation for these
orientations (Jennings & Niemi 1974; Westholm 1991), and there has
been much research on their socio-economic bases in adult life
(Franklin, Mackie & Valen 1992; Särlvik 1974; Oskarson 1994).
Likewise, we know much about the internal structure of such
orientations (especially when it comes to left-right related
orientations), as well as about how orientations affect voting
behaviour (Holmberg 1981; Gilljam 1990; Oscarsson 1998), and
interact into political information processing (Kinder 1998). Also, we
know that general political orientations are relatively stable, so that
there is certainly not an infinite amount of change in adult life to be
explained (Sears & Funk 1999). Likewise, empirical studies have
tended to support an “ageing-stability hypothesis,” indicating that
general political orientations are stabilised and reinforced further with
age (Alwin & Krosnick 1991; Miller & Shanks 1996).
However, we would like to know much more about why, when and
how basic orientations nevertheless can gradually change in adult life.
This desire should not be seen as a criticism against some unnamed
scholars that are somehow denying that systematic political learning in
adult life is going on, and that it is not worthwhile to explore the issue
further. Rather, the point is that such learning in adulthood seems
under-theorised and under-researched compared to other questions
related to political orientations.1 For sure, empirical results arousing
one’s curiosity are published at a regular rate. But they are rarely the
main focus of research projects, and the findings come in the form of
empirical side products noted in passing, often as regression
coefficients of control variables in models estimated for other
purposes. Systematic knowledge about political learning in adulthood
is therefore not accumulating as it should in a systematic and
collective research program (Sigel 1989; Sapiro 1994).
John Zaller’s theory of opinion formation – the so-called RAS
model – is perhaps the prime example of how gradual political
learning in adulthood has become a blind spot in the scientific eye.
This model, most coherently presented in The Nature and Origins of
                                                          
1 There are obviously prominent exceptions to this simplification. For instance,
a vigorous research program has been devoted to investigating the extent to
which party identification – a political orientation originally believed to be
mainly, though not entirely, influenced by early socialisation (Campbell et al.
1960) – is affected by issue stands and retrospective evaluations of government
performance in adult life (see further Converse 1975;  Fiorina 1981; Franklin
& Jackson 1983; Franklin 1984; Miller & Shanks 1996).
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Mass Opinion (Zaller 1992), is interesting for several reasons. For
example, it is widely applied and appreciated by the scientific
community, as reflected by James Stimson’s (1995:182) judgement
that it is “perhaps the best book ever written about public opinion.” A
more important reason, however, is that the model represents the
perhaps most far-reaching and successful attempt to formulate a
general theory about public opinion, an attempt which incorporates a
large number of well-known (and some less well-known) empirical
regularities uncovered by more than a half-century of research. Indeed,
Donald Kinder’s (1998:181) overview indicated that the model has
been applied “with mostly smashing empirical success.” So when
thinking about the state-of-the-art of the research field, the RAS model
is an excellent stimuli.
This is not the place for a detailed discussion on the subtleties of
this sophisticated theory (see Zaller 1992:Chapters 3 and 11). For our
purposes it is enough to notice the important role assigned to political
predispositions in the opinion formation process. Such predispositions
include basic political values such as liberalism-conservatism, party
identification, and race-related orientations. Political trust and
ideology, as conceptualised and measured here, clearly fall into this
category of political orientations.
Furthermore, the RAS model is a memory-based model. It states
that opinions do not exist before a survey researcher asks for them.
When prompted by an interviewer to form an opinion, the respondent
manufactures it “on the spot” aided by the information that happens
to be immediately available in memory. Indeed, “persons who have
been asked a survey question [...] answer the question on the basis of
whatever considerations are accessible ‘at the top of the head.’ In some
cases, only a single consideration may be readily accessible, in which
case people answer on the basis of that consideration; in other cases,
two or more considerations may come quickly to mind, in which case
people answer by averaging across accessible considerations” (Zaller
1992:49).
General political predispositions are predicted to have an effect on
political opinions by virtue of regulating which considerations are
accepted, memorised, and subsequently recalled for “on-the-spot”
opinion formation. Although the model predicts that such effects vary
in strength across individuals, issues, question wordings, and political
contexts, it is clear that general political orientations such as political
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trust and ideology are very important factors behind opinion
formation and political behaviour.2
Therefore, it is not entirely satisfying that we know so little about
how general political orientations are in turn formed, at least not
beyond pre-adult socialisation and location in the socio-economic
structure. Indeed, all its virtues notwithstanding, the Zaller model is
almost completely silent on this matter. All we really learn is that,
“The sources of variability in individuals’ political predispositions are
beyond the scope of this book. My assumption, however, is that
predispositions are at least in part a distillation of a person’s life-time
experiences, including childhood socialisation and direct involvement
with the raw ingredients of policy issues, such as earning a living,
paying taxes, racial discrimination, and so forth. Predispositions also
depend on social and economic location and [...] on inherited and
acquired personality factors” (Zaller 1992:23).
My aim here is not to unjustly bash Zaller’s contribution, but rather
to illustrate that the paths along which basic political orientations may
travel during the life course are under-researched. Not even in a study
that incorporates into a general theory most of what we know about
political attitudes – building a model of the “origins of mass opinion”
– do we learn much about where the crucial political predispositions
come from.
Instead, opinion change is reduced to short-term changes in the
concrete considerations immediately available in citizen’s memories.
And according to the RAS model, when the salience of such short-term
                                                          
2 One of the cornerstones of the RAS model is that, in order for
predispositions to affect opinions, people need contextual information about
how information surrounding the issue in question relates to basic
predispositions. One of the contextual sources that citizens draw on is the
pattern of party conflict on an issue: when there is elite consensus, many
people have a hard time figuring out how different stands and arguments fit
with their basic orientations. Conversely, such value-driven information
processing becomes considerably easier when there are clear differences
between parties. These findings are interesting as they point to systematic
differences between America and many West European systems. The latter are
typically marked by a more issue-based, polarised, and stable mode of party
conflict. It has been shown that more of such conflict has a tendency to make
ideological predispositions more well-developed and frequently used in the
citizenry (see Niemi & Westholm 1984; Granberg & Holmberg 1988; van der
Eijk, Franklin & Oppenhuis 1996; van Wijnen 2001; Kumlin 2001b). These
findings thus suggest that especially ideological orientations are more
important for opinion formation and political behaviour in many West
European political systems, than they are in the US. Naturally, if this is
correct, it becomes even more interesting to explore the processes by which
such orientations develop in adult life.
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considerations drops, they do not leave much of an attitudinal imprint
behind. There is little left for the possibility that citizens, alongside
accepting, rejecting, recalling, and forgetting immediately available
short-term information, actually manage to use information to
gradually develop even their basic long-term political orientations.3
Granted, almost all researchers acknowledge the crucial impact of
basic predispositions in the opinion formation process. But more often
than not, these are assumed to exist rather than constituting the actual
dependent variable in an empirical analysis; they are assumed at the
outset to be the results of some half-mystical process that has occurred
in the past and that is now to a great extent finished. The researcher
can then safely go on to investigate how predispositions affect attitude
formation, information processing, voting behaviour, or some other
important research topic. As a result, basic political learning in
adulthood is far too seldom systematically theorised and investigated.
This must be seen as problematic given the crucial role basic political
predispositions have proven to play in public opinion formation and
political behaviour.
Clarifying the political time of our lives
Against this backdrop, Virginia Sapiro (1994) has made a forceful call
for political scientists to “clarify the political time of our lives.” She,
too, argues that researchers are often too content with the sweeping
assumption that basic political orientations are the results of pre-adult
socialisation, or of the usual socio-economic suspects like class,
education, and income: “As studies of electoral politics show, even
some basic political identities such as partisanship can change during
adulthood. Common sense, or at least experience, also suggests that
we should look more closely at adulthood for political learning. It is
difficult to believe that those things that seem so important to day-to-
day-experience would not affect our political persona: major life
events, dramatic or persistent interaction with social institutions
outside the family, the experience of historical events and changes, the
biological process of ageing and the cumulative impact of acting,
                                                          
3 Zaller pursues a similar line of reasoning when he (1992:280) recognises “a
general weakness of the entire RAS framework, namely its failure to provide
any mechanism for integration of information that has been acquired. By its
axioms, people screen information at the point of first encountering it, but
once internalised, each bit of information becomes just another consideration
in a mental ‘bin’ full of such atomised cognitions.”
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thinking, and being acted on over time. Nevertheless, rummaging
through the relevant literature shows little coherent development of
theory about political development over the life course” (Sapiro
1994:200). Consequently, she (1994:213) calls for more “conceptual
and theoretical work in order to improve our understanding of the
political implications of life course development, especially if we are to
move beyond the notion of life course indicators as an untheorized set
of ‘demographic’ or ‘background’ variables. What are the ways in
which personal life course events and experiences might take on
political meaning, or become part of the process of political learning
and development?”
The theoretical framework and the empirical results presented here
provide some partial answers to these big questions. We have
theorised and empirically investigated personal welfare state
experiences as occasions for political learning in adulthood, occasions
on which political trust and ideology are gradually updated in the light
of new experienced facts about policies and politics. There are reasons
to reinforce Soss’s (1999:364) case for “studying welfare programmes
as sites of adult political learning [...] I argue that as clients
participate in welfare programs they learn lessons about how citizens
and governments relate, and these lessons have political consequences
beyond the domain of welfare agencies. [They] become the basis for
broader orientations toward government and political action.”
Inspired by authors like Sapiro (1994), Sigal (1989), and Soss
(1999), as well as by my own research, I suggest that future public
opinion research puts more energy into generating and testing theory-
driven hypotheses about yet other sorts of political learning in
adulthood. It is hard to believe that welfare state institutions are the
only venues for such processes. But more focused theoretical and
empirical work is needed if we are to find and make sense of these
venues, thereby clarifying the political time of our lives.
The personal is more political in welfare state territory than in the
economic realm
A somewhat more specific research program to which this study
contributes is centred around the contention that personal experiences
– or, in more dramatic parlance, people’s independent observations of
reality – tend to be of minor importance for political attitudes. In
Chapter 1, we even discovered that influential scholars assume at the
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outset of their studies that citizens do not have many politically
relevant experiences in adult life from which they could draw political
conclusions. Political issues and struggles are treated as if they were
extraterrestrial phenomena located far up in the stratosphere, well
beyond the personal life sphere. More than this, many empirical
studies on especially economic voting have found that even when
people do have relevant personal experiences from which they could
draw political conclusions, they nevertheless fail to do it. Especially
personal economic experiences such as unemployment and financial
ups and downs in the pocketbook have proven to be of minor political
importance. Rather than looking at personal experiences, much past
research contends, citizens are driven politically by “sociotropic”
perceptions of collective experiences. Thus, when forming attitudes
they ask themselves, not “what has happened to me?”, but “what has
happened to people in the country.” In turn, sociotropic economic
perceptions have proven to originate mainly in information provided
by elite actors such as journalists, experts, and politicians, rather than
in independent observations of social and political reality. In sum,
previous research suggests that the personal and the political lead
rather separate lives among citizens in modern democracies. This, in
turn, makes people more dependent on elite actors for politically
relevant information.
Certainly, this study has not gone so far as to question the general
notion that citizens to a large extent depend on the mass media and
political elites for political information. Rather, it has made the more
nuanced claim that there is a variance across policy domains. We
predicted in Chapter 1 and supported empirically in Chapter 6 that
the personal and the political are, to a degree, re-connected when we
move out of the economic realm and into welfare state territory. Two
explanations for the difference across policy domains have been
suggested. First, the nature of available political information differs,
with a better supply of general, sociotropic information about
collective experiences in the economic realm compared to welfare state
territory; this makes personal economic experiences less crucial from
an informational point of view. Second, the nature of political
responsibility varies across the two policy domains, with a clearer and
closer link between responsible politicians and personal welfare state
experiences, than between responsible politicians and ups and downs
in the personal pocketbook. Judging from the results presented in
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Chapter 6, this makes personal welfare state experiences more likely
to trigger political thinking and attitude formation. They become a
more important political information source than personal economic
experiences. Whereas personal-level and collective-level judgements
often fail to connect in the economic realm, they do so to a greater
extent in the welfare state.
In sum, this suggests that citizens are not entirely dependent on
politicians, the mass media, or experts, for information relevant to
political learning in adulthood. Far away from the hustle and bustle of
elite politics and mass media attention, there are other opinion
formation processes going on where political trust and ideology are
gradually updated in the light of new independent personal
observations of welfare state arrangements and public services.
Unfortunately, the tendency among researchers to investigate mainly
the political impact of economic outcomes and performance – referred
to in Chapter 6 as the economistic bias in electoral research – has
perhaps hidden this for a longer time than necessary.
Implications of tighter personal-political links
From a democratic point of view, how should we think about the
variation in the strength of the personal-political link? As Diana Mutz
explains in Impersonal Influence (1998), personal-experience-based
opinion formation has traditionally been regarded as something
inherently positive for democratic processes. Building partly on the
“mass society” tradition (Kornhauser 1955), Mutz identifies the
danger that the information provided in the media does not accurately
reflect what the collective has actually experienced. The information
on which citizens’ sociotropic perceptions are based may tell a
different story than the sum of citizens’ life situations. Hence, in
contrast to personal-experience-based opinion formation, “the
sociotropic model suggests a potential for distortion and lack of
accountability that personal-experience-based politics appears to
ensure. Personal concerns are anchored in real-world experience in a
way that judgements of distant collectives are not. If the policies of
current politicians are hurting enough people, voting on the basis of
personal experience guarantees that the rascals will soon be thrown
out of office. On the other hand, a citizenry forming political views on
the basis of collective-level perceptions is vulnerable to manipulation.
If mass media or other information sources lead people to form
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inaccurate perceptions, their political views cannot ensure the same
level of accountability as aggregated personal experiences” Mutz
(1998:109).
Of course, the quality of sociotropic information may vary greatly:
The problem becomes smaller the more relevant, accurate and multi-
faceted information about aggregated collective experience that
journalists, politicians, and experts provide. However, to the extent
that citizens do not draw political conclusions from their personal
observations, there is always the suspicion of a gap between
sociotropic information provided by elite discourse and actual
collective experience.
In fact, the potential sources of distortion of collective-level
perceptions are numerous. Prominent among them are the fact that the
media can only focus on a limited number of aspects of collective
experiences, as well as the fact that a “media logic” is said to give
priority to negative, unusual, or dramatic events. Furthermore, not the
least in election campaign coverage, journalists increasingly seem
prone to report on the current political news of the day and neglect
retrospective performance aspects altogether (Esaiasson & Håkansson
2002). On top of this, governments always have incentives to
emphasise facts conducive to re-election, and avoid talking about
those that are not, as manifested in strategies of blame avoidance
(Weaver 1986; Lewin 2001).
Imagine a situation where a majority of citizens are somewhat
dissatisfied with what they have experienced while in contact with
public health care. In this situation, a government is nevertheless likely
to put an emphasis on the few positive measures, increased spending,
or otherwise positive reforms that have indeed been implemented. At
the same time, selective journalists whose attention are driven by a
media logic may be overly biased in the direction of exaggerated and
dramatic health care events and trends, which are equally poor
representatives of actual collective experience (see Hernes 1987).
For such reasons, sociotropic information provided in the mass
media may not be an entirely satisfactory mirror of what is actually
suggested by “the full” aggregated collective experience that the
population has actually gone through.4 From a democratic point of
                                                          
4 For more in-depth discussions about the meaning and impact of media logic,
see McQuail 1994; Westerståhl & Johansson 1985; Eide & Hernes 1987;
Petersson & Carlberg 1990; Strömbäck 2001.
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view, this is potentially problematic as people’s sociotropic
perceptions “become independent of their aggregated personal
experiences, and democratic accountability breaks down. Those who
do not have accurate perceptions of social conditions may punish
politicians for problems that have not truly occurred or reward them
for improvements that have no basis in collective individual realities.”
(Mutz 1998:285) Such informational biases are exacerbated if citizens
do not manage to draw political conclusions from their personal
observations of reality. Political accountability is obscured if
sociotropic perceptions are not in accord with actual collective
experience, at the same time as actually occurring personal experiences
of societal trends and facts are not informing the opinion formation
process.
Moreover, an absence of personal-experience-based accountability
would arguably be even more serious in the welfare state territory
than in the economic realm. This is because the informational biases
produced by media logic and blame avoidance may well be given
greater leeway in the former policy domain. In Chapter 1, we noted
that economic perceptions have proven to be very responsive to a
small subset of macroeconomic indicators (unemployment level,
budget deficit and inflation). Using such parsimonious and not terribly
disputed information – typically provided by the mass media – it
becomes a manageable task for citizens to form meaningful sociotropic
perceptions. There is no need to consult personal experiences for
political guidance.  In contrast, the welfare state does not offer any
small set of easily available and agreed-upon indicators, comparable to
unemployment level and inflation. Whether welfare state institutions
are improving or deteriorating becomes a more difficult, ambiguous,
and subjective question for both citizens and journalists, than saying
something about the state of the economy. Therefore, given that we
value opinion formation based on perceptions that are as close as
possible to actual collective experience, it seems healthy that people
are more prone to use personal experiences as a political information
source in the welfare state territory, compared to the economic realm.
Welfare state experience effects reflect both self-interest and social
justice
At this point, the reader may wonder if personal experiences are in
fact a miracle medicine for unhealthy democratic processes. Not quite.
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In fact, while personal-experienced-based opinion formation may
promote reality-based accountability, personal experiences are
nevertheless increasingly seen as a rather poor source of political
information. Many democratic theorists stress the importance of
trying to make people look up from their narrow personal life spheres
and consider a broader range of information that include other
people’s arguments, life situations, and experiences (see Mansbridge
1990:Chapter 1).
Further, personal-experience-based opinion formation is often
regarded as dangerously close to short-term, material self-interest. As
noted in Chapter 2, self-interest-based opinions are considered an
obstacle to an enlightened politics striving for more collective and
long-term rationality. Particularly proponents of deliberative
democracy argue that the quality of political decisions increase if they
were preceded by open conversation and debate between citizens with
affected interests (see Fishkin 1995; Bohman & Rehg 1997; Elster
1998). Such deliberative processes, it is argued, encourage participants
to develop their preferences so that they increasingly come to reflect
also other people’s experiences and points of view, not just strictly
personal experiences and personal self-interest. The worry is that
people’s initial attitudes, which are presumably self-interest driven, do
not correspond to the enlightened choices citizens would have made
after more careful deliberation based on broader information.
Therefore, self-interested attitudes, or other attitudes that have not
been distilled through public deliberation, become an obstacle to the
formation of an enlightened and true popular will.
Arguments of this sort build on the assumption that self-interest-
based attitudes typically do change as a result of a broader
information intake; if the public would just engage in activities such as
public deliberation, the will of the people would often look
considerably different than it does in the absence of such intense
activities. Now, it has not been our purpose to examine whether
political orientations become less affected by personal experiences as
citizens engage more in deliberative activities. We do not really know
to what extent deliberative democratic theorists have good reason to
suspect that short-term self-interest gradually loses whatever impact it
has on public opinion as a result of public deliberation. Alternatively,
one may open for the possibility that self-interest is often a resistant
and exogenous force that is rarely reduced by a greater and broader
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information intake. Questions such as these are interesting issues for
further research (see Luskin 2002).
What one can say based on the results, however, is that personal-
experienced-based attitudes are not equivalent to self-interested
attitudes. Rather, the question of whether personal experiences play a
political role is a question of what information sources are used for
opinion formation. It is not a question of what underlying motivation
that drives citizens, or what utility function they are typically
maximising.
This theoretical point has sometimes been made in the context of
economic voting. For instance, Kinder and Kiewiet (1981:132) pointed
out that “The distinction between pocketbook and sociotropic politics
is not equivalent to the distinction between a self-interested and an
altruistic politics. [...] differences between the pocketbook and
sociotropic characterisations of citizen politics should be regarded not
as one of motivation, but as one of information.” Sears and Funk
(1991:65) add to this by explaining, “... apparently disinterested
sociotropic judgments could be based in long-term self-interest. People
who perceive the Republicans as having presided over a period of
great national prosperity may support Republican candidates because
they think that a party that is good for the national economy will
ultimately benefit them as well ...”
This distinction between personal experience effects and self-interest
effects has not always been fully appreciated. For instance, in their
theoretical work on self-interest and politics, Lewin (1988, 1991) and
Udéhn (1996) interpret the relative absence of pocketbook voting, and
the presence of sociotropic voting, as rather unproblematic evidence
that voters are not driven by self-interest. But again, what such
findings really show is that people are not inclined to use self-
communicated economic information to form political preferences.
Whether personal-experience-based opinion formation also signals the
presence of self-interested opinion formation, and whether sociotropic
influence indicates its absence, must be regarded as empirical
questions.
Here, Chapter 7 found that short-term, material, personal self-
interest is indeed one of the ingredients of welfare state experience
effects on general political orientations. In contrast to what much past
research contends, symbolic orientations such as political trust and
ideology are not merely the results of pre-adult socialisation,
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occupation, socio-economic location, or group identities. They also
seem to be significantly affected by current welfare state-related self-
interest.
On the other hand, while the impact of welfare state self-interest is
in all likelihood stronger than previous estimates based on sparse
measures of self-interest, what we have at hand is not more than a
half-full glass. Welfare state self-interest is not the most important
explanation for political orientations, as manifested by the observation
that a simple class identification dichotomy typically beats self-interest
as a factor behind left-right self-identification and state intervention
orientations.
More than this, the self-interest perspective still only tells part of the
true story about welfare state experiences. Consistent with the
remarks of Kinder and Kiewiet above, this study has treated self-
interest as merely one of several possibly influential dimensions of
personal welfare state experiences: in addition to self-interest, the
perspectives of distributive and procedural justice allow the possibility
that the political impact of experiences is driven by a comparison
between one’s personal experience and an expectation as to what one
has a right to experience in a given welfare state setting.
The empirical analyses in Chapters 8 and 9 have supported these
ideas with respect to political trust, though not with respect to
political ideology. Justice-related variables have an impact on political
trust, which is to a large degree independent of self-interest. Further,
justice-related considerations do not seem to be strongly affected by
self-interest. The view that social justice concerns are just “self-interest
in disguise” has received little empirical support. Likewise, in Chapter
9 it was discovered that political reactions to judgements of
procedures were also largely independent of the extent to which
people were satisfied with outcomes of the procedures. Good voice
opportunities in the process seem to enhance trust in the political
system even among those already satisfied with service outcomes.
It seems, then, that the personal and the political are tied together
by both self-interest and social justice concerns. Not even in the
welfare state setting – where politics is so obviously about interests
and redistribution – can the self-interest perspective account for nearly
all of what is going on. Rather, the findings suggest that personal
welfare state experiences are occasions when citizens not only react to
narrow personal gain, but also ponder whether their personal
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outcomes can be regarded as socially just. The results suggest that
people are concerned with what “a person such as me in this
situation,” has the right to expect in terms of outcomes and
procedure. And if personal experiences fall short of social justice
expectations, the welfare state experience has negative effects on
political trust, even though it contributed substantially to personal,
short-term, self-interest.
Taken together, the findings with respect to self-interest and social
justice suggest that we ought to take a nuanced view of public opinion
formation in general, and of personal welfare state experiences in
particular. Not even the political effects of welfare state experiences –
a setting where there is so much at stake for the individual – are only
about short-term maximisation of personal material gain. It seems that
the worry raised by deliberative democrats and others – that personal-
experience-based opinion formation fosters mainly narrow self-
interest-based politics – does not do full justice to the reality of such
opinion formation. Rather, our results suggest that citizens’ faith in
the democratic system does not necessarily hinge on the ability of the
system to satisfy the self-interested wishes of a majority of citizens.
Instead, the crucial issue seems to be whether most citizens see the
their personal outcomes, and the procedures by which outcomes were
reached, as fair.
These findings raise a host of new questions that this study has not
sought to answer. What is it that citizens expect, more exactly, in
terms of procedure and service delivery from different concrete welfare
state institutions? And what are the origins of citizens’ social justice
expectations? If they are not “self-interest” in disguise, then what are
they? Are they themselves mainly the result of previous experiences
with an institution, opinion formation by political elites, or some
other explanatory factor? And how variable and malleable are
expectations across social groups and across time? Questions such as
these should stand a chance of stimulating further research on public
opinion formation in welfare states.
Path dependence
Thus far, we have pondered mostly implications for why and how
individual citizens develop their political orientations. But the
implications of this study go beyond individual opinion formation: the
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findings also say something about the structural impact of some of the
institutions on which political life is founded.
As a general backdrop for such a discussion, it is useful to invoke
the notion of path dependence, which points to a reciprocal
relationship between the organisation of political institutions and
individual behaviour. Furthermore, as noted by scholars such as
Pierson (2001) and Rothstein and Steinmo (2002), such a relationship
can often, though not always, be described as “self-reinforcing over
time.” That is, institutional and organisational choices at a certain
point in time gradually make citizens and major political actors adjust
their knowledge, expectations, and attitudes, so as to become more
consistent with the chosen organisational features of politics. In turn,
such individual adjustment makes later political choices more likely to
be in line with those that have already been made earlier. In this sense,
different polities travel down different institutional paths, where initial
institutional choices tend to constrain later choices, so as to reinforce
the already chosen institutional path.
There are several mechanisms of path dependence. One is what
March and Olsen (1989) call the logic of appropriateness. According
to this logic, citizens and other political actors who must deal with a
complex informational environment use already existing institutions,
rules, and standard operating procedures for guidance as to what
solutions and decisions are appropriate in a given situation. A second
mechanism is that of increasing returns. As Pierson (2001:415)
explains, this vehicle for path dependence “encourages actors to focus
on a single alternative and to continue movement down a particular
path once initial steps are taken. Large set-up or fixed costs are likely
to create increasing returns to further investment in a given
technology, providing individuals with a strong incentive to identify
and stick with a single option. Substantial learning effects connected
to the operation of complex systems provide an additional source of
increasing returns. Coordination effects [...] occur when the individual
receives increased benefits from a particular activity if others also
adopt the same option” (see also Peters 1999).
Below I discuss a further factor that may at times be conducive to
path dependence. More exactly, I discuss institutional effects on
citizens’ personal welfare state experiences and, in turn, their political
orientations as one of the mechanisms by which welfare state
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institutions may – or may sometimes not – reinforce their own
existence.
Path dependence, welfare state reforms, and public opinion
Welfare state institutions have proven resilient to radical
retrenchment. Unlike what is predicted by the more extreme versions
of globalisation theory, it has proven difficult to “roll back the welfare
state” in most policy areas in Western countries. Recent research
concludes that radical retrenchment policies have been implemented
on a major scale only in a small number of countries (such as New
Zeeland, see Pierson 2001). Part of the typically offered explanation is
that although welfare states face economic and demographic
challenges, self-interested citizens are not keen to withdraw support
for their services and entitlements. Retrenchment policies tend to
highlight readily identifiable groups of  “losers,” whereas the potential
gains are more diffuse, insecure, and long-term. Because so many
voters have vested interests in the welfare state, the argument goes,
large-scale welfare state retrenchment becomes “politically suicidal in
most countries” (Pierson 2001:416; see also Lindbom 2001).
This storyline fits nicely into the general notion of path dependence.
By gradually making greater portions of the electorate dependent on
its products, the welfare state is believed to have gradually reinforced
its own popular support. Returning to the dramatic parlance of
Zetterberg (1985), electorates in developed nations are “in the grips of
the welfare state,” where the generosity of welfare state institutions
coupled with the short-sighted egoism of individual citizens mean that
seriously anti-welfare parties and ideological viewpoints will rarely
win democratic battles. A self-reinforcing welfare state has closed its
trap around self-interested voters.
As discussed above, we have found a certain amount of support for
this line of reasoning in our analyses of self-interest and political
orientations. At least to a greater extent than has usually been
acknowledged in past individual-level political behaviour research,
support for state intervention and left-right self-identification are
partly products of the extent to which one benefits personally from
welfare state institutions.
A corollary of this finding is that changes in institutions and policies
that seriously reduce the extent to which citizens have vested welfare
state interests will reduce welfare state support and left identification
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among affected groups. Of course, as we noted above, major efforts to
roll back the state are not nearly as commonplace, popular, or radical
as has been suggested by the more extreme variants of globalisation
theory. Nevertheless, significant institutional and policy changes
clearly do occur, albeit in a more piecemeal fashion. In the fall of
2001, the Swedish parliamentary commission Balance Sheet for the
Welfare State in the 1990s presented its main report (SOU 2001:79).
Resulting in some 13 volumes of research, the purpose of this public
investigation was to map a broad spectrum of welfare state related
lines of development during the 1990s, such as equality of
opportunity, equality of condition, variations in individual resources,
as well as institutional changes in welfare state services and transfers.
The commission found that, as a result of many piecemeal decisions
at several political levels, significant institutional changes in the
Swedish welfare state truly occurred in the 1990s. Interestingly, many
of these seem to have reduced the extent to which people have a vested
personal interest in welfare state institutions. Not least, the public
social insurance system has undergone significant changes.
Replacement rates in income-based insurances against unemployment,
illness etc., are now considerably lower. At the same time, the
replacement ceilings that indicate the maximum amount of income
replacement have typically not been adjusted upwards so as to keep up
with actual wage increases. As a result, an increasing proportion of
citizens in reality receive even lower benefits than what is suggested by
(the gradually lowered) replacement rates. Parallel to these trends,
private or other non-public insurances and solutions have become
considerably more common in areas such as sick-leave, health care,
and pensions (Grip 2001).
Also when it comes to certain public human services, changes have
occurred that may affect the extent to which welfare state experiences
contribute to self-interest. Not the least, the relative importance of
direct user fees has increased compared to general taxes. That is, a
greater financial burden has been placed on the citizens who
themselves experience various institutions.5 Moreover, following the
economic crisis in the early 1990s, most welfare state services have
been forced to deal with reductions in resources. The most important
examples include fewer employees per child in public child care and
                                                          
5 It should be pointed out that this trend has been combated by means of cost
ceilings in especially child care and elder care.
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schools, as well as significant staff reductions in public health care. As
a final example, a smaller proportion of elderly are benefiting from
elder care services now than before. Among those who do, resources
are increasingly concentrated on a smaller and especially needy group.
Services that were formerly provided by public employees (washing,
cleaning, shopping, chatting, taking a walk) are increasingly
considered non-public tasks. In these and other respects, there is an
increasing reliance on family members, voluntary efforts, and market
services.
None of these changes should be exaggerated. As Lindbom (2001)
shows, the development is best described in terms of gradual and
piece-meal changes on the fringe of a still mainly generous and
universal welfare state. Nevertheless, many small changes currently
point in the same direction: crucial welfare state institutions
increasingly seem to generate personal welfare state experiences that
do not contribute as much to personal, short-term, material, self-
interest, as comparable experiences once did. Moreover, given that
self-interest affects political orientations, and given that institutions
and policies continue to change in the same direction, support for state
intervention and identification with leftist politics may become
weakened, all other things being equal. Of course, which institutional
path that is actually chosen in this respect depends on both economic
conditions and, ultimately, on political decisions.
One world of welfare – different institutional paths
Chapters 3 and 10 contrasted two ways of thinking about how
differences across welfare state institutions, and across welfare states,
influence political orientations among mass publics. According to one
of these lines of thought – discussed at some length above – welfare
states exercise a political influence on their publics by building a
foundation of self-interest for themselves. The size and generosity of
the welfare state is the important institutional variable; the more
citizens that gain from such institutions, and the more they gain, the
greater support for state intervention and the political left.
In contrast, the welfare state design perspective on institutional
impact draws attention to the “institutional interfaces” that citizens
experience along the way to outcomes. The idea is that the structure of
the contact interface between citizen and institution may be as
important as the extent to which experiences ultimately satisfy self-
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interest. In support of this idea, Chapter 10 showed that the ability of
welfare state experiences to build support for state intervention and
for the political system varies with the level of empowerment built into
institutional designs. Using the developed terminology, client
institutions tend to undermine support, whereas customer institutions
tend to mobilise it. The irony inherent in these findings is worth
repeating: it is the most market-like and individualist public
institutions that excel at generating positive attitudes towards
collective entities like the welfare state and the political system.
These findings are interesting as it is customary to think about the
impact of welfare state institutions on mass preferences in terms of
differences across countries. Here, a particularly popular theoretical
tool has been various variants of the welfare regime framework
developed by Esping-Andersen (1990) and others. One assumption
found in this discourse is that a popular welfare state is one that
manages to include also the self-interested but politically ambivalent
middle classes, not just the worse off social segments. However, as
discussed in Chapter 3, recent comparative analyses have not been
entirely kind to the predictions of the regime framework. Overall
differences in welfare state support, or differences in welfare state-
related group conflict, cannot be entirely accounted for by classifying
countries into social democratic, liberal, and conservative worlds of
welfare (Papadakis & Bean 1993; Svallfors 1993, 1997; Papadakis
1993; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Lapinski et al. 1998).
Our findings underscore the notion that the regime approach is not
the only tool for thinking about attitudinal impact of welfare state
institutions. We have seen that there is much individual-level variation
within welfare states as to the design of personally experienced
institutions. A significant portion of institutional influence on opinion
seems to operate inside welfare regimes. Depending on whether
Swedes are customers, users, or clients in the social democratic world
of welfare, they appear to travel down different institutional and
attitudinal paths.
More than this, within-regime variation appears to be increasing in
several European welfare states. On the one hand, there is a trend
towards more means-testing. Faced with external challenges such as
globalised markets, as well as with internal challenges such as
demographic change, targeted social services have become increasingly
popular in many countries (Ferrara & Rhodes 2000). Based on trends
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such as these, Cox (1998:3) has even made the radical suggestion that,
“the postwar idea of the welfare state, based on the principle of
universal entitlement derived from citizenship, is giving way to a less
formal, more discursive notion of social entitlement.”
Sweden – usually seen as a universalist stronghold – is a good
example of this trend. The economic crisis of the 1990s caused a surge
in the use of means-tested services such as social assistance, housing
allowance, and early retirement (Svallfors 1996; SOU 2001:79).
Similarly, a firmer emphasis on active labour market policies and
individual-oriented rehabilitation schemes in order to combat
absenteeism and work-related illness (see Kuhnle 2000; Lindqvist
1998) means more citizens get in contact with street-level bureaucrats
making discretionary decisions. Of course, more means-testing and
selectivity hampers the level of citizen empowerment and, judging by
data presented here, general support for state intervention and
political trust among citizens that are in contact with such institutions.
But at the same time we see counter-balancing changes that increase
citizen empowerment. For instance, market-oriented reforms involving
competition between service providers and freedom of choice for
citizens have been introduced in countries such as Britain, Australia,
The Netherlands, and Sweden (Blomqvist & Rothstein 2000). Such
reforms have been especially popular in areas such as education and
health care. Typically, market-like competition and freedom of choice
are combined with public regulation and public financing through
“vouchers.” This trend in the direction of better exit-options in
important public service areas will probably increase the level of
citizen empowerment among those experiencing these institutions.
The growing within-regime institutional heterogeneity underscores
the point that institutional influence on opinion might operate inside
welfare regimes. Different citizens in the same world of welfare are
increasingly experiencing very different parts of the welfare state,
which should mean that they are also increasingly travelling down
different institutional and attitudinal paths. Our results indicate that if
within-regime institutional variation is conceptualised and measured,
we learn useful things about the impact of welfare state design on
opinion formation. The reported findings connect to one growing
empirical literature indicating that citizen empowerment is one fruitful
tool for thinking about within-regime institutional effects on political
preferences (Hoff 1993). It seems that empowering welfare state
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designs are more likely to generate experiences that in turn build
support for the welfare state and the existing political system.
CODA: Thinking about democratic change
The final mission is to think about ongoing democratic changes from
the perspective of our findings. This task is of a different nature than
the previous sections, as they addressed the more direct political,
democratic, and scientific implications of the study. This preceding
discussion was directly structured around the political science research
problems outlined in Chapter 1. In contrast, our final topic probably
bears a more non-obvious relation to the empirical results, and it has
so far largely been left out of the presentation. Nevertheless, because
the presented results do shed a certain amount of light on some very
important democratic lines of development, I think this book would
be incomplete without the following remarks.
Inspired by much contemporary democratic debate, our starting
point is that traditional party-based representative democracy appears
troubled. Underlying this judgement are a number of trends that are
explained in more detail below. These trends are typically seen as
products of a continuous modernisation process in advanced western
societies, involving raised living standard, educational and cognitive
mobilisation, increasing social and geographical mobility, as well as
labour market differentiation and individualisation.
The democratic consequences of modernisation are manifold. One
is decreasing attachment to the institutions and actors of traditional
party-based representative democracy. Party membership and activity
have been decreasing in most countries for several decades (Widfeldt
1995; Scarrow 2000; Petersson et al. 2000). Likewise, the proportion
of citizens who feel emotionally attached to a party – the level of party
identification – is on a long-term decrease (Schmitt & Holmberg 1995;
Dalton & Wattenberg 2000). In the 1990s, more negative news was
added to these long-standing downward trends: general distrust in
democratic institutions and politicians became more widespread, and
voter turnout decreased in many countries (Klingemann 1999; Dalton
1999; Dalton, McAllister & Wattenberg 2000).
However, while attachment to traditional political institutions and
actors is declining, modernisation is also gradually giving birth to a
new form of citizen, one who is more educated, knowledgeable, and
often more interested in societal issues than her predecessors. This
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citizen is anything but unable or unwilling to participate politically.
However, she is not necessarily keen on expressing preferences
through collectivist inventions such as parties and elections. The
worldwide emergence of “critical citizens” (Norris 1999) is a case in
point. As discussed in Chapter 4, critical citizens are deeply committed
to democratic values. But on the other hand they have less respect for
traditional authorities than previous generations. They are sceptical
about the collectivist hierarchical institutions of representative
democracy, as these do not sufficiently allow individual political
participation and influence (see also Inglehart 1990, 1999).
In fact, it has become customary to speak of a general
individualisation of political behaviour. Rather than engaging in
political parties, or perhaps even vote, the modern citizen uses her
improved skills and confidence for more individual forms of exercising
influence in specific issues; examples include contacting journalists and
public employees, consumer boycotts, signing petitions, and so on
(Petersson, Westholm & Blomberg 1989; Petersson et al. 1998). Also,
single-issue organisations appear to grow in popularity at the expense
of political parties (Goul Andersen & Hoff 2001). In a related vein,
researchers have uncovered a normalisation of protest activities that
were once thought of as unconventional (Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979;
Jennings & van Deth 1989). As Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg
(2000:61) explain, “Whereas elections were once seen as the focal
point of political activity, it is often argued that elections are being
displaced by unconventional forms of participation, such as petitions,
protests, and demonstrations [...] These new forms of participation
have emerged as a result of value change, the rise of new social
movements and new issue concerns, and increasing cognitive
mobilisation within the electorates of the advanced societies.”
In conclusion, it is not so much democracy itself that is facing
challenges. Rather, what is increasingly questioned is the ability of the
party-based representative system to integrate a more individualised
and more capable demos into the democratic process.
Democratic reforms
To a larger extent than usually appreciated, democratic systems are
currently reforming themselves to meet the challenges. Moreover,
while some distinct remedies are aimed at improving parties and
elections, many of the most popular democratic reforms are about
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further enhancing opportunities for direct, individualised, single-issue
participation in the political process. This development was clearly
reflected in the main conclusions of the Swedish Democracy
Commission (SOU 2000:1). Drawing on more than 40 research
volumes and reports, this parliamentary commission came down
strongly in favour of “a participatory democracy with deliberative
qualities” (p.23). It was stated that “our notion of democracy does not
refer to just any participation. It builds on the idea that each citizen
can be assured of influence, in other words participation with real
influence in sight [...] political participation is valuable because it
develops the personalities of the participants. Gradually, a public spirit
and a concern for the common good is developed” (p.35).6
Inspired by scholars such as Pateman (1970), Mansbridge (1980),
and Barber (1984), many concrete democratic reforms now under way
in Sweden and elsewhere embody the participatory ideal. We have
already noted welfare state-related institutional changes such as
resources for user influence, vouchers, and freedom-of-choice, which
are meant to empower citizens vis a vis public services. In January
2002 the Swedish government submitted its Democracy Proposition7
which suggested yet other reforms along participatory lines. For
instance, legislative changes were proposed so as to expand decision-
making rights in collective user boards in for instance public schools.
Individual voice opportunities are also to be improved, not least
through enhanced internet-based opportunities to communicate views
and opinions about personally experienced public services to
administrations. Moreover, it was proposed that citizens’
opportunities to initiate local referenda be further expanded, thus
reinforcing the growing use of direct democracy (Butler & Ranney
1994; Hadenius 2001). It was also suggested that municipalities
should be able to decide that individual citizens may initiate issues in
the local parliament. Finally, inspired by for instance Fishkin (1995), it
was envisioned that “deliberative polls” (medborgarpaneler) should be
increasingly offered as a form of political participation for those who
do not want to be active in traditional party politics, but are
nevertheless interested in local issues.
Reforms and trends such as these underscore that at the beginning
of the twenty-first century, participatory democracy is no longer a
                                                          
6 My translation from original Swedish.
7 Prop. 2001/02:80.
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remote philosophical fiction. On the contrary, there are very real
democratic reforms under way, many of which imply that people will
increasingly exercise political influence in an individualised fashion in
specific issues. At the same time, traditional and more collective
channels for exercising political influence are declining in popularity.
Democratic reforms, voice opportunities, and political trust
Party-based representative channels and individualised participatory
channels are not communicating vessels. Just because one increases in
popularity does not mean the other will decline in any automatic
fashion. In fact, proponents of participatory democracy argue that
those who engage in really concrete matters – by signing a petition, by
participating in a user board or in a deliberative poll, or by activism in
a single-issue organisation – will develop a concern and an
understanding also for other and potentially larger issues. Traditional
collectivist channels like party activism and voting may thus be
stimulated by individualistic participation trends. In Warren’s
(1992:8) formulation, “were individuals more broadly empowered,
especially in the institutions that have most impact on their everyday
lives [...] their experiences would have transformative effects: they
would become more public-spirited, more tolerant, more
knowledgeable, more attentive to the interests of others, and more
probing of their own interests. These transformations would improve
the workings of higher-level representative institutions.”
More empirical research is needed here. As previously emphasised,
we know too little about the actual extent of, and conditions for,
positive spill-over effects between individualist participation in specific
issues and areas, and collectivist representative democracy. Most
empirical studies so far conclude that effects on engagement and
knowledge are typically limited to the particular setting and issue in
which participation occurs (see Goul Andersen & Hoff 2001; Jarl
2001).
This study, however, has reported the presence of one such positive
spill-over effect. Chapter 9 reported that satisfaction with the way
democracy works and trust in politicians grows among those who
experience good voice opportunities in contacts with welfare state
institutions. And these effects appear to indicate something more than
just effects of opportunities to steer strictly personal outcomes in a
self-interested direction. Furthermore, Chapter 10 showed that
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empowering customer experiences tend to generate political trust,
whereas more powerless client experiences tend to undermine it.
These findings suggest that citizens generalise the democratic
lessons learned from personal experiences with the implementation
stage of the political process. If such experiences indicate that the
political system is interested in and responsive to citizens’ views, then
trust in the whole political system appears to be strengthened. In turn,
higher levels of general trust in the democratic system should also
increase the prospects for participation also in arenas such as parties
and elections.
Democratic reforms and the variable impact of self-interest
This sounds great. But the increasing popularity of individualised
modes of political participation and deliberation also has potentially
negative democratic implications, which could outweigh potential
positive spill-over effects.8 One such problem is highlighted by our
analyses of self-interest. We have found support for the hypothesis
that the relative importance of self-interest as an ingredient in personal
experience effects varies across political trust and ideology. Whereas
self-interest is the main ingredient of experience effects on left-right-
related orientations, social justice concerns are at least as important
(often more important) when it comes to political trust. Moreover, in
Chapter 7 it was discovered that self-interest effects are stronger for
                                                          
8 For example, research shows that resource-demanding modes of exercising
political influence such as encounters with public employees are less
compatible with the principle of political equality than not so resource-
demanding forms of participation such as voting. The former tends to be
afflicted with larger inequalities in participation and influence across
individuals with different economic and socio-political resources. Whereas
almost everyone can vote, not everybody has enough confidence and
competence to make their voices heard in individual welfare state contacts (see
Verba, Nie & Kim 1978; Lijphart 1997). Similarly, some have much greater
possibilities than others to initiate issues in the local parliament, or to
formulate persuasive arguments in a deliberative poll (Sanders 1997). Hence,
it is perhaps not surprising that while voice opportunities have positive effects
on political trust among those who experience them, participatory democratic
reforms are often among the least popular ones in the population at large
(Oscarsson 1999; Gilljam & Jodal 2002). A somewhat different problem here
is that the decisions of elected politicians in matters concerning, say, schools
may be in conflict with the preferences of empowered users. In that case,
improved opportunities for citizens to exercise voice in personal welfare state
experiences may undermine the steering capabilities of, and in the long run
citizens’ faith in, representative democracy (Jarl 2001).
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experiences with public transfer systems than for experiences of public
human services.
These results are consistent with a greater pattern that is beginning
to emerge in empirical research on self-interest and political
behaviour. Although generally speaking the impact of self-interest is
rarely enormous, it seems to increase when political choices are more
concrete, and when the personal stakes associated with different
alternatives are large and visible (Sears & Citrin 1982; Green 1988).
Other things equal, such choices seem to raise the likelihood that
citizens recognise, calculate, and choose on the basis of consequences
for personal, short-term, material interest.
From a normative point of view, it is not self-evident how to
evaluate self-interested attitudes.9 Then again, it has not been the
purpose of this study to solve such problems. However, if the reader
shares my hunch that self-interested attitudes – especially in the
narrow sense that we have conceptualised them here – do not always
equal the attitudes people would hold after greater information intake,
and after becoming aware of all the involved trade-offs, for instance
through an extensive open debate on equal terms – then the emerging
pattern causes concern. The problem is that many increasingly popular
individualised modes of participation present citizens with exactly the
kind of choices that are most likely to stimulate self-interest.
Participation channels such as single-issue organisations, user
influence, individually experienced voice opportunities, local
referenda, citizen initiatives in local councils, deliberative polls, and
                                                          
9 One approach that we have considered theoretically, but not pursued
empirically, is to treat it as an empirical question whether attitudes typically
become less self-interested as citizens engage more in participation and
deliberation. To the extent that this is often the case, self-interest poses a
threat to the democratic principle of popular rule based on informed and
thoroughly debated preferences. However, as pointed out by for instance
Warren (1992), the evaluation of self-interest also ultimately depends on one’s
normative view of the human nature, as well as on one’s normative view of
the purpose of democracy. According to a standard liberal-democratic view,
self-interest is not much of a democratic problem. Citizens are seen as
maximisers of exogenous and economic interests in a world of scarce
resources. From this vantage point, the purpose of democratic processes is to
aggregate, not transform, pre-political interests in ways that make political
decisions procedurally legitimate and practically feasible. By contrast, from the
vantage point of participatory and deliberative democrats, human interests are
not determined before the democratic process begins, and politics is not only
about allocation of scarce economic resources and fair aggregation of
exogenous interests. Instead, an important purpose of the democratic process
is to give people fair chances to discover what those interests might be through
more participation and deliberation.
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many others, very often facilitate participation in local and specific
matters where personal stakes are high and visible. Moreover, because
such choices do not necessarily involve simultaneous trade-offs
between many issues, they often make self-interest easier to notice and
calculate. We have empirical reasons to believe, then, that individualist
participation in specific issues has a potential for turning into egoism.
In stark contrast to the hope that participatory reforms can transform
otherwise self-interested citizens in the direction of “a public spirit and
a concern for the common good,” such reforms may instead stimulate
the potency of personal, material, short-term self-interest as a decisive
factor in the opinion formation process.
Now, it would be unfair to lump all participatory and deliberative
reforms together without pointing out important internal differences.
Some reforms are in all likelihood worse than others when it comes to
stimulating self-interest. Particularly voice in individual welfare state
experiences is an extreme example in that the influence provided
typically concerns extremely concrete issues, i.e. services that are
directly related to one welfare state institution in a limited
geographical area. And such voice opportunities rarely involve being
confronted with trade-offs, conflicting arguments and interests (except
perhaps for the interests and arguments of the encountered public
official).
This qualification is important as deliberative theorists typically
argue that the open-minded debate involved in settings such as
deliberative polls provides participants with the views and arguments
of other interests and areas. By weighing such information against self-
interested views and arguments, an enlightened attitudinal synthesis is
hoped to emerge. Another mechanism that disarms self-interest
supposedly kicks in when participating citizens are equipped with real
decision-making rights or at least a large influence on decisions, such
as user boards in public schools. When participation is no longer only
about expressing opinions and interests, but also about directly
affecting real decisions, a sense of responsibility to consider other
factors than self-interest is thought to develop. To these caveats one
may add that it is by no means self-evident that the issues raised by
individual citizens in local councils, or the issues debated in
deliberative polls, will always be concrete and local. When
deliberating, say, the future of health care, the convenors can to some
extent decide whether to frame the issue as one of ideological
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principles, or as one where it should be decided which hospital in the
region should be protected from cutbacks.
Nevertheless, when compared to the political choices offered by
traditional party-based democracy, most participatory and deliberative
reforms stick out in the same self-interested direction. Many scholars
have emphasised that a main function of political parties is to elevate
political choices to a more abstract and aggregated level. Because
parties formulate general political programs covering many areas, they
must make trade-offs between interests and issues. Parties take general
ideological positions that can be summarised in overarching concepts
such as left, right, pro-public sector, pro-market, pro-family, and so
on. When parties in this way bundle issues into a smaller set of
abstract alternatives it also becomes more difficult for citizens to
discover and calculate consequences of choosing an alternative for
personal, short-term, material self-interest. In other words, whereas it
is quite easy to say whether you would gain personally from increased
spending on child care in your part of the city, a similar calculus
becomes difficult when the choice is between more leftist or more
rightist policies in society.
These arguments square well with the empirical evidence. Self-
interest has previously proven to be a crucial explanation for very
concrete attitudes towards spending on very concrete services (Green
1988; Sannerstedt 1981; Nilsson 1997; Johansson, Nilsson &
Strömberg 2001). By contrast, Chapter 7 discovered that while welfare
state self-interest is probably somewhat more consequential for left-
right-related ideological orientations than most research has
concluded, it is nevertheless but one of many contributing variables.
Based on results such as these (see further Sears & Funk 1991), one
may venture that collectivist party-based democracy – by virtue of
presenting citizens with general ideological choices – is not as bad at
creating a public spirit as some theorists would have it. Likewise, the
increasingly popular individualist modes of exercising political
influence, by virtue of presenting citizens with concrete choices that
are free of tradeoffs, and where personal stakes are high and visible,
could very well be detrimental to such a spirit.
A more benevolent version of this criticism accepts the (typically
unsupported) participatory and deliberative contentions that open-
minded debate, direct influence, and decision-making responsibility,
do have a potential to disarm narrow self-interest. Still, this does not
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change the fact that most conceivable participatory and deliberative
reforms facilitate participation and deliberation in rather specific,
local, or otherwise limited matters. Therefore, whatever abilities of
such solutions to transform self-interest, the transformation starts out
from a worse initial position compared to a democracy where citizens
choose between overarching ideological alternatives in the first place.
The personal, the political, and the future
The clock cannot be turned back. Neither the citizens nor the
institutional and organisational landscapes of the twentieth century
will return in the foreseeable future. The real issue is how to design
democratic reforms that can combine individualised and issue-specific
modes of citizen deliberation and participation, with a concern for
more long-term and more collective interests. Here, I do not think it
will suffice just to reiterate the largely untested theoretical mantras of
deliberative and participatory theory, and then transform the
democratic process accordingly. Rather, our task as constructive
political scientists must now be to develop and test empirically-
oriented theories that specify the individual, contextual, and
institutional circumstances under which positive democratic effects of
increased participation and deliberation outweigh the negative ones.
Expressed differently, we need to answer the question of how to
improve opportunities for individualist modes of political
participation, at the same as we are faithful to the principle of popular
rule based on informed preferences. If we suspect that specific self-
interested preferences do not always equal the preferences that people
would hold when presented with more abstract and “bundled” choices
with simultaneous trade-offs, then many ongoing democratic changes
are cause for concern.
If we do not take these issues seriously, maybe we are heading for a
democratic order where citizens increasingly think about politics in
terms of specific close-to-home issues, and to a greater extent than
before base their preferences on narrow self-interest. Conversely,
especially if party identification, trust in representative democracy,
and voter turnout continue to decline, citizens might become less
prone to think about politics in terms of long-term, coherent, and
viable ideological courses of action.
If we are not careful, the political might become more personal than
we ever wanted it to be.
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